Muhammad Usman Khurram
Dr. Muhammad Usman Khurram did his Ph.D in Finance from "Zhejiang University, China" (42th QS ranking 2023). He has strong background of financial markets, empirical asset pricing, financial economics, green finance, corporate finance and published approx 13 papers in peer reviewed journals and 14 papers are under-review in different SSCI journals. Further, also served as Lecturer/tutor for more than 6 years to teach several business, finance, accounting related courses to MBA, M.Com and BBA classes. Further, also participated in Multi-Authors Book, “Financial Management Practices in Pakistan, 2016”. He has a number of publications ranging from SSCI, ABDC, ABS, ESCI, and SCOPUS. He is serving as a reviewer/referee of many prestigious international SSCI journals including Emerging Markets Review; Applied Economics; Financial Innovation; International Review of Financial Analysis; International Review of Economics & Finance; The Investment Analysts Journal; Annals of Operations Research; The Singapore Economic Review and many others.
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Papers by Muhammad Usman Khurram
Objectives and methods: We examine the relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020. Firstly, the effect of management equity incentives on tax avoidance is theoretically and normatively analyzed. Secondly, examine the effectiveness of moderating the effect of internal control and distinguishing the ownership of enterprises’ nature through regression analysis.
Results: (1) There is a positive relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance which means, more the stock incentive offered to executives, the more likely corporations are to pursue tax avoidance strategies aggressively. (2) Internal control deficiencies enhance the positive relationship between equity incentives and enterprise tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, in Chinese enterprises, the lack of an internal control system and the failure of internal control measures are prevalent, and such loopholes can intensify the tax avoidance behavior that arises when executives are subject to equity incentives. (3) The influence of management equity incentives on enterprise tax avoidance behavior is greater in state-owned (SOE) than private enterprises. State-owned enterprises are more likely to increase enterprise tax avoidance behavior when management is subject to equity incentives for reasons such as strict performance requirements, lower regulatory oversight, and less interference from negative information. Finally, our findings have significant implications for policymakers/regulators, public companies, investors, standard setters, managerial labor markets, and the welfare of the overall economy.
Objectives and methods: We examine the relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance from both theoretical and empirical perspectives by using data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2016 to 2020. Firstly, the effect of management equity incentives on tax avoidance is theoretically and normatively analyzed. Secondly, examine the effectiveness of moderating the effect of internal control and distinguishing the ownership of enterprises’ nature through regression analysis.
Results: (1) There is a positive relationship between management equity incentives and corporate tax avoidance which means, more the stock incentive offered to executives, the more likely corporations are to pursue tax avoidance strategies aggressively. (2) Internal control deficiencies enhance the positive relationship between equity incentives and enterprise tax avoidance behavior. Therefore, in Chinese enterprises, the lack of an internal control system and the failure of internal control measures are prevalent, and such loopholes can intensify the tax avoidance behavior that arises when executives are subject to equity incentives. (3) The influence of management equity incentives on enterprise tax avoidance behavior is greater in state-owned (SOE) than private enterprises. State-owned enterprises are more likely to increase enterprise tax avoidance behavior when management is subject to equity incentives for reasons such as strict performance requirements, lower regulatory oversight, and less interference from negative information. Finally, our findings have significant implications for policymakers/regulators, public companies, investors, standard setters, managerial labor markets, and the welfare of the overall economy.