Dept. of Politics

Simplified narratives dominate the reports on conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, portraying an image of misery, bloodshed, warlords and ethnic violence. In general, the narratives focus on the symptoms, while the underlying causes of the conflict are omitted or oversimplified. Simplified narratives may be very effective in drawing attention and raising funds. A critical assessment is however required when simplified narratives become influential in shaping views on conflict resolution and in orienting strategies for intervention. In this paper, we critically assess both the rationale and danger of simplified narratives, taking as a case the "Kony 2012" campaign, which reduced the complex conflict in Uganda to a caricature.

How did this young country that attained her independence in 2011 amidst massive international fanfare degenerate into chaos so quickly? To understand the genesis of the conflict in South Sudan one must consider the context in which it takes place. The crisis in South Sudan can be seen within several conflicting realms: politics played by the ruling elites, disagreements within the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), ethnic tensions, and, finally, the fallout between Salva Kiir, the President of South Sudan and his former Vice President, Dr. Riak Machar. The event of December 15 (which set off the crisis) caries an ethnic dimension, but it is first and foremost a political crisis within the ruling political party and the army. Any attempt to broker a peaceful settlement requires that all the dimensions of the conflict and the inherent issues fueling violence be properly diagnosed, and all the key stakeholders be included in the process.

Facing pressure from donors, many African countries conduct regular national elections, but most are neither democratic nor democratizing. Uganda’s 2016 general elections show how the marriage of authoritarianism with contested elections has become the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ugandan elections failed to display any semblance of democracy, with the military, the police and the electoral management body openly working in favour of President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). In particular, Uganda’s 2016 election is infamous for the way in which the regime manipulated the electoral process through gerrymandering constituencies, placing stringent restrictions on media content and consumption, the corrupt patronage network and the failure by the donor community to influence the process. What is perhaps more alarming is how state agencies worked hard to avoid a transparent electoral process to the extent that observers saw the entire exercise as “faking democracy” at its best. It is therefore no surprise that, while the country adopted multipartyism in 2005 largely due to donor pressure) and has since spent millions of dollars conducting periodic elections, the only obvious impact it has produced is the consolidation of Museveni’s authoritarian regime.

In this article we examine the 2016 Ugandan presidential election and
the environment in which it was held. We argue that Uganda, which was once seen as a promising model of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, has instead drifted dangerously towards autocratic rule. Our analysis is fundamentally based on seven factors that, taken together, demonstrate how Uganda’s elections have failed to produce democracy. They have instead become a tool for President Museveni to legitimate his rule. These factors include: the massive crackdown on the regime’s political opponents; the increasing personalization of power by the incumbent; the shrinking space for civil society; the persistent militarization of politics; the failure to initiate genuine electoral reforms; the regime’s enduring control of the election machinery; and the recent amendment of the constitution to lift the age limit for the presidency, thereby setting the stage for President Yoweri Museveni to rule for life. We begin by placing our arguments within a theoretical context.

Facing pressure from donors, many African countries conduct regular national elections, but most are neither democratic nor democratising. Uganda’s 2016 general elections show how the marriage of authoritarianism with con- tested elections has become the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. The Ugandan elections failed to display any semblance of democracy, with the military, the police and the electoral management body openly working in favour of President Yoweri Museveni and his ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). In particular, Uganda’s 2016 election is infamous for the way in which the regime manipulated the electoral process through gerrymandering constituencies, placing stringent restrictions on media content and consumption, the corrupt patronage network and the failure by the donor community to influence the process. What is perhaps more alarming is how state agencies worked hard to avoid a transparent electoral process to the extent that observers saw the entire exercise as “faking democracy” at its best. It is therefore no surprise that, while the country adopted multipartyism in 2005, (largely due to donor pressure) and has since spent millions of dollars conducting periodic elections, the only obvious impact it has produced is the consolidation of Museveni’s authoritarian regime.

In this article, we examine the 2016 Ugandan presidential election and the environment in which it was held. We argue that Uganda, which was once seen as a promising model of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, has instead drifted dangerously towards autocratic rule. Our analysis is fundamentally based on seven factors that, taken together, demonstrate how Uganda’s elections have failed to produce democracy. They have instead become a tool for President Museveni to legitimate his rule. These factors include: the massive crackdown on the regime’s political opponents; the increasing personalisation of power by the incumbent; the shrinking space for civil society; the persistent militarisation of politics; the failure to initiate genuine electoral reforms; the regime’s enduring control of the election machinery; and the recent amendment of the constitution to lift the age limit for the presidency, thereby setting the stage for President Yoweri Museveni to rule for life. we begin by placing our arguments within a theoretical context.