Books by Alice MacLachlan
What are the moral obligations of participants and bystanders during—and in the wake of –a confli... more What are the moral obligations of participants and bystanders during—and in the wake of –a conflict? How have theoretical understandings of justice, peace and responsibility changed in the face of contemporary realities of war? Drawing on the work of leading scholars in the fields of philosophy, political theory, international law, religious studies and peace studies, the collection significantly advances current literature on war, justice and post-conflict reconciliation. Contributors address some of the most pressing issues of international and civil conflict, including the tension between attributing individual and collective responsibility for the wrongs of war, the trade-offs made between the search for truth and demands for justice, and the conceptual intricacies of coming to understand just what is meant by ‘peace’ and ‘conflict.’ Individual essays also address concrete topics including the international criminal court, reparations, truces, political apologies, truth commissions and criminal trials, with an eye to contemporary examples from conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and North and South America.
Papers by Alice MacLachlan
Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal, 2021
Investigating ALIAS, 2007
How ought we to evaluate and respond to expressions of anger and resentment? Can philosophical an... more How ought we to evaluate and respond to expressions of anger and resentment? Can philosophical analysis of resentment as the emotional expression of a moral claim help us to distinguish which resentments ought to be taken seriously? Philosophical work on responsibility and wrongdoing has shifted from a singular focus on determinations of culpability, retribution and compensation to include the social meanings, identities and relationships that emerge in the aftermath of harm, and how these relationships and identities might need some kind of repair and recognition. With this new focus comes renewed interest in the affective dimensions of wrongful harm, and their implications for our social and political relationships. In other words, we are learning not just to take wrongs seriously, but to take claims of wrong seriously: who makes them, to whom they are addressed, and how they are made; their performance and ritual, their context, and their affective emotional inflection; and the i...
Justice, Responsibility, and Reconciliation in the Wake of Conflict, 2011
In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between the twin dangers of piety ... more In this paper, I explore how theorists might navigate a course between the twin dangers of piety and excess cynicism when thinking critically about state apologies, by focusing on two government apologies to indigenous peoples: name- ly, those made by the Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers in 2008. Both apologies are notable for several reasons: they were both issued by heads of gov- ernment, and spoken on record within the space of government: the national par- liaments of both countries. Furthermore, in each case, the object of the apology - that which was apologized for - comes closer to disrupting the idea both countries have of themselves, and their image in the global political community, than any previous apologies made by either government. Perhaps as a result, both apologies were surrounded by celebration and controversy alike, and tracing their conse- quences - even in the short term - is a difficult business. We avoid excessive piety or cynicism, I argue, when we tak...
Journal of Applied Philosophy, 2016
The practice of official apology has a fairly poor reputation. Dismissed as ‘crocodile tears’ or ... more The practice of official apology has a fairly poor reputation. Dismissed as ‘crocodile tears’ or cheap grace, such apologies are often seen by the public as an easy alternative to more punitive or expensive ways of taking real responsibility. I focus on what I call the role‐playing criticism: the argument that someone who offers an apology in public cannot be appropriately apologetic precisely because they are only playing a role. I offer a qualified defence of official apologies against this objection, considering them through the lens of fiduciary duties. This focus draws our attention to formal or impersonal relationships that are nevertheless normatively rich, capable of sustaining trust, concern, and care. At the same time, I highlight several pitfalls for fiduciary apologisers, including the tension between apology as a mode of truth telling and the duty of confidentiality. I consider whether the fiduciary apologiser, in reflecting on her fiduciary obligations, has ‘one thought too many’ for genuine apology, and argue that the issue of mixed motives is not limited to fiduciary contexts, cautioning against excessive idealism in our conception of apology. I conclude with some reflections on possible conflicts between fiduciary obligations and the conscientious desire to apologise.
The categorical denial of third-party forgiveness represents an overly individualistic approach t... more The categorical denial of third-party forgiveness represents an overly individualistic approach to moral repair. Such an approach fails to acknowledge the important roles played by witnesses, bystanders, beneficiaries, and others who stand in solidarity to the primary victim and perpetrator. In this paper, I argue that the prerogative to forgive or withhold forgiveness is not universal, but neither is it restricted to victims alone. Not only can we make moral sense of some third-party acts and utterances of the form, "I can or cannot forgive…" but also, we ought to recognize them as legitimate instances of third party forgiveness. Concern for the primary victim's autonomy tends to exaggerate a need for moral deference, while ignoring how others are called upon to support and mediate for victims of violence and oppression. I advocate a cautious extension of the victim's prerogative to forgive, one that grounds forgiveness in a double relation of sympathetic identification and attentive care. Following Jean Harvey's recent work, I call this relationship moral solidarity. Furthermore, I argue, there are important moral and political reasons to acknowledge third party forgiveness; these reasons are particularly evident in contexts of oppression. In fact, third party refusals to forgive may have particular moral significance. In situations of abuse, oppression and damaged self-respect, third party refusals may protect the agency of victims who too easily forgive.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2012
At one point in Sympathizing with the Enemy: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, Negotiation (h... more At one point in Sympathizing with the Enemy: Reconciliation, Transitional Justice, Negotiation (hereafter SWTE) the author, Nir Eisikovits, remarks: "to some extent, this book is about the benefits of 'seeing' for peacemaking" (85). 2 The self-description is apt, but, given Eisikovits' insistence on the moral importance of conscious choice, a more befitting depiction might be: this book is about the tremendous moral and political benefits of "choosing to look". SWTE makes the case for such benefits remarkably well, but what emerges from its pages most strikingly is that the author practices what he preaches. In expounding his account, Eisikovits moves effortlessly through an encyclopedia of examples, ranging from historical accounts of conflict (from the Peloponnesian War between ancient Athens and Sparta to World War II, the Cold War, and its aftermath) to contemporary global politics (both Iraq Wars and the War on Terror, as well as Middle East politics, and race relations in postapartheid South Africa and the USA); he also draws on fictional narratives and on his first hand experiences as an Israeli citizen. Eisikovits himself has chosen to look-and to look long, hard, carefully, and well-at the intricate and
What is appreciation?" is a basic question in the philosophy of art, and the analogy between appr... more What is appreciation?" is a basic question in the philosophy of art, and the analogy between appreciating a work of art and getting a joke can help us answer it. We first propose a subjective account of aesthetic appreciation (I). Then we consider jokes (II). The difference between getting a joke and not, or what it is to get it right, can often be objectively articulated. Such explanations cannot substitute for the joke itself, and indeed may undermine the very power of the joke to evoke an appropriate response. Sometimes the discourse of art critics can have a similar effect. We therefore explore the analogy between getting jokes and appreciating works of art (III), and find it unexpectedly strong. Finally (IV), we consider Wittgensteinian grounds for thinking as we do, considering the language game of joke-telling, the relevance of seeing aspects, and giving reasons. "The question, 'what is the nature of a joke?' is like the question, 'what is the nature of a lyric poem?'" [1] Philosophers have a reputation for wit, but not all of us indulge. A. C. Ewing, for instance, was much given to seriousness. He has been described as "a drab little man". At Cambridge, one student recalls, "he would talk for a bit, and then say 'I will now dictate'. …He always had a worked-out answer to everything." [2] Ewing "was deeply religious and serious. A. J. Ayer [who was of course a wit] ribbed him about his belief in the afterlife, demanding to know what he most looked forward to in the next world. Ewing replied immediately, 'God will tell me whether there are synthetic a priori propositions.'" That is not a joke. It is just a story. This is not changed by the fact that we might even see Ayer as the straight man in the story,
'raw material' of the emotion itself is presented. ln just over fifiy pages, not only Smith's att... more 'raw material' of the emotion itself is presented. ln just over fifiy pages, not only Smith's attitude towards the passion of resentrnent, but also his very conception of the term, appea$ to shift dramatically. What is an unpleasant, nsocial and relatively amoral passion of anger in general metamorphos€s into a morally and psychologically rich account of a cognjtively sharpened, Ti€ Philosophy ol Adan Snirh, The Adam Smirb R.viw. 5: l6l-t ?? @ 2010 The I.tematonal Adah smith sci.l, tssN '?41-5285, lsBN 9?8{_41t56256{.
On the Uses and Abuses of Political Apologies, 2014
As official apologies by political, corporate, and religious leaders becoming increasingly common... more As official apologies by political, corporate, and religious leaders becoming increasingly commonplace – offered in response to everything from personal wrongdoing to historical oppression and genocide – providing a plausible account of what such apologies can and cannot accomplish is of paramount importance. Yet reigning theories of apology typically conceive of them primarily as moral and not political phenomena, often modeling official apologies after interpersonal ones. This risks distorting the meaning and function of political apologies, while holding them to an impossible standard. In this paper, I argue that we require a normative theory of official apologies as political practice, and that crucial resources for this theory can be found in Hannah Arendt’s account of meaningful speech and action. In the Human Condition, Arendt privileges what she calls political speech and action as the highest category of human activity, which she identifies according to the following features: i) it can only take place with others; ii) it forces the agent to risk something by disclosing him or herself; iii) it creates a meaningful narrative; and, iv) it engenders some new relationship among those involved. These features, taken together, are a very good description of a successful apology. Furthermore, Arendt’s account of political speech depends upon her account of political forgiveness and political promising, two practices closely linked to the emerging practice of official state apology. In particular, I argue, theorizing apologies as Arendtian speech draws our attention to hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features of apologies and their functions, such the role they play – both powerful and problematic – in establishing authoritative narratives.
This presentation is part of the Vision of the Dolls: Theorizing technology, identity and agency ... more This presentation is part of the Vision of the Dolls: Theorizing technology, identity and agency in Joss Whedon’s Dollhouse track. The conceit of Dollhouse revolves around desire and the agency of the desired. “We give people what they want” promises the corporate representative, reassuring a client that he won’t just be granted a woman who pretends to love him: his imprinted doll will be fully, authentically, and “chemically” besotted. What is on offer is not merely a body or a complex role-play. The Dollhouse offers the promise of perfectly reciprocal desire. In reaching to explain what is disturbing about Dollhouse, the comparison to the sex industry is tempting. Dolls are constructed agents of pleasure. They are young, beautiful and – it appears – most often hired for sexually themed engagements. But, dolls are not only bodies for hire; they are persons for hire. Feminists who seek to abolish sex work lament that sex workers are demeaned because they are objectified, that is, th...
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2012
Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics, 2012
Public Forgiveness in Post-Conflict Contexts, 2012
The question of forgiveness in politics has attained a certain cachet. Indeed, in the fifty years... more The question of forgiveness in politics has attained a certain cachet. Indeed, in the fifty years since Arendt commented on the notable absence of forgiveness in the political tradition, a vast and multidisciplinary literature on the politics of apology, reparation, and reconciliation has emerged. To a novice scouring the relevant literatures, it might appear that the only discordant note in this new veritable symphony of writings on political forgiveness has been sounded by philosophers. There is a more-than-healthy cynicism directed at what many philosophers see as an uncritical promotion of forgiveness, which – they fear – risks distorting and cheapening forgiveness as a moral ideal, on the one hand, and ignoring the moral and political values of justice, accountability and the cessation of harmful relationships, on the other. Are philosophical fears about the dangers of thinking about forgiveness in political terms warranted – or do they perhaps depend in part on conceptual conservatism regarding what exactly political forgiveness might be? I argue that most, if not all, standard objections to political forgiveness emerge from theoretical reliance on a picture of forgiveness I will call the Emotional Model. Once we make conceptual space for descriptions of forgiveness in performative and social terms, the concept is more easily adapted to a political account without at least some of the risks feared by philosophers.
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Books by Alice MacLachlan
Papers by Alice MacLachlan