Papers by Christopher Belshaw
Kripke's opponents claim chat gold, in all possible worlds, is a yellow metal. They believe t... more Kripke's opponents claim chat gold, in all possible worlds, is a yellow metal. They believe that the atomic number can vary from world to world. Kripke inverts this, holding chat while gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79, its surface properties may vary widely from world to world. Both views are flawed, but of the two, the rival is to be preferred. There is a better view. Gold is, in all possible worlds, the element with atomic number 79. And (given certain specifiable conditions) it is, in all possible worlds, a yellow metal. Only insofar as they give rise to familiar and important surface properties is there reason to maintain chat structural properties are at the essence or nature of things
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, 2012
This chapter examines the connection between value and desire with regard to death. It argues tha... more This chapter examines the connection between value and desire with regard to death. It argues that having categorical desires is a necessary condition for death to be bad for those who die, and that the degree to which death is bad bears a close relation to the number and strength of those desires. The chapter also analyzes the principles espoused by Jeff McMahan in his book “The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life.”.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2010
... Imagen de portada del libro Filosofía del medio ambiente. Información General. Autores:Christ... more ... Imagen de portada del libro Filosofía del medio ambiente. Información General. Autores:Christopher Belshaw; Amalia Vijande Martínez ( trad. ... y aboga por un enfoque conciliador antes que por la confrontación. Fundación Dialnet. Acceso de usuarios registrados. ...
South African Journal of Philosophy, 2012
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The Journal of Ethics, 2015
Immortality—living forever and avoiding death—seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has be... more Immortality—living forever and avoiding death—seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has been argued (notably by Williams, recently by Scheffler) that an immortal life would fairly soon become boring, trivial, and meaningless, and is not at all the sort of thing that any of us should want. Yet boredom and triviality presuppose our having powerful memories and imaginations, and an inability either to shake off the past or to free ourselves of weighty visions of the future. Suppose, though, that our capacities here are limited, so that our temporal reach is fairly significantly constrained. Then, I argue, these alleged problems with immortality will recede. Moreover, similar limitations might help us in the actual world, where life is short. If we cannot see clearly to its end points, both ahead and behind, life will seem longer.
The ever-present possibility of death forces upon us the question of life’s meaning and for this ... more The ever-present possibility of death forces upon us the question of life’s meaning and for this reason death has been a central concern of philosophers throughout history. From Socrates to Heidegger, philosophers have grappled with the nature and significance of death. In Annihilation, Christopher Belshaw explores two central questions at the heart of philosophy’s engagement with death: what is death; and is it bad that we die? Belshaw begins by distinguishing between literal and metaphorical uses of the term and offers a unified and biological account of death, denying that death brings about non-existence. How our death relates to the death of the brain is explored in detail. Belshaw considers the common-sense view that death is often bad for us by examining the circumstances that might make it bad as well as the grounds for thinking that one death can be worse than another. In addition, Belshaw explores whether we can be harmed after we die and before we were born. The final chapters explore whether we should prevent more deaths and whether, via cryonics, brain transplants, data storage, we might cheat death. Throughout Belshaw shows how questions of personhood and life’s value are bound up with our views on the sense and significance of death. Annihilation’s in-depth analysis and insightful exposition will be welcomed not only by philosophers working on the metaphysics of death but also by students and scholars alike looking for a foundation for discussions of the ethics of abortion, euthanasia, life-support and suicide.
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2011
A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is ... more A number of claims are closely connected with, though logically distinct from, animalism. One is that organisms cease to exist when they die. Two others concern the relation of the brain, or the brainstem, to animal life. One of these holds that the brainstem is necessary for life-more precisely, that (say) my cat's brainstem is necessary for my cat's life to continue. The other is that it is sufficient for life-more precisely, that so long as (say) my cat's brainstem continues to function, so too does my cat. I argue against these claims. Are we animals? Many say yes. But these people are not therefore animalists. For animalists hold that we are essentially animals. 1 My psychology could travel elsewhere, and find itself in a new body. But I wouldn't have travelled, on the animalist view. And my psychology could be obliterated, as in PVS. 2 But if the animal that I am survives, then I survive. I am unpersuaded. Yet apart from just a couple of comments, I won't directly discuss any of this here. My present concern is only with certain further theses: first, that animals cease to exist when they die, second, that the brainstem is necessary for the animal's survival, and third, that the brainstem is sufficient for its survival. These further theses are distinct from one another and neither imply, nor are implied by animalism's core. So someone might accept, say, the claim about death, but not those about the brainstem. And someone might reject them all and still count himself an animalist. Even so, there are links here. Perhaps the best-known defender of animalism is also a prominent supporter of these further views. And, in what follows, I will focus on several of Eric Olson's contentions and claims. Moreover, animalism proper and these further theses all overlap, both in Olson's arguments and elsewhere, more than might be expected. 3 A general issue here is a concern with precision. Animalism, against some rival accounts, offers a clear and well-defined answer to the question of what we are. The view that an animal's existence ends with death is in part motivated by the thought that an animal, in stark contrast to its remains, is a thing sharply drawn. And appeal to the brainstem connects here, promising crisp accounts both of animal survival and of animal identity. So anyone inclining to one of these views may well be drawn to others. 1 This is the neatest way quickly to characterize animalism, even though there is disagreement about its accuracy. Nichols [2009] puts it thus; Johannson [2007: 196] avoids commitment here, while Olson [2003: 321] expresses reservations about the essentialist claim. 2 A persistent or, as some prefer, a permanent vegetative state. The differences can be ignored here.
The Philosophical Quarterly, 2014
Classical affine Lie algebras appear e.g. as symmetries of infinite dimensional integrable system... more Classical affine Lie algebras appear e.g. as symmetries of infinite dimensional integrable systems and are related to certain differential equations. They are central extensions of current algebras associated to finite-dimensional Lie algebras g. In geometric terms these current algebras might be described as Lie algebra valued meromorphic functions on the Riemann sphere with two possible poles. They carry a natural grading. In this talk the generalization to higher genus compact Riemann surfaces and more poles is reviewed. In case that the Lie algebra g is reductive (e.g. g is simple, semi-simple, abelian, ...) a complete classification of (almost-) graded central extensions is given. In particular, for g simple there exists a unique non-trivial (almost-)graded extension class. The considered algebras are related to difference equations, special functions and play a role in Conformal Field Theory.
European Journal of Philosophy, 2012
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Suppose we accept that punishment can be legitimate. What form should it take? Many of us believe... more Suppose we accept that punishment can be legitimate. What form should it take? Many of us believe that it can be acceptable to fine or imprison someone, but that capital punishment, along with corporal punishment in its various manifestations, is wholly unacceptable. I suggest that it is hard to account for or justify this distinction. But granting that resistance to these latter forms is unlikely to be dislodged, and granting too that imprisonment in particular is hardly problem-free, it is worth considering whether there might be alternatives. And I argue here that we should consider enforced coma as a procedure having many advantages over the more familiar methods of delivering a penalty. Of course, there are disadvantages also. The aim isn’t to offer a detailed and practical solution to the problem of crime, but to explore some of the presumptions and principles involved in our thinking about punishment.
Bioethics, 1997
In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Subs... more In Life's Dominion Dworkin argues that the debate about abortion is habitually misconstrued. Substantial areas of agreement are overlooked, while areas of disagreement are, mistakenly, seen as central. If we uncover a truer picture, then hope of a certain accord may no longer seem vain. I dispute many of these claims. Dworkin argues that both sides in the debate are united in believing that life is sacred, or intrinsically valuable. I disagree. I maintain that only in a very attenuated sense of intrinsic value will this be agreed upon. I consider how an account of such value might be further fleshed out, but suggest, if this is done on any plausible lines, agreement will fall away. Dworkin argues, also, that the issue of personhood, does not, contrary to widespread belief, keep the parties apart. Again I disagree. We need to distinguish the question of whether there is in fact dispute over this issue from that of whether there is, in truth, good reason for dispute. And I argue that, rightly or wrongly, the issue of personhood remains central. Dworkin suggests that the purported proximity between the two sides offers some hope of an eventual reconciliation. At least, they will agree to differ, accepting that in this area freedom of choice is paramount. I am sceptical. Even this measure of reconciliation depends upon conservatives giving up positions which, I argue, they will continue to maintain. There is a further point. Dworkin appears to be, in many ways, cautiously optimistic. I appear, in contrast, to be pessimistic. I argue, however, that only so long as we do disagree over matters of substance is there much hope that our differences might be resolved. No one can fail to be impressed by the resilience of the abortion debate. For as long as many of us can remember, this single issue has divided conservative and liberal thinkers in, at the very least, most of
Choice Reviews Online
... National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data Belshaw, Christopher, 1952-Environ... more ... National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication Data Belshaw, Christopher, 1952-Environmental philosophy Includes bibliographical references and ... Finally to John Shand, Steven Gerrard at Acumen and Kate Williams, for patience, encouragement and always intelli ...
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2003
Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this ar... more Although many people believe that more people would be better, arguments intended to show this are unconvincing. I consider one of Parfit's arguments for a related conclusion, that even when both are worth living, we ought to prefer the better of two lives. Were this argument successful, or so I claim, then it would follow that more people would be better. But there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives. Nor is an attempted rejoinder effective. We can agree that there aren't reasons for preferring the better of two lives, and yet still maintain there are reasons for improving lives.
The Moral Complexities of Eating Meat, 2015
We wish to die later. But we don't wish to have been born earlier. Our future non-existence matte... more We wish to die later. But we don't wish to have been born earlier. Our future non-existence matters to us in a way that past non-existence does not. How is this asymmetrical attitude to be explained? Nagel (1979) has suggested that Parfit's discussion of a corresponding asymmetry regarding pain throws light upon this problem. And Parfit himself (1984) has made a handful of remarks which explicitly draw the connection between our attitudes to death, on the one hand, and to pain on the other. More recently, Anthony Brueckner and John Fischer (1986, 1993a, forthcoming) have extended Parfit's point, claiming that our similarly asymmetrical attitude towards pleasure even better illuminates our attitude to death. Frances Kamm (1988, 1993) has, in various works, shown herself sympathetic to this approach. Thus have several philosophers expressed similar views, holding both that our asymmetrical attitude to non-existence is deeply problematic, and that reflection on our attitude to pain can throw useful light upon it. I find much at fault in these accounts. Neither the claims about pleasures and pains, nor the purported connections between these claims on the one hand, and our attitude to death on the other are, I shall argue, well made. Moreover, the purported explanation gets things the wrong way round. For our asymmetrical attitude regarding pleasures and pains is, I shall maintain, complex and untidy, while that concerning non-existence is more straightforward, and relatively easy to explain. Reflection on the former cannot do much to help us understand the latter. Certain assumptions are made throughout. These are shared with most of the writers whose views I want to discuss, but still it is worth mentioning them now. I assume that death brings nothingness, and that no kind of afterlife is available to us. I assume that death is bad in many cases. More explicitly, I assume it is bad when
The Sense and Significance of Death, 2009
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Papers by Christopher Belshaw