Why Is Criticism of Islam Called Racist but Criticism of Judaism Is Not?
One of the more striking asymmetries in contemporary political discourse is this: criticism of Islam is frequently labelled racist, while criticism of Judaism is commonly treated as legitimate religious or political critique. This is not a marginal claim but a settled assumption within much radical-left commentary, particularly in academic and activist circles.
How is this asymmetry explained—and does it withstand philosophical scrutiny?
The Radical-Left Explanation
The dominant explanation rests on a power-based redefinition of racism. Racism, on this view, is not simply hostility toward a group but prejudice combined with systemic power. Groups regarded as marginalised can be victims of racism; groups perceived as powerful cannot be, at least not in the full moral sense.
Within Western societies, Muslims are framed as a racialised minority—subject to discrimination in policing, immigration policy, media representation, and employment. Islam therefore becomes inseparable from Muslim identity. Criticism of Islamic beliefs is interpreted as an attack on Muslims as people, and hence as racism.
Judaism, by contrast, is treated very differently. Jews are often framed—especially in light of Israel’s existence—as comparatively powerful or protected. Criticism of Judaism (or more commonly Zionism) is therefore presented as “punching up”: ideological opposition rather than racial hostility.
This framework is reinforced by historical narratives. Antisemitism is acknowledged as a catastrophic historical phenomenon—Nazism, pogroms, the Holocaust—but is often treated as largely past. Islamophobia, meanwhile, is framed as a present and ongoing system of oppression, tied to colonialism and the “War on Terror”. Criticism of Islam is thus said to reinforce current harms, while criticism of Judaism is regarded as abstract or academic unless it crosses extreme lines.
Israel plays a pivotal role in this moral calculus. Judaism is frequently conflated with a modern nation-state viewed as colonial or oppressive. This allows critics to claim that attacks on Judaism or Zionism are acts of resistance rather than prejudice.
Finally, intent is inferred asymmetrically. Criticism of Islam is presumed to arise from bigotry; criticism of Judaism is presumed to arise from moral concern. The same language or argument is therefore judged very differently depending on its target.
That, in outline, is how the radical-left position explains itself.
The Philosophical Problems
Despite its confidence, this framework suffers from deep conceptual flaws.
1. A Category Error: Race vs Belief
The foundational mistake is a confusion of categories. Race and ethnicity are not belief systems. Religions are.
Islam and Judaism consist of doctrines, laws, and metaphysical claims. They are truth-apt and therefore criticisable. To treat criticism of a religion as an attack on people collapses the distinction between holding a belief and being that belief.
Unless one is prepared to say that people are identical with their beliefs—a position that would make rational disagreement impossible—this collapse cannot be defended.
2. Asymmetrical Essentialism
Radical-left discourse essentialises Muslims while de-essentialising Jews.
Muslims are treated as defined by Islam; Judaism is treated as detachable from Jewish identity. But this asymmetry is ad hoc. Either beliefs define identity, or they do not. One cannot coherently insist on inseparability in one case and deny it in another without abandoning consistency.
3. Power-Based Racism Abandons Moral Universals
Redefining racism as “prejudice plus power” replaces moral judgement with sociological bookkeeping. On this view, the moral status of a statement depends not on its content or intent, but on the relative positions of speaker and target within a hierarchy.
This leads to absurdities: identical statements can be racist or non-racist depending on who says them and about whom. Moral wrongness becomes contingent rather than principled.
From a realist perspective, this is upside-down. Moral evaluation attaches to acts, intentions, and reasons—not to group algebra.
4. Intent Laundering
The asymmetry in presumed intent is particularly revealing. Criticism of Islam is treated as evidence of prejudice; criticism of Judaism is treated as evidence of conscience.
But intent cannot be inferred from target alone. That violates basic interpretive charity. A critique of apostasy laws, dietary restrictions, or gender roles should be evaluated on its merits, not on the perceived vulnerability or power of the group involved.
5. Israel as a Moral Solvent
Conflating Judaism with Israel introduces further incoherence. Jews worldwide are implicitly treated as morally implicated in the actions of a state they may not support or even belong to—precisely the sort of collective moral responsibility liberals usually reject.
Worse, claims about disproportionate Jewish power—however clothed in anti-colonial rhetoric—structurally resemble historic antisemitic narratives, while being declared immune from that charge.
6. The Suppression of Free Inquiry
If criticism of Islam is racist by definition, then genuine inquiry becomes impossible. Ex-Muslims, reformist Muslims, and philosophers are pressured into silence. This is not protection but epistemic paternalism—the assumption that certain groups cannot withstand rational scrutiny.
Ironically, it treats Muslims as less capable of intellectual engagement than anyone else.
The Core Contradiction
The position ultimately tries to hold four claims simultaneously:
- Ideas shape behaviour
- Islam and Judaism are systems of ideas
- Islam may not be criticised without moral suspicion
- Judaism may be criticised freely
Any three of these can be held together. All four cannot.
Conclusion
The radical-left asymmetry between Islam and Judaism collapses under analysis. It confuses race with belief, applies essentialism selectively, replaces moral universals with power calculations, infers intent from identity, and undermines free inquiry while claiming moral seriousness.
A simpler and more coherent position remains available:
People deserve equal moral respect. Ideas deserve no immunity from criticism.
That principle protects minorities without infantilising them—and preserves the very conditions of rational moral discourse.
The Logical Place 