A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves a... more A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel’s insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of thought through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one’s account.
In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/ synthetic distincti... more In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/ synthetic distinction-that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/ species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition-as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure-through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand 'the dialectical method' and 'speculative cognition' on the model of discursive cognition. Kant, famously, distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgments and employs this distinction to limit the metaphysical pretensions of reason. In the 'Introduction' to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant notes that metaphysics has remained in a 'state of uncertainty and contradictions' because metaphysicians have not posed the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and perhaps not even thought of 'the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments'. 1 Kant's suggestion is that simply formulating the distinction clearly will enable us to make real progress in metaphysics by inquiring into its very possibility in a newly systematic way. On the basis of this distinction, he will be able to critique reason: in its human and discursive form, he will argue, reason can only advance valid synthetic judgments about experience and its forms. 2 Hegel, infamously, derided Kant's claim that reason was limited, and in its place insisted that reason can cognize what he termed 'the absolute'. It is not easy to understand what Hegel means by 'the absolute', or how it relates to the metaphysical pretensions of reason that Kant attempted to limit. But one interpretive possibility suggests itself rather naturally: if Kant limits reason on the basis of drawing a distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment, then
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "diale... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical method". Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
With what right do we believe that our thoughts can be objectively valid, can determine how thing... more With what right do we believe that our thoughts can be objectively valid, can determine how things are and not merely how things seem to us? On prevailing views, Hegel answers this Kantian question by rejecting some part of Kant’s account of ordinary, truth-tracking knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Hegel defends Kant’s account of such knowledge, and that he distinguishes, within it, between analytic and synthetic judgments. He departs from Kant in offering a new account of philosophical knowledge, in which the two forms of judgment, analytic and synthetic, are united. Philosophical knowledge analyzes what is contained in the mere concept of the world. The result of this analysis is a synthesis by which we advance to another concept. The advance yields the laws that determine what we think, and it enables us to grasp those laws as constituting the nature of the world, thereby ensuring their objective validity. I thereby show how Hegel thinks philosophy can explain the possibility...
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s socalled “dialectical met... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s socalled “dialectical method”. Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical me... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical method". Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
In this paper I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction... more In this paper I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction-that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition-as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure-through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on the attempts to understand 'the dialectical method' and 'speculative cognition' on the model of discursive cognition. Kant, famously, distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgments and employs this distinction to limit the metaphysical pretensions of reason. In the 'Introduction' to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant notes that metaphysics has remained in a 'state of uncertainty and contradictions' because metaphysicians have not posed the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and perhaps not even thought of 'the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments'. i Kant's suggestion is that simply formulating the distinction clearly will enable us to make real progress in metaphysics by inquiring into its very possibility in a newly systematic way. On the basis of this distinction, he will be able to critique reason: in its human and discursive form, he will argue, reason can only advance valid synthetic judgments about experience and its forms. ii
A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves a... more A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel's insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of cognition through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one's account. A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. As an example: many think that in the Phenomenology of Spirit we begin with the thought that cognition consists solely in sensible-certainty, realize that that is incoherent, and then advance to a more sophisticated account of cognition. If we gather up proponents of the Modification View, we find scholars who disagree on nearly everything of significance in Hegel. But they all agree that the dialectical method is one by which we correct erroneous accounts of its subject matter. 1 In this essay, I point to some textual evidence from 1
A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves a... more A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel’s dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel’s insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of thought through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one’s account.
In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/ synthetic distincti... more In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/ synthetic distinction-that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/ species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition-as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure-through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand 'the dialectical method' and 'speculative cognition' on the model of discursive cognition. Kant, famously, distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgments and employs this distinction to limit the metaphysical pretensions of reason. In the 'Introduction' to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant notes that metaphysics has remained in a 'state of uncertainty and contradictions' because metaphysicians have not posed the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and perhaps not even thought of 'the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments'. 1 Kant's suggestion is that simply formulating the distinction clearly will enable us to make real progress in metaphysics by inquiring into its very possibility in a newly systematic way. On the basis of this distinction, he will be able to critique reason: in its human and discursive form, he will argue, reason can only advance valid synthetic judgments about experience and its forms. 2 Hegel, infamously, derided Kant's claim that reason was limited, and in its place insisted that reason can cognize what he termed 'the absolute'. It is not easy to understand what Hegel means by 'the absolute', or how it relates to the metaphysical pretensions of reason that Kant attempted to limit. But one interpretive possibility suggests itself rather naturally: if Kant limits reason on the basis of drawing a distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment, then
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "diale... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical method". Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
With what right do we believe that our thoughts can be objectively valid, can determine how thing... more With what right do we believe that our thoughts can be objectively valid, can determine how things are and not merely how things seem to us? On prevailing views, Hegel answers this Kantian question by rejecting some part of Kant’s account of ordinary, truth-tracking knowledge. In contrast, I argue that Hegel defends Kant’s account of such knowledge, and that he distinguishes, within it, between analytic and synthetic judgments. He departs from Kant in offering a new account of philosophical knowledge, in which the two forms of judgment, analytic and synthetic, are united. Philosophical knowledge analyzes what is contained in the mere concept of the world. The result of this analysis is a synthesis by which we advance to another concept. The advance yields the laws that determine what we think, and it enables us to grasp those laws as constituting the nature of the world, thereby ensuring their objective validity. I thereby show how Hegel thinks philosophy can explain the possibility...
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s socalled “dialectical met... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel’s socalled “dialectical method”. Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical me... more For two hundred years, people have been trying to make sense of Hegel's so-called "dialectical method". Helpfully, Hegel frequently compares this method with the idea of life, or the organic (cf., e.g., PhG 2, 34, 56). This comparison has become very popular in the literature (in, e.g., Pippin, Beiser, and Ng). Typically, scholars who invoke the idea of life also note that the comparison has limits and that no organic analogy can completely explain the nature of the dialectical method. To my knowledge, however, no scholar has attempted to explain exactly where or why the organic analogy falls short. In this paper, I propose to remedy this lack by exploring in depth two different organic models. In brief, I argue that both versions of the organic model require an appeal to something external to the organism, and no such appeal can be made sense of within the dialectical method.
In this paper I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction... more In this paper I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction-that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition-as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure-through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on the attempts to understand 'the dialectical method' and 'speculative cognition' on the model of discursive cognition. Kant, famously, distinguishes between analytic and synthetic judgments and employs this distinction to limit the metaphysical pretensions of reason. In the 'Introduction' to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant notes that metaphysics has remained in a 'state of uncertainty and contradictions' because metaphysicians have not posed the question of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments and perhaps not even thought of 'the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments'. i Kant's suggestion is that simply formulating the distinction clearly will enable us to make real progress in metaphysics by inquiring into its very possibility in a newly systematic way. On the basis of this distinction, he will be able to critique reason: in its human and discursive form, he will argue, reason can only advance valid synthetic judgments about experience and its forms. ii
A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves a... more A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. In this essay, I argue that the Modification View is incorrect. Hegel's insight, I show, is that one can only explain the objective validity of a form of cognition through employing that very form. Consequently, the dialectical method cannot relate to its subject matter as something given to it, and so cannot involve advancing and then correcting errors in one's account. A prevailing view in the literature on Hegel's dialectical method is that employing it involves advancing a false account and then modifying it to be closer to the truth. I will call this the Modification View. As an example: many think that in the Phenomenology of Spirit we begin with the thought that cognition consists solely in sensible-certainty, realize that that is incoherent, and then advance to a more sophisticated account of cognition. If we gather up proponents of the Modification View, we find scholars who disagree on nearly everything of significance in Hegel. But they all agree that the dialectical method is one by which we correct erroneous accounts of its subject matter. 1 In this essay, I point to some textual evidence from 1
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