Security researcher from Hungary. I audit open source and AI products, prove every finding with a working PoC, then report it. 21 advisories filed and 47 PRs merged so far. Findings and writeups here from now on.
If your agent can call tools, every tool argument is attacker input. Prompt injection is not a chatbot problem. It is an authorization problem. Untrusted text should never reach a consequential tool call without a check the model cannot override.
Most of my best findings started in the JS bundle, not in a scanner. Scanners test what they know. The bundle tells you what the app actually does. Read it first.
free ai method #100
Ling-3.1-flash-1019
Ant Group, inclusionAI
560B total, 25B active MoE
1M context
MIT license, no revenue carve-out
weights free on Hugging Face
most bounty reports die in the first minute.
not on the bug. on the repro.
no target, no steps, no expected vs actual.
write the repro like the triager is tired and in a hurry. because they are.