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Literal Rule

The document discusses the literal rule of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that statutes should be interpreted using their plain and ordinary meaning, even if this leads to absurd outcomes. It includes case law examples such as Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy, which illustrate the application of the literal rule. The document also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, highlighting its respect for parliamentary supremacy and potential for creating awkward precedents.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
32 views38 pages

Literal Rule

The document discusses the literal rule of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that statutes should be interpreted using their plain and ordinary meaning, even if this leads to absurd outcomes. It includes case law examples such as Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd and Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy, which illustrate the application of the literal rule. The document also outlines the advantages and disadvantages of this approach, highlighting its respect for parliamentary supremacy and potential for creating awkward precedents.

Uploaded by

vaniagupta8
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

The Literal Rule

• One of the leading statements of the literal rule


was made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex Peerage Case
(1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85
“… the only rule for the construction of Acts of
Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which
passed the Act.
If the words of the statute are in themselves
precise and unambiguous, then no more can be
necessary than to expound those words in their
natural and ordinary sense. The words
themselves alone do, in such case, best declare
the intention of the lawgiver.”
• By the literal rule, words in a statute must be
given their plain, ordinary or literal meaning.
• The objective of the court is to discover the
intention of Parliament as expressed in the
words used.
• This approach will be used even if it produces
absurdity or hardship, in which case the remedy
is for Parliament to pass an amending statute.
• Lord Esof in R v Judge of the City [1892] 1 QB
273 said:
• “If the words of an Act are clear then you
must follow them even though they lead to a
manifest absurdity. The court has nothing to
do with the question whether the legislature
has committed an absurdity.”
Cutter v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd
[1998] 4 All ER 417, House of Lords
Facts
• In the case Mr C, the Claimant, was injured in
a car.
• The Defendant’s insurance only covered him
under the Road Traffic Act 1988 for the use of
his car ‘on any highway and any other road to
which the public has access’.

Issue
• The question for the court to determine,
therefore, was whether the multi-storey car
park was a road?
Held
• The HL held that the car park was not a road
because a road provides for cars to move
along it to a destination.
• Therefore, the insurance company was not
liable to pay out on the driver’s policy because
the claimant had not been injured due to the
use of the car on a “road”.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v
Hinchy (1960) aka Tax penalty case
Issue
• Concerned the construction of s.25 (3) of the
Income Tax Act 1952

• The Act stated that anyone convicted should


be subject to a fixed penalty and treble the tax
which he ought to have been charged under
the Act

• The Court had to decide whether the amount


should be based on the whole amount that
was liable under the statute of just the unpaid
amount
• The Court decided that on the literal rule he
was liable to pay the whole amount, even
though this was a harsh decision
Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green [1981] 1
All ER 153 aka Green hill case
Facts:
• In 1961 Mr. Walter Green(Father) granted an
option to purchase Gravel Hill farm to his son
Geoffrey Green(Son). The option, although
registrable as a land charge under
ChargestheAct Land
1925, was not registered.
• In 1967 there was a disagreement in the family
and Mr. Walter (Father) sold the farm to his wife
for £500 (it was worth around £40,000) in a
deliberate attempt to defeat the option granted to
his son.
• The wife then changed her will so as to leave the
farm to all five of her children including Mr.
Geoffrey.
• Geoffrey learnt of the sale and sought to enforce
the option.
Issue
• The question for the court was whether the
option was binding on the wife or whether she
took the farm free of the option.
Provision
• S 13 (2) of the Land Charges Act 1925 provided
that a land charge would be void against a
purchaser of the land unless registered and
where an estate contract was under
consideration it would only be void against a
purchaser of a legal estate for money or money’s
worth.
• Purchaser was also defined in s.20(8) as a
purchaser who for valuable consideration takes
any interest in land.
• The trial judge found for the wife and held that
the option was not binding on the wife
• This was reversed by the Court of Appeal with
Lord Denning holding that the sale was not for
money or money’s worth and that the protection
of the Act was not available in cases of fraud
where there was a deliberate attempt to defeat
an interest.
• The wife’s representative appealed to the House
of Lords.
Held
• Lord Wilberforce stated that the decision
of Lord Dennings as 'muddying clear
waters'.
• Delivering a unanimous reversal of the
Court of Appeal's majority decision, he said:
'Thus the case appears to be a plain one . . . In
my opinion this appearance is also the
reality. The case is plain; the Act is clear and
definite. Intended as it was to provide a
simple and understandable system for the
protection of title to land, it should not be
read down or glossed; to do so would destroy
the usefulness of the Act.'
• The appeal was allowed. There was no
requirement of good faith for a purchaser
under the Land Charges Act 1925.
• The options should have been registered
under the Land Charges Act 1972
• Good faith was irrelevant to the Land Charges
Act 1972.
Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB
147 aka Dead person case
Facts:
• Defendant was arrested for impersonating
a dead person in order to cast an extra vote
Provision:
• A statute aimed at preventing election rigging
made it an offence to impersonate “…any
person entitled to vote” at an election.
Issue:
• Was he guilty or not guilty of casting an extra
vote?
Held
• He was found not guilty as dead people
are clearly not entitled to vote!
London and North Eastern Railway
v Berriman [1946] AC 278
Facts
• A railway worker was knocked down and killed
by a train whilst oiling parts of the line. His
wife was trying to claim compensation for his
death.
Provision
• The relevant statute said that compensation
was available for workers who were ‘..killed
whilst repairing the line…’
Issue
• Whether the widow is entitled for
the compensation.
• The court held that in the ordinary sense of
the word, ‘repairing’ did not include oiling as
this was merely maintenance.
Maqbool Hussain v. St of Bom.(AIR
1953 SC325) aka Gold Confiscated
case
Facts
• A citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did
not declare that he had bought gold with him.
• Gold found in his possession during search in
violation of govt. notification, was confiscated
u/s.167(8) of Sea Customs Act, 1878.
• The appellant could be proceeded against under
section 167(8) of the Sea Customs Act as also
under section 23 of the Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act in respect of the said act.
• Proceedings were in fact taken under section
167(8) of the Sea Customs Act which resulted in
the confiscation of the gold.
• Further proceedings were taken under section 23
of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act by way of
filing the complaint aforesaid in the Court of the
Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay.
Issue
• whether by reason of the proceedings taken by
the Sea, Custom Authorities the appellant could
be said to have been prosecuted and punished
for the same offence with which he was charged
in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate,
Bombay.
• The plea which was taken by the accused in bar
of the prosecution in the Court of the Chief
Presidency Magistrate, was that he had already
been prosecuted and punished for the same
offence and by virtue of the provisions of article
20(2) of the Constitution he could not be
prosecuted and punished again.
Held
• The Customs Officers are not required to act judicially
on legal evidence tendered on oath and they are not
authorised to administer oath to any witness.
• Sea Customs Authorities are merely constituted
administrative machinery for the purpose of adjudging
confiscation, increased rates of duty and penalty
prescribed in the Act.
• We are of the opinion that the Sea Customs Authorities
are not a judicial tribunal and the adjudging of
confiscation, increased rate of duty or penalty under
the provisions of the Sea Customs Act do not constitute
a judgment or order of a court or judicial tribunal
necessary for the purpose of supporting a plea of
double jeopardy.
Shriram v. St. of Mah.(AIR 1961 SC
674) aka Witness Case
Facts
• The Magistrate framed charges against the
appellant on the basis of documents produced
before him.
• The Magistrate did not examine any eye
witness cited by the prosecution.
• The session court convicted the appellant and
the HC confirmed the conviction.
Issue
• Now the appellant urges the SC that the act of
Magistrate committing him for trail was illegal because
the Mag. had not examined the eye-witness as was
required u/s.207-A(4) of CrPC.

Provision
• 207-A(4)- The Magistrate shall then proceed to take
the evidence of such persons, if any, as may be
produced by the prosecution as witnesses to the
actual commission of the offence alleged, and if the
Magistrate is of opinion that it is necessary in the
interests of justice to take the evidence of any one or
more of the other witnesses for the prosecution, he
may take such evidence also.
Held
• SC rejected the argument and held that the
use of the word shall imposes a duty on the
Mag. but that duty is limited to the witnesses
produced by the prosecution .
Motipur Zamindary Company Pvt. Ltd.
V. St of Bihar (AIR 1962 SC 660)
Facts
• Green vegetable are exempted the sales
of tax within Bihar Sales Tax Act,
1947
•Issue
Whether sugarcane fall within the term green
vegetable?
Held:
• That sugar cane was not a green vegetable
and was not exempted under the notification.
• The word "vegetables" in taxing statutes
was to be understood as in common parlance
i.e. denoting class of vegetables which were
grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm and
were used for the table.
• The dictionaries defined sugar cane as a
"grass."
State Of West Bengal & Ors vs Washi
Ahmed
(AIR 1977 SC 1638)
• Whether Green ginger is a vegetable?

• The Sales Tax Authorities levied sales tax on


"green ginger" sold by the respondents, taking
the view that green ginger is used to add
flavour and taste to food.
Held:
• Green ginger is included. within the meaning
of the words "vegetables---commonly
known as subji, tarkari- or sak."
Advantages Disadvantages
Respects Parliamentary Supremacy and There can be disagreement as to what
leaves law making to those elected to the amounts to the ordinary or natural
job meaning

Provides no scope for judges to use their Creates awkward precedents which
own opinions or prejudices require Parliamentary time to correct

Fails to recognise the complexities and


Restricts the role of judges to applying the limitations of English language and
law to the facts of the case assumes every Act is perfectly drafted

Maintains uniformity in application and Undermines public confidence in the law


implementation of law
Ensures complete separation of power Creates loopholes in the law

Leads to injustice

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