CULTURAL RIGHTS

All rights encompass a cultural dimension and it is within this

that all rights must be implemented.

It should be noted, however, that practices perpetuating

inequality and which are universal notions of rights have no
place in human rights discourse, even if branded as cultural.

The existence of cultural rights as such presupposes both a

‘culture’ or ‘cultures’ and the notion of ‘cultural identity’.

When we talk about the mores and norms associated with a

grouping of individuals (society or social system) what we are
really investigating is the culture of the group.

Culture, in its anthropological sense, consists of a set of

shared meanings communicated by language or other forms
(e.g. symbols) between group members.
The role of the anthropologist is to first ‘discover’
these shared meanings and then translate them into
(same, similar, approximate or other) concepts which
the observer clearly understands.

In its more narrow sense, it comprises cultural

(group) identity as a way of life and intangible
heritage.

‘Cultural identity’ may be understood as ‘the sum of

all cultural references through which a person, alone
or in community with others, defines or constitutes
oneself, communicates or wishes to be recognized in
one’s dignity.
The scope of ‘cultural rights’ has initially orbited
around the right ‘to take part in cultural life’,
guaranteed in article 15(1)(a) ICESCR.

The meaning of ‘cultural life’ has evolved over time.

In the 1950s, shortly after the UN specialized

agency on the protection of education, science and
culture (UNESCO) was created, international efforts
to protect ‘culture’ have been confined to the
protection of education and the preservation of
cultural assets.

Debates on cultural identity have been scarce, and

 It is only in the late 1990s that the need to protect
identities in the sense of ‘being different’ became
more visible within the international human rights
discourse, encompassing other potential grounds
for discrimination such as religion, disability,
gender or sexuality.

Regional human rights bodies have contributed to

the empowerment of cultural identities, dotting
them – to some extent – with justiciability.

Yet, under international law, only five human rights

are expressly labelled as ‘cultural’: the right to
education; the right to participate in cultural life;
the right to enjoy he benefits of scientific progress
Several developments in international human rights
law have resulted in the ‘enlargement’ of cultural
rights.

The ‘right to participate in cultural life’, in

particular, has been gradually interpreted so
broadly as to include a right of ‘access to and
enjoyment of cultural heritage’.

This is precisely the case with article 15 paragraph

1(a) ICESCR as a starting point that guarantees the
right to participate in cultural life.

This development coincides with the adoption of

General Comment 21 by the CESCR in which it
But why are cultural rights important?

• Clearly, they empower human rights discourse.

• The cultural dimension of human rights law

enhances their indivisibility and
interdependence.

• This includes the understanding that challenges

for human rights are substantially different in
various parts of the world.

• Freedom of expression are paradigmatic of the

variety of cultural issues raised by an
appreciation of culture.
• Cultural rights further empower individuals and
groups, particularly disadvantaged groups, as
right holders of cultural rights – even in respect
of primarily individual rights (such as the right to
the arts).

• This freedom of the arts includes the right of the

public to access the arts; access to culture for all,
or a culture of one’s choice; consultation and
participation in cultural activities.

• Finally, it should not be forgotten that the

promotion of cultural diversity and access to
culture contributes to understanding cultural and
MINORITIES AS A SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
There is no normative definition of the
term ‘minority’ under treaty or soft law.

…there is a broad consensus that it

encompasses objective and subjective
elements.

The objective dimension suggests the

existence of a group that constitutes a
non-dominant minority of the entire
population of a country, even if its
The subjective element is less visible, but is the
cohesive substance that defines and sustains the
group’s identity as such: that is, the members’
sense of belonging, which is reflected in cultural
characteristics, ultimately giving rise to group
solidarity.

This solidarity ensures the continuing existence of

the group, given that even a racial minority may in
time become assimilated with the dominant racial
group and implicitly renounce, or become oblivious
to, its particular identity.

It is accepted that the existence of a minority is not

dependent on the concentration of its members in
The Recognition and Protection
of the Human Rights of
Vulnerable Groups and Persons
The liberal, universal notion of human rights is
centered on the abstract person, i.e. ‘everyone’.

This approach, evident in the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights (UDHR), has been increasingly
complemented by a focus on particular features or
identities of persons and groups, as a result of
campaigns and changed mindsets.

That focus emerged largely as a result of the

heightened awareness of the exposure to
discrimination and various forms of violence that
these persons or groups face, and the factors that
hinder the exercise of individual or collective
It has resulted in a more contextual understanding of
human rights violations, and the use of an array of
terms, particularly discrimination, vulnerability and
sometimes marginalization when referring to the
situation of individuals and groups.

The greater contextualization has informed legal and

institutional developments, and enabled various actors
to tailor states’ obligations, particularly in respect of
preventive, protective and justice measures relating to
(members of) the group concerned.
 VULNERABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Discrimination is a well-developed legal concept

recognised in the International Bill of Human Rights
and numerous other instruments.

It constitutes a violation of a state’s international

human rights obligations and frequently acts as
gateway to multiple other violations, with the
international crime of genocide as its most extreme
manifestation.

Discrimination might therefore be taken to indicate

However, the ‘relationship between discrimination
and vulnerability’ is not clearly conceptualised in
the practice of human rights treaty bodies.

• Vulnerability may therefore stem from, but is not

necessarily identical to, discrimination.

• Vulnerability “the possibility of being exposed to

harm and the impact any such harm will have on
those affected; policies, such as in the field of
disaster management, are aimed at reducing the
attendant risks “
In the human rights context, the use and
interpretation of the notion of vulnerability is far
from uniform.

Human rights law is based on generic human

vulnerability in the sense that it seeks to protect
core human values such as life, physical and mental
integrity, freedom, equality and dignity.

In principle, every person is vulnerable.

However, a series of factors, not least the level of

resources a person commands, makes vulnerability
Vulnerability is situation-specific, and has
been usefully described as a concept that is
‘relational, particular, and harm-based’.

The notion of vulnerability has become

increasingly important in human rights
discourse and practice.

In the interpretation of human rights

treaties, bodies and courts have utilised
vulnerability to specify positive obligations,
to determine whether or not certain conduct
Vulnerability underpins several human rights
instruments.

The vulnerability of a child, for example, ‘by reason

of his [her] physical and mental immaturity’, is
implied in the preamble of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child.

It is also part of the definition of trafficking, one

element being the ‘abuse of a position of
vulnerability’, whereby vulnerability is understood
to refer to a situation where victims lack
alternatives and adequate protection.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), when referring to
vulnerable groups, … that has had ‘lasting consequences
resulting in ... social exclusion’.

It has developed its jurisprudence in relation to ethnic groups,

such as the Roma, persons with mental disabilities, persons
living with HIV and asylum seekers.

Importantly, this approach conceptualises vulnerability not as an

immutable trait but as socially constructed.

It has considered vulnerability in the context of ‘historical

structural discrimination based on economic position’, groups
that are discriminated against, such as persons with HIV/AIDS, or
persons with ‘specific needs of protection ... either because of
his [her] personal condition or the specific condition he [she] is
in’.
 VULNERABLE GROUPS AND PERSONS

Race

The effect of racism and racial discrimination is widely

acknowledged; its causes, manifestations and
consequences, including its role in politics and society,
have been the subject of rich scholarly literature and
debate in multiple disciplines.
Yet racism, understood as a world view and acts based
on the superiority of certain ‘races’ over other ‘races’,
faces a paradox.

The notion of race, which emerged in discourses in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, lacks a scientific
basis.

The fact that it is socially constructed does, however,

not mean that it is less real.

On the contrary, notions of race have played a defining

role in shaping societal and international relations over
the last two centuries.
Gender, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation

Gender discrimination and gender-based violence have

become a core focus of many legal and institutional
responses in the field of international human rights
law.

This focus is the result of sustained engagement and

advocacy of women’s (rights) movements.

They had to identify, highlight and denounce both the

various realities (that were not necessarily
acknowledged as violations) faced by women and the
male-centric biases in the system of international
Persons with Disabilities

It may be surprising to learn that about a billion

persons in the world are disabled.

This means that one in five persons has some form of

disability; yet disabled persons are often invisible and
societies share fixed perceptions about the role and
capabilities of disabled persons, without really knowing
much about their capabilities or their aspirations.

Before ascribing rights to disabled persons, the

starting point for this discussion should be the
common understanding of non-disabled persons
Persons Living in Extreme Poverty

Poverty is a condition and lived experience that has

multiple economic, social and political causes,
dimensions and consequences.

While the experience and consequences of poverty

vary considerably, it is closely associated with low
levels of educational attainment, poor health,
precarious work and living conditions, stigmatisation
and marginalisation.

For this reason, the issue of poverty has predominantly

Age

Age creates vulnerabilities at both extremes, namely

the young (children) and the old.

Unlike the situation of children, where the related

vulnerability emanates from the imbalance in power
and awareness in relation to adults, the plight of old
age is similar to the issues encountered with persons
with disabilities.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the principles

enunciated in the CRPD are commonly applied to
explain both the status and attendant rights of old
The Human Rights of Women
The disadvantages, discrimination and subordination
suffered by women globally have been well documented
in a variety of contexts.

Yet the issue of women’s human rights has, until

relatively recently, been neglected in international law.

The instruments composing the International Bill of

Human Rights contain general non-discrimination
clauses which include the prohibition of discrimination
on the basis of sex or gender, whereby the rights within
these instruments are held to be applicable to everyone,
regardless of, inter alia, sex.

These generic non-discrimination clauses have, in a

Women’s human rights are an overarching
phenomenon touching on all aspects of the
international human rights framework.

The importance of addressing human rights

issues as they specifically pertain to women and
others suffering disadvantage or oppression
within gender-based power structures has now
been widely recognised.

The major approach to the protection of women’s

human rights, from the UN Charter onwards, has
been that of non-discrimination and equality.
At present, the overarching approach to the protection
of women’s human rights is one of non-discrimination,
as embodied in the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

CEDAW, or the Women’s Convention, is the first major

international treaty on the protection of women’s
rights.

CEDAW marks out inequality and discrimination against

women as a particular and serious form of human rights
violation meriting a specific instrument.
Besides a general prohibition of discrimination, CEDAW
includes the right to non-discrimination against women
in the fields of education, health care, and employment,
including in relation to marriage and maternity rights in
the employment context.

The treaty builds further on issues relating to maternity,

marriage and family relations in article 16, which sets
out women’s rights to freely enter into marriage and to
exercise equal rights and responsibilities in relation to
their children.

CEDAW also emphasises the rights of women to equality

in the administration of property and their legal
capacity to administer contracts.
In addition, it refers to a number of other specific
protections; namely,

• the right not to be trafficked or exploited in

prostitution;

• political and elective rights and representation

in political bodies and international
organisations;

• the right of women to attain or change

nationality, including in relation to their
children, regardless of their marital status
Children’s Rights
The presumption is that a specialized legal
regime for children is warranted because of
their inherent vulnerabilities.

The vulnerability of children is rather different

from that of other vulnerable groups, in that at
different stages of their development they are
mostly dependent on others for their survival
and cannot (or are not allowed to) partake in
social or political life in the same way as adults.
Unlike all other vulnerable persons, the well-being of
children is entrusted to their parents and guardians,
and hence many of the issues facing children have
traditionally been perceived through the lens of family
relationships and family law, as opposed to human
rights law.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its

subsequent protocols has somewhat changed this state
of affairs by introducing several principles which
transform children from objects to real subjects of the
law.

Moreover, these instruments highlight the reality that

children can and do constitute a ‘material’ for
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

• The CRC recognises four key guiding principles which

permeate the understanding and construction of all
pertinent rights.

Some of these have long been recognised as general

principles, but others are new for many states.

These principles are meant to be applied contextually

(based on the particular circumstances of each case),
but also as peremptory principles of
construction/interpretation.
As a result, they may be applied substantively (for
example to interpret the child’s right to leisure), as
well as in respect of procedural law.

These principles are:

(1)the best interests of the child (article 3 CRC);

(2) respect for the views of the child (article 12 CRC);

(3) the right to life, survival and development (article 6

CRC);
International Humanitarian Law
(IHL)
IHL is marked by four main features.

First, IHL applies only during situations of

armed conflict, or, in other words, violent
situations resulting from a failure of the
law that threaten the very survival of the
individual, communities or States.

Second, IHL mainly protects the life and

dignity of persons who are perceived as
the enemies of one of the parties to the
Third, international armed conflicts (IACs)
would not exist today if States respected
the prohibition of the use of force in
international relations, which is one of
international law’s most important rules.

Fourth, IHL is part of public international

law, which is characterized as a mainly
self-administered horizontal legal system
that lacks a centralized system of
adjudication and enforcement for most of
Consequently, IHL too suffers from the
absence of a centralized adjudication and
enforcement system.

These four features of IHL not only

weaken it, but also would make it
surprising if the parties to a conflict
always respected IHL or if its rules were
uncontroversial.

… ‘if international law is, in some ways, at

Nevertheless, one may also consider that
IHL necessarily exists as long as armed
conflicts exist.

In contrast to laws that merely prohibit

criminal conduct, international law not
only prohibits armed conflicts but also
prescribes how armed conflicts should be
conducted.

Indeed, IHL is one of the oldest branches

IHL is less humanitarian than peacetime
law by necessity because it must be
sufficiently adapted to the reality of
armed conflicts.

It may therefore be better to refer to IHL

as the laws of war or laws of armed
conflict as the military, one of the main
societal groups that use and apply IHL,
prefers to call it.
Its substantive rules try to limit the use of
violence in armed conflicts by:

-prohibiting the use of violence against persons

who do not or who no longer directly participate
in hostilities (therefore all persons in the power
of the enemy must be treated humanely at all
times);

-restricting the level of violence to the amount

necessary to achieve the only legitimate aim of
the conflict, which is to weaken the military
These two objectives generate not only
specific principles of IHL but also highlight
some of its limitations:

- the separation between the rules on the

legitimacy of resorting to an armed conflict
(jus ad bellum) and the rules on how armed
conflicts must be conducted (jus in bello)
- the distinction between civilians and
combatants;
- the prohibition against attacking persons
who are hors de combat –out of combant
- the prohibition against inflicting
The distinction between combatants and
civilians, in turn, highlights another important
limitation of IHL:

as combatants are part of the military potential

of the enemy whereas civilians are not, IHL
cannot protect both civilians and combatants
in the same manner.

The principle for distinguishing between the two

main categories of individuals is, at least in
modern IHL, not based on innocence or guilt but
rather on status in IACs and a controversial
Finally, the prohibition against inflicting
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering
implies a further limitation from a
humanitarian point of view:

IHL does not prohibit violence or even

deliberate infliction of suffering as long
as such actions are indispensable for
achieving the legitimate aim of
weakening the enemy’s military
potential.
Complex distinctions to protect human rights
during armed conflicts:

[Link] an international or non-

international armed conflict exists;

[Link] the individual affected by the

conflict is a civilian or a combatant;

[Link] that person is in the power of the

party affecting him or her;
4. whether a civilian is found in a State’s own
territory or in an occupied territory;

5. whether such a civilian is interned for imperative

security reasons, to await

6. trial or to serve a sentence;

7. whether a civilian affected by hostilities was

directly targeted or only an

[Link] victim of an attack and, in the latter case,

what was actually targeted and how important that
target was for the attacker’s military aims.
HISTORY
For thousands of years, different societies have recognised that there are
certain acts that are, and others that are not, permissible in war.

There is evidence of rules regarding warfare in ancient China, India and

what we now call the Middle East, dating back two millennia BC.

Hugo Grotius, the great seventeenth century Dutch jurist regarded as the
“Father of the Law of Nations”, devoted one of the three books comprising
his 1625 masterpiece On the Law of War and Peace to the rules applicable
in war.

In it he drew on extensive examples from ancient Roman and Greek

practice and literature to conclude that a number of principles were part of
the “Law of Nations”.
Practices that he asserted were forbidden included the use of
poison and poisoned weapons, and rape, while destruction and
pillage of enemy property were permitted, as was the killing of
all those in enemy territory – even women and children, and
prisoners.

But Grotius drew a distinction between what was legally

permissible and what was “right”, compiling an extensive list of
moral prohibitions that included the killing of women, children,
prisoners of war and other categories of non-fighters, and
positive requirements of moderation in the conduct of hostilities.
While the laws and usages of war continued to evolve,
the practice of States was by no means uniform; in many
cases these were rules, as Grotius had put it, “if not of all
nations, certainly of those of the better sort”.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, many of these

usages may indeed have become customary international
law, but they had not been codified in a multilateral
treaty.
This began to change in 1856 with the Declaration
of Paris at the end of the Crimean War, establishing
a few short but important rules on maritime law in
time of war.

But it was in the following decade that the modern

law of armed conflict, or international humanitarian
law, began to take shape from two quite separate
but concurrent developments.
The 1864 Geneva Convention
Dunant's suggestions were taken up by the Geneva
Society for Public Welfare, and in early 1863 a committee
including Dunant was set up to develop these ideas.

The committee organised an international conference in

Geneva later that year which discussed a draft
convention the committee had prepared, and passed a
number of resolutions agreeing to the establishment of
national committees;
these would supply voluntary medical personnel to armies
in the field and these volunteers would wear a white
armband with a red cross as a uniform, distinctive sign.

Another important step was the conference's

recommendation that all countries adopt a uniform flag
and sign for their medical corps and facilities, and that
medical personnel, hospitals and ambulances, as well as
the wounded themselves, should be recognised as neutral
To give effect to these principles, at the behest of the committee
the Swiss government invited States to a diplomatic conference
which, in August 1864, adopted the landmark Geneva Convention
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies
in the Field.

The core provisions of the Convention were neutrality of the

wounded-hurted- and those who care for them, the adoption of
the red cross on a white background as the distinctive sign for
medical facilities and personnel, and an obligation to collect and
care for the wounded and sick on the battlefield, regardless of
nationality.
These were radical provisions:
for the first time, international law applied to an activity –
war – which (apart from some maritime questions) had
previously been ruled by force; moral ideas of humanity
moderated State interests; and international law protected
private actors, such as the voluntary relief societies, on the
battlefield.

A dozen years after this, the Geneva committee adopted the

name by which it is now known: the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC)
Thus the experiences of one man witnessing the
effects of one battle led directly to two milestones in
the development of modern international
humanitarian law:
the 1864 Geneva Convention, and the founding
of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

In recognition of his contribution, Dunant was the

joint recipient of the first Nobel Peace Prize, in 1901.
The 1949 Geneva Conventions

The First World War precluded the holding of the anticipated third
Hague Peace Conference, but the international community
continued its efforts to “humanize war”.

One of the recommendations of the 1899 Hague Conference had

been the revision of the 1864 Geneva Convention, and this was put
into effect by the 1906 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.
Other important treaties were concluded in the
inter-war period, such as the 1925 Geneva Gas
Protocol, and in the 1930s the ICRC prepared a
number of draft treaties revising the 1929 Geneva
Convention concerning the wounded and sick,
adapting its principles to maritime and air warfare,
on hospital and safety zones in time of war, and on
the protection of civilians in occupied territory.
The intention was to submit the drafts to a diplomatic
conference but again war intervened, and in light of the
experiences of the Second World War, the drafts were
significantly revised.

The result was the four draft treaties that became the 1949
Geneva Conventions

The Geneva Conventions have received universal

acceptance, having been ratified or acceded to by more
States than there are members of the UN.
Each convention deals with a distinct topic.
The first (GC I) concerns the Amelioration-Upgrade- of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
and replaces the 1864, 1906 and 1929 conventions on the same
subject.

The title itself is noteworthy in that it refers to “armed forces”

rather than “armies” as did its predecessors, reflecting the
enlarged scope of protection afforded by the Convention to
include, among others, members of organized resistance
movements
The second Convention (GC II) deals with
“the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea”, and adapts the
provisions of the first convention to
maritime warfare, replacing the 1907
Hague X Convention.
The third (GC III) is a detailed code on the treatment of prisoners of
war, the exhaustive detail (143 articles compared with 97 in the
1929 Convention) necessitated by the experience of the Second
World War.

The 1929 Convention had, for example, applied primarily to

members of the armed forces “captured by the enemy”, thus
excluding prisoner of war status for those surrendering.

The 1949 Convention spells out, and to a degree expands, the

categories of persons entitled to prisoner of war status, thereby
indirectly defining who is entitled to combatant status in armed
conflict.
The fourth Convention (GC IV) is on the protection of
civilians, primarily in occupied territories, the need for
which was made acutely apparent during the Second
World War.

The main purpose of GC IV was to protect civilians from

arbitrary enemy action, and it contains detailed
regulations on the treatment of civilians in occupied
territory or who are aliens in the territory of a party to
the conflict. The scope and effect of the Convention are
examined
IHL APPLIES ONLY TO ARMED
CONFLICTS
IHL largely applies only during armed
conflicts.

Most IHL rules regulating conduct can only

be invoked if an armed conflict exists and
the conduct to be regulated has the requisite
link, or nexus, to that conflict.

Otherwise, only peacetime law, in particular

IHRL, applies.
Rather, there are two categories of armed
conflicts: international armed conflicts (IACs) and
non-international armed conflicts (NIACs).

IACs are fortunately rare in the contemporary

world.

Such conflicts are fought between opposing

States, either directly or indirectly in cases in
which one State has the requisite control over an
armed group fighting against the government of
another State.
Today, most armed conflicts are
NIACs.

Referring to NIACs as ‘internal’

armed conflicts leads to confusion
as such conflicts may involve
several States fighting on the
same side and may take place
Indeed, the concept of NIACs
includes not only internal civil
wars but also extra-territorial
armed conflicts conducted by one
or more States against a non-State
armed group, such as the conflict
in Afghanistan between NATO
member States and the Afghan
government, on the one hand, and
Contrary to
IHL of IACs, which applies
according to the prevailing opinion
as soon as one State commits any
act of violence against another
State,

IHL of NIACs only applies once a

certain level of violence is used by,
In reality, developments over the
last few decades have resulted in
the slow but steady merger of the
IHL of NIACs and the IHL of IACs.

The jurisprudence of the

international criminal tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
Rwanda (ICTR) has been
In its first decision in the Tadić
case, the ICTY held that the
majority of IHL rules apply
equally in both IACs and NIACs
and that, under customary
international law, the concept of
war crimes is also applicable in
NIACs.
States, however, maintained the distinction
between the two types of conflict by listing such
crimes separately and by omitting for NIACs the
crimes of clearly disproportionate attacks and
attacks targeting civilian objects.

This makes the prosecution of violations of the

rules on the conduct of hostilities much more
difficult in NIACs than in IACs.

Outside the field of ICL, recent IHL treaties

relating to the use of certain weapons and on
the protection of cultural property establish the
As a result of this merger, the distinction
between IACs and NIACs arguably remains
only relevant for severl issues in IHL.

• First, combatant and prisoner of war

status only exist in IACs and, in contrast
to insurgents in a NIAC…

• Second, the concept of occupied

territory for which IHL rules protecting
civilians are much more detailed is
difficult to extend to NIACs.
THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
CIVILIANS AND COMBATANTS AND THE
RESULTING IHL PROTECTION REGIMES
 The Difference Between Civilians And Combatants In
International Armed Conflicts (IACS)

At least in IACs, the protection afforded to an

individual under IHL largely depends on whether they
are a civilian or combatant.

…civilians are defined by opposition to combatants.

Combatants are members of armed forces belonging

to a party to an IAC.

Only combatants have the ‘right’ to directly

participate in hostilities, a ‘right’ which is often
• Combatants may therefore not be punished
for merely participating in hostilities, even if
such participation constitutes a crime under
the enemy’s domestic legislation.

• This legal consequence of combatant

privilege is called ‘combatant immunity’.

• Civilians, conversely, have no right to directly

participate in hostilities and may
consequently be punished under the enemy’s
applicable domestic law for doing so.
In contrast to combatants, … customary law protect
civilians against attacks except if and for such time
as they directly participate in hostilities as well as,
to a certain extent, against the incidental effects of
attacks.

Unlike civilians, combatants – even if they do not

pose an actual threat to the enemy at the time of
the attack – may be directly targeted at any time
until they surrender or are otherwise hors de
combat

Nevertheless, combatants are protected by a few

rules limiting the means (for example, the
Combatants receive full protection from
attack only when they become hurt sick
or people whose ship is destroyed in an
accident at sea but they survive and
manage to reach land …

Indeed, Convention III provides

combatants who have become Prisoners
of War (POWs) with detailed protection
during their internment and also requires