Module 5
Module 5
• miserable mason. the petitioner before us, could not afford to procure that huge sum or manage a
surety of sufficient prosperity. Affluents do not befriend indigents. For another, the magistrate made
an odd order refusing to accept the suretyship of the petitioner's brother because he and his assets
were in another district.
• ( 1 ) Can the Court, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, enlarge, on his own bond without
sureties, a person undergoing incarceration for a non-bailable offence either as undertrial or as
convict who has appealed or sought special leave ? (2) If the Court decides to grant bail with
sureties, what criteria should guide it in quantifying the amount of bail, and (3) Is it within the power
of The court to reject a surety because he or his estate is situate in a different district or State ?
• The consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Defendants presumed innocent are subjected to
the psychological and physical deprivations of jail life, usually under more onerous conditions than
are imposed on convicted defendants. The jailed defendant loses his job is he has one and is
prevented from contributing to the preparation of his defence. Equally important, the burden of his
detention frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
• The Gujarat Committee from which we quote extensively, dealt with this matter in depth:
• "The bail system, as we see it administered in the criminal courts to-day, is extremely unsatisfactory and
needs drastic change. In the first place it is virtually in possible to translate risk of non- appearance by the
accused into precise monetary terms and even its basic premise that risk of financial loss is necessary to
prevent the accused from fleeing is of doubtful validity. There are several considerations which deter an
accused from running away from justice and risk of financial loss is only one of them and that too not a
major one. The experience of enlightened Bail Projects in the United States such as Manhattan Bail Project
and D. C. Bail Project shows that even without monetary bail it has been possible to secure the presence of
the accused at the trial in quite a large number of cases. Moreover, the bail system causes discrimination
against the poor since the poor would not be able to furnish bail on account of their poverty while the
wealthier persons otherwise similarly situate would be able to secure their freedom because they can afford
to furnish bail. This discrimination arises even if the amount of the bail fixed by the Magistrate is not high,
for a large majority of those who are brought before the Courts in criminal cases are so poor that they would
and it difficult to furnish bail even in a small amount."(emphasis added) The vice of the system is brought out in the
Report:
• "The evil of the bail system is that either the poor accused has to fall back on touts and professional
sureties for providing bail or suffer pre-trial detention. Both these consequences are fraught with great
hardship to the poor. In one case the poor accused is fleeced of his moneys by touts and professional
sureties and sometimes has even to incur debts to make payment to them for securing his release; in the
other he is deprived of his liberty without trial and conviction and this leads to grave consequences, namely:
(1) though presumed innocent he is subjected to the psychological and physical deprivations of jail life; (2)
he loses his job, if he has one, and is deprived of an opportunity to work to support himself and his family
with the result that burden of his detention falls heavily on the innocent members of the family, (3) he is
prevented from contribution to the preparation of his defence; and (4) the public exchequer has to bear the
cost of maintaining him in the jail.
• Social Justice is the signature tune of our Constitution and the littleman in peril of losing his
liberty is the consumer of social justice. And the grant of bail can be stultified or made
impossibly inconvenient and expensive if the Court is powerless to dispense with surety or to
receive an Indian bailor across the district borders as good or the sum is so excessive that to
procure a wealthy surety may be both exasperating and expensive. The problem is plainly one
of human rights, especially freedom vis-a- vis, the lowly and necessitates the Supreme Court to
interdict judicial arbitrariness deprivatory of liberty and ensure "fair procedure" which has a
creative connotation after Maneka Gandhi [1978] 2 SCR 621. [338 C-F. 339 A-B]
• Bail covers release on one's own bond with or without sureties, as the legal literature, Indian
and Anglo- American on bail jurisprudence lends countenance and the need for liberal
interpretation in areas of social justice, individual freedom and indigent's rights justifies. When
sureties should be demanded and what sum should be insisted on are dependent on variables.
[344 G, 347 C]
• Art. 14 protects all Indians qua Indians, within the territory of India. Art. 350 sanctions
representation to any authority, including a Court, for redress of grievances in any language
used in the Union of India. Equality before the law implies that even a vakalat or affirmation
made in and State language according to the law in that State must be accepted everywhere
in the territory of India, same where a valid legislation to the contrary exists. Otherwise, an
Adivasi will be unfree in Free India, and likewise many other minorities. The process of making
Indians aliens in their own homeland should be inhibited. Swaraj is made out of united stuff.
The best guarantee of presence in Court is the reach of law, not the money tag. [347 G-H, 348
A-B, D] The Court left open to the Parliament to consider- whether in our socialist republic with
social justice as its hallmark, monetary supersti- 337 tion, not other relevant consideration like
family ties, roots in the community, membership of stable organisations should prevail or bail
bonds to ensure that the 'bailee' does not flee justice.]
Non-Bailable Offences Procedure
• Triple test
• The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are
circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or
creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and
the like, by the petitioner who seeks enlargement on bail from the court. We do not intend
to be exhaustive but only illustrative. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is
likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when
considering the question of jail. So also the heinousness of the crime.
• This petitioner will be released on bail on his entering into a bond of his own and one
surety for Rs. 5,000/- to the satisfaction of the Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Baren. While the system- of pecuniary bail has a tradition behind it, the time has come for
rethinking on the subject. It may well be that in most cases not monetary suretyship but
undertaking by relations of the petitioner or organisation to which he belongs may be
better and more socially relevant. Even so, in this case we stick to the practice and direct
the furnishing of one surety for Rs. 5,000/-. Application for intervention allowed. S.R.
Bail granted.
Powers of HC and COS
483. Special powers of High Court or Court of Session regarding bail.
(1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct,—
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody be released on bail, and if the offence is of the
nature specified in sub-section (3) of section 480, may impose any condition which it considers
necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section;
(b) that any condition imposed by a Magistrate when releasing any person on bail be set aside or
modified:
Provided that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is
accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable,
is punishable with imprisonment for life, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor
unless it is, for reasons to be recorded in writing, of opinion that it is not practicable to give such notice:
Provided further that the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is
accused of an offence triable under section 65 or sub-section (2) of section 70 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor within a period of fifteen
days from the date of receipt of the notice of such application.
(2) The presence of the informant or any person authorised by him shall be obligatory at the time of hearing
of the application for bail to the person under section 65 or sub-section (2) of section 70 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
(3) A High Court or Court of Session may direct that any person who has been released on bail under this
Chapter be arrested and commit him to custody.
Anticipatory Bail
• 482. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.
(1) When any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on an accusation of having
committed a non-bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for
a direction under this section; and that Court may, if it thinks fit, direct that in the event of such
arrest, he shall be released on bail.
(2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes a direction under sub-section (1), it may
include such conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the particular case, as it may
think fit, including—
(i) a condition that the person shall make himself available for interrogation by a police officer
as and when required;
(ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or
promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from
disclosing such facts to the Court or to any police officer;
(iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India without the previous permission of the
Court;
(iv) such other condition as may be imposed under sub-section (3) of section 480, as if the bail
were granted under that section.
(3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station
on such accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or at any time while in the custody
of such officer to give bail, he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking cognizance of
such offence decides that a warrant should be issued in the first instance against that person, he
Vipan Kumar Dhir v The State Of Punjab
• The challenge laid is to an order dated 28.01.2021 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana whereby anticipatory
bail has been granted to Respondent No.2 (hereafter ‘Respondent Accused’), who is the motherin law of the deceased and
is charged under Sections 304B, 302 read with 120B of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”).
• Soon after the FIR was lodged, the RespondentAccused moved an anticipatory bail application before the Sessions Court,
which was rejected on 21.12.2017. Discontented, the RespondentAccused approached the High Court for a similar relief,
but the petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 08.03.2018. Meanwhile, on account of noncooperation with the ongoing
investigation, the SHO of the concerned police station applied for and got issued arrest warrants against the Respondent
Accused from Judicial Magistrate. However, the arrest warrant could not be executed as the RespondentAccused had been
on the run and she was thus declared an absconder on 23 042018 under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for
short, “Cr.P.C.”).
• The RespondentAccused continued to evade her arrest until this Court granted anticipatory bail to her younger son Daksh
Adya (brotherinlaw of the deceased) on 22.10.2019. Thereafter, taking advantage of this subsequent event and presenting
the same as a material change in circumstance, RespondentAccused filed two petitions before the High Court, seeking
quashing of the order that declared her a ‘proclaimed offender’ and further sought the relief of anticipatory bail.
• It is noted explicitly that during the pendency of the abovementioned proceedings, the High Court granted interim bail to
the RespondentAccused on 03.12.2020 and pursuant thereto, she joined the investigation on 07.12.2020. Thereafter, vide
the impugned order, High Court allowed both the petitions and set aside the order declaring the Respondent Accused as an
absconder and also granted her anticipatory bail. These reliefs were primarily allowed on two grounds firstly that the
RespondentAccused had joined the investigation and undertook to remain present at each date of trial proceedings;
secondly she was entitled to seek parity with the coaccused Daksh Adya whom this Court granted anticipatory bail.
• At the outset, it would be fruitful to recapitulate the wellsettled legal principle that the cancellation of bail is to be dealt on a different footing in
comparison to a proceeding for grant of bail. It is necessary that ‘cogent and overwhelming reasons’ are present for the cancellation of bail.
Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances which may develop post the grant of bail and are nonconducive to fair trial, making it
necessary to cancel the bail.
• bail can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order
granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the
investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage
of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system. This Court has repeatedly viewed that while granting bail, especially
anticipatory bail which is per se extraordinary in nature, the possibility of the accused to influence prosecution witnesses, threatening the family
members of the deceased, fleeing from justice or creating other impediments in the fair investigation, ought not to be overlooked.
• Broadly speaking, each case has its own unique factual scenario which holds the key for adjudication of bail matters including cancellation thereof.
The offence alleged in the instant case is heinous and protrudes our medieval social structure which still wails for reforms despite multiple efforts
made by Legislation and Judiciary.
• 12. In the case in hand, the High Court seems to have been primarily swayed by the fact that the RespondentAccused was coperating with
investigation. This is, however, contrary to the record as the RespondentAccused remained absconding for more than two years after being declared a
proclaimed offender on 23.04.2018. She chose to join investigation only after securing interim bail from the High Court. She kept on hiding from the
Investigating Agency as well as Magistrate’s Court till she got protection against arrest from the High Court in the 2nd round of bail proceedings.
• 13. Even if there was any procedural irregularity in declaring the RespondentAccused as an absconder, that by itself was not a justifiable ground to
grant prearrest bail in a case of grave offence save where the High Court on perusal of casediary and other material on record is, prima facie, satisfied
that it is a case of false or overexaggerated accusation. Such being not the case here, the High Court went on a wrong premise in granting anticipatory
bail to the RespondentAccused.
• 14. The ground of parity with coaccused Daksh Adya invoked by the High Court is equally unwarranted. The allegations in the FIR against the
RespondentMotherinLaw and her younger son Daksh Adya are materially different. It is indubitable that some of the allegations against all the family
members are common but there are other specific allegations accusing the RespondentAccused of playing a key role in the alleged offence.
• 16. In light of the above discussion and without expressing any views on merit, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 28.01.2021
and direct the RespondentAccused to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of one week.
Sushila Aggarwal and Ors. Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors.
(1) Whether the protection granted to a person under Section 438 Cr.P.C. should be
limited to a fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before the Trial
Court and seek regular bail.
(2) Whether the life of an anticipatory bail should end at the time and stage when
the accused is summoned by the court.
The protection granted to a person Under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure
should not invariably be limited to a fixed period; it should be without any restriction
on time. Normal conditions Under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be
imposed; if there are specific facts or features in regard to any offence, it is open for
the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its
being tied to an event) etc.
The life or duration of an anticipatory bail order does not end normally at the time
and stage when the Accused is summoned by the court, or when charges are
framed, but can continue till the end of the trial. Again, if there are any special or
peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it is
open for it to do so.
(1) Consistent with the judgment in Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Ors. v. State of Punjab, when a person complains of apprehension of arrest and
approaches for order, the application should be based on concrete facts (and not vague or general allegations) relatable to one or other specific offence.
The application seeking anticipatory bail should contain bare essential facts relating to the offence, and why the applicant reasonably apprehends
arrest, as well as his side of the story. These are essential for the court which should consider his application, to evaluate the threat or apprehension, its
gravity or seriousness and the appropriateness of any condition that may have to be imposed. It is not essential that an application should be moved
only after an FIR is filed; it can be moved earlier, so long as the facts are clear and there is reasonable basis for apprehending arrest.
(2) It may be advisable for the court, which is approached with an application Under Section 438, depending on the seriousness of the threat (of arrest)
to issue notice to the public prosecutor and obtain facts, even while granting limited interim anticipatory bail.
(3) Nothing in Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure, compels or obliges courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms of time, or upon filing
of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during investigation or inquiry, etc. While considering an application (for grant of
anticipatory bail) the court has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the course of investigation,
or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. The courts would be
justified - and ought to impose conditions spelt out in Section 437(3), Code of Criminal Procedure [by virtue of Section 438(2)]. The need to impose
other restrictive conditions, would have to be judged on a case by case basis, and depending upon the materials produced by the state or the
investigating agency. Such special or other restrictive conditions may be imposed if the case or cases warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine
manner, in all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory bail may be granted, if they are required in the facts of any case or
cases; however, such limiting conditions may not be invariably imposed.
(4) Courts ought to be generally guided by considerations such as the nature and gravity of the offences, the role attributed to the applicant, and the
facts of the case, while considering whether to grant anticipatory bail, or refuse it. Whether to grant or not is a matter of discretion; equally whether
and if so, what kind of special conditions are to be imposed (or not imposed) are dependent on facts of the case, and subject to the discretion of the
court.
(5) Anticipatory bail granted can, depending on the conduct and behavior of the Accused, continue after filing of the charge sheet till end of trial.
(6) An order of anticipatory bail should not be "blanket" in the sense that it should not enable the Accused to commit further offences and
claim relief of indefinite protection from arrest. It should be confined to the offence or incident, for which apprehension of arrest is sought, in
relation to a specific incident. It cannot operate in respect of a future incident that involves commission of an offence.
(7) An order of anticipatory bail does not in any manner limit or restrict the rights or duties of the police or investigating agency, to investigate
into the charges against the person who seeks and is granted pre-arrest bail.
(8) The observations in Sibbia regarding "limited custody" or "deemed custody" to facilitate the requirements of the investigative authority,
would be sufficient for the purpose of fulfilling the provisions of Section 27, in the event of recovery of an article, or discovery of a fact,
which is relatable to a statement made during such event (i.e. deemed custody). In such event, there is no question (or necessity) of asking the
Accused to separately surrender and seek regular bail. Sibbia (supra) had observed that
"if and when the occasion arises, it may be possible for the prosecution to claim the benefit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act in regard to a dis
covery of facts made in pursuance of information supplied by a person released on bail by invoking the principle stated by this Court in State
of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya.
(9) It is open to the police or the investigating agency to move the court concerned, which grants anticipatory bail, for a direction Under
Section 439(2) to arrest the Accused, in the event of violation of any term, such as absconding, non-cooperating during investigation, evasion,
intimidation or inducement to witnesses with a view to influence outcome of the investigation or trial, etc.
(10) The court referred to in para (9) above is the court which grants anticipatory bail, in the first instance, according to prevailing authorities.
(11) The correctness of an order granting bail, can be considered by the appellate or superior court at the behest of the state or investigating
agency, and set aside on the ground that the court granting it did not consider material facts or crucial circumstances. (See Prakash Kadam &
Etc. Etc v. Ramprasad Vishwanath Gupta and Anr. Jai Prakash Singh (supra) State through C.B.I. v. Amarmani Tripathi). This does not
amount to "cancellation" in terms of Section 439(2), Code of Criminal Procedure.
(12) The observations in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (and other similar judgments) that no restrictive
conditions at all can be imposed, while granting anticipatory bail are hereby overruled. Likewise, the decision
in Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra and subsequent
decisions(including K.L. Verma v. State and Anr. , Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Anr., Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal , Nirmal Jee
t Kaur v. State of M.P., HDFC Bank Limited v. J.J. Mannan , Satpal Singh v. the State of Punjab and Naresh Kumar Yadav v. Ravindra Kumar)
which lay down such restrictive conditions, or terms limiting the grant of anticipatory bail, to a period of time are hereby overruled.
R ig h ts o fu n d e rtia lp ris o n e rs