DEVELOPMENT ADMININSTRATION IN CHINA

EDGARDO S. APUHIN JR. MD,MPA,MMHA,CHA,PAPSHI,PCOM,PCHA

• The Chinese society has deeply rooted concepts, ideas and
traditions that have historically influenced the development of
social, political, and economic institutions.

• The system of governance has been greatly impacted by the well-

established traditions and ideas forming the bases of the Chinese
culture that has endured throughout history.
•
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE PREHISTORIC ERA (21ST CENTURY-221 B.C.)

• The prehistoric period lasted for more than two thousand years in
Chinese history with three dynasties, the Xia (2100-1600 B.C.), the
Shang (1600-1122 B.C.) and the Zhou (1122-221B.C.), subrogating
one another (Seeger, 1934).
• During this time, the leaders in the royal kingdom created the
early style of governance through the formation of the Feudal
system, the enhancement of the centralized rule, and the
evolution of the intellectual foundations of the government
process under the feudal system (Huters, Wong, & Yu, 1997).
• The first nationhood of the Xia Dynasty was transformed from the immemorial
clannish system (Wei, 1998). In late clannish era, the strongest man or the leader in
the clan conquered

• the lands and properties of other tribes. Gradually, the conqueror emerged as the
king and his young followers were considered to be the original part of the military,
whereas those people who were defeated became the slaves and the personal
property of the rulers. In order to appease his supporters in his clan and consolidate
his control, the king had to distribute the fruits of conquest to his relatives and
confer titles of nobility unto them according to the closeness of the relationship
between himself and the relatives (Seeger, 1934). Therefore, the feudalism system
was established in the Chinese society during the early period of its history.
• The major contribution to the practice of public administration during that time was the formation of the centralized
kingship governmental structure, which included executive, defense, prison, and judicial systems (Jian, Shao, & Hu, 1956).
The early form of the kingship
• government in China consisted of three hierarchical systems: the central or the interior government, called Nei Fu, the
vassal states or exterior government, Wai Fu, and the rural Xiang and Sui administrative system (Wei, 1998).
• The interior officials were classified in a hierarchy of executives, ministers, educators and clergies, and agricultural and
business officials (Jian, Shao, & Hu, 1956). The positions of executive officials were occupied by the direct relatives of the
king, such as the king’s uncles. They served as regents to assist the young ruler in consolidating his power in the royal
family. Ministers were responsible for the royal family’s internal affairs, such as food service, construction, hunting,
reception, and religious ceremonies (Wiethoff, 1975). Evidence from the inscriptions on bones or tortoise shells of the Shang
Dynasty showed that educators were usually senior officials or some experienced members of the class of clergies (Jian,
Shao, & Hu, 1956). Only the young persons from ruling families became the students. The subjects of education ranged from
rituals and musical arts to astrology, which served the purpose of enhancing the king’s mental control (Chang, 1975). Also,
agriculture, stockbreeding, and bronze manufacture

• were major financial resources in the primitive ages. In the West Zhou Dynasty (1122-771 B.C.), central government formally
appointed officials to take care of agriculture, Si Tu, stockbreeding, Mu Zheng, and manufacturing, Si Gong (Wei, 1998).
• The exterior government normally referred to the heads of affiliated states, which can be considered the earliest form of local
government in China. The vassal states submitted to the military control in lieu of direct hegemony via the central government and
were forced to pay tribute to the central empire regularly (Jian, Shao, & Hu, 1956). Sometimes, the king would call meetings of all
the vassal states leaders in order to secure his direct control. A story in the book “ Han Feizi,” written by Han Feizi (280-233 B.C.),
depicted that one day Yu, the first King of Xia Dynasty, called for a meeting of all the vassal states leaders. The leader of tribe
Fang Feng was executed in the meeting simply because he came in late (Yu, 2000). However, once the central government lost its
military power and support, the strongest vassal state leader such as Tang,
• the leader of the Shang tribe and the first king of Shang Dynasty, and Ji Chang, the Marquis of Xi Bo and the first king of the Zhou
Dynasty, would rebel and overthrow the unpopular rulers (Wei, 2002). Therefore, in prehistoric ages, maintaining the military
power was the first priority for the central empire to consolidate the rule over vassal states.
• Regionalism had also been developed fully in the Zhou Dynasty (Jian, Shao, & Hu, 1956). According to the Zhou Li, a book which was
thought to be written in the Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.), there were three levels of administrative districts: state capital
Guo, which was
• the king’s royal seat; city Du, which was the headquarters for the vassal states, and rural township Yi, which was made up of
several small communities(Yang, 1954). The county administrative hierarchy operating in the Xiang and Sui system consisted of
seven ranks from the smallest family, Jia, to Bi, Lv, Zu, Dang, Zhou, to the township level Xiang (Zhou Li, n.d.). Each

• level of hierarchy had its own administrator who appeared to be someone from the well-respected older generation in that level
(Wiethoff, 1975).
• Historians divided the Zhou Dynasty rule into two parts: the West Zhou and East Zhou Dynasties (770 B.C.-221 B.C.).
The later dynasty was further divided into the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.) and the Warring States Period.
During these periods, several vassal states became very powerful and the central government could not control them
any longer (Wright, 1975). In order to survive and strengthen the state, the state leaders started looking into various
types of public administration theories. The development of these theories was nurtured and set the intellectual
foundation for two thousand years of monarchical domination. The monarchical system thrived because of the support
of the most famous thinkers of this time, including Confucius, Mencius, Sun Tzu, Han Feizi, and Lao Tzu (Wright,
1975). Also at this time, significant political, economic, and social changes had occurred in three areas: the decline of
hereditary aristocracy in government, the establishment of county as basic unit of local administration, and the
maturation of the legal system.
• During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, vassal states were constantly engaged in battles (Jian,
Shao, & Hu, 1956). Scholars noted the reasons for the political turmoil as “the king who is not with good morals; the
eupatrids who are inappropriately rewarded; and the officials who are not capable in their positions” (Song, 1980).
Consequently, state leaders realized that kindred relations could no longer be the sole criterion for appointing public
officials (Huters, Wong, Yu, 1997). Under this circumstance, a group of elites from the lower noble class, Shi, were
able to receive sufficient education and became high ranking officials. Supportive recommendations, education, and
self-promotion were three major methods for the Shi class elites to be appointed as officials (Wei, 1998). With the
aim of attracting qualified intellectuals,
• the leaders of the states presented lands and properties to the elites (Huters, Wong, & Yu, 1997). The
old clannish hereditary aristocracy was abolished gradually.
• In 536 B.C. in the State of Zheng, the first criminal law was cast in a bronze cooking vessel. More laws
were promulgated in other states, such as Fa Jing (The Classic of Law) and Qin Lv (The Law of the
State of Qin) (Wei, 1998). Although those laws merely aimed to strike down civil criminals, they
efficiently protected the ruler class’s rights and enhanced their control over the civilians.
Accordingly, state governments constituted judicial offices that took charge of the criminal justice,
whereas at the local level, the head of the local government was responsible for enforcing the laws.
Consequently, prisons were also created as a ramification of these established criminal laws (Huters,
Wong, & Yu, 1997).
• As a result of the improvement of personnel management, executive control, and criminal justice,
the king of the State of Qin became more powerful than other major states. Finally in 221
• B.C., Emperor Qin Shi Huang conquered six other major states and united the entire country of China
(Wei, 1998). The formation of the Qin Dynasty marked the beginning of a centralized monarchy
system in China .
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE MONARCHICAL SYSTEM (221 B.C.-1911 A.D.)

• During the two thousand years of monarchical system, nearly twenty dynasties replaced one another. Once
the old kingdom failed to sustain its governance, a new interest group would supersede it by force. This
trend of replacement represented the political, social, and economic development, which consummated
China’s centralized monarchical public administration. During most of this time, the imperial government
was divided into three linear administrative levels: the king, the royal court, and the local government.
Moreover, the examination and the
• inspectorate systems were also constituted at this time. These two systems had great influence on
• the development of the civil service based on merit and the supervision of government performance in
modern public administration.
• The King
• The king was the core or the head of the centralized monarchical system (Wei, 1998). Thus, how to
maintain the king’s supremacy and prolong the duration of the kingship became the primary objective of
its public administration. After the military uprising to usurp the throne, kings in each dynasty focused
more on spiritual domination and thought control.
• 
• Since Qin Shi Huang, all the kings believed that they were the sons of heaven and
were designated by the God in heaven to control the kingdom (Jian, Shao, & Hu,
1956). This belief became a powerful tool for the kings’ spiritual control to common
people and assisted the kings’ supreme monarchical governance. Besides spiritual
domination, thought control was another efficient tool for imperial rule (Hucker,
1975a). Right after Qin Shi Huang united the country, one of his policies was to
burn all the books and bury the scholars alive (Wright, 1975). In the West Han
Dynasty (206 B.C.-9 A.D.), the third king Han Wu Di (156 B.C.-87 B.C.) followed
• Dong Zhongshu’s advice to “dismiss all other philosophies but Confucianism” (Liu,
2002. p. 56). Since then, Confucian doctrines such as the Three Cardinal Guides
(San Gang) and the Five Constant Virtues (Wu Chang)1 were established as a
primary social norm throughout imperial society (Huters, Wong, & Yu, 1997).
• The king in China’s monarchical system had unlimited power in ruling the
government, military, and common people. The king’s autocracy was vividly
depicted by Guan Zi, a prominent legalist in the Warring States Period, as “six
major powers are manipulated by the bright kings: survive them (the officials)
or kill them, grant them fortune or make them poor, and award them as noble
or demote them as slaves” (Li, 2004. p.101). Moreover, the king had a
systematic chain of command to enhance his hegemony. Memorial to the throne,
discussion in

• the court, and supervise local government officials were the three major means
for the king to obtain the political and social information (Jian, Shao, & Hu,
1956).
The Central Government (the Royal Court Administrative System)

• A comprehensive structure of monarchical central government had evolved throughout imperial society. In most of the two thousand years of the monarchical
system, the central government was mainly comprised of two simple hierarchical levels: ministry level and departmental level (Huters, Wong, & Yu, 1997).
However, due to the specified division of work, the number of central government officials could be as many as several hundreds (Wei, 1998). The development
of central public administration had undergone three stages: the three ministers and nine officials (San Gong and Jiu Qing), the three ministries and six
departments (San Sheng and Liu Bu), and the interior cabinet and military-political-affair agency (Nei Ge and Jun Ji Chu) (Wei, 1998). Although the central
government was created to assist the king’s supreme rule, the outcome was contradictory. The king was skeptical and afraid of his ministers who might
• possess superabundant power that would endanger the king’s sovereignty (Jian, Shao, & Hu,
• 1956). Therefore, the central government in the monarchical system emerged during a course of fighting for the controlling power between the king and his
subordinates.
• The three ministers and nine officials (San Gong and Jiu Qing2) administrative system
• separated executive power into three main branches: the executive affairs, the military affairs, 
• and the inspectorate, and nine subdivisions of these three branches (Daubier, 1974). Although the three ministers were politically in a higher rank than the nine
officials, there were no superior
• and subordinate administrative relationships between them because they were all under the direct control of the king. The purpose of the separation of the
executive power to many departments was to prevent any single minister seizing greater power than other officials and to enhance t
 
• king’s monarchy (Daubier, 1974). Han Wu Di further developed the administrative structures to control their behaviors by separating the central government into
two parts: the central offices (Zhong Chao) and exterior offices (Wai Chao) and creating the position of the interior chancellor (Shang Shu), whose job was to
help the king to issue decrees (Wei, 1998). Since the kings’ decrees were the supreme laws and orders in monarchical China, the interior chancellor was
• more powerful than any other officials by taking the power of legislation. With the assistance from the interior chancellor, the king efficiently enhanced his
control over the central government (Daubier, 1974).
• In the Sui (581-618 A.D.) and Tang (619-907 A.D.) Dynasties, the kings realized the importance of enforcing his legislative
power, so that they created a new three ministries and six offices (San Sheng and Liu Bu3) administrative system (Wei,
1998). The responsibilities of three ministries were drafting (Zhong Shu Sheng), checking (Men Xia Sheng), and
implementing (Shang Shu Sheng) the king’s decrees (Wei, 1998). The minister of the Shang Shu Sheng controlled the six
executive offices. Similarly, being afraid of one superior power minister, the king in the Tang Dynasty created the Imperial
Academy (Han Lin Xue Shi Yuan), which was located inside the king’s royal palace (Figure 1). The scholars in the Imperial
Academy assisted the king to initiate and check the decrees before delivering them to the ministries (Huters, Wong,
• Yu, 1997).
• Although this structure had been abandoned and readopted several time, it was further developed by the Ming Dynasty
(1368-1644 A.D.). The third king in the Ming Dynasty Zhu Li hired several young intellectuals from the Imperial Academy to
the royal court to consult about national affairs and formed the Executive Cabinet (Nei Ge) (Wei, 1998). At his time, those
scholars in the Cabinet, called Nei Ge Da Xue Shi, were all in very low administrative rankings (Huters, Wong, Yu, 1997).
Therefore, the administrative processes appeared to be in a grotesque
• circumstance, where the king discussed major national affairs with lower ranking scholars, who were also responsible for
giving executive orders and decrees to the higher ranking ministers. However, this situation did not last long. In the Qing
Dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.), the last monarchical government in China, the king created the even closer Military-Political-
Affair Agency in the royal court to determine important national affairs and to restrict the power of the Cabinet, which
dealt with mainly routinised civic affairs (Daubier, 1974).
Local Government

•  
• Although the central government structure had been changing throughout
ancient Chinese history, local government arrangements had not experienced
major alterations until its

• formalization during the Qin Dynasty. Most dynasties practiced a three level
local administrative system4, consisting of provinces, counties, and townships
(Wei, 1998). Although many smaller territorial units were set up as part of
the township level, such as Xiang, Li, Cun (villages or communities level),
they were under the authority of township government and did not have any
administrative power (Huters, Wong, & Yu, 1997).
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DURING THE NATIONALISTS MOVEMENT (1912-1949)

• The Xin Hai Revolution overthrew the old monarchical system in 1911. A chaotic situation continued until the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The Chinese people suffered through a period of constant turmoil and wars (Adshead, 2000, Bailey,
• 2001, Bastid-Bruguiere, 1994, & Ch’ien, 1950). This period started with the conflicts among regional warlords, expended to include the civil
wars between the Nationalist (Guomingdang) and Communist Parties, and ended with wars against foreign invaders (Bastid-Bruguiere, 1994).
By the end of this time, China’s social, political, and economic situation was extremely miserable. However, this was also the time that
China’s democratic political development improved tremendously. This improvement led to an epochal alteration that China went from a
monarchy to a republic (Li, 1987). The two most prominent progresses in reforming China’s public administration systems established by the
Nationalists during that time were the evolution of the republican constitution and the formation of the Nationalist government with the
concept of the separation of powers (Nathan, 1976).

• A week after the victory of the Wuchang Uprising in 1911, a military ordinance with constitutional characteristics known as the “Military
Government Provisional Ordinance,” was passed by the reformists (Fincher, 1981). This ordinance was considered to be the rudiment of the
republican constitution (Nathan, 1976). Sparks from the Wuchang Uprising soon ignited the
• entire country. One month later, most of the provinces declared independence. On November 30,
• 
• 1911, all of the independent provincial representatives met in Hankou, a neighboring city to
• 
• Wuchang in the Hubei Province, to discuss the formation of a new central government (Thornton
• 1973). Two days later, the provisional government promulgated the “Provisional Government Organizational Synopsis of
the Republic of China (ROC)” (hereinafter “Synopsis”) which was considered to be the initial form of the ROC Constitution
(Nathan, 1976). The Synopsis legalized the form of provisional government, which had a provisional president, senate and
five departments. It also specified the rights and obligations of the president and senate. Before long, the forerunner of
Chinese republican reform and the founder of the largest reformist organization—Tong Meng Hui—Sun Yat-sen came back
from abroad (Li, 1987). Due to his world-wide reputation and his dedication to the reform, he was nominated and elected
to be the first Provisional President of the ROC. On January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen arrived in Nanjing and inaugurated a new
era (Fincher, 1981).
• Sun Yat-sen further amended the Synopsis after his accession (Li, 1987). The new Synopsis followed the American
separation of power political structure, but endowed the President with even more power including issuing executive
orders, utilizing veto power, commanding military forces, declaring war, making peace, and signing treaties (Shen, 1966).
Moreover, the Synopsis stated that “with the consent of the Provisional Senate, the Provisional President shall have the
authority to establish the Provisional Court” (Wei, 1998. p.440). This Synopsis allowed the Provisional President to take
charge of the judiciary system (Thornton,

• 1973). The structure of the provisional government basically attributed the more Americanized western administrative
format, which contained two functional offices: Presidential Office and Secretariat, and nine executive departments: the
Army, the Navy, Foreign Affairs, Justice,
• Finance, Interior, Education, Industry, and Transportation. According to the Synopsis, the Provisional Senate had
legislative, budgeting, official appointment and dismissal, foreign affairs, and advisory powers (Thornton, 1973).
The legalization of a provisional government and senate system formally marked the end of the thousands-year-old
monarchical system and the establishment of a new republican administration (Fincher, 1981).
• The Synopsis, according to its organizational format, was more like a law defining the format of a government. It
could not fulfill the reformists’ desire of creating a republican Constitution. After nearly two months of preparation,
on March 11, 1912 the Nanjing Provisional Senate passed the first constitutional law—Provisional Constitution of the
ROC (hereinafter “the Provisional Constitution”) (Bailey, 2001). Concluded by Zhu (1993), the Provisional
• Constitution was more comprehensive and closer to a formal constitution than the Synopsis in the following aspects:
• 1. According to the Provisional Constitution, the provisional government formally established the separation-of-
power system with three branches: provisional senate, provisional president, and the court.
• 2. It was the first time throughout Chinese history that Chinese citizens’ basic human rights had been guaranteed by
a law. Some articles of the Provisional Constitution, expressing these rights were: “the sovereignty of the ROC shall
reside in the whole body of citizens,” “the people shall have freedom of speech, teaching, writing, and
publication,” and “the right to live, the right to work, and the right to own property
• shall be guaranteed to the people.” These passages indicated establishment of a capitalist society or government that guaranteed the protection of private
properties.
• 3. The Provisional Constitution defined the territory of China, which included twenty-two provinces, plus Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai.
• 4. The Provisional Constitution also altered the governmental structure described by the Synopsis and created the position of the Prime Minister (p. 103).
• Although the Provisional Constitution represented the interests of a group of Chinese capitalists at that time, the complicated social and political
environment obstructed the progress of the Nationalists movement toward the democracy. For the next sixteen years, China experienced twice restoration of
the monarchy system, replaced four Presidents and twenty-eight Prime Ministers, and experienced several wars among warlords (Wei, 1998). However, in
July
• 1928, the Manchurian warlord Zhang Xueliang pledged allegiance to the National Government, which symbolized the end of the period of warlords’ turmoil
and marked the first unified republican rule in China (Thornton, 1973). The National Government at that time was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek (also
known as Jiang Jieshi), Sun Yat-sen’s successor and the leader of the Nationalist Party (Gregory, 1982). In October 1928, the Nationalist Party’s Central
Political Council promulgated the National Government Organic Law (hereinafter “the Organic Law”) initiating a five-branch government (Five- Yuan) system
(Xiao, 1994). The theoretical base of the Five-Yuan System was derived from Sun Yat-sen’s political thoughts, the Three Principles of the People, and
referred to the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan (Xiao, 1994). The purpose of separating
government powers into five branches was to maintain the checks and balances in all of the
• Yuans. According to the Organic Law, the National Government had one President and twelve to sixteen commissioners (Wells, 2001). The President was also
the Chief Commander of the Army,

• Navy, and Air Force. The laws passed by the Legislative Yuan should be endorsed and approved by all other Yuans. Each Yuan should have a President and a
Vice President and should be independent from each other. The detailed duties and obligations are also explained in the Organic Law (Figure 2) (Xiao, 1994).
• The Constitution of the ROC was formally adopted by the National Constituent
•  
• Assembly on December 25, 1946 and promulgated by the National Government on January 1,
•  
• 1947 (Wells, 2001). It reflected Sun Yat-sen’s goodwill of republican democracy. However, the real political democracy was a pure dream at that time
because although the Five-Yuan system clearly limited the power of each Yuan and all of them were supposed to be independent, the President of National
Government Chiang Kai-shek was a de facto autocrat in the Nationalists’ regime (Gregory, 1982). Chiang’s military and political powers were so strong that
nobody could remove him from the President’s seat. He was the President of the ROC even after he retreated to Taiwan after losing the Civil War with the
Communist military in 1949 and had remained politically influential until his death in 1975 (Gregory, 1982).
• Besides the establishment of a central government structure, the Nationalist Government also issued the Provincial Organic Law, County Organic Law, and
City Organic Law that clarified the local hierarchical structure and instituted the tri-level administrative system (Thornton, 1973). The Provincial Organic
Law ordained that the provincial government consist of a Provincial Affairs Council, Secretariat, Departments, Offices directly under Provincial Government,
and Judiciary Court. The Provincial Affairs Council was the central administrative agency in a province. It had one chairperson and several council members.
Major departments in
• the provincial government were the Department of Civil Administration, Department of Finance, Department of Education, and Department of Construction.
The offices directly under Provincial Government were Public Security, Police, Statistics, Social Affairs, Public Health, Accounting,
•
 
• 
• Public Personnel, and Food. Provincial government also maintained a High Court. Some provinces with broader territories could have two High Courts
(Thornton, 1973).
• Under Provincial control, there were smaller administrative units such as county, district,
township, village, and city (Wei, 1998). County government was responsible for local public
security, finance, construction, education, public health, and agrarian affairs (Wei, 1998).
According to the County Organic Law, Xiang (villages) was the subordinate administrative
unit to County, and ten villages could form a Xiang. City government was an administrative
unit under the direct control of either the Executive Yuan or Province. Since the National
Government’s organic laws were created in the 1920s, a systematic modern government
• structure was established (Shen, 1966). However, due to the Communist control in Northwest
China and the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, this form of government was not efficiently
implemented and functioned (Thornton, 1973). In 1949 after the Communist Party of China
defeated the Nationalist Party in the Second Civil War, Chiang Kai-shek had to escape to
Taiwan. Since then, Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of People have been carried out in the
island, whereas mainland China is implementing the socialism system (Wells, 2001).
THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST CHINA (1949-2003)

• Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China’s socio-political structure has been fundamentally shaped and reshaped several times. The
transformation of political systems requires support of the relevant economic bases. Therefore, changes of the economic systems have been
the major political theme during the development of modern public administration. For the past 56 years, Chinese government has gone
through the reconstruction, revolution, and reform stages with respect to the establishment of economic bases. The government has actually
• sought to transform China from a pure agrarian economy controlled by the landlord to a socialist economy characterized by public
ownership, and to establish the market economy in socialist
•
 
• 
• society (CPAS, 2002). It is essential to understand the evolving path of Chinese economic policies before further exploring the current
structures and processes of the Chinese government.
• After the Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Mao Zedong announced the founding of the PRC in 1949, the first task for the new
leaders was how to revive the war-torn economy to realize their dream of actualizing Socialism (Trager, & Henderson, 1970, CPAS,
• 2002, & Bailey, 2001). At that time, there were three major obstructions that undermined the Socialist movement: landlordism in
agricultural industry, capitalism in urban economy, and private-ownership in industrial area (Shen, 2000). In 1950, the People’s Government
promulgated the Land Reform Law, which articulated its mission as “abolishing the feudalist exploitation from the landlords, liberalizing the
agrarian productivity, promoting the agricultural
• industry, and paving the way for the new China’s industrialization” (People’s Daily, 1950.). This law, the first ever in China, legalized the
farmers’ equal rights in owning certain areas of land
• and abolished the old land private-ownership system that existed. Although there were brutal crackdowns against the feudal landlords,
the Land Reform Law produced progressive thinking in terms of consolidating the CPC’s rule by uniting the broader peasantry class
(Trager, & Henderson, 1970). After the promulgation of this law for two years, approximately 250 million peasants were given two or
three mu (Chinese unit of area equals 1/15 of a hectare) each (Saich,
• 2004). The reconstruction of the agrarian economic structure effectively prepared for the impending industrial socialization. Starting in
the early 1950s and expending throughout the First Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957) period, the Socialist reconstruction goal had been carried
out and achieved in the area of agriculture, manufacturing, and privately-owned industry and business (Shen, 2000). By the end of 1956,
96.3 per cent of China’s peasantry population joined the agricultural cooperatives; 91.7 per cent of the manufacturing workers
participated in the manufacturing production cooperatives; and 99 per cent of the privately-owned industries and
•
 
• 
• 82.2 per cent small businesses had also been converted to the public cooperative system (CPAS,
• 
• 2002). Therefore, the goal of Socialist reconstruction had been accomplished by the end of 1957. After the First Five-Year-Plan, China’s
gross value of industrial output was 78.39 billion yuan (about US$9.44 billion under the exchange rate in 2005), gross value of agriculture
output was
• 60.4 billion yuan (about US$7.28 billion) (CPAS, 2002). The advantages of the Socialist economy became extraordinarily noticeable at that
time.
• The initial success achieved by the Chinese leaders during the First Five-Year-Plan made the jubilance and led to the creation of “leftist” movements that
embarked upon most ambitious agenda of the Great Leap Forward, the People’s Commune, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Daubier, 1974).
Starting during May of 1958, the Second Session of the Eighth CPC National Congress framed a new policy of “go all out, aim high, and achieve greater, faster,
• better and more economical results,” which marked the beginning of the “Great Leap Forward” (Bailey, 2001, p.167). The original goal of the Great Leap
Forward movement aimed at stimulating people’s mental incentives to realize more vigorous economic achievement (Trager,
• & Henderson, 1970). However, the consequences of this unrealistic hope were merely the formation of the proneness to boasting and exaggeration and the
Utopian style the People’s Commune. The institution of the commune was intended to create as an agrarian economic organizational system, which was used to
replace the village cooperatives (Chesneaux, 1979). According to Mao’s concept, the People’s Commune was intent upon achieving Communist public ownership
(Trager, & Henderson, 1970). All properties of each member belonged to the entire commune. Public eateries was built, so that people could get free food. The
method of payment to people was merely in-kind, which was the so-called the Supply System (Deng 2004). However, the Communist experiment of the People’s
Commune failed to fulfill its great economic and political aim and also damaged the common people’s motivation to work and their

• trust in the government. Xinhua News Agency reporters published an article in a journal circulated only among the central government officials in January 1959,
which vividly described the side effect caused by the commune system. The writer observed a phenomenon that “[there are] more people eating in the eateries,
but less going out for work; more people malingering, but less using medicine; more people becoming lazy, but less hardworking; and more people are reading
books, but less working in the fields” (CPAS, 2002). Unfortunately, Mao not only ignored his mistakes, but also enforced his “leftist” movement by calling for the
“class struggle against the reactionary and revisionists” (Bailey, 2001, p.178). On May 16, 1966, Chairman Mao’s ordinance “the Circular from the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China” (also called as “May 16 Circular”) marked the beginning of the ten-year Cultural Revolution (Domes, 1970). The
Cultural Revolution severely demolished the socio-political order and destroyed the juggernaut image of the CPC created by Mao’s charisma (Saich, 2004).
Moreover, the economic growth rate during this period slowed down from 17.8 per cent in 1963 to1965 to
• 10 per cent from1965 to 1980 (Lin, Cai, & Li, 2001).
• After the dream of the Communism vanished, the pragmatic post-Mao leadership, headed by Deng Xiaoping, realized the importance of restoring the national goal to the economic
development. In the Twelfth CPC National Congress, the CPC Secretary Hu Yaobang remarked in his report that China’s economic policy shifted from the Socialist economy to “carry on the
planned economy, but assisted with the market adjustment” (CPAS, 2002). The CPC also intended to alleviate people’s distress from the mental atrocities imposed by the Cultural
Revolution to the modernization of people’s life. Deng Xiaoping, the great architect of the economic reform publicly declared that “socialism means eliminating the poverty. Pauperism is
not socialism, still less communism. The superiority of the socialist system lies above all in its ability to improve the people’s material and culture life” (Deng, 1985, p. 37). Under the
•
 
• 
• economic development guidelines, a series of reforms were undertaken in both rural and urban areas. In the realm of agriculture, the most significant change was to initiate the
“household responsibility” policy, in which the publicly-owned land was contracted to individual household instead of being controlled by the commune (Chesneaux, 1979). Once the
household leased the land, the peasants could decide whatever production and investment they wanted to make, as long as they met their obligations to the state (Bailey, 2001). The
urban industrial policy and government reforms had also followed that developmental goal. The major policies that were undertaken as part of the industrial reform have been successful
as evidenced by the statement made by Hamer (1999), Mok (2000), and Bailey (2001):
• 1. the opening-up policy allows foreign investment ventures to establish joint ventures, cooperative ventures, or the wholly foreign owned ventures;
• 2. the self-determination policy for state-owned enterprises enhances the incentives and creativity of the managers and employees in those enterprises;
• 3. the reform of the financial system creates and separates the central and local taxation system in lieu of the original direct profits-collection system;
• 4. the reform of the price system looses the state control over the commodities and raw materials; and
• 5. the establishment of the five Special Economic Zones and fourteen Costal Economic
• 
• Development Zones5 stimulates the development in the East China.
• 
• Besides these five major economic policies, more specific government ordinances and regulations were issued to enforce the economic development goal.
• From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the open investment policy and economic reforms set a solid foundation for further social, political, and economic structural change, notably the
reform to the Socialist-market economy (Shen, 2000).
ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION: STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS

• Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the government has undertaken
several major structural and organizational changes in order to realize its strategic
mission and the changing economic policy goals (CPAS, 2002). During the period of 50
years of transformation, the current governmental structure represents a more
pragmatic approach toward achieving its economic development goals (Shen, 2000).
Among various policy changes, streamlining the central government, the separation of
the Party and the policies, and the city
• government controlling the county government reflect the vision of Deng Xiaoping
who believed that the economic modernization of China would require constant
structural and organic changes in the political as well as the administrative
organization of the Chinese society (Deng, 1985). Therefore, the purpose of this
chapter is to examine the current institutional development and administrative
reforms focusing on structures, processes, and interactive relationships.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN CHINA

• The Central Government

• 
• The structure of governance in China at the central level is characterized by a 6+1+2 system (CPAS, 2002). The six refers to the following decision-making organs:
the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), the National People’s Congress (NPC), the
State Council (SC), the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The one stands for the President
and the two for the judicial organs, such as the Supreme People Court (SPC), and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP). All these nine
• administrative components can be grouped into five branches according to their political functions: the party, legislature, executives, judiciary, and military
(Zhu, 2002).
• The Communist Party of China
• The impact of the Bolshevistic Revolution in the Soviet Union influenced the Chinese intellectuals, such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu, about the theory of
Marxism, which led to the founding of the CPC in 1921 (Thoroton, 1973). However, in the 1920s, with the influence of the nations’ founding father Sun Yat-sen,
the Nationalist Party was still the leading group in China’s political arena. It was not until the Civil Wars and the Anti-Japanese War of the 1930s and 1940s
helped the CPC to gain much broader support among the peasantry and so-called proletarian classes (Thornton, 1973). In 1949, the Liberation Army of the CPC
defeated the Nationalist government forces after three major battles and took over the political power in mainland China (Chesneaux, 1979). Since then, the
CPC has been the only ruling party in China.
• Currently, the CPC is the largest political party in the world developing at a very fast pace. In 1978, the CPC had 35 million members, but the number increased
to 64 million in 2000 and reached 70 million in 2005 (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Although the number of the CPC members only counts for five per cent of
China’s 1.3 billion population, one tenth of the urban citizens are CPC members (Zhu, 2002). From central to local, every level of government has one CPC
committee, which is in charge of the CPC administration at its respective level and directs government policy-making on major issues. The grassroots organ of
the CPC committee is the CPC branch (Zhi Bu) or the CPC group (Zu), with the mission of recruiting and evaluating new CPC members, organizing Communism
theory learning activities, and collecting membership fees (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). There were more than three million CPC branches and groups in China in
2000 (Zhu, 2002).
• In the central level, the CPC has two executive organs: the CPCCC and the CDIC (Figure 3).
The members of the two committees are elected by the members of the National Congress
of the CPC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Because the National Congress of the CPC holds its
meeting once every five years, the CPCCC is the de facto CPC chief administrative organ,
which is chaired by the secretary general. The CPCCC members meet every year to serve
the major issues dealing with major national affairs and policies. Three functioning offices
under the CPCCC are the Political Bureau of the CPCCC, the Standing Committee of the
Political Bureau (SCPB), and the Secretariat of the CPCCC. These three offices form the
inner cabinet of the CPCCC, that are responsible for handling the major Party and national
issues during the adjournment of the CPCCC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). The 16th Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China, elected in 2002, is headed by the Secretary
General Hu Jingtao and consists of nine members of the SCPB, seven members of the
Secretariat, 24 members of Political Bureau, and
• 356 CPCCC members (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.).
• The National People’s Congress and the President of the PRC
• 
• Article 57 and 58 of the Constitution of the PRC articulated the NPC’s political and legislative status
in China by stating that “the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China is the
highest organ of state power. Its permanent body is the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress” and “the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee exercises the
legislative power of the state” (People’s Daily Online. March
• 22, 2004). Literarily, the NPC is more powerful than the parliament or the congress in western
countries because it is the top organ in the nation with the highest legislative, executive, and
supervisory power. In addition, it is also the NPC representatives’ rights to elect or impeach the
President of the PRC. In reality, due to the fact that the CPC is the only ruling party in China, the
NPC is basically the legislative organ for the policies and decisions approved by the leaders of
• the CPC. For example, in the NPC session in 2005, 71 per cent of the NPC representatives were the
CPC members (Zhou & Zhang, 2005).
• The representatives of the NPC are elected by indirect vote. Electing a NPC representative normally requires three steps: (1) Chinese citizens directly vote for the
county and city district level congress members in their respective electorates; (2) the elected local congress votes to elect the members in the provincial,
municipal or autonomous region’s congress; (3) the provincial congress members finally vote for their NPC representatives7. In recent years, the

• number of representatives in all levels of People’s Congress is around 3.5 million (Zhu, 2002). The NPC members are elected for a five year term and meet once
every year. According to the Electoral Law of the NPC, 880 thousand constituencies have one representative in rural or suburban electorates, whereas the number is
only 220 thousand in cities or municipalities (NPC,
• 1995). Therefore, the total NPC representatives number near 3,000 each year. Currently, the population of China’s 55 ethnic minority groups, such as Mongolia, Hui,
Zang, Tibetan, etc., is around eight per cent among the nation’s population. However, in order to protect the minority citizens’ congressional rights, the proportion
of minority representatives are over 13 per cent each year (Zhou & Zhang, 2005). The composition of the NPC representatives suits the China’s national situation.
• In the last decade, the two-week long NPC sessions are usually held in March in Beijing. The representatives of the NPC consist of 34 provincial delegations and one
military delegation (Npc.gov.cn, n.d.). The delegation is the basic legislative unit to bring forward bills for discussion during the NPC session. Three delegations
together can file a non-confidence bill to impeach the president, the vice president, the State Council officials, or the Supreme Court judges (Npc.gov.cn, n.d.).
Four types of sessions normally hold during the NPC meetings: the preliminary session, the presidium session, the plenary session, and the delegation session (Zhu,
• 2002). The preliminary session elects the presidium and the secretary-general of the NPC and frames the agenda for the meeting. The presidium session is the
caucus in the NPC session,
• which determines the processes and major issues that are going to be voted in the plenary session. The plenary session is set for the representatives to vote for the
bills. All laws and important
• policy decisions are made after more than half of the representatives pass them in the plenary sessions. However, delegates usually do not discuss or debate issues
in the plenary meeting, due to the large size of the NPC. Thus, the delegation session is the place where major issues are
• discussed before the plenary session. The delegations communicate with each other through meeting minutes circulated during the NPC sessions (Zhu, 2002).
• The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC) represents the NPC and practice as the top
legislative body during the adjournment of the NPC. Since it is impractical to have 3,000 representatives to discuss
national issues everyday, the NPC delegations elect their representatives to establish the SCNPC. During the
adjournment of the NPC, the SCNPC carries out the overall functions and responsibilities of the NPC. In 2003, the First
Plenary Session of the Tenth NPC elected the 160-member SCNPC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Members of the SCNPC
are the professional congresspersons who, abiding by the Constitution, are not allowed to take any administrative,
judicial, or procuratorial position in
• government (People’s Daily Online, March 22, 2004). The current Presidium of SCNPC consists of one chairman, 15 vice
chairmen, and one secretary-general. Under the presidium, there are three subordinate branches: specialized
committees, work committees, and SCNPC Representatives Qualification Censorship Committee. (Figure 4) (Npc.gov.cn,
n.d.).
• The president and the vice president of the PRC are elected by the NPC. The president is the nation’s top civil official
who represents the nation by signing laws, appointing government officials, awarding national honor titles or medals,
declaring the state of war, and ordering martial law (Zhu, 2002). However, the position of the president in China is not
the same as it is in the U.S. because the Chinese president does not control the military power. Therefore, the symbolic
authority of the president in China is much greater than its real executive power. However, the last two Presidents,
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, have been holding all powers as the CPC’s Secretary-General, nation’s President, and the
military Commander-in-Chief. China’s political structure is leaning toward a more centralized direction (Zhu, 2002).
• The State Council
• 
• The SC is China’s central government and the executive branch of the NPC and SCNPC. Although constant reforms and
structural changes have been made to reorganize the central government since the founding of the nation, the political and
constitutional status of the SC remains the same. The premier is the head of the SC. However, major national policies are
determined by the joint efforts of the premier, the vice premiers and the state councilors. Ministers, commissioners, the
central bank governor, and the auditor-general are responsible for the affairs in their respective Ministries (Zhu, 2002).
• There are two kinds of caucus meetings in the SC: the Plenary Meetings (PMSC) and the Executive Meetings of the SC (EMSC)
(Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). The PMSC is summoned and presided by the premier, and attended by the premier, the vice
premiers, and all ministers,

• commissioners, the central bank governor, the auditor-general, and the secretary-general. According to the Work Regulation of
the SC, the major task of the PMSC is to discuss important national and international issues, which usually involve several
ministries or commissions (The SC, 2004). Normally, the PMSC is held once every six-month or for special occasions8. The
premier, vice premiers, state councilors, and the secretary-general are the ones who participated in the EMSC. The major
duties of the EMSC are discussing the more detailed national and international policies, drafting administrative ordinances, and
communicating national and international issues (The SC, 2004). The EMSC meets much more frequently than the PMSC, usually
three times every month.
• The Constitution empowers the SC with 18 specific functions and responsibilities. These powers can be summarized and categorized into the following
five major aspects (Zhu, 2002, p.
• 43): 
• 1. Executive powers. The SC is the highest executive organ to direct the work of all subordinate ministries and offices, including both the central and
local governments.
• 2. Legislative powers. The SC is responsible for drafting and issuing the administrative regulations, ordinances, rules, and measures. Sometimes, the
NPC or the SCNPC may mandate the SC to draft bills for them to discuss.
• 3. Managerial powers for economic policies. The SC is in charge of making the national economic and social development plan, initiating annual
budgets, coordinating the economic relationships among all industries, placing major national projects on the agenda, and making policies regarding
national finances, taxation, and social security.
• 4. Administrative powers for social affairs. The SC is controlling and guiding the development of national defense, education, scientific research,
culture, and public

• health affairs. Other social affairs such as civil service, public security, justice administration, ethnic minority affairs, special administrative regions,
and Taiwan issues are all administered by the SC. When serious crisis occurs in local areas, the SC has the authority to enforce the martial law.
• 5. Directorial powers for foreign affairs. The SC represents the Chinese government when dealing with foreign affairs. The SC is also the legitimate
government organ to negotiate and conclude treaties and agreements with foreign countries.
• The current SC, elected in 2002, consists of one premier, four vice premiers, five state councilors, 26 ministers and commissioners, one central bank
governor, one auditor-general, and one secretary-general. There are altogether 28 ministries, one special commission, 18 organizations, 14 working
organs, and 10 administrations and bureaus under the ministries and commissions (Figure 5) (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.).
• The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Commission
• Although the CPPCC is not formally defined by the Constitution, it
plays an important role in terms of uniting all other democratic
parties, and non-affiliated personages
• The CPPCC was established in September, 1949, even before the founding of the PRC. At that time the CPPCC was the
national congress. The CPPCC’s first Plenary Session adopted the provisional constitution Common Program of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference and the Organic Law of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic
of China (General Office of CPPCC, n.d.). However, after the first Constitution enacted in 1954,
• the congressional and legislative powers were, then, transferred to the NPC. Due to the uniqueness of its political position,
some western scholars consider the CPPCC as “the advisory legislative upper house” in China (Wikipedia, n.d.).
• Currently, the CPPCC has two major political responsibilities: political consultation and democratic supervision (Zhu, 2002).
During the annual session of the CPPCC meeting, the CPPCC members discuss current national and local policies. Normally,
before the NPC representatives vote for any bill, they should consult the CPPCC for suggestions and advice. After a law or a
national policy has been passed by the NPC, the CPPCC members are also responsible for supervision and inspection of
implementation of the laws and policies. The CPPCC is organized by a system of the national committee, which consists of
one chairperson,
• several vice chairpersons, one secretary general, and around 2,000 committee members9 (Zhu,
• 
• 2002). The CPPCC responsibilities are carried out by several specific committees10 (Xinhua

• News Agency, n.d.).

• The Central Military Commission
• 
• The CMC in China has dual identities because it belongs to both the CPC and the

• Chinese People (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). It seems paradoxical because two different political organs, the National
Congress of the CPC and the NPC, need to elect the same military leaders. However, this paradox is not a problem in
China because of its single ruling party system. There is no term limitation on CMC Chairman, although the CMC has a five-
year term the same as the NPC representatives. The CMC Chairman is the military commander-in-chief. Although he is
accountable to both the CPCCC and the NPC, he had the final decisive power in issuing the military command (Zhu, 2002).
• In China, the military acts as an independent system associated with the government. It is controlled neither by the NPC
nor by the government, but by the CPC Central Committee Military Commission (CCMC). The military power is the
foundation of the CPC reign. Usually, one of the vice chairmen of the CMC is also the minister of the Ministry of Defense
(MOD) in the SC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Therefore, the main function of the MOD is carried out by the Departments of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Under the command of the CMC, China’s armed forces consist of the PLA, the Chinese
People’s Armed Police Force, and the People’s Militia. The PLA administrative structure has three systems, four general
departments,
• four services, and seven military area commands11 (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.).
• The People’s Court System and the People’s Procuratorate System
• 
• The judicial system in China consists of the people’s court system and the people’s procuratorate system (CPAS, 2002). The people’s court
system is China’s national justice and trial organ, which consists of the central Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the local courts, and special
courts. The responsibilities of the SPC are: (1) to supervise lower courts and special courts; (2) to try special or appealing cases brought by
the SPP; (3) to approve death penalty cases; (4) to issue judiciary explanations on laws and orders; and (5) to order local courts to retry
cases (China.org.cn, n.d.). The local court system consists of 30 Higher People’s Courts, more than 300 Intermediate People’s Courts, and
over 2,700 grassroots-level People’s Courts. The Higher People’s Court is established in provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities;
the Intermediate People’s Courts are set up in cities; and the grassroots-level People’s Courts consist of tribunals in counties or autonomous
counties, cities without administrative districts, or administrative districts of cities. There are also three kinds of special courts: the People’s
• Military Courts, the Maritime Courts, and the Railway Transportation Courts (Figure 6) (Zhu,2002).
• The people’s procuratorate is the national procuratorial and supervisory organ (Spp.gov.cn, n.d.). Similarly, the people’s procuratorate
system also has four levels: the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), provincial procuratorates, city procuratorates, and the grassroots
level procuratorates. Moreover, in the military and railway system, special procuratorates are
• also established (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). The functions and duties of the SPP include: directing the work of local and special
procuratorates, initiating a prosecution process to corruption, bribery, and misconduct cases, supervising court trial process, investigating
criminal cases, appealing or protesting to the SPC on wrong rulings made by local courts, and supervising the performance and maintenance
in prisons and reform-through-labor institutions (Spp.gov.cn, n.d.). Local procuratorates are under the control of both upper level
procuratorates and local People’s Congress.
• Local Levels of Authority
• 
• Due to the highly centralized organizational structure, China’s local government structure practices a linear hierarchical system with subordinate
administrative unit responsible to its hierarchical superior. Currently, there are three local administrative levels: provincial level government, which consists
of 23 provinces (including Taiwan Province), four municipalities
•
 
• 
• under direct control of the SC, five autonomous regions, and two special administrative regions; urban administration, which includes fifteen semi-provincial
level cities, 259 local level cities, and 400 county level cities; and rural administration, comprises 1,671 counties, 24,043 xiangs (rural administrative unit
between county and village), 19,692 zhens (township), and 734,715 villages (NSB, 2003).
• The Provincial Level
• 
• The provincial government is the top administrative unit in the Chinese local governmental structure, which was originated in the Yuan Dynasty about 500
years ago (Wei,
• 2002). Presently, the provincial government consists of five administrative branches, the CPC committee, the people’s congress, the CPPCC, the people’s
government, and the provincial judicial organs, such as the higher people’s court and the people’s procuratorate (Zhu, 2002).
• The CPC committee is responsible for overall public administrative activities in the provincial government. The CPC committee has 20 to 40 committee
members, among whom there are usually one secretary-general, four to six vice secretary, and four to eight standing committee members. Similar to the
CPCCC, the provincial CPC committee also contains work offices, such as the General Office, the Organization Office, the Propaganda Office, the United
Front Work Office, and the Policy Research Office (Zhu, 2002).
• The provincial people’s congress and its standing committee are the local legislative and policy consultative organs. They also have the power of
appointing and dismissing the people’s government officials (Npc.gov.cn, n.d.). The number of representatives in the provincial people’s congress
varies in accordance with the population in the respective provinces. For example, the most populous Sichuan Province has 1500 representatives,
whereas the least populous Qinghai Province has only 500 provincial congressmen (NSB, 2003). The Standing Committee of the provincial congress
consists of 35 to 85 members, among whom there is one chairman, two to
•
 
•  
• ten vice chairpersons, and one secretary. The provincial congress also has special committees in the areas of economics and finance, politics and
law, education and science, and culture and public health. The local level CPPCC has a similar function as the central CPPCC, which is responsible
for supervision or policy consultation (China.org.cn, n.d.).
• The people’s government is the executive organ of the provincial people’s congress, which has three key functions: to implement the executive
orders and directives given by both the provincial congress and the SC; to issue local executive plans, policies, and regulations; and to manage the
political, social, and economic affairs in its own region (Zhu, 2002). The people’s government is under the lead of the governor with the assistance
from several vice governors, one secretary-general, and officials in administrative offices and departments. The governor and the vice governors
are elected by the local congress, whereas other departmental officials are
• nominated by the governor and approved by the congress. The administrative organization in the provincial government is similar to that in the SC
with two executive sessions. The governor, the vice governors, and the secretary-general hold the governor’s session, which is the organ for
provincial officials to discuss local policies and issues. The government plenary session consists of the members in the governor’s session and the
departmental heads. Expect for the foreign affairs and the national defense, the provincial government implements all other administrative
functions of the SC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.).
• Due to the fact that China has 55 ethnic minority groups, the Chinese government has created a self-governed autonomous region
administrative system. Current law prescribes a three level self-government system: provincial autonomous region, autonomous
prefecture and autonomous county, and autonomous xiang12 (NSB, 2003). According to the Organic Law of the Autonomous Regions,
those regions enjoy the following five administrative privileges: (1) autonomous regions’ government can request to suspend
inappropriate laws and regulations
•
 
• 
• promulgated by the NPC, and they can also enact laws according to the characteristics of their own ethnicities; (2) the local
people’s congress chairperson, the autonomous regions governors, and major government officials should be chosen from local
ethnic minority groups; (3) the
• self-government has more power in dealing with local economic development policies, infrastructure construction, and education;
(4) the ethnic minority groups can have their own armed police to safeguard local public security; and (5) it is required to use both
mandarin and local language as official languages (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). However, the autonomous regions’ CPC committee,
people’s congress, government and judicial organs do not have significant difference from other provinces (Appendix III).
• The municipalities under direct control of the SC are also provincial level administration units. Currently, there are four
municipalities: Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. The organizational structure of the municipalities is similar to the
provinces (NSB, 2003).
• The Urban Administration
•  
• Obviously, the urban administration in China refers to the city governments, which are responsible for taking care of local industrial and business
development (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). The 15 semi-provincial level cities are major cities in China, which have less
• administrative power than the municipalities, but are directly under the control of the SC 13. Most
•  
• of these cities are capitals of provinces with a population more than one million and have prosperous businesses and industries. These 15 cities have
greater authority in economic and financial management, though their political and CPC structures are under the provincial level (Zhu, 2002).
• Provincial capitals in China have more local legislative power than normal cities. Since they are the seats of the provincial governments, some key
officials in the capital cities’ government also take positions in their provincial governments (China.org.cn. n.d.). Other than
•
 
•  
• the semi-provincial level cities and capital cities, there are 227 prefecture-level cities in China with a population more than 250 thousand and a gross
industrial product of more than 250
• million dollars (NSB, 2003). Those prefecture-level cities have become politically more essential after China adopted a policy called “the city
government controls the county government” in the early 1980s. The smallest unit of the urban level government is the county level city, the size of
which is in between the prefecture-level city and the county. Its economic function lies also in
• the middle of urban industrial and rural agrarian (China.org.cn. n.d.).
The Rural Administration

 
• The majority of the rural administration constituencies are farmers. This level of administration is in charge of developing China’s agrarian economy. County is a very old
administrative unit in China, which can be dated back to the Qin Dynasty about 2,000 years ago (Wei, 1998). However, due to the economic structural change, the development
of county structure has experienced a time from expanding to shrinking (Yu, 2002). Before the founding of the PRC, there were more than 2,000 counties in China (Zhu, 2002).
The development of the county system reached its peak in between the 1920s and the 1940s (Yu, 2002). However, after the 1980s, influenced by the trend of urbanization, many
counties have been upgraded to city level. The size and political significance have been reduced greatly. Although more Chinese citizens are moving from rural areas to cities,
China still remains the largest agrarian country due to its 935 million peasant population (NSB, 2003). Therefore, the rural administration still plays
• a significant role in China’s social, political, and economic areas.

• The county governmental structure is similar to the provincial government. The county government also consists of the CPC committee, the people’s congress, the people’s
government, and the grassroots judicial offices (Yu, 2002). Their basic functions and processes are also close to the provincial government. However, since the focus of its
administrative objective is to
• develop the agrarian economy, the county government usually contains several special government offices, such as agricultural technology, forestry, livestock industry, and some
other agriculture related research offices (Zhu, 2002). Although the county administrative level is the same as the county level city, they have more authoritative powers with
regard to the economic development and policy-making. Differed from its western counterpart, the county government in China is not the lowest administrative unit. Due to
large sizes in both population and geographic territory, subordinate administrative units, such as the xiang and the zhen have been established in China (Xinhua News Agency,
n.d.).
• The xiang, the combination of villages, is the basic administrative unit in China’s organizational structure (Zhu, 2002). The zhen is at the same level as the xiang, but consists of
more non-farm industries as well as residents. It is the smallest administrative unit for non-farm regions or industrial hamlets/commune. The xiang and the zhen have a similar
administrative structure to the CPC committee, the people’s congress, and the people’s government (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.).
• The provincial-urban-rural structure system has evolved together with the development of Chinese modern public administration. However, it is still in constant changing through
organizational restructuring. The Chinese central government leaders have been putting tremendous effort into the government reforms. The following section describes the
major
• central governmental structural changes and local administrative reforms, illustra
THE REORGANIZATION EFFORTS IN CHINA

• Since the establishment of the PRC, the Chinese central government has
undertaken major reforms periodically. The reasons for frequent administrative
structural change are
• (1) the economic structural rearrangements led to governmental changes;
• (2) political turmoil also affects government stability;
• (3) ideological reform inevitably determined the transformation of political
structure; and
• (4) the financial situation was the decisive factor for the adjustment of the size
of the government (Xia 2004).
• The basic structures of the Chinese central and local governments have evolved
by following a course of construction, revolution, and reformation.
The Interim Constitutional Structure of the Chinese Government

• In September, 1949, 662 CPPCC representatives gathered in Beijing and passed the Collective Guiding
Principles of the Political Consultative Conference of China (hereinafter referred to as the guiding
principles) and the Organic Law of the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China
(hereinafter referred to as the organic law of PRC), which created the initial form of government
structure under Communist control (Chesneaux, 1979).
• The guiding principles prescribed that the Council of Central People’s Government (CCPG) was the top
administrative organ during the adjournment of the CPPCC. The CCPG possesses the military, legislative,
executive, judicial, and inspectional powers (Thornton, 1973). At that time, the CCPG was chaired by
Mao Zedong and consisted of six vice chairmen, and 56 councilors (Zhu, 2002). There were four branches
in the CCPG: (1) the People’s Revolutionary Military Control Commission, which was responsible for
establishing unified national military troops, such as the People’s Liberation Army and the Armed Police;
(2) the Supreme People’s Court, responsible for the control and supervision of subordinate levels of
courts; (3) the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, responsible for supervising the performance of
government officials; and (4) the Government Administration Council (GAC), which was the executive
body of the CCPG (Zhu, 2002). The GAC had one premier, four vice premiers, 15 councilor, and one
secretary-general. There were 35 ministries under its reign (Chesneaux, 1979).
• In the early 1950s, the General Administrative Region (GAR) was the first level of local government (Zhu, 2002). The Chinese leaders
divided the country into six larger GARs, each of which consisted of several provinces. The GAR administrative organization was
relatively simple because it consisted of only two components: the people’s government and the military
• control committee. The GAR was directly under the control of the GAC and took charge of local legislative, executive, judicial, and
military powers. Provinces, autonomous regions, and the municipal administrative offices were the second level of administrative
systems under the control of the GAR (Zhu, 2002). The provincial government had several executive offices, such as the General
Office, the Office of Civil Service, and the Office of Public Security. In 1949, the government of Beijng, Shanghai, Tianjin, and ten
other cities were kept under the direct control of the central government. The municipal government was a special administrative
unit designed for cities with a more dense population and with more economic importance (Bailey, 2001). In late 1949, there were
55 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities (Chesneaux, 1979). The smaller local administrative units included counties,
districts, and townships that mostly followed the ROC’s local government system (Bailey, 2001).
• It was not until the first Constitution of the PRC was promulgated in 1954, that the NPC was formalized as the top legislative
government organ in China. According to this Constitution, the representatives of the NPC were elected publicly. The executive,
judicial, and procuratorate branches were created by the NPC (CPAS, 2002). This Constitution also established the position of the
president to be the head of the national government. The president and vice president were elected by the members of the NPC.
However, no term limitation was put on the reign of the president. At that time, the president also served as the chair of the
National Military and
• Defense Committee, serving as the central military command organ. The SC was the central executive body and the top
administrative organ. The premier was appointed by the president
• and approved by the NPC members, whereas the vice premier and the members of the SC were
nominated by the premier-elected and approved by the NPC. The early form of the SC
contained
• 35 ministries, 20 offices, eight institutions, and one secretariat The local administrative
authority consisted of the local congress and local people’s council (Zhu, 2002). The head of the
people’s council was elected by and responsible to the local congress. The executive offices of
the provincial level people’s council were controlled by both the related ministries in the SC
and the people’s council itself. The provincial officials’ term was four years, whereas
municipalities, counties, cities, districts, and townships officials’ term was two years (CPAS,
2002). The Constitution eliminated the administrative unit of GAR; therefore, province,
autonomous regions, and municipalities became the top local administrative organs directly
under the SC’s governance. The Constitution clarified the criteria for the size of a city and its
administrative system, and those criteria have been kept until today (Bailey, 2001).
The Revolutionary Efforts

• From 1956 to 1978, China’s administration had experienced a vicious circle of reduction-expansion-reduction (Xia, 2004).
In late 1956 due to the influence of the dominant centralized-planning ideology, the SC intended to control all executive
power and planned to limit local administrative functions. Thus, the SC expanded from 64 offices to 81 (CPAS, 2002).
However, the oversized-government structure became a huge burden for the government
• expenditures (Xia, 2004). Then, the SC had to reduce and simplify its offices. By the end of 1959, more than 20 redundant
offices in the SC had been cut (CPAS, 2002). The scenario of the structural expansion-reduction of both the central and
local government lasted until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
• During the Cultural Revolution period, the systematic process of public administration was destroyed by the so-called
“class struggle” (Bailey, 2001). On one hand, the extremist Red Guards destroyed all levels of governments and seized
administrative powers by establishing the military authority—Revolutionary Committee. On the other hand, the whole
nation was immersed in a de facto anarchical state, in which the Revolutionaries and the Red Guards willfully overrode
human and legal rights (Daubier, 1974). Although the Premier Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping endeavored to alter the
disordered social and political situation, it was hard to make a huge difference because the Red Guards controlled almost
all of the central and local governments. At that time, the Revolutionary Committee (RC) was the top CPC and military

• administrative body. Followed by Mao’s “Three Combination Theory,” the RC was formed by combining leaders from the
working classes with local military commanders and the revolutionary leaders (CPAS, 2002).
• The RC administrative system destroyed the original government organizational structure at both the central and local levels. As the only local administrative organ, the RC consisted
of several groups or offices (Zu), such as the Political Group, the Production Group, the Public Security Group, and the Civil Affairs Group (Xia, 2002). Most of the original public
employees were libeled as the “capitalist roaders” and were sent to the countryside to reform as prisoners
• and laborers. Many government officials were persecuted by the Red Guards (Bailey, 2001). The paralysis of local administrative and economic order made the central government a
mere figurehead. Although the revolutionaries failed to remove Premier Zhou Enlai from power in the SC, the managerial function of the SC ministries and offices was controlled by the
RC. In 1970, the SC ministries and offices were cut down from 79 to 32 (Xia, 2002).
• The inception of the RC did not follow any legal procedures, and therefore could not represent the people’s interests. Furthermore, the major task for the RC was to supervise “class
struggle,” instead of economic development (Daubier, 1974). Thus, the Communists revolutionary effort during the Cultural Revolution period was doomed to failure in terms of social,
political, and economic system transformation. It lasted until the CPC Central Political Bureau ordered the resumption of local people’s congress and reelected officials in the local
people’s government in early 1978 (CPAS, 2002).
• After the Third Plenum of the CPC Eleventh Congress was held in December, 1978, Deng Xiaoping and his supporters overthrew the Maoist socialist policies and established the new
socio-political goals of economic development (Bailey, 2001). The new central leadership consisted of many economic practitioners and technocrats whose goal was to map out a
•
 
• 
• three-year economic recuperation plan and reestablish the Party’s authority and image (Chang,
• 
• 1990). Since then, the Chinese central government has been restructured five times and local governments have also experienced three major structural changes (Xia, 2004).
• After the Cultural Revolution, the SC regained its administrative authority. In order to fulfill the requirement of the economic development goal, the SC began to expand by adding
more ministries and offices. The number of ministries in the SC was increased from 52 in 1978 to 100 in 1982 (CPAS, 2002). Although more people were dedicated to the development
goal, the government efficiency and effectiveness was affected by the voluminous organizational structure. In January 1982, Deng Xiaoping pointed out the flaws of the oversized
government structure by stating that:
• “to simplify and condense the governmental structural requires a revolution, which is a huge issue for the government. If we do not carry out this revolution and continue to indulge
the overstaffed and overlapped state governmental organization, we will never win support from our people. This situation is intolerant and unbearable, not only for the general
people, but also for the Party itself” (Deng, 1984. p.396).
• Under his support, the governmental structural reforms were carried out by taking four steps: (1) reduce the numbers of vice premiers and add the position of
the SC who had the same rank as vice premier, but specialized in certain administrative areas, such as foreign affairs, economic development, and social affairs;
(2) decrease the number of ministries and offices to sixty; (3) restrict the member of leaders in each ministry; and (4) lay off more than 25 per cent central
government staff (Xia, 2004).
• The local government organizational structure in the early 1980s returned to its
• pre-Cultural Revolution format and was also changed in the following four aspects: (1) The governor, mayor, or chairman replaced the commissioners in the RC
as leaders in the provincial level governments. The number of vice governors was restricted between three and five. Th
• number of offices or departments was no more than 40. Consequently, the number of public employees should have been around 3,000 to 5,000 in accordance
with the size of respective provinces. Many young officials with higher educational backgrounds were promoted and the elder and senior officials retired from
their positions. (2) Besides the political officials, the number of civil servants was also reduced during the reform. By the end of 1982, more than one and a half
million staff members had been cut. (3) Some cities and regional governments were merged together and the county government was put under the authority of
city administration. This structural change marked the end of the county-city parallel administrative level system and established a new provincial-city-county-
township-village hierarchical system. (4) The xiang government was re-instituted to replace the People’s Commune system (Xia, 2004). The 1982
• local structural reform consolidated the centralized control and clarified the hierarchical structure. Since then, the basic formation of local government has
been established.
• The economic institutional change in the late 1980s led to the government structural reform in 1988 (Chossudovsky, 1986). In the reform, more ministries in the
SC were combined
• or dropped to facilitate the development of the socialist market economy and boost the efficiency of the central government. After this reform, there were 41
ministries and commissions directly under the State Council, 19 bureaus and administrations, and five offices. More than 7,900 public employees were laid off
(CPAS, 2002). Due to the 1989 Students’ Democratic Movement, the local structural reform was not implemented at this time (Schoppa, 2002).
• The governmental structural reforms in 1993 and 1998 further streamlined the central and local government organizations. Central government reforms brought
the number of the SC offices down from 65 in 1988 to 59 1993 and the number of ministries and commissions has
• been cut to 29 in 1998 (Xia, 2004). These reforms concentrated more on economic development, which served the purpose of promoting market economy. At that
time local government reforms

• had also accomplished four major tasks: (1) changing government function from specific management to general administration and alleviating the political
administration on the state-owned enterprises; (2) clarifying the intergovernmental relations and the hierarchical
• structure by further strengthening the policy of city government control over county government; (3) simplifying the governmental organization and reducing
overlapping administrative agencies; and (4) reducing local government personnel (CPAS, 2002).
• The most recent reforms were carried out in 2003 (Xia, 2004). These reforms do not focus on comprehensive structural changes. Their main goal was to enhance the
• politico-economic institutional transformation in the new century (Lin, & Hu, 2003). According to the Blue Print for the Organizational Structure Reform in State
Council passed by the First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, there are five tasks of this reform: (1) creating a State Assets Regulatory and
Management Commission as a special institution directly under the SC so as to supervise and manage the state-owned enterprises reform; (2) recomposing the
structure of National Development and Planning Commission to the National Development and
• Reform Commission in order to further enhance the macro level adjustment of national structural reform; (3) installing the China Banking Regulatory Commission to
strengthen the financial system supervision; (4) combining several ministries’ and subordinate offices’ functions to form the Ministry of Commerce which is in charge
of internal and foreign trade while boosting global economic cooperation; and (5) reinforcing the administrative function in public health, food, and drug control and
expending the State Food and Drug Administration’s authority to safeguard people’s health and safety (Xia 2004).
• After these five reforms, the Chinese central government became more efficient in terms of facilitating the economic development and actualizing the industrial
modernization goal. Therefore, the government structural reform becomes one of the most effective methods to serve

• national development goals. Moreover, the processes of the intergovernmental relationships in China are also designed and implemented for the purpose of
developing the national economy
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS

• The intergovernmental relationships in China have unique characteristics. Because China has the single dominant party in power, the interactions
between the CPC and all levels of governments become one of the most important features. The interactions include the relations between the CPC and
the central governmental branches and the relations between the superior and subordinate CPC committees. Comparatively speaking, the relationships
among different levels of governments are simple because of the highly centralized local hierarchical structure.
• The CPC and Governments
•  
• As a ruling party, the political position of the CPC is significantly different as compared to any other ruling parties in a bipartisan or a multi-partisan
system in western countries. The control of the CPC is ubiquitous in China’s social, economic, and political spheres (Bailey,
• 2001). Its policies and activities are considered to be the voice of the people of China. Although the relationships between the CPC and the government
are complicated, the analysis of these relationships can be simplified through two directions: horizontal and vertical organizational relations. The
horizontal organizational relations refer to integrative relationships between the CPC and the same level governmental branches, whereas the vertical
organizational relations stand for the linear hierarchical relations between the CPC and its subordinate committees throughout the system (Figure 8)
•  
• Horizontal Organizational Relations
•  
• The NPC is the “highest organ of state power,” which has the power of amending the Constitution to define the CPC’s role (People’s Daily Online, 2004).
However, the NPC operates under the direction and control of the CPC. The leading role of the CPC to the NPC is significant as demonstrated by the
following: (1) the NPC itself is created by the CPC and historically has been reorganized by the CPC several times; (2) the majority of the NPC
representatives are CPC members; and (3) all key positions in the SCNPC, such as the chairman, vice chairpersons, and commissioners in the NPC
committees are all taken by the CPC members. Consequently, the NPC is regulated to be the primary legislative organ of the CPC to legitimize its
political, economic, and social policies.
• The relationship between the CPC and the SC is always quoted by the CPC official media as having “close working relations” ( Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). It is important to note that in the
early ages of the CPC’s rule, the SC premier, vice premiers, and ministers are normally the

• 
• officials in the CPCCC (Zhu, 2002). However, since the CPC enacted the policy of the
• 
• separation of the Party and administration in the 1980s, the relations between the CPC and the
• 
• SC are changed to general guidance and executive management. The CPC is no longer issue specific executive order to the SC. Instead, the CPC legalizes the national development goals
through the NPC’s legislative power and it is the SC’s responsibility to initiate policies and
• courses to achieve these goals (CPAS, 2002). Moreover, before the premier delivers the annual
• 
• government work report to the NPC Plenary Session, he must submit the report to the CPCCC
• first and ask the CPCCC leaders for advice and suggestions (Npc.gov.cn, n.d.). The CPC also determines the appointment and dismissal of the SC officials by enforcing the orders through
the
• 
• NPC or the SCNPC (Xinhua News Agency, n.d.). Therefore, the SC is the executive organ of the
• CPC. By utilizing the similar methods, the CPC practices its overall political powers by dominating the judiciary and military besides its control over the legislative and executive
• 
• branches. The judiciary and military are two essential mechanisms for the CPC to guarantee its
• 
• unilateral rule.