Subsidiary Rules
CONJUNCTIVE OR DISJUNCTIVE
The word ‘or’ is normally disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive but at
times they read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the
Legislature as disclosed from the context [Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of U.P.,
AIR 1968].
According to Lord HALSBURY, the reading of ‘or’ as ‘and’ is not be resorted to,
unless some other part of the same statute or the clear intention of it requires that
to be done.
CONJUNCTIVE OR DISJUNCTIVE
In Ishwar Singh Bindra v. State of U.P. [AIR 1968] section 3(b)(i) of the Drugs
Act, 1940 defined drugs before its amendments as: ‘All medicines for internal or
external use of human beings or animals and all substances intended to be used
for or in the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation or prevention of disease in human
beings or animals other than medicines and substances exclusively used or
prepared for use in accordance with the Ayurvedic or Unani Systems of
medicine’. In this definition, the italicized word ‘and’ was read disjunctively as
the context showed that it was the clear intention of the legislature.
CONJUNCTIVE OR DISJUNCTIVE
In State of Bombay v. RMD Chamarbaugwala [AIR 1957] while dealing with
section 2(d)(i) of the Bombay Lotteries and Prize Competition Control and Tax
Act, 1948 the Supreme Court read ‘or’ as ‘and’ to give effect to the clear intention
of the legislature as expressed in the Act read as whole.
SAME WORD SAME MEANING
Dharmadhikari, J, “When the Legislature uses same word in different parts of the
same section or statute, there is a presumption that the word is used in the same
sense throughout. But this presumption is a weak presumption and is readily
displaced by the context. Even when the same word is used at different places in
the same clause of the same section it may not bear the same meaning at each
place having regard to the context of its use”
Maniklal Mazumdar v. Gauranga Chandra Dey, (2004)
SAME WORD SAME MEANING
In Parrell v. Alexander [1976] the more correct statement of the rule is stated
thus: “where the draftsman uses the same word or phrase in similar contexts, he
must be presumed to intend it in each place to bear the same meaning”.
It has been held that the rule of same word same meaning may not apply under
different provisions of the same statute [CIT v. Venkateshwara Hatcheries (P.)
Ltd., (1999); AIR 1992]. It does not necessarily follow that same words used in
two provisions must carry the same meaning [CIT v. V. Venkatachalam, 1933].
SAME WORD SAME MEANING
The Supreme Court in interpreting the words ‘the grounds on which the order has
been made’ as they occurred in section 3(3) and section 7(1) of the Preventive
Detention Act, 1950 held that the words did not bear the same meaning in these
two provisions. Under section 7(1), in communicating the grounds of detention to
the detenu the Authority could withhold such facts which were according to it
against the public interest to disclose. While under section 3(3), in reporting to the
State Government the grounds of detention, these facts were likely to figure more
prominently.
USE OF DIFFERENT WORDS
When in relation to same subject-matter, different words are used in the same
statute, there is presumption that they are not used in the same sense. Two
different words used in the same statute prima facie has to be construed as
carrying different meanings. Carrying of the same meaning by such words is an
exception rather than the rule [2003].
The words ‘under any other law for the time being in force’ were held to have
different meaning from the words ‘under this Act’ or under any other provision of
this Act [Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai v. Kodala, (2001): AIR
2001].
USE OF DIFFERENT WORDS
The Supreme Court applied this rule in the construction of the phrase ‘rendered
illegal’ occurring in section 42 and the phrase ‘held illegal’ occurring in section
43, 44 and 45 of the same statute, C.P. and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement
Act. It was held that the phrase ‘rendered illegal’ bore a different meaning from
the phrase ‘held illegal’ [Members Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall, AIR
1956].
USE OF DIFFERENT WORDS
In the words of Justice VENKATARAMA AIYAR, “when two words of different
import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to
maintain that they are used in the same sense” [CIT v. V. Venkatachalam, 1933].
When dealing with a long complicated statute, much weight to the presumption
arising out of use of different words in different parts of a statute cannot be given
[Qualter Hall & Co. v. Board of Trade (1961)].
RULE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
As a corollary to the rule that phrases and sentences in a statute are interpreted
according to the grammatical meaning, relative and qualifying words, phrases and
clauses are applied to the antecedent immediately preceding. However, this rule is
subordinate to context. A qualifying phrase ought to be referred to the next
antecedent which will make sense with the context and to which the context
appears to be properly related [Eastern Countries and London and Black Wall
Railway Companies v. Marriage].
RULE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
In Ashwini Kumar Ghose v. Arbinda Bose [AIR 1952] section 2 of the Supreme
Court Advocates (Practice in High Courts) Acts, 1951 was construed. Section
read: ‘notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926,
or in any other law regulating the conditions subject to which a person not entered
in the roll of Advocates of a High Court may be permitted to practice in that High
Court, every Advocate of the Supreme Court shall be entitled as of right to
practice in any High Court whether or not he is an advocate of that High Court’. It
was held by the Supreme Court that the adjectival clause ‘regulating the
conditions etc.’, qualified the word ‘law’ and not the words ‘Bar Council Act’.
RULE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
The views of Lord MACNAUGHTEN in an early case of Irra Waddy Flotilla Company v.
Bhagwan Das [1891] are pertinent here. In this case, section 1 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
was construed which reads, “Nothing herein contained shall effect the provisions of any statute,
Act or Regulation, not hereby expressly repeated, nor any usage or custom of trade, nor any
incident of any contact not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act”. Lord MACNAUGHTEN
observed that “the words ‘not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act’ are not to be connected
with the clause ‘nor any usage or custom of trade’. Both, the reason of the thing and grammatical
construction of the sentence, if such a sentence is to be tried by any rules of grammar, seem to
require that the application of those words should be confined to the subject which immediately
precedes them”.
RULE OF LAST ANTECEDENT
This rule is subordinate to context is illustrated by a decision of the Supreme Court relating to the
construction of section 1(3)(a) of the employee’s Provident Fund Act, 1952. This section read,
‘subject to the provision contained in section 16, it (the Act) applies to every establishment which
is a factor engaged in any industry specified in Schedule I and in which fifty or more persons are
employed’. The contention before the Court was that the requirement that the workman employed
should be fifty and more governed the word ‘industry’ and not the word ‘factory’. In support of
this it was urged that the pronoun ‘which’, must under the ordinary rules of grammar qualify the
noun immediately preceding it and that took it to the word ‘industry’ rather than to the word
‘factory’.
However, this contention was rejected on the basis of the context and it was held that the
requirement as to the prescribed number qualified the word ‘factory’ and not the word ‘industry’
[Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Bombay v. Shree Krishna Metal Manufacturing Co.
Bhandara, AIR 1962].
NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE
The expression ‘non-obstante’ means “notwithstanding”. A clause beginning with
“notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in some particular provision in
the Act or in some particular Act or in any law for the time being in force’, is
something appended to a section in the beginning, with a view to give the
enacting part of the section in case of conflict an overriding effect over the
provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It is equivalent to saying
that in spite of the provision or Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the
enactment following it will have its full operation or that the provision indicated
in the non-obstante clause will not be an impediment for the operation of the
enactment” [Parayan Kandiyal Eravath Kanaparavan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi
(1996): AIR 1996].
NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE
The very purpose of non-obstante clause is that the provision shall prevail over
any other provision and that other provision shall be of no consequence. In case of
any discrepancy between non-obstante clause and other provisions, non-obstante
clause would prevail over the other clauses. Even by dictionary sense, the
expression ‘notwithstanding’ implies that other provisions shall not prevail over
the main provisions [Lallu Prasad and another v. State of Bihar and other, AIR
1996].
NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE
The case of Municipal Corporation, Indore v. Ratnaprabha [AIR 1977] is very
important regarding the effect of non-obstante clause on a question of
construction. In this case, the Supreme Court considered section 138(b) of the
Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, which enacted that “the
annual value of any building shall notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force be deemed to be gross annual rent at which
such building might reasonably at the time of assessment be expected to let from
year to year”. Taking in view the non-obstante clause the Supreme Court held that
the annual letting value determined under section 138(b) need not in every case be
limited to the standard rent which might be fixed for the building under the Rent
Control Act.
NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE
In Laxminarayan Saw Mill v. State of Orissa [AIR 1995], it was held that the non-
obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co-extensive with the
operative part so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of the
enactment. If the words of the enactment are clear and capable of only one
interpretation on a plain and grammatical construction of the words thereof, a
non-obstante clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its
operation. The enacting part of the statute must, where it is clear be taken to
control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read harmoniously.
LEGAL FICTION
A legal fiction is one which is not an actual reality and which the law recognises
and the court accepts as a reality. Therefore, in case of a legal fiction the courts
believe something to exist which in reality does not exist. It is nothing but a
presumption of the existence of the state of affairs which in actually is non-
existent. The effect of such legal fiction is that a position which otherwise would
not obtain is deemed to obtain under the circumstances [Gajraj Singh v. State,
(1997)].
LEGAL FICTION
Legislature can create not only one but a chain of legal fictions by the same Act
[State of W.B. v. Sadan K. Bormal, (2004): AIR 2004]. When a legal fiction is
created by a statute it must be given its full effect [Bhavnagar University v.
Palitana Sugar Mill (P.) Ltd., (2003): AIR 2003]
In interpreting a provision creating legal fiction the court must ascertain the
purpose for which it is created and having done so to assume all such facts and
consequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries to the giving effect to
the fiction. However, the court must not lose sign of the fact that on unforeseen
event may give rise to unusual situations [CCT v. Swarn Rekha Cokes and Coals
(P.) Ltd., (2004)].
LEGAL FICTION
Regarding the scope of application of a legal fiction, it has been held that it is to
be confined to the purpose for which the fiction was created [A. B. Krishna v.
State of Karnataka, (1998): AIR 1998].
A fiction should not be extended beyond its purpose. This is well illustrated by the
case of Union of India v. Sampat Raj Dugar [AIR 1992]. In this case, section 5(3)
(ii) of the Imports (Control) Order was construed. This section provides that “It
shall be deemed to be a condition of every such license (Import license) that the
goods for the import of which a license is granted shall be the property of the
licensee at the time of import and thereafter upto the clearance through customs”.
LEGAL FICTION
The fiction created by this clause was held to be for the proper implementation of
the Import (Control) Order and the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and
also for holding the licensee responsible for anything and everything that happens
from the time of import till the goods are cleared through customs and that the
fiction cannot be employed to attribute ownership of the imported goods to the
importer in a case where he abandons them i.e., in a situation where he does not
pay and receive the documents of title.
In Lokmat Newspapers (P.) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad [1999: AIR 1999] it was held
that while giving effect to the legal fiction for the purpose for which it is created
by the legislature, it has to be given full play for fructifying the said legislative
intention.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS
In legal terminology where something is required to be done and the
consequences of failure to do so are also provided then it is known as mandatory
provision [Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Chandrashekhar, [1993]. There is no
universal rule regarding the directory or mandatory provisions except this that
language alone most often is not decisive, and regard must be had to the context,
subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question in determining
whether the same is directory or mandatory. Mandatory or directory does not
depend upon phraseology used in the statute but has to be determined having
regard to purpose and object of the statute [Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of
Bihar, (2004): AIR 2004].
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS
It is the duty of the courts to get the real intention of the legislature by carefully
attending the whole scope of the provision to be construed. The key to the
opening of every law is the reason and spirit of the law, it is the animus
impotentia, the intention of the law maker expressed in the law itself, taken as a
whole [Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, In re (Gujarat Assembly Election
matter), (2002)].
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS
The Supreme Court approved the following passage: “The question as to whether
a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and
not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of
the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained not only from the
phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the
consequences which would follow from construing it one way or the other”
[Passage from Crawford: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, p. 516].
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS DISTINGUISHED
In the case of mandatory enactment it is said that they must be stayed or fulfilled
exactly but in case of directory enactments only substantial compliance is
sufficient.
There are two directory requirements regarding enactments:
1. They which should be substantially complied with to make the Act valid.
2. Even if not at all complied with they will have no effect on the Act.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS DISTINGUISHED
The correct position appears to be that substantial compliance of an enactment is
insisting, where mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together, for in
such case, if mandatory requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say
that the enactment has been substantially complied with notwithstanding the non-
compliance of directory requirements.
A provision is not mandatory unless non-compliance with it is made penal. A
mandatory provision must be obeyed and any act done in its breach will be invalid
but if it is directory it will be valid.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS DISTINGUISHED
It is a general rule that non-compliance of mandatory requirements results in
nullification of the Act. But there is one exception to this rule. If certain
requirements or conditions are provided by a statute in the interest of a particular
person, the requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by
him if no public interest is involved and in such a case the act done will be valid
even if the requirements or condition has not been performed.
CONSEQUENCES PROVIDED BY
STATUTE
When no failure to comply with a prescribed requirement, nullification as a
consequence is provided by the statute itself, there is no doubt that such statutory
requirement must be interpreted as mandatory.
The periods prescribed in the Schedule to the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, for
bringing a legal proceeding are mandatory because the consequences of the expiry
of the period of limitation is provided by section 4 of the Act in that the Court is
empowered to dismiss a legal proceeding instituted after expiry of the prescribed
period [Maqbool Ahmed v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1935].
USE OF NEGATIVE WORDS
When the command is clothed in a negative form, it suggests that there is clear
intention to consider the enacted provision as mandatory. SUBBARAO, J.,
observed that “negative words are clearly prohibitory and are ordinarily used as a
legislative device to make a statute imperative” [M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veera
Mallappa, AIR 1961].
In Lachmi Narain v. Union of India [AIR 1976] a provision requiring ‘not less
than three months’ notice was held to be mandatory.
AFFIRMATIVE WORDS WHEN IMPLY
NEGATIVE
For reading the provision as mandatory, affirmative words stand at a weaker
footing than the negative words; but affirmative words may also be so limiting as
to imply a negative. As an example the provisions of section 54, 59, 107 and 123
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, prescribing modes of transfer by sale,
mortgage, lease or gift may be taken. The formalities prescribed by these
provisions for effecting a transfer of the nature mentioned in them are mandatory
and the language used although affirmative clearly imports a negative [Mian Pir
Bux v. Mohamed Tahar, AIR 1934].
USE OF ‘SHALL’ OR ‘SHALL AND
MAY’; ‘MUST’ AND ‘SHOULD’
In the words of Justice HIDAYATULLAH: “The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily
mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention
otherwise demands [Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961; UPSEB v.
Shiv Mohan Singh, (2004)]
The use of the word ‘shall’ is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so
interpreted if the scope of the enactment, on consequences to flow from such
construction would not so demand. The word ‘shall’, therefore, ought to be
construed not according to the language with which it is clothed but in the context
in which it is used and the purpose it seeks to serve. If by holding them to be
mandatory, serious general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or general
public, without very much furthering the object of the Act, the same would be
construed as directory [State of Haryana v. Raghubir Dayal, (1995)].
USE OF ‘SHALL’ OR ‘SHALL AND
MAY’; ‘MUST’ AND ‘SHOULD’
The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the language depends
upon the language in which the statute under consideration is couched and its object,
purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’
depends on conferment of power. In certain context, ‘may’ does not always mean
may. May is a must for enabling compliance of provision but there are cases in
which, for various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted
with the power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a
duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty.
A statute must be read in the text and its context. Whether a statute is directory or
mandatory would not be depended on the user of the words ‘shall’ or ‘may’. Such a
question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it
seeks to achieve. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object
for which the same had been used.
STATUTES IMPOSING PUBLIC DUTY
Where a statute imposes a public duty and also lays down the manner in which
and the time within which the duty shall be performed, injustice or inconvenience
resulting from a rigid adherence to the statutory prescription may be a relevant
factor in holding such prescriptions only directory.
In Chander Mohan v. State of U.P. [AIR 1966] after having regard to the object of
securing independence of subordinate judiciary, provision for consultation with
the High Court in the matter of appointment of District Judges as enacted in
Article 233 of the Constitution, was held to be mandatory.
STATUTES IMPOSING PUBLIC DUTY
In Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association v. Union of India [AIR 1994]
the question of primacy of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India in the context
of appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, and transfer of
judges of High Courts as required by Articles 124, 217 and 222 of the
Constitution was reconsidered by the Supreme Court and the following
propositions were laid down:
1. The nature of consultation amongst the different Constitutional functionaries is
‘an integrated participatory consultative process’ and all the functionaries must
act collectively to reach an agreed decision;
STATUTES IMPOSING PUBLIC DUTY
2. In the event of conflicting opinions by the Constitutional functionaries the opinion
of the judiciary ‘symbolised by the view of the Chief Justice of India’ and formed in
the manner indicated has primacy;
3. No appointment of any judge to the Supreme Court or any high Court can be made
unless it is in conformity with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India;
4. The opinion of the Chief Justice of India has not mere primacy but is determinative
in the matter of transfer of High Court Judges.
STATUTES CONFERRING POWER
Those statutes which confer power often contain certain express conditions for the
exercise of the conferred power and in the absence of or in addition to the express
conditions.
In Haridwar Singh v. Begum Sumbrui [AIR 1972] it has been held that in statutes
conferring a power to be exercised on certain conditions, the conditions
prescribed are normally held to be mandatory and a power inconsistent with those
conditions is impliedly negatived.
STATUTES CONFERRING POWER
Similarly, when a corporation is conferred with a power, it impliedly authorises
everything which could be fairly and reasonably regarded as incidental or
consequential to the power conferred [V.T. Khanzode v. RBI, (1982); AIR (1982)].
The view of Lord ROCHE is pertinent here. He was considering the requirement
that a confession must be recorded in a manner prescribed by section 164,
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, or not at all. He said that “where a power is
given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or
not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden” [Nazir Ahmad
v. King Emperor, AIR 1976].
STATUTES CONFERRING POWER
Where statutes confer power to deprive the liberty of citizens, the conditions
prescribed for the exercise of the power, including procedural requirements, must
be strictly followed.
When a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice
a person’s rights, interest, or legitimate expectations, the rules of natural justice
regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words or
necessary intendment [Annetts v. McCann (1991)].
When a power is conferred to make subordinate legislation, it must be exercised
in conformity with the express and implied conditions contained in the
empowering statute. Therefore, an order in the nature of subordinate legislation
can be challenged on the following grounds:
STATUTES CONFERRING POWER
1. When powers entrusted for one purpose are deliberately used with the design of
achieving another purpose which is unauthorised or actually forbidden.
2. The order shows on the face of it a misconstruction of the enabling Act or a
failure to comply with the conditions which the Act has prescribed for the
exercise of its powers.
3. The order is not capable of being related to any one of the prescribed purposes
[A.G. for Canada v. Hallet and Carey Ltd., (1952)].
STATUTE CONFERRING PRIVATE
RIGHTS AND BENEFITS
If a statute confers a concession or privilege and prescribes a mode of acquiring it,
the mode so prescribed must be adopted as even affirmative words in such cases
are construed imperative [Edwards Ramia Ltd. v. African Woods Ltd., (1960)].
If a person wants to exercise his rights of appeal he must prefer his appeal in
accordance with the statute conferring the right and if the statute requires filing of
a certified copy of decree or order appealed against along with the memo of
appeal, he must do so otherwise the appeal will become incompetent [Jagat Dhish
Bhargava v. Jawahar Lal Bhargava, AIR 1961].
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis (meaning of a word should be known from its
accompanying or associating words) has much relevance in understanding the
import of words in a statutory provision [CBI v. Braj Bhushan Prasad, (2001)]
According to Maxwell, “this rule means that when two or more words which are
susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be
used in their cognate sense. They take as it were their colour from each other, i.e.
the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
In the State of Karnataka v. union of India [AIR 1978] Article 194(3) of the
Constitution which refers to Powers, Privileges and Immunities of a House of
legislature of a State was construed. The Supreme Court held that the word
‘Powers’ must take its colour from words in immediate connection with it and that
it should be construed to refer not to legislative powers but to powers of a House
which are necessary for the conduct of its business.
In a recent case of Lokmat Newspapers (P.) Ltd. v. Shankarprasad [AIR 1999] It
has been held that for the applicability of this rule two words in the statute should
have analogous meaning. Since in this case, the words ‘discharge’ and ‘dismissal’
used in a statutory provision did not have the same analogous meaning, this rule
did not apply.
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
According to the Rule of ejusdem generis, when particular words pertaining to a
class, category or genus are followed by general words, they are construed as
limited to the things of the same kind as those specified [K.K. Kuchuni v. State of
Madras AIR 1960].
Regarding the application of Rule of ejusdem generis it is said that the general
expression has to be read to comprehend things of the same kind as those referred
to by the preceding specific things constituting a genus, unless for the language of
the statute it can be inferred that the general words were not intended to be so
limited and no absurdity or unintended complication is likely to result if they are
allowed to take their natural meaning.
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
The cardinal nature of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their
natural wide meaning unless the language of the statute gives a different
indication or such meaning is likely to lead to absurd results in which case their
meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required
to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. But
unless there is a genus which can be comprehended from the preceding words,
there can be no question of invoking this rule. Nor can this rule have any
application where the general words precede specific words [Asstt. Collector of
Central Excise v. Ramdev Tobacco Co., (1991); AIR 1991].
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
This rule applies under the following situations:
1. When the statute contains an enumeration of specific words;
2. The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
3. That class or category is not exhausted by the enumerations;
4. The general terms follow the enumeration; and
5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent
Amar Chandra v. Collector of Excise, Tripura, AIR 1972
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
The rule of ejusdem generis has to be applied with care and caution. This is not an
inviolable rule of law but it is only permissible inference, in the absence of any
indication to the contrary [Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs,
(2002)].
In a case before him Justice HIDAYATULLAH explained the principle of
ejusdem generis by giving the following illustration: “In the expression ‘books,
pamphlets, newspapers and other documentaries’, private letters may not be held
included if ‘other documents’ be interpreted ejusdem generis with what goes
before. But in a provision which reads ‘newspapers or other documents, likely to
convey secrets to the enemy’, the words ‘other documents’ would include
document of any kind and would not take their colour form newspaper” [Jagdish
Chander Gupta v. Kajaria Traders (India) Ltd., AIR 1964].
RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
The rule ejusdem generis is merely a canon of construction like many other rules
which gives way to the clear intention of the legislature. It also appears that this
rule has no inverse application. General words proceeding the enumeration of
specific instances are not governed by this rule and their import cannot be limited
by any such principle.
In State of Karnataka v. Kempaiah [(1998) AIR 1998] it was held that the rule of
ejusdem generis which is an exception to the rule of construction the general
words should be given their full and natural meaning was enunciated by Lord
CAMPBELL in R. v. Edmundson [1859], “……….. where there are general
words following particular and specific words the general words must be confined
to things of the same kind as those specified”.
WORDS OF RANK
According to the rule of ‘word of rank’, the statutes which deals with persons or
things of inferior rank are not extended to those of superior degree by introduction
of general words and the general words following particular words will not cover
anything of a class superior to those to which the particular words relate. For
example, a duty imposed on ‘copper, brass, pewter, and tin and all other metals
not enumerated’ did not cover silver or gold as these are metals of a superior kind
to the particular metals enumerated [Casher v. Holmes, (1831)].
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
“Where there are general words of description, following an enumeration of
particular things such general words are to be construed distributively, reddendo
singula singulis; and if the general words will apply to some things and not
others, the general words are to be applied to those things to which they will, and
not to those to which they will not apply; that rule is beyond all controversy” [M’
Neill v. Crommelin, (1858)].
Osborne’s Concise Dictionary gives an example of reddendo singula singulis as ‘I
devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A’ will be construed
reddendo singula singulis by applying ‘devise’ to ‘real’ property and ‘bequeath’ to
personal property [7th edn., p. 281].
REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS
The rule has been applied in the construction of the Proviso to Article 304 of the
Constitution which reads: ‘Provided that no Bill or amendment for the purpose of
clause (b) shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of a State without the
previous sanction of the President’. It was held by the Supreme Court that the
word ‘introduced’ referred to ‘Bill’ and the word ‘moved’ to ‘Amendment’
[Koteshwar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga & Co., AIR 1969].
Questions
