Protection Application - An Overview: Part 2A
Protection Application - An Overview: Part 2A
Layouts
Busbar in Substation HV - Breaker Main Transformer Generator Breaker Excitation Transformer Turbine valve Turbine - Generator G Excitation System Field Circuit Breaker Power plant Auxiliary Transformer
Earthing System
Generator Protection
Possible Faults
Stator Earth Faults Rotor Earth Faults Stator Short Circuits Stator/Rotor Interturn faults External faults
Generator Protection
overcurrent/overload unbalanced load overtemperature over- and undervoltage over- and underexcitation over- and underfrequency over-fluxing asynchronous running out of step generator motoring failures in the machine control system (i.e. AVR or governor failure) failures in the machine cooling system failures in the primary equipment (i.e. breaker head flashover) open phase
Following are the various protections recommended for the generator and generator transformer protection:
Generator differential Overall differential Minimum impedance (or alternatively Over current / under voltage) Negative sequence Overload 95% stator earth fault 100% stator earth fault
Loss of excitation Out of step Monitoring Blade fatigue Inter turn fault Mag. Circuits Higher voltage Accidental energisation Monitoring
Loss of excitation Pole slip Low forward power / reverse power (double protection for large generators) Minimum frequency Over voltage or over current Overfluxing volt / Hz Over voltage Dead machine PT fuse failure
GENERATOR ROTOR Rotor ground GENERATOR TRANSFORMER Short Circuits Ground fault Overhang UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER Short circuit Ground fault
64F
Overall differential Overcurrent Transformer differential Earth fault over-current Restricted earth fault HV winding cum overhang differential
50/51
Unit aux. transformer
64F
Field winding ground-fault RAGRA (RXNB4) 1) Instruments
1ph U
3ph U
Turbine (frequency, reverse power) Generator (Main1/Main2, Main/Back-up) Generator transformer/Step-up transformer Auxiliary/Station service transformer Excitation transformer
3ph I
1ph U
1ph I
3ph I
1ph U
REG 670 focus on the optimized integration and function to protect your generator
IEC 61850
IEC 61850
130 kV Subtransmission
Generation
MV
Distribution
LV M
315MVA Transformer
Cooling
In principle the larger the losses in the Inner Circuit the larger the size of the Outer Circuit (coolers or radiators) There is nevertheless a limit either due to the size of the coolers or to the impossibility of cooling a certain spot (hot-spot) in the Inner Circuit A pump to move the oil is often unnecessary. The generated heat will act as a siphon
F an opti onal
Oi l i mmersed Tank
Earth faults Short-circuits Inter turn Faults Core Faults Tank Faults Reduced cooling
Abnormal Conditions
Overload
Over voltage
Over excitation
Overload Capability
Over current protection Ground fault protection Differential protection Interturn faults Pressure relay for tap changer Oil level monitor
Gas detector relay Overload protection Overcurrent protection Ground fault protection
Monitors
Monitors are very important devices which detect faults and abnormal service conditions which may develop into fault.
Transformer Monitors
Temperature Monitoring
Introduction Transformer Protection 670/650 series Openness and flexibility Reliable Operation Complementary functionality Control Capabilities Communication Offering and application examples Technology Summary Relion Summary
Unrivalled compatibility for new and retrofit installations Designed for IEC 61850, implementing the core values of this standard Ensures open, future-proof and flexible system architectures, with state-of-the-art performance Interoperates with other IEC 61850 compliant IEDs
Shunt Reactor
ABC
ABC
L
Lp Lp Lp
Ln
General
Shunt reactors are used in EHV systems to limit the over voltages due to capacitive VAR generation in Long Transmission Lines The shunt reactors are normally connected
Through isolators to a line Through circuit breakers to a busbar Through circuit breakers to the tertiary of a Interconnecting transformer
Internal Faults
Faults occur in shunt reactors due to insulation breakdown, ageing of insulation, overheating due to over excitation, oil contamination and leakage
Phase-to-phase faults , resulting in high magnitude phase current Phase-to-earth faults ,, resulting in a low-magnitude earth-fault current, dependent upon the size of the system earthing. Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor bank, resulting in a very small change in phase current
Oil-immersed reactors
High current phase-to-phase and phase-to-earth faults. Turn-to-turn faults within the reactor winding. Miscellaneous failures such as loss of cooling or low oil
Abnormal Conditions
Inrush currents
Inrush currents flow in connection with energisation Inrush currents usually lower than 200% of rated current
Differential protection Distance protection Phase over current protection Restricted earth fault protection Mechanical fault detectors Oil temperature and winding temperature protection
Monitors
Monitors are very important devices which detect faults and abnormal service conditions which may develop into fault.
Reactor Monitors
Temperature Monitoring
Introduction Transformer Protection 670/650 series Openness and flexibility Reliable Operation Complementary functionality Control Capabilities Communication Offering and application examples Technology Summary Relion Summary
Phase segregated biased differential protection Low impedance restricted earth-fault High impedance differential protection
Capacitor Construction
KW is the Working Power component kVAR is the Non- Working Power or Reactive Power component to serve inductive loads, which require magnetizing current: Motors, Transformers, Lighting ballast
KVA is the Total Power required to serve a load Capacitors supply the reactive power component Power Factor is a measurement of how efficiently power is being used.
By supplying reactive current (kVAR) close to the load, capacitors release system capacity on the entire system and reduce costs.
A feeder circuit will have a voltage drop related to the impedance of the line and the power factor Adding capacitance will actually cause a voltage rise by supplying reactive current to the bus
Normally used in MV networks to generate reactive power Series reactors are used to limit inrush current
Harmonic filters for thyristor controlled reactors are also variation of capacitor banks having reactance tuned to capacitance
Shunt
Capacitors-General
Terminal shunt faults Capacitor unit failures Capacitor unit over voltages Capacitor rack arc-over
Abnormal Conditions
Inrush currents Transient over voltages Temporary over voltages Out rush currents
Short -circuit protection Ground-fault protection Under current protection Unbalance protection
Fuse
Discharge Resistor
Fuseless
SPAJ
Transmission Line
85% 12% 3%
100%
Fault types
Transient faults
are common on transmission lines, approximately 80-85% lightnings are the most common reason can also be caused by birds, falling trees, swinging lines etc. will disappear after a short dead interval
Persistent faults
can be caused by a broken conductor fallen down can be a tree falling on a line must be located and repaired before normal service
Measuring principles
Overcurrent protection Differential protection Phase comparison Distance protection Directional- wave protection
Overcurrent protection
Are normally used in radial networks with system voltage below 70 kV where relatively long operating time is acceptable. On transmission lines directional or nondirectional over current relays are used as back-up protections.
I>
block
I>
I>
I>
Pilot wires can be in soil or on towers. The resistance in the wires will limit the use on longer lines. The use is mostly restricted to distances up to 10 km.
Phase comparison
load I1
> >
I2
Phase comparison relays compare the angle difference between the two currents at both ends of the line. The measured time for zero crossing is transmitted to the other end. Normally a start criteria is added to the phase angle requirement.
I1 I2
e1 e2 e1- e2
ABB Group September 12, 2013 | Slide 60
func- tion
I2 I1 I2
ZK=Uk/Ik
Uk
A
Uk=0
metallic fault
Zk Z<
Ik
Fault resistance
multi-phase faults
L3 L1 L2
L1 L2 L3
earth faults
Warringtons formula
Rarc =
28707 x L I
1.4
Footing resistance
Quadrilateral characteristic improves sensitivity for higher RF/XF ratio It still has some limitations:
RF XF
jX
Load impedance limits the reach in resistive direction High value of RF/XF ratio is generally not necessary Circular (mho) characteristic
Has no strictly defined reach in resistive direction Needs limitations in resistive direction (blinder)
t
t3 t2 t1
A
f 1 f 2
l
B
f 3
Z<
Z<
Z<
Z<
t
t3 t2 t1
l
ABB Group September 12, 2013 | Slide 65
ZL
ZL
Zb
PLCC equipment
R
t
t = 40 ms
100%
gape flashed
B A R
gape not flashed
70%
Correct direction discrim-ination at voltage reversal (negative fault reactance) variation in resulted line impedance
Line distance protection with Relion 670/650 series For maximum reliability of your power system
Introduction Line
670/650 Reliable
Full scheme distance protection with independent phase selection Power swing detection Wide range of scheme communication logics Five zone distance protection
Capabilities
Communication Offering
application
Technology Relion
Summary
670/650 Reliable
Unrivalled compatibility for new and retrofit installations Designed for IEC 61850, implementing the core values of this standard Ensures open, future-proof and flexible system architectures, with state-of-the-art performance Interoperates with other IEC 61850 compliant IEDs
Capabilities
Communication Offering
application
Technology Relion
Summary
Helps verify phase angles are not out of phase e.g: due to heavy power swing
Single-pole Reclosing
Single-Pole Reclosing
ABC ABC
L
Lp Lp Lp
Ln
ULine
UBus
FreqDiff < 50-300 mHz o PhaseDiff < 5-75 UDiff < 5-50% Ur UHigh > 50-120% Ur ULow < 10-100% Ur
U Bus
1-ph ULine
U Line
SYNC-BLOCK
In its absence fault clearance takes place in Zone-II of distance relay by remote end tripping This means slow and unselective tripping and wide spread black out
Greater damage at fault point Indirect shock to connected equipments like shafts of Generator and windings of transformer.
Types of BB Protections
High impedance Medium impedance Low impedance Blockable O/C relay ( For radial systems in distribution systems)
Need for dedicated CTs Identical CT ratios , magnetising impedances Aux CTs not acceptable
T MD n MD Ud3
IR1
dR D2 D1
US
REB 500
C E
Distributed installation
ABB Network Partner AG REB 500 ABB Network Partner AG REB 500 ABB Network Partner AG REB 500
Central Unit
REB 500
C E
Bay Unit Bay Unit
C E
Bay Unit
E
C E
Bay Unit
E
C E
Free from any need for Identical CT ratios or matched CTs Other relays can be included in the same CT core Increasing fault levels have no impact
200A 500/5
500A
3.5A
5A
5A
5/1
5/0.2 0.7A
closes and Aux contact b closes after the primary contact opens.
C Throw-over relay
100%
AUX. BUS
1- BREAKER SYSTEM
RADSS - A
L1 BUS - A L3 L5
BUS - B
L2
L4
L6
RADSS - B
Air Blast
Oil Minimum
SF6 Gas
around 1960
around 1980
todays technology
Relay back-up
RELAY SYSTEM 52 52 52a 52a
CHANNEL
50
RELAY SYSTEM +
ABB Group September 12, 2013 | Slide 95
CHANNEL
Breaker back-up
5 1 2 6
Z<
7 3 4
ForunclearedfaultshownCBstobetrippedare1,3,4&6
Classical CBFP
Breaker Failure Protection
t trip
Introduction
Majority faults are earth faults Earth fault protection depends on type of earthing
Effectively earthed Reactance earthed High resistance earthed Resonance earthed
U0>
Directional earth fault relays are used Can use communication link Inrush current stabilization may be required for sensitive settings
C0
R0
I02 L RL
U0 Ief
C0
R0
U0
I02
Ief
Substitution for conventional control panels Substitution for other sub systems A more efficient way of controlling your substation
Theconventionalway
Control Board
Telecontrol RTU
Alarming
Synchronization
Busbar Protection
MARSHALING RACK
Local TELEControl
Interlocking ALARMING
Measuring NISATION
Station bus Bay Control Web Client IEDs Object Protection Control & Protection Multi Object Protection Multi Bay Control
Process bus
Merging Unit
Merging Unit
Bay Protection
ABB 225kV LIGNE ABOBO 1 =D04+R01 125VDC Distributuion Battery A ABB 125VDC Distributuion Battery B
Busbar Protection
ABB 225kV LIGNE ABOBO 1 =D04+R01 125VDC Distributuion Battery A 125VDC Distributuion Battery B
SCADA RTU
ABB 225kV LIGNE ABOBO 1 =D04+R01 125VDC Distributuion Battery A 125VDC Distributuion Battery B RTU 200 IN 1 IN 2 IN 3 IN 4 IN 5 IN 6 IN 7 IN 8 OUT ON/OFF
Event Recording
ABB 225kV LIGNE ABOBO 1 =D04+R01 125VDC Distributuion Battery A 125VDC Distributuion Battery B
Station Level
Inda ct i c 650
nd ac tic 65 0 I
Indacti c6 50
ON/OFF
ON/OFF
ABB
=D04+R01
ABB
ABB
ABB
Bay Level
Control Panel
=W1
=W2
-Q1 SEL
-Q2 SEL
ESC
EXE
Local Control
DISTANCE LOC
Marshalling
Process Level
MicroSCADA
LEITUNGSHAUPTSCHUTZ REL316*4 I 0 0 I
Reset AUS
STUFENVERL. WE-BLOCK
Reset AUS
STUFENVERL. WE-BLOCK
-Q1
-Q2
COM 581
Power Automation AG ABB COM581
Communication Converter
NCC / RCC
C
-Q0
Marshalling
-Q9
Control Cubicle Relays for control / logic Transducers, Meters Switches, Lamps Annunciators, Terminals Protection Cubicle
-Q8
MicroSCADA
LEITUNGSHAUPTSCHUTZ REL316*4 I 0 0 I
Reset AUS
STUFENVERL. WE-BLOCK
Reset AUS
-Q1
-Q2
STUFENVERL. WE-BLOCK
COM 581
Power Automation AG ABB COM581
Communication Converter
NCC / RCC
C E
-Q0
Marshalling
-Q9
-Q8
Modern SA Architecture
Station Level
COM581
C E
ABB
= D04+R 01
A B B Net work P a rt n er
RE L 3 16 *4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
=D04 ABOBO 1
=W1
=W2
-Q1 S EL
-Q 2 SE L
-Q0 S EL
L A MP E TE S T E
OU V RI R
F E RME R DI S TA NCE
ABB
LOCAL CONTROL
AB B
ES C
EXE L OC
METERING
RE L 3 16 *4
A B B Net work P a rt n er
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
Process Level
Interbay
Basic Functionality
Bus
Bay Level
MicroSCADA
125VDC Di s tributuion Battery B
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
RE L31 6*4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
=D04 ABOBO 1
=W1
A BB
PO W E R M ON IT O R I NG UNI T
=W2
-Q1 SEL
M M M
-Q2 S EL
-Q0 SEL
L AM P E T ES TE
OUV RI R
FE RME R D I S T A NCE
-Q1 -Q51
-Q2
?
AB B
ABB
ESC
EX E
LO C
LOCAL CONTROL
RE L31 6*4
METERI NG
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
PISA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
-Q1
-Q2
A B B Net work P a r t n er
COM 581
Power Automation AG ABB COM581
Communication Converter
NCC / RCC
C
-Q0
Feeder Marshalling
-Q0
PISA A
Process Bus
-T1 -Q9
PISA A PISA B
-Q8
-Q9 -Q8
Intelligent SA Architecture
Station Level
COM581
C E
ABB
2 25kV L IG NE ABOBO 1
= D0 4+R01
ABB
A B B Net work P a rt n er
RE L 31 6 *4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
=D04 ABOBO 1
=W1
A BB
P OW E R MO N I TORI NG U NI T
=W2
-Q1 S EL
M M M
-Q 2 S EL
-Q0 S EL
L A MP E TE S T E
OUV RI R
F E RME R DI S TA NC E
?
ABB
ABB
ESC
EXE
L OC
LOCAL CONTROL
RE L 31 6 *4
METERING
A B B Net work P a rt n er
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
Process B us
Process Level
PISA
-Q2
PISA A
PISA A PISA B
-T1
-Q9
-Q8
Basic Functionality
Interbay
Bus
Bay Level
Station Level
COM581
C E
Interbay
Bus
ABB
225kV L IGNE ABOBO 1 = D04+R 01 125VDC Distributuion Batt er y A
AB B
A B B Net work P a rt n er
RE L 3 16 *4
Bay Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
=D04 ABOBO 1
=W1
=W2
-Q1 S EL
-Q 2 SE L
-Q0 S EL
L A MP E TE S T E
OU V RI R
F E RME R DI S TA NCE
ABB
LOCAL CONTROL
AB B
Monitoring
ES C
EXE L OC
METERING
RE L 3 16 *4
A B B Net work P a rt n er
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
Process Level
Functions Allocation
Scalable System Extensions SCADA Remote Communication Fault evaluation Monitoring Events and alarms Supervision & Control Data Exchange
COM581
C E
Interbay
Bus
AB B
2 25kV L IG NE ABOBO 1 = D0 4+R 01 125VDC Dis tr ibutuion Battery A
AB B
A B B Net work P a rt n er
RE L 3 16 *4
Bay Level
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
=D0 4 ABOBO 1
=W1
AB B
P OW E R MO N I TORI NG U NI T
=W2
Q 1 S EL
M M M
-Q 2 S EL
Q 0 S EL
L A MP E TE S T E
OUV RI R
F E RME R DI S TA NCE
?
AB B
ABB
ESC
EXE
L OC
METERING
Monitoring
A B B Net work P a rt n er
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
A B B Ne t w o rk P art ne r
Process B us
Process Level
-Q2
-T1
-Q9
-Q8
Intelligent or smart AIS / GIS Switchgear Data acquisition Sensors & Actuators Power Transformers Surge Arrestors
PISA
PISA A
PISA A PISA B
PISA
PISA PISA
PISA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
-Q2 SEL
-Q0 SEL
LAMPE TESTE
OUVRIR
FERMER DISTANCE
? ABB
LOCAL
SET
ESC
EXE LOC
REMOTE
OPERATION
LOCAL CONTROL
METERING
REL316*4
ABB
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
PISA A
PISA A PISA B
R EB500
Busbar Protection
BUSBAR PROTECTION REB500
Process Bus
GPS
Alarm Classes
Sequence of Events
ABB Network Partner AG
# Of trips
C E
ABB Network Partner AG REL 316*4 ABB Network Partner AG REL 316*4 ABB Network Partner AG REL 316*4
IED Parameter
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
C E
C E
C E
ThegoaloftheIEC61850standard
Interoperability TheabilityforIEDsfromoneorseveralmanufacturer toexchangeinformationandusetheinformationfor thetheirownfunctions.
Free Configuration Thestandardshallsupportdifferentphilosophiesand allowafreeallocationoffunctionse.g.itwillwork equallywellforcentralized(RTUlike)ordecentralized (SCSlike)systems. Long Term Stability Thestandardshallbefutureproof,i.e.itmustbeable tofollowtheprogressincommunicationtechnologyas wellasevolvingsystemrequirements.