Land Reforms in India-086
Land Reforms in India-086
Booklet No. 86 Agricultural Situation in India: ASIS - 4 Contents Preface I. Introduction II. Land Tenure III. The Need for Land Reforms IV. Objective of Land Reforms V. Progress of Land Reform Measures VI. Impact of Land Reforms VII. Review of Land Reform Measures VIII. Reasons for Low Progress of Land Reforms IX. Suggestions for Improvement Preface A huge disparity in land holding pattern continues to exist in the country even after four decades of independence. A series of land reform laws have been passed by the State and Central Governments. Though the laws are very rosy and catchy but their implementation is hope- less. However, people working with rural poor masses of India must have an elementary knowledge about the existing land reform measures, operating in 'the country. Dr. K. T. Chandy, Agricultural & Environmental Education I. Introduction The stigma of Indian Agriculture is the highly defective structure of its land holdings. The measures of land reforms aim at correcting it. The term 'land reforms' involves procurement and redistribution of large holdings of agricultural land among the small farmers and landless agricultural labourers. It is an instrument to bring about improvements in the institutional framework of land. The responsibility of land reforms is owned by the government with a view of benefiting those who either have petty holdings or have no land at all. As big land owners are quite unlikely to share their holdings with their landless counterparts, intervention by the government using force of law/legislation is necessary to secure social justice for the masses. II, Land Tenure Land tenure may be defined as the system in which land is held by an individual or the actual tiller of the land; it determines his rights and responsibilities in connection with his holding. Obviously, land tenure system refers to law/rules and regulations which confer ownership rights upon an individual or actual tiller of the soil. It determines the status of the actual tiller of the land and his relations with the state. If actual tiller is not the owner of the land it determines the relation between the owner and the actual tiller of the land. It points out under what circumstances, the actual owner of the land may lose his ownership right. It specifies rent to be realized from the tiller, its time and methods. It specifies the conditions under which the actual tiller can sell or transfer his holding. It specifies the conditions, whether a cultivator can mort- gage his land or not.
There were a large number of land tenure systems prevalent in India in preindependence period. But the following three were more prevalent in different parts of i the country. 1. Raiyatwari system Under this system, every registered holder is recognized as its owner. The owner cultivator or peasant proprietor is responsible directly to the government for the payment of land revenues and other dues. There is no intermediary between the government and the cultivator. This is perhaps the best system of land tenure. The peasant proprietor does not fear ejection by the government so long as he pays the land revenue. He can make permanent investments in his land as he is sure to reap its benefits. Thus, this system can ensure an increase in agricultural productivity. 2. Mahalwari system Under this system, land is held (owned) jointly by a collective body of village. This body collects land revenues from the owners or cultivator peasants and is responsible to the government. This system is found in some parts of U.P., Punjab and Haryana. This system facilitates cooperative farming to get maximum yield from land. The small holdings of peasant cultivators can be combined for this purpose. The main drawback with this system is that it encourages absentee landlordism. 3. Zamindari system In Zamindari system, there is a separation of ownership of land from its cultivators. Under this system, one person known as zamindar owns a village and is responsible for the payment of land revenues to the government. This system existed in West Bengal, some parts of U.P., 1 Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu. Now this system has been abolished. III. The Need for Land Reforms As discussed earlier, the defects existing with Indian agrarian structure pointed out by Planning Commission, highlighted the need for land reforms. The existing system during the beginning of Planned Growth, allowed the landlord and intermediaries to grow richer and they continued to flourish at the cost of the actual tillers. The cultivator tenants had to live a very tough life. Tenant got little incentive to increase his output since a large share went to the landowner. Very small margin was left for the actual cultivator and this amount was quite insufficient to provide for a capital investment on the land. The landlords grew richer, the intermediaries continued to flourish, the state was deprived of its share of legitimate increase in revenue and the cultivator tenants were in hand to mouth existence. In order to remove the defects with existing agrarian structure, there was need of institutional changes in holdings. A high powered committee in 1948 with J. L. Nehru as its Chairman recommended that all intermediaries between the tiller and the state should be eliminate and all middlemen should be replaced by non-profit making agencies like cooperatives. The maximum size of holdings should be fixed and the surplus land should be acquired and placed at the disposal of the village cooperatives. Small holdings should be consolidated and steps should be taken to prevent further fragmentation". IV. Objective of Land Reforms The basic objective of land reforms in India has been the creation of a system of peasant proprietorship. 'Land to the tiller' has been the motto. Through the redistribution of land by
applying ceiling on land holdings, the idea has been to build up a vigorous independent peasantry consisting of small farmers and to help these farmers class with extension of credit and distribution facilities, largely through a network of cooperative service organization. The objectives of land reforms policy were set out by the planners as "the removal of such institutional and motivational impediments to the modernization of agriculture as were innate in the agrarian structure inherited from the past and the reduction of gross inequalities in the agrarian economy and rural society which stemmed from unequal rights in land". The Planning Commission gave two basic objectives of land reforms, namely. 1. Economic efficiency The agrarian reforms should help in removing all obstacles to achieve high agricultural productivity. They should help in creating conditions for evolving as speedy as possible ,an agricultural economy with high level of efficiency. 2. Social justice The agrarian reforms should help to eliminate all elements of exploitation and ensure social justice within the agrarian system to provide security for the tiller of the soil and assure equality of status and opportunity to all the sections of the rural population. In order to achieve these objectives, the following policy measures were envisaged: -abolition of the prevalent intermediary system between the state and the actual tillers; -tenancy reforms such as conferment of ownership rights on the cultivating tenants in the land held under their possession; -imposition of a ceiling on agricultural land holdings as a measure contributing to the modernization of agriculture and to eliminate parasitic absentee landlordism; -rationalization of the record of rights in land so as to make the rights of tenants, share croppers and other categories of insecure landlords; -consolidation of holdings with a view to making easier the application of modern techniques of agriculture; and Development of co-operative farming and co- operative village management. V. Progress of Land Reform Measures The land tenure systems which the British imposed in India, regardless of the different juridical forms they assumed in different regions, were only variants of feudal and semi-feudal land ownership. The British administrators altered these systems in a manner as to facilitate the extraction of more rents from the cultivators by making the landlord, who was earlier a rent collector, the absolute owner of land and by depriving the actual cultivators of all their traditional rights. This was done in .forthright manner under the zamindari system and in yield and indirect manner in the Raiyatwari system. Although juridically no landlord or intermediaries were created and the settlements were made directly with the raiyat, yet the fact was that, due to prevailing inequalities in land holdings, the bigger raiyat landlords came to dominate the agrarian set up in many respects and became the counter- parts of the landlords in zamindari areas. Like the latter, they indulged in many semi-feudal forms of exploitation such as share cropping, rack renting, ejectments, forced labour, usury, etc. Under British rule, land reforms had a very limited scope and content. These land reforms were motivated not by consideration of improving production, nor did they have any sense of social justice. They were meant to safeguard British political influence in the rural areas and save the rural market from being completely pauperized.
Thus, the structure of agrarian society evolved under British rule, created a socioeconomic set up in which parasitism flourished, land concentration in the hands of a few rural rich continued to grow, and landlessness and land hunger of the peasants mounted at an over increasing pace. Evictions and insecurity of tenancy and rack- renting became a general phenomenon and the cultivators were ground down by a colossal burden of indebtedness. Land reforms have been on the agenda of rural reconstruction since independence. Number of land reform laws have been made by state and central government after independence. The reforms have been undertaken along the following lines: -abolition of zamindars and other intermediaries (jagirdars, inamdars, malgujars, etc) between the/state and the cultivator; - tenancy reforms and the reconstruction of the land ownership system; -fixation of ceiling on holdings and distribution of surplus land among the landless; -reorganization of agriculture through consolidation of holding and prevention of further fragmentation; and -development of co-operative farming and co-operative village management systems. A. Abolition of zamindari system Intermediary tenures like zamindaris, jagirs, inams, etc. which prevailed over nearly 40 % of the cultivated land have been abolished. These intermediaries were responsible for the payment of land revenues to the government. The zamindars and other intermediaries were merely rent receivers and were not bothered about the improvements ! in land. They extorted high rents and exploited the poor tenants. 1. Reasons for abolition The general compulsion underlying the abolition of the intermediaries was the concentration of land ownership in the hands of a parasitic class who played no positive role in production while the vast mass of small peasants, who were the actual cultivators, were divorced from the ownership of land. This discrepancy became the root cause of the state of chronic crises in which the Indian agricultural economy was enmeshed for several decades before the attainment of independence. It remained a completely stagnant economy. The rate of growth was less than half per cent. It was not expected that an utterly weak and unstable agriculture of this nature would meet the growing demands of food and raw material of a new developing independent nation's economy. Thus the abolition of feudal and semi-feudal vested interests became an essential step for facilitating the growth of productive forces in the country. Besides, the intermediary system was subject to high rent and rack-renting, share-cropping, exploitation and demoralization of the actual tiller of the soil. Thus, immediately after independence a strong voice was raised against the vested interests in land. As a result, top priority was given to the abolition of zamindari system or the intermediary system as a whole. Accordingly, every state enacted its own legislations for the abolition of intermediary interests. Legislative measures for the abolition of intermediaries were initiated soon after the independence, starting with Uttar Pradesh and being followed up in other states. The whole process of legal enactments on this issue was completed in the country within a decade, i.e. from 1950 to 1960. Since land reform was a state subject, actual enactments abolishing intermediaries were marked by certain variations from state to state though the salient features of most of those enactments were common.
2. Economic and social effect Though the abolition of intermediaries was associated with many advantages, it had the following economic and social undesired consequences. a. Heavy burden of compensation The compensation to be paid to the intermediaries amounted to Rs 670 crores as compared to additional land revenues of only Rs 29.52 crores. This was a heavy burden on state governments. The compensation received by the landlords was a waste of capital resources by the state governments. This amount was not invested in agriculture but in urban property or was spent in buying consumer durables. b. Increase in the number of feudal landlords , The acts abolishing intermediaries did not divest the feudal landlords of their holdings. This is because owners were allowed to retain as much land as they themselves can cultivate. Big land owners started cultivating lands by employing hired labour in any form. Thus, the "feudal landlord" was permitted or rather encouraged to shift! their position from rent receivers to self cultivators. It also encouraged "absentee landlordism" in which many intermediaries and non-cultivators of soil became owners of land. They retained as much areas as they could show under their personal cultivation. Before the implementation of the act, the zamindars got the records manipulated into their favour in connivance with the local bureaucrats. c. Eviction on a large scale Since the intermediaries wanted to become owners of land under the garb of selfcultivators, they evicted tenant cultivators before the implementation of the legislation. The poor evicted tenants did not approach the court or the government because of poverty, fear and lack of organization. d. Faulty records The revenue records were faulty because of which many cultivators could not get the benefit under the legislation of abolition of intermediaries. B. Tenancy reforms The first phase of land reforms (1948-55) was mainly concerned with the abolition of intermediaries. The tenancy reform which is the integral part of land reform policy favored neither wholesale removal of landlordism nor the wholesale abolition of tenant cultivators. Hence, the middle course was adopted. Thus certain amendments to the existing tenancy laws were carried out along with the legislations for the abolition of intermediaries. This extended the scope of protection to the tenants of intermediaries particularly in areas of statutory landlorddism. But the owners were allowed to resume land for their personal cultivation. This led to the mass eviction of tenants, sub-tenants and share-croppers through various legal and extra-legal actions. In fact, a big drive to clear land of tenant occupants was started by landlords in order to obtain maximum areas. Innumerable evictions were effected III the process of resumption of land by landowners. But such evictions could not take place in U.P. and Union Territory of Delhi. In fact, U.P. has the credit of having the best land reforms in India. To counteract this, the law makers in most of the states tried to enact or amend tenancy laws in the following decade (1955-65) and friends plug certain glaring loopholes in the existing
laws. The major aspects incorporated in tenancy legislation in different states to protect the tenants can be identified as follows. 1. Fixation of rents Before the initiation of land reform measures the tenants were required to pay one half of their produce or more as rent to the landlords. During the first plan period, it was suggested that the rent should not exceed 1/4th or 1/5 of the produce in any case. During the second and third plans also this suggestion was repeated and it was suggested that the rent should be made payable in cash. Legislation along these lines has been enacted in all the states. However; different states have prescribed different rates of rents. For instance in Gujarat and Maharashtra the maximum rent stands at one-sixth of the produce. In Assam, Manipur and Tripura maxi: mum rents vary between 1/4 to 1/5th of the gross produce. In Orissa and Bihar, 1/4th of the gross produce has been fixed as rent. In Rajasthan, fair rent is fixed at 1/6th of the gross produce but in case of cash rents, at twice the ' land revenue assessment. 2. Security of tenants It was emphasized in the first, second and third five year plans that the tenants. should be accorded permanent rights In the lands leased In by them subject to a limited right of resumption to be granted to land-owners. In accordance with this legislation providing for security of tenure has been enacted in all states. This legislation has three aims: -the ejectment of tenant should not take place except in accordance with the provision of law; -the land may be resumed by the owner only for personal cultivation; and -in the event of resumption, the tenant is to be assured of a minimum tenanted area in his possession. The legislation provided that the ejectment of tenant can take place only through order of a revenue court. The grounds on which ejectment may be allowed include: (a) non-payment of rent, (b) performance of an act which is destructive or permanently injurious to land, (c) subletting the land, and (d) resumption of land for personal cultivation by the landlord. Legislations have been passed for granting security of tenure in different states on the following patterns. -All tenants in possession of cultivated land, have been given full security of tenure. The land owners have no right to resume land for personal cultivation as in V.P. and Delhi. -In Assam, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Punjab, Rajasthan and Himachal Pradesh land owners are permitted to resume a limited area for personal cultivation subject to the condition that a minimum area or portion of the holding is left with the tenants. -In West Bengal and Jammu & Kashmir, a limit has been placed on the extent of land which a land owner may resume. But the tenant is not entitled to retain a minimum area or portion of this holding in all cases. 3. Right of ownership Regulation of rents and security of tenure are treated as first stage in the tenancy reforms. The ultimate goal is to confer rights of ownership on as many tenants as possible and bring them in direct contact with the state. Legislations passed along these lines provide for bringing tenants of non-resumable lands into direct relationship with the state in the following three ways.
-by declaring tenants as owners; the tenants were required to pay compensation to owners in suitable installments; -through the acquisition of right of ownership by the state on payment of compensation and transfer of ownership to tenants; and -by protecting the interests of sub-tenants under the tenancy laws and bringing them into direct relation- ship with the state. The impact of these measures can be seen from the pattern of holding that has now emerged in the country. Agricultural census report pointed out that out of the 70 million holdings in the country 64 million or 92 % holdings are wholly owned or self-operated, 3 million holdings are partly owned and partly rented and another 3 million holdings are wholly leased accounting for 4 % each. Out of 162 million hectares under the holdings, 148 million hectares (91 %) are wholly owned and self operated; 10 million hectares (6 %) are partly owned and partly rented and the balance 4 million (3 %) hectares are wholly leased. It is now obvious that the most of the holdings are now under self-cultivation and the evil of share-cropping has been reduced to a great extent. It is because of high re- turns in self-cultivation and the owner cultivator does not find it profitable to lease out land on share cropping. In view of increasing pressure of population on land and unemployment the leasing out of land is expected to be a rare phenomenon in future. The practice of leasing out of land is adopted by those cultivators' who do not possess required amount of labour and capitals. Otherwise, in view of high returns from land, leasing out and share-cropping are considered unprofitable by owner cultivators. 4. Evaluation of tenancy reforms As a result of tenancy legislations in many states the tenants and sub-tenants have been brought into direct relationship with the state. But the progress was very slow in some states due to the following reasons. -The legislation has not been able to meet the objects laid down by the Planning Commission. The fixation of statutory rent was very high in some states. -The term personal cultivation was defined in a loose manner. Because of this, the lands ostensibly resumed by the land-lords on the pretext of personal cultivation are cultivated through crop -sharing arrangements where the sharers are treated as labourers. -The definition of the term 'tenant' excluded the share croppers who form a vast majority of the tenant cultivators. Thus share croppers did not get any benefit. -The non-availability of correct and up-to-date land '. records has not allowed to carry out the tenancy reforms properly. -The tenants can be evicted from their holdings on many grounds. This has been termed as a continuing hang over of the feudal system. 5. Suggestions for improvement The following suggestions can be considered useful in achieving the aims of tenancy reforms. 1. The resumption of land by the owner should be legal in cases where the owner cultivates the land himself. 2. The ex-landlords who have retained excess holdings under the pretext of personal cultivation should be brought under a ceiling limit. 3. Correct land records should be compiled and maintained so as to facilitate effective application of tenancy land reforms.
4. There should be complete ban on letting and subletting of agricultural lands. Exception should be allowed in cases where the owner is a widow, minor or handicapped. The real purpose of land reforms can be served only if the cultivators get financial support from the financial institutions for the permanent improvement of their holdings. C. Ceiling on land holdings Ceiling on land holdings refers to the fixation of maximum size of a holding that an individual cultivator or a household may possess. Beyond this maximum limit, all land belonging to the landlords is taken away by the government to be redistributed among the landless labourers. Thus the imposition of ceiling on agricultural holdings is mainly a redistribution measure. The idea basically is to ration the land in such a way that, above a certain level, the surplus land is taken away from the pre- sent holders and is distributed to the landless or to the small farmers. This will reduce the wide disparities of income and wealth found in the agrarian structure. The ceiling question gave rise to more debate and arguments than any other reform issue. Legislations for ceiling on existing holding and future acquisition were enacted in most of the states during the second plan period. The ceiling on agricultural holdings was intended to : -meet the hunger of the landless; -reduce the glaring inequalities in land ownership so as to pave the way for development of cooperative rural economy; and -increase self employment in owned land. The ceiling laws were enacted and enforced actually in two phases: the earlier phase covering the period from 1960-1972, before the national guidelines were laid down, and the later since 1972 after the adoption of guidelines. However, provisions related to ceiling laws can be analyzed under the following heads. a. Unit of application In the beginning some states took 'individual' as the unit of ceiling, while some others regarded 'family' as the unit. This led to widespread irregularities and big land owners started transferring their land into pieces to their fake kiths and kins and managed to keep unduly large holdings. However, since 1972, after suitable corrections, the unit of land ceiling universally adopted by all the states is family having a father, a mother and children. Parents having more than 5 children can be given a little exemption but in no way the amount of exemption will exceed twice the prescribed limits. b. Level of ceiling or maximum limit Under the old acts (prior to 1972) there were wide variations in the fixation of ceiling on land holdings since ceiling was a state subject and each state enacted its own ceiling laws. For instance the limit of ceiling prior to 1972 in Andhra Pradesh varied from 27 to 234 acres, in Assam it was fixed at 50 acres, in Gujarat it varied between 10 to 132 acres, Haryana 30-60 standard acres, Kerala 15 acres, M.P. 25 acres, Orissa 20-80 acres, Punjab 30-40, acres, U.P. 40-80 acres, Tamil Nadu 30 acres to 120 ordinary acres, and West Bengal 25 acres. Thus, there was a large gap between minimum and maximum and from state to state permissible limits of land holdings. As such, much land could not be achieved for redistribution. Since 1972 these limits have been rationalized. Thus under the new policy, the upper limit of ceiling has been lowered and the range between the lowest and the highest has been considerably
narrowed. For irrigated land where at least two crops are raised, the ceiling, depending on the productivity of land and other factors, has been fixed at 10-18 acres. In places where irrigation is done by private sources, for purpose of fixation of ceiling, 1.25 acre is deemed to be equivalent to one acre of land irrigated by public sources. However, in both cases, the upper, limit does not exceed 18 acres. In areas where there is a provision for irrigation for the raising of only one crop, the upper limit of ceiling has been fixed at 27 acres. For, remaining types of land which are not so productive, the I~ upper limit. is 54 acres. c. Exemptions There was a long list of other kinds of lands which f were exempted from the purview of ceiling legislation before 1972. For instance, tea, coffee, and rubber plantations, orchards, specialized farms engaged in cattle breeding, dairying, wood raising etc., sugarcane farms, factories and efficiently managed farms which consist of compact blocks on which heavy investment or permanent structural improvements have been made were exempted. In those parts where cultivable wastes are available and sufficient Ii number of cultivators are not forthcoming, ceiling may not be imposed or may be placed at a higher level. The land ceiling measures have been disappointing in the country except in the states of J & K and West Bengal. By the end of 1970 about 11 lakh hectares of land could really be taken over and again only a half of the taken- over land could actually be distributed among the landless labourers. In some states such as Bihar, Karnataka, Orissa and Rajasthan no land was declared surplus. The situation did not improve even after 1970. D. Recommendations of the chief minister's conference In 1972, a new national policy on land ceiling was evolved on the recommendations of the chief minister's conference. The following guidelines were laid down. -Taking into account the fertility of soil and other conditions, the best category of land in the state with assured irrigation and capable of yielding atleast two crops a year the ceiling should be fixed 10-18 acres. -In the case of land with assured irrigation for only one crop in a year, ceiling shall not exceed 27 acres. -In case of owners with different types of holdings, after converting the better categories of land into lowest categories, the ceiling should not exceed 54 acres. -The unit of application should be a family of 5 members. Where the members of the family exceed additional land may be allowed for each member in excess of 5 in such a manner that the total area admissible to the family does not exceed twice the ceiling limit for a family of 5 members. Where both husband and wife hold land in their own names the two will have rights in the properties within the ceiling in proportion to the value of land held by each before the application of ceiling. Each major child is to be f treated as a separate unit for the purpose of application of ceiling. E. Consolidation of holding India is a land of very small, fragmented and uneconomical holdings. That is why need of consolidating these fragmented holdings was felt in order to improve their productivity and viability of investments. Legislations have been introduced by various state governments, on these lines. Consolidation of land is a process of i rearrangement of land on the basis of existing rights. Most states have not shown any enthusiasm for implementing such legislations. Only in Punjab, Haryana and parts of U:P. this programme has made desired progress. Orissa, Bihar, H.P. etc. have also taken up consolidation in a big way. An area of 584.72 lath hectares has so far been consolidated all over India.
VI. Impact of Land Reforms The impact of land reform measures on agrarian structure of the country can be discussed under following heads. 1. Changing over to market oriented farming The analysis of pre-independence patterns of land systems reveals that the agrarian and social structure which developed under the British tended to perpetuate a back- ward and medieval economy in a state of stagnation for decades. The forces to impede the production and development were very active. In contrast to this, National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) pointed out that the essence of present situation is that Indian agriculture is in a stage of transition from predominantly semi-feudal type of agriculture characterized by large scale leasing of land and subsistence farming to a commercialized agriculture and, thus, increasingly assuming the character of market oriented farming. 2. End of feudalism The National Commission on Agriculture also pointed out that as a result of land reforms that have taken place since the independence, the feudal and semi-feudal land owning classes have lost their erstwhile domination over Indian agrarian economy as a whole. Moreover, the decline in the semi-feudalistic relations has followed growth of agriculture on commercial lines. However, some of the evils such as share-cropping, extraction of high rates of rents, usury, eviction of tenants, social and caste oppression, etc. still prevail in some parts of the country but the degree of their intensity is negligible. 3. Leasing in of land by big owners One of the important effects of land reforms is that, the subsistence farming is changing over to commercial farming. In this context NCA has pointed out that under commercial tenancy, leasing in of land by the big land owners from the small farmers takes place and such tenancy prevails more in areas where agriculture is modernized. It is common in Punjab and other areas where the impact of the green revolution has been appreciable. It is almost absent in the eastern regions of the country where agriculture is far less developed and where old type of tenancy still persists. 4. Emergence of modern entrepreneurs As a result of land reforms a class of modem entrepreneur farmers has emerged. These farmers have substantial land holdings and cultivate their land through hired labour and new technology. They are drawn largely from the ranks of exfeudal landlords, upper strata of privileged tenants and the bigger raiyots, moneylenders, f merchants and various other categories of substantial landlords. Besides the growth of commercial agriculture and the rise in the prices of agricultural commodities and also I improvement in techniques, have strengthened the economic position of this class of big farmers. They are also the main beneficiaries of governmental expenditure on agricultural development. It is this class which has been treated as the main custodian of the 'green-revolution'. 5. Reduction of poverty Besides several negative impacts, land reform measures have certainly reduced the disparities in agricultural holdings. The surplus lands of big landlords have been distributed
among the tenants and small farmers. The exploitation of tenants by the land owners has been reduced considerably. The cultivator-owner has been given assistance by the credit institutions to increase the productivity of their lands. The cultivator-owner has been brought in direct contact with state. They are no longer required to share their produce with their landlords. All these steps have led to an increase in the income of the small farmers and thus reduced poverty in the rural areas. 6. Use of institutional credit Agrarian reforms have significant implications in facilitating the use of institutional credit. The land re- form measures have influenced the working of financial institutions viz. cooperative banks, regional rural banks and commercial banks, etc. VII. Review of Land Reform Measures Though the land reform measures have been instrumental in bringing about some desirable changes in Indian agrarian structure, yet, they have failed to secure a justice to a large section of the rural population. The results of land reforms implemented so far have been far from satisfactory. Because of certain loopholes in the reform policies and implementation methodology, the progress has been very slow. In 1980.81 more then 54% holdings were less than 1 hectare each. Only 32% holdings were in the range of 1 to 4 hectares. More than 70% of the cultivators still have to survive on less than 30 % of the total arable land of the country. These figures reveal the existing wide disparities in agricultural holdings despite 40 years of planned economic development. Some of the glaring examples of weakness in land reform measures are listed as under. 1. There has been no uniformity in execution of land reform policies and legislations in different states. For example, the rent to be charged from the cultivators shows a wide variation from 20 % to 50 % of the gross product. 2. Land reform measures have failed to prevent subletting and rack-renting. 3. The identification of self-cultivation was wrong which allowed the big landlords to keep large holdings with them. 4. Ex-landlords and zamindars have showed on papers that they have been cultivating the land. However, they get them tilled by hired labourers. 5. Eviction of tenants has occurred on a large scale out of the suspicion of land being lost and under the guise of "voluntary surrenders". 6. Administrative arrangements for enforcement and : supervision of land reforms have been fully inadequate. 7. Records of tenants did not exist in several states and often incomplete and out of date records were used for the implementation purposes. 8. the several states the existing provisions of security of tenure were of an interim nature and comprehensive measures to bring tenants into direct relation with the state are yet to be adopted. 9. The rights to resumption widened the scope of ejectment. 10. To provide security of tenure to the tiller, the land lord tenant bond was to be broken by the state inter posing between them to collect fair rents from the tenant and pay it to the landlord after deducting land revenue and collection charges. VIII. Reasons for Low Progress of Land Reforms
The task force on agrarian relations set up by the Planning Commission to appraise the progress and problems of land reforms, identified the following reasons for the poor performance of land reform measures. 1. Lack of political will In the context of the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the country, no tangible progress can be expected in the field of land reforms in the absence of requisite political will. The sad truth is that this crucial factor has been wanting. In no sphere of public activity in our country since independence has had such a big gap between precept and practice i.e. between policy pronouncement and actual execution. 2. Absence of pressure from below Except in a few scattered and localized pockets, practically allover the country, the poor peasants and agricultural workers are passive, unorganized and inarticulate. The basic difficulty in our situation arises from the fact that the beneficiaries of land reforms do not constitute a homogeneous social or economic group. 3. Negative attitude of the bureaucracy Towards the implementation of land reforms, attitude of bureaucracy has been generally lukewarm and indifferent. This is, of course, inevitable because, as in the case of men who wield political power, those in the high echelons of the administration also are either big landowners themselves or have close nexus with big land- owners. 4. Legal hurdles Legal hurdles also stand in the way of land reforms. l The task force categorically states: "in a society in which the entire weight of civil and criminal laws, judicial pronouncements and precedents, .administrative procedure and practice is thrown on the side of the existing social order based on the inviolability of the private property, an isolated law aiming at the restructuring of the property relation in the rural area has little chance of success. And whatever little chance of success was there, completely evaporated because of the loopholes in the laws and protracted legislations". 5. Absence of correct and up-to-date land records The absence of correct and complete land records further added a good deal of confusion. It is because of this that no amount of legislative measures could help the tenant in the court unless he could prove that he is the e actual tenant. This he could only do if there were reliable, and up-to-date records of tenants. The main reason for the unsatisfactory state of affairs are (a) many of the areas in the country have never been cadastrally surveyed, (b) in some areas where cadestral surveys were done for a r long time, no resurveys have been taken, (c) no machinery , of any kind existed for maintaining village records, (d) even where records were kept by government officials, there is no uniform system, and (e) it has been found that even official records in many cases have not been correct. 6. Lack of financial support Lack of financial support plagued the Land Reform Act from the beginning. No separate allocation of funds was made in the fifth plan for financing land reforms. Many states declined to include even expenditure of such essential items like preparation of records of rights in their plan budget. The state plans which are nothing but aggregate of expenditure programmes hardly made any reference to land reforms. Whatever funds were needed for finalizing of this programme had to be provided in non-plan budgets. It is because of this that the expenditure for land reforms was always postponed. or kept to ' the minimum.
7. Land reforms have been treated as an administrative issue The implementation of land reforms is not an administrative issue, it is more of a political issue. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen the political will for implementing land reforms. The task force of the Planning Commission in a very forthright manner states: "it should, however, be clearly understood that the mere setting up of an efficient administrative machinery will not by itself lead to any substantial improvement unless the political and economic hurdles operating against the programme are removed." IX. Suggestions for Improvement The land reform measures were thoroughly reviewed by Planning Commission and other committees. Based on their findings, National Commission on Agriculture has suggested following measures to reinforce the implementation of land reforms. 1. Breaking of landlord-tenant nexus The private owner who rents out land today is undoubtedly intermediary between the tiller and the state and, as such, does not fit into the fundamental pattern of land reforms. It is, therefore, high time that tenancy I reforms were directed towards the state of finally breaking up the landlord-tenant nexus. A potent practice of agriculture i.e. landlordism r f should be discouraged and ultimately curbed. Agriculture should be treated as a family occupation of the peasant-cultivator and not a source of subsidiary unearned income. In a normal peasant-proprietor economy absentee landlordism should find no place. 2. Restricted tenancy should be allowed Under the present land-man ratio existing in India, tenancy as such cannot be banned though undesirable. Experience has shown that wherever such an overall ban has been imposed, it has led to the emergence of concealed tenancy with all its evils. Hence, until such time as socio-economic development in the country bring I about a radical change in man-land ratio and create possibilities of transfer of population from the agriculture to non-agricultural sectors on a big scale, tenancy shall have I to be permitted in a restricted form. It will have to be strictly controlled and regulated. Leasing in of land I should be permitted only in case of small farmers. Leasing in of land by big landowners from small landowners should be discouraged. All tenants of landowners excepting such landowners who possess land up to a marginal holding should be vested with proprietary rights and simultaneously declared virtual owners on a date to be specified by the state government. However, disabled persons, minors, widows and army personnels are given some concession, the nature of which may be decided by the state governments. This provision shall not apply to those cases where a bigger landowner has leased in land from a smaller landowner. Share-croppers who have so far been not treated as tenants should be recognized and regarded as tenants and given all due protection as such. 3. Effective implementation of ceiling laws The studies have revealed that ceiling laws have not been able to make any appreciable break-through in reducing concentration of land in the hands of a few big farmers. These laws are devised to achieve the objective of substantially reducing the present inequalities in land holdings. It is, therefore, suggested that present ceiling legislations should be enforced vigorously. For instance, it is necessary to take firm measures against fiction and benami
transfers which have been deliberately manipulated by big landowners in order to by-pass ceiling legislations. The state government should conduct a proper inquiry into such transfers. If it is found that the transfers were made purposely to evade the provisions of ceiling laws, the land so transferred should be vested in the state after imposition of some penalty on the transferee. In cases where fictions co-operative societies have been organized with a view to concealing the surplus land, such co-operatives should be subjected to proper investi- gation. And where many partners have been shown in a holding, but the holding as a whole is under a single management, such cases should also be brought to lime- light and adequate actions should be taken to undo it. 4. Control on land held by trusts and institutions The Planning Commission holds the view that the land possessed by trusts or institutions used for religions, charitable or educational purposes should be brought under ceiling laws. It would not be proper to give them a blanket exemption because a large number of such institutions and trusts are fictions or have been deliberately created to evade ceiling laws. Some of them are not being used for the purpose which on paper they profess to serve. Arable lands held by such trusts and endowments should be brought under the ceiling laws and more ceiling should also be made applicable to forests and water areas held by such institutions. 5. Distribution of surplus land For distributing the surplus land accumulated out of enforcing ceiling legislations, opinions are different as to who should be preferred for allotment, landless labourers or small farmers owing less land than minimum limit in order to make such holding viable. There is enough force in the argument that land should be distributed. to I small peasants owning less land than the economic holding or the minimum operational holding. Some have also argued that it is not only important to fix a ceiling on land holding, but it is also important to fix floor so that a large number of peasants may have at least a small operational i holdings. But in the view of massive landlessness, a serious lack of employment opportunities and a subsistence level of, almost half of the rural population below the poverty line, the land should be distributed to the landless labourer to whom land, however small, is the source of employment and relief from destitution. Hence for a long time to come a floor or ownership cannot be applied. 6. Simplification of legal procedure and administrative machinery The Planning Commission has observed that ceiling legislations have suffered not only because of certain political and economic constraints but also because of a very inadequate and inefficient administrative machinery for enforcing it. The same is true for other kinds of land reform measures. It means that existing administrative machinery has generally failed to prevent the evasion of effected laws and has been functioning largely in collusion with the vested interests, especially at the village and tehsil levels. The existing districts civil and revenue courts cannot properly discharge those functions being already over- burdened with other kinds of litigations. Besides, the existing system causes unnecessary delays and makes justice very costly. It often results in dispensation of a doubtful nature. These courts are far away from villages and the poor man is generally at a disadvantage. Hence, the restructuring of administrative machinery is required. 7. Voluntary surrenders should not be accepted Voluntary surrenders have generally been used to cover up forcible and illegal eviction of tenants. Such surrenders should not be accepted as valid unless they are certified as genuine by an appropriate authority. In this context, the commission suggested that land
surrendered should not revert to the landowner but should vest in the state to be allotted to any other eligible person. It can also be argued that it should revert to the owner if he possesses land less than the ceiling limit. 8. Higher rent should be curbed Despite the fixation of rent in most states on lines recommended under various plans, higher rent still prevails in many parts of the country. It is, therefore, suggested that such rent receipts should be strictly enforced. The tenants should be entitled to remit their rents through t moneylenders or deposit them in the tehsil. 9. Preparation of up-to-date land records Tenancy legislation cannot be properly implemented without adequate and proper land records. Therefore, it is imperative that the preparation of land records should be given top priority in the whole scheme of enforcement of land reforms. Tenants, tenants-at will, and sharecroppers should be promptly and properly identified and their names should be recorded forthwith. It can, how- ever, be said that the interest of the owner should not be ignored. 10. Ensure security of tenure So far as the tenure is concerned, the most important requirements would be: -recording the names of all the persons who hold land including share-croppers in the record of right; -ensuring that not more than the legally stipulated share of crop is taken from the sharecroppers by land owners; -ensuring that no ejectment takes place either on the basis of voluntary or through other extralegal or illegal methods; -ensuring inheritance to the heirs of the share-croppers on their death where law provides it; and providing supportive services including credit to share-croppers to free them from the clutches of landowners and moneylenders. %%%%%%%%%%%%%