The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case (Denmark v.

Norway) did not involve a direct ruling

on the definition of a treaty, but it is a foundational case for the doctrine that international
obligations can arise from a unilateral act in a manner distinct from, but just as binding as, a
treaty.

Doctrine on Treaties (Implied by the Case)

While not a formal definition, the case illustrates the fundamental nature of a treaty as a source
of international obligation:

1.​ Requirement of Agreement: A treaty is a bilateral or multilateral agreement where

two or more states manifest their mutual consent to create reciprocal legal rights and
obligations.
2.​ Basis in Good Faith: The Court's emphasis on the binding nature of the Ihlen
Declaration rested on the principle of good faith, which is also the core foundation for
the binding nature of treaties (pacta sunt servanda—agreements must be kept).
3.​ Contrast with Unilateral Acts: The case implicitly defines a treaty by contrast,
confirming that a formal, reciprocal agreement is not the only way for states to become
legally bound. The Ihlen Declaration was binding precisely because the court found it
was a unilateral statement of intent by a competent authority, creating an obligation
without the need for negotiation, acceptance, or reciprocity—the hallmarks of a
formal treaty.
○​ The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held the Ihlen Declaration
binding because it was an oral statement made by the Norwegian Minister for
Foreign Affairs while acting in his official capacity. The Minister's assurance to the
Danish Minister that Norway "would not make any difficulties" regarding
Denmark's claim to all of Greenland demonstrated a clear intention to create a
legal obligation. The Court established that a statement of this nature by a
competent government agent is a unilateral act that creates a binding
commitment under international law. Therefore, Norway was legally precluded
(estopped) from later occupying or contesting Danish sovereignty over Eastern
Greenland.

The doctrine applied by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Maritime Delimitation
and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (2001) case was the principle that
international legal obligations can be created by minutes of meetings and exchanges of
letters, provided the parties intended to be bound. This affirms the broad definition of an
international agreement, treating substance over form.
Treaty Doctrine and Application in Qatar v. Bahrain
1. The Doctrine: Agreement-in-Principle and Intention to be Bound

The core issue was whether the Minutes of the meeting of December 1990 between the
Foreign Ministers of Qatar and Bahrain constituted a binding international agreement that
conferred jurisdiction on the ICJ.

●​ Principle of Intention: The ICJ ruled that the Minutes did constitute a treaty,
emphasizing that form is not decisive in international law. What matters is whether the
document records an agreement and whether the parties intended to create legal
rights and obligations through that agreement.
●​ Binding Effect: The Court found that the Minutes, along with previous exchanges (like
the 1987 document which was also contested), met this test. They established a
mechanism for dispute resolution (negotiations, mediation, and eventual submission to
the ICJ), thereby creating a binding commitment to resolve the dispute through judicial
settlement.

2. Application of Facts

●​ The Disputed "Treaty": The key facts were the "Doha Minutes" of December 1990,
which were signed by the Foreign Ministers of both states.
●​ The Agreement: The Minutes recorded an agreement on a framework for resolving their
territorial and maritime disputes, including submitting the case to the ICJ under terms of
"full agreement" if mediation failed.
●​ The ICJ's Finding: The Court looked at the actual terms and context of the Minutes,
concluding that they were not merely a record of negotiations or a political
understanding. Instead, the document enumerated the commitments to which the
parties had agreed and was signed by high-ranking officials. The Court therefore
confirmed the binding nature of these Minutes, finding that Bahrain’s reservations about
the document’s legal status were insufficient to negate the objective evidence of a
mutual agreement to be bound. This was a crucial preliminary step before the Court
could proceed to decide the merits of the territorial claims.
○​ No, not all minutes are automatically binding; the Qatar v. Bahrain case
established that the legal effect depends entirely on the intention of the states.
The Minutes of 1990 were deemed binding because the ICJ found their text
enumerated specific commitments and was signed by high-level officials,
objectively demonstrating a shared intention to create legal obligations. Minutes
that merely record negotiating positions or a general political understanding,
lacking this objective evidence of intent, would not be considered binding treaties.
Therefore, international law prioritizes the substance of the agreement and the
parties' will to be legally bound over the formal title of the document.
The case of Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel (2008) is a domestic
constitutional law case that relates to agreements by establishing the limits of Executive
authority in treaty-making and peace negotiations and the primacy of the national
Constitution over agreements made with non-state entities.

Doctrine: Constitutional Limits on Executive

Agreement-Making
The Philippine Supreme Court's ruling focused on the fundamental doctrine that the President's
power to enter into agreements (whether international treaties or domestic peace
agreements) is constrained by the Constitution and existing laws.

1.​ Constitutional Supremacy: Any agreement—including one intended to resolve an

internal conflict—that seeks to fundamentally change the sovereignty, territorial
integrity, or basic governmental structure of the State is unconstitutional unless
carried out through the proper procedures for Constitutional amendment or revision,
which belong solely to Congress and the people.
2.​ Executive Overreach: The Executive branch cannot, through negotiation, commit the
State to a solution (like creating a new political entity) that is not contemplated by or
would require the amendment of the existing fundamental law. The peace panel
committed grave abuse of discretion by guaranteeing such changes.
3.​ Right to Information and Consultation: The Executive's negotiation of the agreement
was invalid because it violated the constitutional and statutory requirements for public
consultation and the right to information on matters of public concern, particularly
involving affected local government units (LGUs) and Indigenous Peoples.

Application of Facts (The MOA-AD)

The case specifically challenged the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

●​ The Problematic Provisions: The MOA-AD proposed the creation of a Bangsamoro

Juridical Entity (BJE), which the Court found would have been an "associate state"
with the attributes of sovereignty (separate territory, government, armed forces, and
capacity to enter foreign trade relations).
●​ The Judicial Finding: The Court ruled that the MOA-AD was unconstitutional because
its concept of an "associative relationship" and the powers granted to the BJE
 fundamentally altered the national sovereignty and territorial integrity defined in
the 1987 Constitution.
●​ The Legal Effect: By committing the Philippine government to amend the Constitution
to implement the MOA-AD, the Executive Peace Panel illegally usurped the exclusive
powers of the Legislature and the sovereign Filipino people. The MOA-AD was thus
declared null and void, even though it was never formally signed.
●​ Query successful

The case of USAFFE Veterans Association, Inc. vs. The Treasurer of the Philippines (G.R.
No. L-10500, June 30, 1959) is a seminal Philippine Supreme Court ruling that established the
validity and binding effect of executive agreements in the realm of international relations, even
without the concurrence of the Senate required for treaties.

Doctrine on Treaties vs. Executive Agreements

The key doctrine derived from this case regarding treaties and executive agreements is:

1.​ Validity of Executive Agreements: The Court held that the Executive's power to
enter into international agreements is not exhausted by the power to negotiate a
formal treaty requiring Senate concurrence. Executive agreements are valid
international pacts that may be entered into by the President (or his duly authorized
representative) and are effective even without the concurrence of the Senate.
2.​ Binding Effect of International Agreements: From the standpoint of international law,
the Court noted there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in
their binding effect upon the States concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries
have remained within their respective powers.
3.​ Distinction Based on Subject Matter: The decision implicitly affirmed the distinction
between the two forms of international agreements:
○​ Treaties: Usually cover international agreements involving political issues,
changes of national policy, or international arrangements of a permanent
character. These require Senate concurrence (under the Philippine
Constitution).
○​ Executive Agreements: Typically embody adjustments of detail carrying out
well-established national policies and traditions, or arrangements of a more or
less temporary nature.

Application to the Romulo-Snyder Agreement

The doctrine was applied to uphold the validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement of 1950 (an
agreement for the repayment of $35 million in unexpended WWII funds to the US), which the
USAFFE Veterans Association argued was void because it was not ratified by the Philippine
Senate.

●​ The Court's Ruling: The Supreme Court upheld the agreement, classifying it as a valid
executive agreement, not a treaty, for the following reasons:
○​ Subject Matter: The agreement involved a financial or pecuniary arrangement
(repayment of an advance/loan), which falls under the category of an executive
agreement.
○​ Executive Authority: The President was found to have the authority to enter into
the agreement (as a presidential agreement or one in pursuance of
Congressional acts, such as one allowing the President to obtain loans).
○​ Ratification by Appropriation: Subsequent acts of the Philippine Congress
appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to comply with the
Agreement were deemed to constitute legislative ratification of the executive
agreement, placing the question of its validity beyond the Court's reach.

The doctrine established by the Philippine Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs v.

Eastern Sea Trading (G.R. No. L-14279, October 31, 1961) clearly distinguishes a treaty from
an executive agreement based on the necessity of legislative concurrence and the nature of
the subject matter:

1.​ Treaties:
○​ Are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of
two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate.
○​ They involve political issues, changes of national policy, and international
arrangements of a permanent character.
2.​ Executive Agreements:
○​ Become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the
Senate or Congress.
○​ They embody adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national
policies and traditions, and involve arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature (e.g., those covering customs matters and commercial relations).

The Court held that the President has the authority, confirmed by long usage, to enter into
binding executive agreements without subsequent Congressional approval. Since the Trade and
Financial Agreements in question were merely arrangements of a temporary, commercial, and
administrative nature, they were valid executive agreements and did not require Senate
concurrence.

Application of Doctrine in Commissioner of Customs v.

Eastern Sea Trading
 Legal Application to Facts
Concept

Doctrine The Executive may enter into Executive Agreements without Senate
concurrence when they involve adjustments of detail, are of a temporary
nature, or implement existing national policies.

Facts The agreement between the Philippines and Japan (implemented by EO 328
and CB Circulars) was a Trade and Financial Agreement that regulated
import transactions. The Court of Tax Appeals questioned its validity for lack
of Senate concurrence.

Application The Supreme Court held that the agreement was a valid Executive
Agreement because its subject matter—regulating commercial and financial
transactions—was of a temporary nature and merely implemented the
national policy of preserving monetary stability. Since it did not involve
permanent changes to national policy, it was valid and binding even without
Senate concurrence.

Conclusion The challenged agreement was legal, and the forfeiture of goods that
violated the circulars based on this agreement was upheld.

The Philippine Supreme Court, in the consolidated cases of Bayan v. Zamora (G.R. No.
138570, October 10, 2000), affirmed the distinction between a treaty and an executive
agreement, but its most critical ruling centered on the requirements for agreements involving
foreign military troops.

🛡️ Doctrine on Treaties vs. Executive Agreements (Bayan

v. Zamora)
The Bayan v. Zamora ruling reinforced the existing doctrine on the two types of international
agreements and clarified the application of the relevant Constitutional provisions, particularly
concerning the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA):
1. Reiteration of General Distinction

The Court affirmed the distinction previously made in Eastern Sea Trading, recognizing that the
President has the power to enter into Executive Agreements without Senate concurrence,
especially those which are administrative or operational in nature and merely implement
existing treaties or statutes.

2. The Special Constitutional Mandate (Article XVIII, Sec. 25)

The case hinged on Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution, which sets special
requirements for agreements involving foreign military forces:

"Foreign military bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines
except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a
treaty by the other contracting State."

This provision mandates that any agreement allowing foreign troops (like the VFA) must meet all
three requirements, effectively elevating it to the status of a treaty for domestic law purposes.

3. Interpretation of "Recognized as a Treaty"

The key question raised by petitioners was whether the phrase "recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State" meant that the U.S. had to comply with its own Senate's treaty approval
process (Advice and Consent). The Supreme Court ruled:

●​ The phrase simply means that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges
the agreement as a treaty and binds itself to comply with its obligations under it.
●​ It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA as an executive
agreement under its domestic law because, under international law, an executive
agreement is as binding as a treaty.

⚔️ Short Application of Facts to the Doctrine

Legal Concept Application to Facts (VFA)

Constitutional The VFA, allowing U.S. troops for visits and exercises, fell under Article
Mandate XVIII, Section 25, requiring it to be in the form of a treaty.
Philippine The Philippine government treated the VFA as a treaty by having the
Compliance President ratify it and securing a two-thirds (2/3) vote of concurrence
from the Senate (as required by Art. VII, Sec. 21 and Art. XVIII, Sec.
25).

U.S. Compliance Petitioners argued the VFA failed because the U.S. did not secure its
(Recognition) Senate's approval. The Supreme Court rejected this, holding that the
U.S.'s executive acknowledgment and assent to be bound was
sufficient to meet the "recognized as a treaty" requirement, given that
the VFA is binding under international law.

Conclusion The Supreme Court held the VFA was constitutional and a valid
agreement because all three domestic constitutional requirements for
foreign military arrangements were met.

The doctrine established in Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr. (G.R. No. 167919, February 14, 2007)
concerns the status of international loan agreements and their supremacy over domestic
procurement laws based on the Executive's power to enter into binding agreements.

📜 Doctrine on Treaties vs. Executive Agreements

1.​ Executive Agreements are Binding International Instruments: An agreement, such
as an Exchange of Notes and its accessory Loan Agreement (for commercial,
financial, or administrative purposes), is classified as a valid Executive Agreement.
2.​ Supremacy of International Commitment: An Executive Agreement, being a binding
international instrument, is governed by the principle of pacta sunt servanda
(agreements must be kept).
3.​ Waiver of Domestic Law: If the Executive Agreement contains specific rules (like
procurement guidelines) that conflict with domestic law, those international guidelines
shall govern the foreign-funded project, as the Executive has the authority to waive
certain domestic requirements to secure international financing. The Executive
Agreement is thus exempt from conflicting domestic laws (like certain bid ceiling
requirements).
🛠️ Application of Facts to the Doctrine
Legal Concept Application to Facts (Arterial Road Links Development Project)

Agreement The Exchange of Notes between the Philippines and Japan, and the
Type subsequent JBIC Loan Agreement No. PH-P204, were determined to
be a valid Executive Agreement.

Conflict of The Loan Agreement stipulated that the procurement must follow JBIC
Rules Procurement Guidelines, which did not impose a bid ceiling. This
conflicted with the Philippine Government Procurement Reform Act
(RA 9184), which generally disqualified bids exceeding the Approved
Budget for the Contract (ABC).

Application of Since the agreement was a valid international commitment, the Supreme
Pacta Sunt Court ruled that the Philippines must honor the terms, specifically the
Servanda JBIC Guidelines, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Conclusion The award of the contract to China Road & Bridge Corporation (CRBC),
whose bid exceeded the ABC, was upheld as valid, because the
procurement was governed by the international rules stipulated in the
Executive Agreement, which effectively exempted it from the conflicting
local bid ceiling rule.

⚖️ The Court's Rationale on Conflict of Laws

The Supreme Court's ruling in Abaya v. Ebdane, Jr. essentially determined that the Executive
Agreement did not constitute a violation of domestic law in the legal sense that would
render it void.

Here is the breakdown of the Court's reasoning regarding the conflict between the domestic law
(RA 9184 on the bid ceiling) and the international agreement (JBIC Procurement Guidelines):
 Legal Court's Holding and Rationale
Principle

No Violation, The Court viewed the situation not as the executive agreement violating or
but illegally overriding domestic law, but rather as exempting the
Exemption foreign-funded project from the domestic procurement rules.

The Nature The requirement being set aside was a procedural or implementing
of the Rule detail (the bid ceiling rule), not a fundamental principle of the Constitution
or a core piece of public policy.

Executive The President, as the Chief Executive and architect of foreign policy, has
Authority the constitutional authority to enter into these binding international
agreements. This power inherently includes the discretion to agree to terms
(like foreign procurement rules) that are necessary to secure the benefits of
the loan.

Pacta Sunt The international agreement, being validly concluded, is governed by the
Servanda principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements must be kept). The
Philippine government committed to the JBIC guidelines to get the loan; to
secure the benefits, it must honor the burdens. To allow a domestic
procedural rule to frustrate a foreign obligation would violate this
fundamental principle of international law, which the Constitution adopts as
part of the law of the land (Art. II, Sec. 2).

In summary, the court reasoned that the Executive's commitment to the JBIC rules was a valid
exercise of its treaty-making power (even if it was an executive agreement), and this
commitment superseded the conflicting procedural rules of RA 9184 for that specific
foreign-assisted project. Therefore, the award of the contract was not illegal but was instead
validly governed by the terms of the executive agreement.
The Supreme Court's decision in Nicolas v. Romulo (G.R. No. 175888, February 11, 2009)
reinforced the principle that international agreements (like the VFA) are binding and may
create specific exceptions to domestic rules, provided they align with the Constitution.

However, the case also established a crucial limit: implementing agreements cannot violate
the very international agreement they are supposed to execute.

📜 Doctrine and Principles in Nicolas v. Romulo

The ruling addressed two major points: the general validity of the VFA and the specific validity
of the post-conviction custody arrangement (the Romulo-Kenney Agreements).

1. VFA Constitutionality and International Law (Executive Action Valid)

●​ VFA is Valid: The Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that the Visiting Forces
Agreement (VFA) is constitutional because it was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and is recognized as a binding agreement by the United States.
●​ Waiver of Jurisdiction/Procedure is Valid: The VFA's provisions, which give the US
military primary custody over its personnel pending trial (VFA Article V, Section 6), do
not violate the Constitution's mandate for the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure or the equal protection clause. The VFA merely recognizes the generally
accepted principle of international law that a receiving state's jurisdiction over foreign
armed forces is limited to the extent agreed upon by the parties. This special treatment
has a substantial basis in international relations and the nature of Status of Forces
Agreements.

2. Romulo-Kenney Agreements (Executive Action Invalid)

●​ Limit on Executive Agreement: The subsequent Romulo-Kenney Agreements (which

transferred Daniel Smith from a Philippine jail to the US Embassy following his
conviction) were declared NOT valid.
●​ Violation of the VFA: The Court found that these agreements violated VFA Article V,
Section 10, which explicitly requires that the post-conviction confinement or detention
of US personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed upon by both authorities and,
critically, shall be "by Philippine authorities."
●​ Conclusion on Implementation: An Executive Agreement's implementing arrangement
cannot stand if it contradicts the clear, unambiguous terms of the primary treaty or
agreement it is meant to enforce. The detention of Smith under US authority in the US
Embassy premises violated the requirement for detention to be under Philippine
authorities.
🛠️ Application to Facts (Lance Corporal Daniel Smith
Case)

Stage of Application of VFA/Doctrine Outcome

Process

Trial Custody VFA Article V, Sec. 6 Valid. US authorities retained custody of

(Pre-Convictio (Custody shall reside with Smith but faithfully brought him to the
n) US military authorities, if Philippine RTC for trial.
requested).

Conviction Philippine Revised Penal Valid. Smith was convicted of rape and
Code, as applied by the RTC sentenced to reclusion perpetua under
Makati. Philippine law.

Post-Convicti VFA Article V, Sec. 10 Violated. The Romulo-Kenney Agreements

on Detention (Detention shall be by transferred Smith to US custody at the US
Philippine authorities in Embassy, which the SC found was not
agreed facilities). detention by Philippine authorities.

Final Ruling International agreements are The VFA was upheld as constitutional, but
paramount, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements were
implementing agreements nullified. The Executive was ordered to
must strictly adhere to the negotiate a new arrangement ensuring
original terms. post-conviction detention was "by Philippine
authorities."

The case of Bayan Muna v. Romulo (G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011) established the
doctrine regarding the Executive's power to conclude agreements that modify or limit the
application of unratified international commitments.
📜 Doctrine on Executive Agreements and Unratified
Treaties
1.​ Executive Agreements are Valid Without Senate Concurrence: The President,
through the Executive Department (Department of Foreign Affairs), has the constitutional
authority to enter into Executive Agreements (like the Non-Surrender Agreement
concluded by an Exchange of Notes) without the concurrence of the Senate. This
authority is an inherent part of the President’s power as the Chief Architect of foreign
policy.
2.​ Agreements Prevail over Signatory Obligations: An Executive Agreement that limits
the surrender of persons to an international tribunal does not violate the Rome Statute
(which established the ICC) if the Philippines is only a signatory and not a ratified
State-Party. The only obligation of a signatory is to refrain from acts that defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty.
3.​ Consistency with Complementarity: Such an agreement is actually consistent with the
principle of complementarity under the Rome Statute, as it asserts the primary
jurisdiction of national courts (Philippines or US) to prosecute serious crimes,
allowing the ICC's jurisdiction to be complementary, not preemptive.
4.​ Basis in Article 98(2): The Non-Surrender Agreement is expressly contemplated by
Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, which allows a State to refuse surrender to the ICC
if doing so would be inconsistent with its obligations under another international
agreement requiring the consent of the sending State.

🛠️ Application of Facts to the Doctrine (RP-US

Non-Surrender Agreement)

Legal Concept Application to Facts (Non-Surrender Agreement)

Agreement Type The RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, concluded via an Exchange

and Validity of Notes, was challenged as requiring Senate concurrence.
Application: The Court ruled it was a valid Executive Agreement
and therefore effective immediately without Senate concurrence,
upholding the Executive's power.
 Conflict with Petitioners argued the agreement violated the Rome Statute by
International Law potentially shielding US nationals from the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Application: The Court held the Philippines was only a
signatory to the Rome Statute at the time. The Non-Surrender
Agreement did not defeat the object or purpose of the Statute, as it
did not grant impunity but merely specified the forum for prosecution
(Philippine or US national courts, not the ICC, absent consent).

Use of The core issue was the non-surrender commitment to the ICC.
Complementarity Application: The Court cited the principle of complementarity,
asserting that the agreement simply reaffirmed the Philippines'
sovereign right to exercise its primary criminal jurisdiction over its
nationals or those present in its territory.

Conclusion The agreement, which prohibited the Philippines from surrendering

certain US and Philippine personnel to the ICC without the sending
state's consent, was upheld as constitutional and valid, as it was a
permissible assertion of national jurisdiction in line with both the
Constitution and international law (specifically Article 98(2) of the
Rome Statute).

●​ Query successful

Try again without apps

The case of Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, Jr., et al. (G.R. No. 212426,
January 12, 2016) is a landmark Philippine Supreme Court decision concerning the
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

The Court upheld the constitutionality of EDCA, ruling that it was a valid executive agreement
and did not require the concurrence of the Senate.

📜 Doctrine on Treaties vs. Executive Agreements

The case established the following doctrines, particularly in relation to Article XVIII, Section 25
of the 1987 Constitution:
 1.​ Nature of the Agreement: The President may validly enter into an executive
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities, without Senate concurrence,
provided that the agreement:
○​ Is not the principal agreement that first allows their entry; or
○​ Merely implements an existing law or treaty already concurred in by the Senate.
2.​ Scope of Implementing Agreements: An executive agreement implementing a treaty
must not go beyond the parameters, limitations, and standards set by the "mother
treaty" or domestic law. However, the terms and details used by an implementing
agreement need not be found verbatim in the mother treaty; they must only be sourced
from the authority derived from it.
3.​ The "Treaty" Requirement (Art. XVIII, Sec. 25): The stringent requirement of a treaty
and Senate concurrence under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution (disallowing
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities except under a treaty) applies only to the initial
act of allowing their presence. Once a treaty (like the Visiting Forces Agreement or VFA)
already provides the legal framework for the presence of foreign troops, an executive
agreement may be used to implement its details.
4.​ President's Authority: The President, as the Chief Architect of foreign policy and the
Commander-in-Chief, has the prerogative to choose the form of the agreement (treaty
or executive agreement) so long as the constitutional and statutory limitations are
respected.

Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v.

Ochoa, et al. (G.R. No. 204605, July 19, 2016)
Doctrine on Classification of International Agreements (Treaty vs. Executive Agreement):

●​ DFA's Primary Determination: The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has the
primary authority to determine whether an international agreement should be classified
as a treaty (requiring Senate concurrence) or an executive agreement (not requiring
Senate concurrence).
●​ Procedural vs. Substantive: An international agreement (like the Madrid Protocol) that
merely involves the adjustment of administrative or procedural details and
implements existing national policy or law is validly categorized as an executive
agreement.
●​ No Conflict with Domestic Law: An executive agreement is valid if it does not amend,
modify, or irreconcilably conflict with existing substantive domestic law (like the IP Code).
It only provides an alternative or streamlined method for compliance with the law.

Doctrine Summary: Tañada v. Angara

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the Senate's concurrence in its ratification.
Key Doctrines Established:

1.​ Limited Sovereignty (Auto-Limitation): Sovereignty is not absolute in the international

sphere; it is subject to restrictions voluntarily agreed upon by the State through
treaties. Entering into an international agreement like the WTO is an exercise of
sovereignty, not a surrender of it.
2.​ Binding Treaties (Pacta Sunt Servanda): As a member of the international community,
the Philippines is bound by the doctrine of incorporation and the fundamental rule that
international agreements must be performed in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).
3.​ WTO is Consistent with the Constitution: The Court ruled that the economic
provisions in the Constitution (e.g., "Filipino First" policies) must be read alongside the
mandate for a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity. The WTO's principles of
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) and National Treatment are consistent with the goal of
developing a competitive national economy, not an isolationist one.
4.​ Political Question: The Court affirmed that it cannot inquire into the wisdom or
desirability of a treaty, as that is a political question best left to the executive and
legislative branches.
5.​ Query successful

Stages of Treaty-Making in Philippine Jurisprudence

The usual steps in the treaty-making process, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, are:
Negotiation, Signature, Ratification, and Concurrence/Entry into Force. The cases
discussed below clarify which branches of government control which stages.

1. Negotiation (Executive Power)

This is the process where the representatives of the states discuss and agree on the terms of
the proposed treaty.

●​ Vested in: The President as the country's sole organ in foreign relations.
●​ Doctrine in Akbayan v. Aquino: The Court upheld the Executive's claim of executive
privilege over the confidential internal documents and offers exchanged during the
negotiation of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA).
○​ Ruling: The negotiation phase is solely within the President's discretion and
exclusive domain. The Senate (or the House, as represented by the petitioners)
cannot intrude into the field of treaty negotiations. Premature disclosure of
diplomatic negotiation documents (like initial offers) is privileged to ensure the
integrity of the negotiation process, which requires "candor and flexibility."
2. Signature (Executive Power)

The representatives sign the final text of the agreement. The signature serves to authenticate
the instrument and symbolize the good faith of the parties.

●​ Vested in: The President (or his authorized representative).

●​ Doctrine in Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary: The Court clarified the
legal effect of the signature.
○​ Ruling: Signature does not signify the final consent of the State to be bound
by the treaty. It only obligates the signatory State, under Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty until it ratifies it or makes its
intention clear not to become a party.

3. Ratification (Executive Power)

This is the formal act by which a State confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representative. This is the stage where the State expresses its final consent to
be bound.

●​ Vested in: The President (Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution).
●​ Doctrine in Pimentel v. Office of the Executive Secretary: This case definitively
settled the internal allocation of the power to ratify.
○​ Ruling: The power to ratify (give final consent) is a political question vested
exclusively in the President. The President has the discretion to refuse to ratify a
treaty even if it has been signed. Crucially, the Court held that a writ of
mandamus cannot compel the Executive to submit a signed treaty (like the
Rome Statute) to the Senate for its concurrence, as this act falls within the
Executive's discretionary political power.

4. Concurrence / Entry into Force (Legislative Check and Final Act)

The domestic process that gives the treaty the binding force of law in the Philippines.

●​ Vested in: The Senate (Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution).
●​ Doctrine in Both Cases:
○​ Nature of Senate's Role: The Senate's role is limited to giving or withholding
its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification already performed (or intended
to be performed) by the President.
○​ Constitutional Mandate: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members
of the Senate.
○​ Finality: As noted in Akbayan v. Aquino, even after signing, a treaty is not final
and binding until it "goes through the procedures required by the laws of each
 country for its entry into force," which includes Senate concurrence in the
Philippines.

Treaty Stage Controlling Significance Case Clarification

Branch

1. Executive Formulation of terms; Akbayan v. Aquino: Exclusive to

Negotiation determining national the President; covered by
position. Executive Privilege from public
disclosure.

2. Signature Executive Authentication of text; Pimentel v. Executive Secretary:

symbol of good faith. Does not bind the State to the
treaty; an act short of final consent.

3. Executive Formal act of giving Pimentel v. Executive Secretary:

Ratification final consent. Exclusive to the President; a
discretionary political act that cannot
be compelled by the courts.

4. Legislative Constitutional check; Both Cases: Requires 2/3 vote of

Concurrence (Senate) validates treaty's all Senate Members (Art. VII, Sec.
domestic effectivity. 21).

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) is the
foundational decision in modern international law regarding how reservations to multilateral
treaties are handled, replacing the traditional rule of unanimity.

The core issue before the ICJ was: Can a State that has made a reservation to the Genocide
Convention be regarded as a Party to the Convention if some, but not all, of the
contracting parties object to that reservation?

Doctrine of Compatibility (Key Rule)

The ICJ rejected the traditional rule that required a reservation to be accepted by all contracting
parties (the unanimity rule). Instead, it established the Doctrine of Compatibility, which
introduced flexibility while safeguarding the purpose of the treaty.

1.​ Test for Admissibility: The test for a valid reservation is its compatibility with the
object and purpose of the Convention.
○​ Principle: A State that makes a reservation incompatible with the object and
purpose of the Convention cannot be regarded as a party to the Convention.
2.​ Assessment of Compatibility: It is up to each contracting State to individually assess
the reservation's compatibility.
○​ No Central Authority: In the absence of an authoritative body to decide on the
validity of a reservation, each State acts as its own judge.

Consequences of Acceptance and Objection

The ICJ's opinion established a nuanced, bilateral relationship between the reserving State and
every other contracting State, rather than a universal result:

Action by a Relationship with Reserving Effect of the Reservation

Contracting State
State

1. Acceptance The reserving State is a party to The Convention enters into force
the Convention with respect to between the two States, modified by the
the accepting State. reservation to the extent thereof.

2. Objection Conditional Objection: The The Convention does not enter into force
objecting State declares that it between the two States.
does not consider the
reserving State a party to the
Convention.

3. Objection Simple Objection: The The Convention does enter into force,
(Simple) objecting State does not but the reserved provision does not
oppose the entry into force of apply between the two States to the
 the Convention with the extent of the reservation (this is the rule
reserving State. later codified in the VCLT).

Impact and Limitation on Sovereignty

●​ Modification of Pacta Sunt Servanda: While the principle that agreements must be
kept is fundamental, the opinion recognized the right of a sovereign state to modify its
consent to a treaty via a reservation, provided it doesn't undermine the treaty's essential
purpose.
●​ Significance of the Genocide Convention: The ICJ noted the unique humanitarian
and universal character of the Genocide Convention, which aims to protect human
rights, meaning it was not one where mutual concessions were exchanged for individual
advantage. This justified the emphasis on the object and purpose test.

The principles laid down in this 1951 Advisory Opinion were later adopted and codified in the
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), specifically in Article 19, which sets
the "object and purpose" test as the main criterion for a valid reservation.

The principles of treaty invalidity, termination, and withdrawal, primarily codified in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), are fundamentally important in international law and
have been clarified by key international and domestic jurisprudence.

1. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(Namibia Case), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1971

This case affirmed the right of a supervisory body to unilaterally terminate a treaty on grounds of
material breach, even if that power is not explicitly written into the treaty.

Doctrine Established Short Application of Facts

 Termination by Material Breach The UN General Assembly (as the supervisory body
(General Principle): The Court held succeeding the League of Nations Council)
that the right to terminate a treaty on terminated South Africa's Mandate over South West
account of a breach is a general Africa (Namibia) via Resolution 2145 (XXI) on the
principle of international law (later ground of a material breach of its obligations. The
codified in VCLT Article 60) and is ICJ found this termination valid, confirming that
presumed to exist in all treaties, South Africa's persistent refusal to submit to the
even if unexpressed in the treaty supervision of the UN and its application of
instrument itself. apartheid constituted a fundamental repudiation and
violation of the Mandate's essential purpose.

2. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Iceland), ICJ Reports 1973

This case established the strict standard for invoking the doctrine of fundamental change of
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) as a ground for treaty termination.

Doctrine Established Short Application of Facts

Fundamental Change of Circumstances Iceland argued that a 1961 Exchange of

(rebus sic stantibus): For a change of Notes (which provided for ICJ jurisdiction over
circumstances to justify terminating a treaty disputes about a fisheries limit extension) was
(VCLT Article 62), the change must have terminated because the subsequent evolution
radically transformed the extent of the of customary international law on fisheries
obligations still to be performed. The had fundamentally changed the
changed circumstance must be an circumstances. The ICJ rejected this, ruling
essential basis of the parties' consent to that the essential obligation in the 1961
be bound. Notes was the jurisdictional clause itself,
which had not been radically transformed by
the changes in substantive fisheries law.

3. Danube Dam Case (Hungary v. Slovakia), ICJ Reports 1997

This case addressed multiple VCLT grounds for termination and suspended operation, notably
the conditions for state of necessity and supervening impossibility of performance.
 Doctrine Established Short Application of Facts

State of Necessity (Not a ground for Hungary suspended work on the

termination): The Court confirmed that a Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project and then
state of necessity (ecological peril) is a terminated the 1977 treaty, citing a state of
ground for precluding the wrongfulness ecological necessity and supervening
of a treaty-violating act (Law of State impossibility of performance. The ICJ
Responsibility), not a ground for rejected these arguments, finding the
terminating the treaty itself (Law of ecological perils were not proven to be grave
Treaties). The peril must be grave and and imminent in 1989, and Hungary's own
imminent, and the measure taken the only actions had created the "impossibility" by
means to safeguard the essential interest. suspending works. The termination was
therefore unlawful.

Impossibility of Performance (Strict The Court found that the basic conditions
reading): For a treaty to terminate due to necessary to carry out the joint project still
the permanent disappearance or existed, and it was Hungary's unilateral and
destruction of an object indispensable for wrongful suspension of the works that made
execution (VCLT Article 61), the the joint operation impossible, not a
impossibility must not result from the supervening, unforeseen event.
breach of the terminating party.

Export to Sheets

4. Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16, 2021 (Supreme Court of the
Philippines)

This domestic constitutional law case explored the limits of the Executive branch's power of
unilateral withdrawal from a treaty under a national constitution that requires Senate
concurrence for treaty ratification.

Doctrine Established Short Application of Facts

 Domestic Authority for Treaty The petitioners challenged the President's
Withdrawal (Constitutional Law): As a unilateral withdrawal of the Philippines from the
matter of Philippine domestic law, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
President possesses the power to (ICC). The Court ultimately dismissed the
withdraw from a treaty (Rome Statute) petitions as moot because the withdrawal had
without the Senate's concurrence (which already become effective under international law.
was required for ratification). This power However, the Court indicated that while
stems from the President's constitutional treaty-making is a shared power, treaty
role as the chief architect of foreign withdrawal falls primarily within the
policy. President’s foreign relations prerogative,
absent a clear constitutional or statutory provision
to the contrary.

Limits on Unilateral Withdrawal: The The Court found no express law or

power to unilaterally withdraw is not Senate-imposed condition on the Rome Statute's
absolute. If the treaty was entered into ratification that required Senate concurrence for
upon the express will of Congress or withdrawal. The existence of a domestic law (RA
if the domestic law implementing the 9851) covering the same crimes as the Rome
treaty places limitations on the Statute was not deemed to limit the withdrawal
President's diplomatic authority, then from the international treaty.
legislative involvement (e.g., Senate
concurrence) would be imperative for
withdrawal.

The cases you cited, Lim v. Executive Secretary (GR 151445, 4/11/2002) and Air France v.
Saks (470 US 392), are landmark decisions in their respective jurisdictions concerning the
interpretation of treaties.

Here is a summary of the treaty interpretation principles applied in each case:

1. Lim v. Executive Secretary (Philippine Supreme Court)

●​ Treaty in Question: The Philippines-United States Visiting Forces Agreement

(VFA), interpreted in the context of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the
Philippine Constitution.
●​ Key Issue: Whether the joint military exercises ("Balikatan 02-1") between Philippine
and U.S. forces were a permissible "activity" under the VFA and consistent with the
Philippine Constitution.
Treaty Interpretation Doctrine Applied:

The Philippine Supreme Court primarily applied principles derived from the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which is the international standard for treaty interpretation,
along with the fundamental principle that a treaty must be consistent with the domestic
Constitution.

●​ VCLT Principles (Textual, Contextual, and Teleological Interpretation): The Court

noted the cardinal rule of interpretation is to examine the text, presumed to verbalize the
parties' intentions, along with the context and purpose of the treaty.
○​ Textual/Contextual: The Court scrutinized the meaning of the word "activities"
in the VFA. It found the term was "deliberately left broad and ambiguous" to give
both parties flexibility for non-military purposes like training, medical missions,
etc. To define it, the Court looked to its context, including the Terms of
Reference (TOR) of the joint exercises, which specified the limitations (e.g., no
permanent US bases, no combat except in self-defense).
○​ Effectivity Principle: The interpretation was one that gave effect to the VFA,
concluding that the Balikatan exercises, being a form of mutual anti-terrorism
training, were a legitimate "activity."
●​ Harmonization with Domestic Law (Constitutional Supremacy): The Court affirmed
that treaties, including the MDT and VFA, must be read in the context of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
○​ It explicitly ruled that while the VFA permits joint training, neither the MDT nor
the VFA allows foreign troops to engage in an offensive war on Philippine
territory, upholding the constitutional renunciation of war and the restriction on
foreign military presence.
○​ This demonstrates the principle of reading a treaty so as to avoid conflict with the
domestic constitution, favoring an interpretation that preserves its
constitutionality.

2. Air France v. Saks (U.S. Supreme Court)

●​ Treaty in Question: The Warsaw Convention (formally, the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air).
●​ Key Issue: The meaning of the term "accident" in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
which establishes air carrier liability for passenger injury caused by an "accident."

Treaty Interpretation Doctrine Applied:

The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized an internationalist approach to treaty interpretation to

maintain uniformity among contracting states, prioritizing the shared intent of the original
drafters.
 ●​ Focus on the Treaty Text and Original Intent: The Court stated that treaty
interpretation begins with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written
words are used.
○​ The primary goal is to give effect to the treaty's purpose, which is to promote
uniformity in the law of international air travel.
●​ Resort to French Authentic Text and Legal Meaning: Since the Warsaw Convention
was drafted in French by civil law jurists, the Court looked to the French legal meaning
of the authentic French text where terms were ambiguous.
○​ The term "accident" (accident) was compared to the term "occurrence"
(événement) used in a different Article (Article 18, dealing with baggage) to
establish that the drafters intended for a distinction.
○​ The Court found that the French legal meaning of accident—when used to
describe a cause of injury—was a "fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or
unintended event."
●​ Independent, Uniform Interpretation: The Court rejected domestic common-law
interpretations (like negligence standards) in favor of one that was neutral and
designed for uniform international application.

Conclusion/Holding: For air carrier liability under Article 17, an "accident" is an unexpected or
unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger. An injury resulting from a
passenger's own internal reaction to the normal, usual, and expected operation of the aircraft
(like a standard pressurization change) is not an "accident."

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgments in the Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v.
France, New Zealand v. France) of December 20, 1974, are a cornerstone of the international
law doctrine concerning the binding nature of unilateral statements by a state.

Here is a summary of the ruling's significance regarding unilateral statements:

The Core Finding

The ICJ did not rule on the merits of the dispute (the legality of French nuclear testing). Instead,
it found that the applications of Australia and New Zealand no longer had any object, as the
objective of the applicants (the cessation of atmospheric nuclear tests) had been achieved by
France's unilateral public statements.

The Court held that these unilateral declarations by French authorities (the President, Foreign
Minister, and Minister of Defence) created a legal obligation for France to cease atmospheric
nuclear tests after the 1974 series.

Key Principles of Unilateral Statements Established by the ICJ

The judgments articulated several crucial principles that govern when a unilateral statement by
a state can create a binding legal obligation:

1.​ Intention to be Bound: The essential condition is that the State making the declaration,
through an authorized representative, must have the intention to be bound by its
terms. This intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking.
2.​ Publicity and Form: The undertaking must be given publicly. The form of the
statement (oral or written) is not decisive in international law. The French statements
were made in press conferences and official communiqués.
3.​ No Quid Pro Quo or Acceptance Required: An undertaking of this kind is binding even
if it is not made within the context of international negotiations. It does not require
any subsequent acceptance, reply, or reaction from other states to take effect, as this
would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the act.
4.​ Basis in Good Faith: The binding character of such an international obligation is based
on the principle of good faith in international relations. Interested states are entitled to
take cognizance of the declarations and rely on them, and they are entitled to require
that the obligation thus created be respected.
5.​ Clear and Specific Terms: Obligations resulting from a unilateral declaration should be
stated in clear and specific terms. In case of doubt as to the scope of the obligations,
they must be interpreted in a restrictive manner.

By applying these principles, the ICJ concluded that France was legally bound by its public
declarations to cease atmospheric nuclear testing, which satisfied the applicants' claims and
removed the subject matter of the dispute. This case is widely cited as the principal legal
authority for the proposition that unilateral declarations can be a source of international legal
obligations.

The landmark Philippine Supreme Court case of Kuroda v. Jalandoni (G.R. No. L-2662, March
26, 1949) is highly significant for establishing the Doctrine of Incorporation of international law
into Philippine domestic law.

The case involved Shigenori Kuroda, a former Japanese Lieutenant-General, who challenged
the jurisdiction of a Philippine Military Commission to try him for war crimes based on a violation
of the laws and customs of war.

Doctrine of Incorporation
The core legal principle articulated and applied in this case is the Doctrine of Incorporation of
International Law.

The Court held that the generally accepted principles of international law are automatically
incorporated as part of the law of the land, by virtue of the Philippine Constitution.
Constitutional Basis

The doctrine is rooted in Article II, Section 2 (then Section 3) of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution (now Article II, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution), which states:

"The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
nation."

Application of the Doctrine to the Facts

The Court used this doctrine to address Kuroda's main argument that Executive Order No. 68
(creating the Military Commission) was illegal because the Philippines was not a signatory to the
Hague and Geneva Conventions on land warfare at the time the crimes were committed.

Point of Contention Court's Ruling Applying the Doctrine

Legality of The Court ruled that Executive Order No. 68, which
Charges/Jurisdiction authorized the trial of war criminals, was valid and
constitutional.

Applicable Law (Hague The Court held that the rules and regulations of the Hague
and Geneva and Geneva Conventions form part of and are wholly based
Conventions) on the generally accepted principles of international law.

Philippines' The Court stressed that these international law principles form
Non-Signatory Status part of the law of the nation even if the Philippines was not
a signatory to the conventions embodying them. The
constitutional provision is "deliberately general and extensive
in its scope."

Conclusion on the Law By trying Kuroda for violations of the laws and customs of war
(including the principles of the Conventions), the President, in
issuing E.O. No. 68, acted "in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part
of the our Constitution."
The Implied Rejection of the Transformation Doctrine
While the Court did not explicitly use the term "Transformation Doctrine," its robust embrace of
the Doctrine of Incorporation constitutes an implied rejection of the Transformation Doctrine for
the application of customary international law and general principles.

Transformation Doctrine (The Alternative)

The Transformation Doctrine holds that rules of international law only become part of domestic
law if they are expressly and specifically "transformed" (converted) into domestic law
through an act of the legislature (e.g., a statute).

Why the Court Rejected it

If the Court had applied the Transformation Doctrine, it would have been compelled to rule in
Kuroda's favor because the Philippines had not yet passed a law or signed the conventions at
the time of the crimes, thus lacking the specific domestic act of "transformation."

By relying solely on the constitutional provision ("adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the nation") to immediately incorporate the laws and
customs of war, the Court made it clear that a separate, transformative act of the legislature was
not necessary to give effect to these generally accepted international norms. The constitutional
clause itself is the mechanism of incorporation.

The Philippine Supreme Court case of Mejoff v. Director of Prisons (G. R. No. L-4254,
September 26, 1951) is a critical case in Philippine jurisprudence for establishing the limitation
on the government's power to indefinitely detain a deportable alien and for reaffirming the
Doctrine of Incorporation concerning international human rights norms.

Limitation on Indefinite Detention

The central doctrine of this case is that an alien, particularly one who is not an enemy alien,
cannot be detained indefinitely merely because the government is unable to deport him.

Application to the Facts (Boris Mejoff)

●​ Initial Detention and First Petition: Boris Mejoff, an alien of Russian (Kusaian)
descent, was ordered deported in 1948 but could not be sent away because no country
or ship would take him. His first petition for habeas corpus was denied in 1949, as his
detention was deemed "temporary" and "for a reasonable length of time" while
arrangements were being made.
 ●​ Second Petition and Ruling: Over two years after the first decision, the Government
still had no means of deporting him. The Supreme Court granted his second petition for
habeas corpus and ordered his release under certain conditions.
●​ The Limit of Detention: The Court ruled that "too long a detention may justify the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." While the government has the right to detain an
undesirable alien for a reasonable time, a prolonged, indefinite detention is unwarranted
by law and the Constitution.

Legal Basis for Release

The Court cited both domestic and international law to justify the release:

1.​ Domestic Law (Constitutional Right): The Court noted that the "protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law... is not limited to Philippine citizens but
extends to all residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality."
2.​ American Precedent (Inclusion of U.S. v. Nichols and Staniszewski v. Watkins):
The Court explicitly adopted the reasoning in American cases which held that the court
has the power to release an alien who has been detained for an unreasonably long
period of time after it becomes apparent that the deportation warrant cannot be
effectuated (i.e., the warrant is functus officio or spent).

Doctrine of Incorporation (International Human Rights)

This case significantly broadened the scope of the Doctrine of Incorporation by including
international human rights standards.

Constitutional and International Basis

The Court once again cited Article II, Section 3 (now Sec. 2) of the Constitution ("adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation").

It then specifically incorporated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which
was approved by the UN General Assembly in 1948 and to which the Philippines is a member.
The Court cited the following principles from the UDHR:

●​ Article 1: "All human beings are born free and equal in degree and rights."
●​ Article 2: Everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms without distinction of any kind.
●​ Article 9: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile."

Conclusion on International Law

By referencing the UDHR, the Supreme Court effectively held that the prohibition against
arbitrary and indefinite detention is a generally accepted principle of international law and
is therefore automatically binding as part of Philippine domestic law, reinforcing the
constitutional protection afforded to all persons within the jurisdiction, including aliens.

Outcome
The Court ordered the release of Boris Mejoff, but under the following conditions:

1.​ Surveillance: He was to be placed under the surveillance of the immigration authorities
in a manner deemed adequate to ensure he kept the peace and remained available for
deportation.
2.​ Bail Bond: He was required to put up a bond in the amount of P5,000 (a substantial
amount at the time) with sufficient surety for the purpose of ensuring his availability.

The Supreme Court of the Philippines has consistently adhered to the Doctrine of
Incorporation of international law, while impliedly rejecting the Transformation Doctrine for
customary international law and generally accepted principles.

1. The Doctrine of Incorporation

The Doctrine of Incorporation holds that generally accepted principles of international law
and international customary rules automatically form part of the law of the land, by operation
of the Constitution, without the need for a legislative enactment to validate or "transform" them.

●​ Constitutional Basis: This doctrine is enshrined in the Philippine Constitution (Article

II, Section 2), which mandates that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation."
●​ Effect on Treaties: For treaties (conventional international law), the doctrine applies
upon ratification by the State and concurrence by the Senate (or the functional
equivalent), making the treaty equivalent to an act of Congress.

2. The Transformation Doctrine (Contrasting View)

The Transformation Doctrine is the competing view, which holds that rules of international law
(whether customary or conventional) must be expressly and specifically "transformed"
(converted) into domestic law by a constitutional or statutory act of the legislature before they
can be applied by domestic courts.
 ●​ Philippine Stance: The Philippine Supreme Court rejects the strict Transformation
Doctrine for customary international law and general principles, as the Constitution itself
serves as the transformation mechanism (the Doctrine of Incorporation). However,
treaties still generally require a formal act of ratification.

3. Application of the Facts in Philippine Jurisprudence

Case Legal Issue Doctrine Applied Application Summary

Kuroda v. Legality of Incorporation The laws and customs of war are

Jalandoni prosecuting a (Customary Law) "generally accepted principles
(1949) Japanese general for of international law" and
war crimes based on therefore automatically apply as
the Hague and part of the law of the land,
Geneva regardless of the Philippines'
Conventions, even non-signatory status. No
though the domestic statute was needed to
Philippines was not a transform these principles into
signatory. binding law.

Mejoff v. Legality of Incorporation The prohibition against

Director of indefinitely detaining (General "arbitrary arrest, detention or
Prisons an alien whose Principles/Human exile" found in the Universal
(1951) deportation cannot Rights) Declaration of Human Rights
be executed. (UDHR) is a generally accepted
principle of international law.
This principle is incorporated and
overrides the government's
power to indefinitely detain the
alien, mandating his release.
 Agustin v. Validity of the Incorporation The LOI was upheld because it
Edu (1979) Executive Order (Treaty Law) executed the obligations arising
mandating the Early from the 1968 Vienna
Warning Device Convention, a treaty that the
(EWD) based on the Philippines had ratified. Once
Vienna Convention. ratified, the treaty's mandate for
road safety (EWD) became part
of the domestic law of the land,
justifying the President's
exercise of Police Power. The
principle of Pacta Sunt
Servanda supports this.

The Supreme Court case of Mijares v. Ranada (2005) definitively reinforced the Doctrine of
Incorporation concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Doctrine of Incorporation and Foreign Judgments

The core doctrine established is that the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments constitute a generally accepted principle of international law that is
automatically incorporated into Philippine law via the Constitution's incorporation clause (Art.
II, Sec. 2).

●​ Status of the Rule: The procedural rules governing this process, specifically Section
48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure (on the effect of foreign judgments and
grounds for impeachment), derive their efficacy not just from the Supreme Court's
rule-making power, but from this constitutional mandate.
●​ Principle Applied: The mechanism is upheld based on international law principles such
as comity and the policy of preclusion (res judicata), ensuring that foreign judicial
decisions are given due respect in Philippine courts.

Application of Facts
The petitioners sought to enforce a $1.96 billion U.S. Final Judgment against the Marcos Estate
for human rights abuses. The trial court dismissed the case for non-payment of an exorbitant
filing fee (P472 million).
 Aspect Ruling Relevance to Doctrine

Enforcement The Court reinstated the The ruling ensured that victims had
of Judgment complaint, ruling that the action access to courts to pursue recognition
to enforce a foreign judgment is of a judgment based on internationally
one where the value of the protected human rights, upholding the
subject matter cannot be spirit of the incorporated law (Rule 39).
estimated for the purpose of
computing docket fees.

Classification The Court classified the action This procedural interpretation prevents
of the Action under Section 7(b)(3), Rule 141 exorbitant docket fees from acting as
("all other actions not involving a barrier that effectively nullifies the
property"), requiring only a internationally recognized right to seek
minimal fixed fee. enforcement, which would be contrary
to the incorporated principles of
international law and constitutional
rights.

Source of The Court affirmed that the This directly confirmed the Doctrine of
Rule requisites for enforcing the Incorporation as the legal foundation
judgment (Rule 39) are for domestic recognition of foreign
mandatory because they are a judgments.
restatement of generally
accepted principles of
international law adopted by the
Philippines.

The Supreme Court case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines
(PHAP) v. Duque III (2007) is the definitive case establishing the hierarchical relationship
between different sources of international law and domestic law.

Doctrine of Incorporation and Transformation

The Court established and strictly applied the distinction between the two methods by which
international law enters the Philippine domestic system:

1.​ Transformation Doctrine (Treaties): Requires a formal constitutional mechanism,

primarily Senate concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 21). The Court confirmed that the ICMBS
and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties because they were never ratified by the
Senate; therefore, they were not transformed into domestic law. The Milk Code (E.O.
51) itself is the only transformed law in effect.
2.​ Incorporation Doctrine (Customary Law): Automatically incorporates "generally
accepted principles of international law" (Art. II, Sec. 2) provided they meet the two
elements of custom: widespread State Practice and a sense of legal obligation (Opinio
Juris). The Court ruled that the DOH failed to prove that the strict WHA Resolutions
had attained the status of binding customary international law.

Application of Facts
The DOH issued the RIRR to implement the Milk Code, but included stricter provisions (like a
total advertising ban and new administrative fines) based on the WHA Resolutions.

●​ International Law Conflict: The DOH could not rely on the WHA Resolutions because
they were neither ratified (Transformation failed) nor proven to be legally binding
custom (Incorporation failed).
●​ Subordinate Legislation Conflict (Ultra Vires): Since the WHA Resolutions were
unenforceable, the RIRR had to adhere strictly to the Milk Code (the enabling law).
○​ The Milk Code mandated regulation of advertising; the RIRR imposed absolute
prohibition (Sections 4(f), 11).
○​ The Milk Code did not authorize the DOH to create new penalties; the RIRR
imposed administrative fines (Section 46).
●​ Outcome: The Court ruled that the DOH acted ultra vires (beyond its delegated
authority), as it cannot convert a statutory scheme of regulation into one of prohibition,
nor can it create penalties without express legislative grant. Consequently, the provisions
imposing the absolute ban and fines were declared NULL and VOID. The rest of the
RIRR, being reasonable health regulations, were upheld.

The doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Razon v. Tagitis concerning the Writ of
Amparo and enforced disappearances focuses on three key principles: the definition of an
enforced disappearance, the necessary evidentiary standard, and the imposition of a positive
duty of extraordinary diligence on public officials.

I. The Doctrine in Razon v. Tagitis

The core doctrine is procedural and substantive, intended to provide an effective remedy for
constitutional violations inherent in enforced disappearances:

1.​ Judicial Definition and Elements of Enforced Disappearance: The Court adopted the
definition from the UN Declaration/Convention, holding that an enforced disappearance
is established when:
○​ There is an arrest, detention, abduction, or any form of deprivation of
liberty.
○​ It is carried out by State agents or persons acting with the State's
authorization, support, or acquiescence.
○​ It is followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention or a concealment of
the victim's fate/whereabouts.
○​ The victim is consequently placed outside the protection of the law.
2.​ Flexible Evidentiary Standard (Substantial Evidence): The Court mandated that in
Amparo proceedings, the required proof is substantial evidence (not proof beyond
reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence). Crucially, given the unique difficulty of
proving State-sponsored concealment, the Court allows for flexibility in the admission of
evidence, including hearsay or circumstantial evidence, provided it is relevant and
consistent with the totality of the other evidence adduced.
3.​ Positive Duty and Accountability of Public Officials: The Court imposed a positive
duty on public officials and employees who are respondents in an Amparo petition to
observe extraordinary diligence in the investigation and search for the disappeared
person. The officials cannot invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance
of duty, placing the burden of proof (accountability) on the State to show that they
exerted maximum effort to resolve the case.

II. Application of the Facts

The Court applied this doctrine to the facts of Engineer Morced Tagitis' case to establish that an
enforced disappearance had occurred and that the State was accountable:

Doctrinal Element Supporting Facts Conclusion

(Application)
Enforced The corroborated "Kasim Element Established: The
Disappearance/State Agent evidence" (hearsay from a Court found the disappearance
Involvement police official's "raw report") was not due to non-state
disclosed that Tagitis was actors (like Abu Sayyaf) but to
under "custodial action with government
investigation" for alleged complicity/acquiescence.
ties to Jema'ah Islamiah.
This constituted substantial
and relevant circumstantial
evidence implying that State
agents (PNP/CIDG or
military) deprived Tagitis of
his liberty.

Failure to The officials' conduct was Element Established: The

Acknowledge/Concealment characterized by a "chorus State agents refused to
of acknowledge custody and
concealment"—including actively concealed information.
Col. Kasim's destruction of
the "raw report"
(suppression of evidence),
consistent blanket denials
by police/CIDG, and
dismissive, unfounded
theories (e.g., Tagitis
absconded with funds or
was with another woman).

Extraordinary Diligence Task Force Tagitis and the Accountability Established:

Violated petitioners failed to pursue The PNP and PNP-CIDG failed
key leads (like the terrorist to meet the extraordinary
links or the Talipapao diligence standard, holding
sighting), relied on them accountable for the
superficial records checks, enforced disappearance.
and were found to have
conducted a "haphazard"
investigation (e.g., taking
three months to secure a
clear photo).
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the Writ of Amparo, effectively denying the petition of
the police chiefs and ordering continuing directives against the incumbent heads of the PNP and
CIDG until Tagitis' fate and whereabouts could be disclosed.

The document provided is the Supreme Court's Decision in Mary Grace Natividad S.
Poe−Llamanzares v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016).

I. The Doctrine in Poe−Llamanzares v. COMELEC

The ruling established several critical doctrines concerning the scope of the COMELEC's
jurisdiction and the qualifications for high office (citizenship and residence):

A. Doctrine on COMELEC Jurisdiction (Scope of Cancellation Proceedings)

The Supreme Court doctrine limits the COMELEC's power in a Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
cancellation case (Rule 23) to the exclusive ground of false material misrepresentation. The
COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion when it preemptively determines a candidate's
eligibility based on complex constitutional qualifications (like citizenship or residency) that are
contested and require authoritative findings.

B. Doctrine on Citizenship (Foundlings)

The Court established that foundlings are, as a class, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines. This doctrine is based on the following:

1.​ Constitutional Intent: The framers of the 1935 Constitution intended foundlings to be
citizens, with their explicit inclusion being deemed redundant.
2.​ Statistical Certainty: The overwhelming statistical probability that a child found in the
Philippines (especially in the 1960s) was born to Filipino parents (a probability of over
99.8%).
3.​ International Law: Principles of international law (UDHR, UNCRC) are incorporated into
domestic law, prohibiting statelessness and establishing the presumption that a
foundling has the nationality of the place where they are found.

C. Doctrine on Repatriation

Repatriation restores the individual to their original citizenship status. Since a natural-born
citizen who loses citizenship through naturalization is restored upon repatriation under R.A. No.
9225, that individual reacquires the status of a natural-born citizen. Repatriation is not an "act
to acquire or perfect" citizenship.
D. Doctrine on Residence/Domicile

Residence for election purposes is determined by the fact of domicile (physical presence
plus intent), not by legal status or statements in a prior COC. A candidate is not bound by a
mistaken declaration in a previous COC if there is overwhelming evidence that they established
actual domicile (requiring animus manendi and animus non revertendi) at an earlier date.
Furthermore, the establishment of domicile is not conditional upon the reacquisition of
citizenship.

II. Application of Facts

Doctrinal Point Poe's Claim Application of Facts Conclusion

COMELEC COMELEC The COMELEC arbitrarily ruled Doctrine Applied:

Jurisdiction acted with on complex constitutional The COMELEC
grave abuse issues (foundling status, resolutions were
of discretion. repatriation effect) that Annulled and Set
exceeded its authority in a Aside for lack of
COC cancellation case. jurisdiction/grave
abuse of discretion.

Citizenship Poe is a The facts showed Poe was a Doctrine Applied:

(Foundling) natural-born foundling in Iloilo in 1968 (a Poe is a
Filipino. place with ∼99.5% Filipino natural-born
population). The law presumes citizen.
her parents were Filipino,
making her a natural-born
citizen from birth.

Repatriation Repatriation Poe reacquired Philippine Doctrine Applied:

restored her citizenship on July 7, 2006, Her subsequent
natural-born after losing it when she repatriation restored
status. became a U.S. citizen in 2001. her original
natural-born
status.
 Residence/Domicil Residence Overwhelming evidence Doctrine Applied:
e began on May (selling US house, shipping Poe met the 10-year
24, 2005, 28,000 lbs of goods, enrolling residency
meeting the children, buying property) requirement.
10-year showed animus manendi and
requirement. animus non revertendi as of
May 24, 2005, satisfying the 10
years by May 2016. The prior
COC statement of "6 years and
6 months" was a mistake and
not controlling.

The document is the Supreme Court of the United States case Whitney v. Robertson (1888),
which addresses the relationship between an Act of Congress and a prior treaty under U.S. law,
specifically regarding import duties.

I. The Doctrine in Whitney v. Robertson

The decision established two key doctrines: one on the interpretation of "most-favored-nation"
clauses in trade treaties, and one on the constitutional parity between treaties and federal
statutes.

A. Doctrine on Treaty Interpretation (Most-Favored-Nation Clauses)

The Court held that "most-favored-nation" (MFN) clauses in a treaty—which guarantee that
one contracting party will not impose higher duties than those imposed on "any other foreign
country"—are not intended to interfere with special concessions or arrangements with
other countries founded upon a consideration (or equivalent compensation).

●​ An MFN clause generally guarantees freedom from discriminatory legislation (hostile

treatment), but not a free, unconditional enjoyment of special privileges granted to a third
nation in exchange for something of value (a conditional concession).

B. Doctrine on the Parity of Treaties and Federal Statutes (The "Last in

Date" Rule)

The Court affirmed the doctrine that under the U.S. Constitution, a treaty and an Act of
Congress are placed on the same footing and have like obligation as the supreme law of the
land.

●​ Conflict Resolution: When a treaty and a self-executing Act of Congress relate to the
same subject and are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other.
 ●​ Judicial Role: The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest
expression of the sovereign will (the legislative department or treaty-making power).
●​ Non-Justiciable Questions: Whether a treaty has been violated, or whether Congress
was justified in superseding its stipulations, are political questions belonging to the
executive and legislative departments (diplomacy and legislation), and are not matters
for judicial cognizance.

II. Application of Facts

Doctrinal Treaty Application of Facts Conclusion

Point Stipulation &
U.S. Law

MFN The treaty with Sugars from the Hawaiian Applied: The special
Clause San Domingo islands were admitted free of privilege to Hawaii, being
guaranteed that duty based on a special treaty conditional, was not
no higher duty that included reciprocal extended unconditionally
would be concessions (a to San Domingo under
imposed than consideration/equivalent) from the MFN clause.
that on articles Hawaii.
from "any other
foreign country."

Last in The general Act The collector exacted duties on Applied: Since the Act
Date Rule of Congress the San Domingo sugars under of Congress was the
imposing duties the general Act of Congress, later expression of the
was passed which was of general sovereign will and
after the San application, making no authorized the duties, it
Domingo treaty. exception in favor of any must control and prevail
country. over any conflicting
stipulations in the
previous San Domingo
treaty.
 Conclusio The Court The later Act of Congress Judgment Affirmed:
n sustained the controlled the prior treaty The duties were properly
demurrer. stipulation, and the San collected.
Domingo treaty did not entitle
the sugars to free entry given
the conditional nature of the
Hawaiian concession.

The criteria for statehood in international law are primarily defined by the Montevideo
Convention of 1933, which is widely considered to reflect customary international law.
Subsequent legal opinions, such as the one from the Philippine Supreme Court and the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), have reinforced or provided context to these criteria,
particularly in the complicated processes of self-determination and secession.

I. The Foundational Criteria: Montevideo Convention

(Article 1)
Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933) sets forth
the four qualifications for a state as a person of international law:

1.​ Permanent Population: There must be a stable community of people residing within the
territory. There's no minimum number specified, but the population must be a permanent
body of inhabitants.
2.​ Defined Territory: The state must exercise effective control over a specific geographical
area. The boundaries don't have to be precisely delimited or undisputed, as long as
there is a consistent, core territory under control.
3.​ Government: There must be an effective, functioning political authority capable of
exercising internal sovereign control and maintaining law and order. This criterion is
about effectiveness, not the form of government.
4.​ Capacity to Enter into Relations with the Other States: This criterion essentially
means sovereignty and independence. The entity must be legally independent of any
other state and able to conduct its own external affairs.

The Convention also espouses the declaratory theory of recognition in Article 3, stating that
the political existence of a state is independent of recognition by the other states. Recognition
merely signifies that the recognizing state accepts the personality of the other

II. Application and Interpretation: Case Law

A. Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel (2008)

The Philippine Supreme Court's decision in this case is a significant example of how the
Montevideo criteria can be applied within a domestic legal framework to assess the legal nature
of a sub-state entity.

●​ Context: The case concerned the constitutionality of a draft Memorandum of Agreement

on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which proposed the
creation of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE).
●​ Relevance to Statehood Criteria: The Supreme Court ultimately declared the MOA-AD
unconstitutional because the "associative relationship" it envisioned would grant the BJE
powers and attributes that exceeded those of an autonomous region and were
fundamentally inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution. The Court noted that the
proposed BJE possessed virtually all the elements of a state in all but name, including
its own territory, governmental structures, and the capacity to enter into some forms of
external relations.
●​ Conclusion: By comparing the attributes of the proposed BJE to the Montevideo
criteria, the Court reasoned that the agreement effectively constituted a step toward
creating a separate, independent state or a legal entity (an "associate state") not
permitted under the existing Constitution, thereby violating the country's sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

B. ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo (2010)

The International Court of Justice's Advisory Opinion addressed the legality of Kosovo's
unilateral declaration of independence, providing insight into the role of international law
concerning secession and the prohibition of declaring independence.

●​ Question: The core legal question was: "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with
international law?"
●​ The Court's Finding: The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence did
not violate general international law.
●​ Relevance to Statehood Criteria:
○​ Focus on Prohibition, not Entitlement: Critically, the Court stated that it was
not required to determine whether international law conferred a positive
entitlement on Kosovo to declare independence (which would typically be linked
to fulfilling the Montevideo criteria and the right to self-determination). Instead, it
only had to determine whether international law contained a prohibition on
making such a declaration.
○​ Absence of Prohibition: The Court found no rule in general international law
that prohibited declarations of independence. It also confirmed that the principle
 of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States, not
to relations between a state and an entity within its own territory.
○​ Non-Constitutive Nature: The Opinion reinforced the view that the declaration
itself does not automatically confer statehood. Whether Kosovo ultimately
achieved statehood depended on fulfilling the Montevideo criteria (effectiveness
of government, defined territory, etc.) and the subsequent actions and recognition
of other states—a matter the ICJ explicitly avoided ruling on.

In summary, while the Montevideo Convention provides the factual, objective benchmarks for
statehood, the two case examples demonstrate the complexity of applying these criteria in
real-world scenarios: the Philippine Supreme Court used them to police domestic constitutional
limits on sub-state autonomy, and the ICJ used the principles to navigate the legality of a
declaration of independence without deciding on the ultimate question of the entity's state
status.

The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish
Populations Case established the following rules regarding the role of National Law within the
International Legal System when interpreting treaties:

🛡️
1. National Law Cannot Be Used to Interpret International
Obligations
The PCIJ rejected Turkey's argument that the meaning of the treaty word "established" must be
determined by Turkish national law (specifically, the Noufouz laws).

●​ Rule: When interpreting a treaty, the local tie indicated by a word like "established" is a
situation of fact to be determined by the natural meaning of the word in the treaty itself,
not by reference to national legislation.
●​ Rationale: To rely on different national laws (Greek and Turkish) would lead to
uncertainties, difficulties, delays, and inconsistent, non-reciprocal application of the
treaty, which would violate the Convention's spirit.

2. Treaties Prevail Over Conflicting National Law ⚖️

A State cannot invoke its national law to avoid an international obligation, even if the treaty
affects matters typically governed by domestic law.

●​ Rule: A State that has signed a valid international obligation (treaty) is bound to
modify its legislation to ensure the fulfillment of that obligation. The Convention is
self-contained and cannot be construed as implicitly referring to national legislation that
is contrary to its terms.
●​ Basis: The Court reinforced the principle that the right to enter into international
engagements is an attribute of State sovereignty, and a convention creating equal and
 reciprocal obligations does not infringe sovereign rights when construed according to
its natural meaning.

3. The Competent Interpreter is the International Body 🌐

National courts are superseded by the international or mixed body specifically created to
implement the treaty.

●​ Rule: The Mixed Commission, the international body given "full power... to decide all
questions to which this Convention may give rise" (Article 12), has the exclusive
competence to investigate and determine the factual conditions of "establishment" for
all individuals concerned.
●​ Rationale: Relying on domestic courts would be incompatible with the rapid
fulfillment required by the treaty and is superseded by the clear delegation of authority
to the international organ.

Doctrine Principle Status/Nature

Declaratory The existence of a state is a matter of Prevailing Theory. A state exists

Theory fact that is independent of recognition. if it meets the Montevideo
Recognition is merely a political and Convention criteria (territory,
formal acknowledgment of an existing population, government, and
reality, and it doesn't create the state. capacity to enter into relations with
other states).

Constitutive Recognition is a necessary condition Minority Theory. Criticized for

Theory for statehood. An entity does not being unworkable, as it implies a
become a state, or a subject of state's rights and duties depend
international law, until it is recognized by on the number of states that
existing states. recognize it.

The legal capabilities and limitations of International Organizations (IOs) are governed by the
doctrine of international organizations, which centers on the principle of speciality and was
profoundly shaped by the ICJ's 1949 Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations Advisory Opinion.

International Organizations Doctrine

The fundamental rule governing the powers of International Organizations is the principle of
speciality or attributed/conferred powers (compétences d'attribution). This principle dictates
that IOs, being created by states, only possess the powers explicitly granted to them in their
constituent instruments (e.g., a treaty or charter). IOs do not possess the general competence
or inherent sovereignty that states do.

What IOs are Capable Of (Powers)

IOs are subjects of international law with legal personality, a status that grants them rights and
duties distinct from their member states. Their capabilities are primarily categorized as:

●​ Explicit Powers: Powers clearly and expressly laid out in the organization's founding
treaty or charter. These are the primary basis for an IO's actions.
●​ Implied Powers: Powers not explicitly stated but are considered necessary for the
organization to effectively carry out its express functions or achieve its purposes. The
doctrine of implied powers is a widely accepted exception to the principle of speciality.
●​ External Legal Personality: Capacity to operate on the international plane, which
includes the ability to:
○​ Enter into treaties and international agreements.
○​ Own property.
○​ Enjoy privileges and immunities (e.g., immunity from the jurisdiction of domestic
courts).
○​ Participate in diplomatic relations and bring international claims.
●​ Breach of International Obligation: IOs are capable of being held responsible for
breaches of their international obligations, which in turn means their acts or omissions
may be attributable to the organization itself.

What IOs are Not Capable Of (Limitations)

The limitations on IOs directly stem from the principle of speciality and the fact that they are
derivative subjects of international law, unlike states which are primary subjects.

●​ No General Competence: IOs do not possess sovereignty like states. Their powers
are functional and limited to the scope defined by their member states, meaning they
cannot act outside the purposes and functions for which they were created.
●​ Not a "Super-State": As the ICJ clarified, an IO is not a "super-State" and does not
possess a general authority over its members or non-members beyond what is conferred
to it.
●​ Limits on Power: The scope of an IO's powers, including its treaty-making capacity, is
always governed by the rules of that organization (its constituent instrument), unlike
the general capacity of a state.

The Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion

The 1949 ICJ Advisory Opinion was a landmark case that solidified the status and capabilities
of International Organizations in international law. The United Nations requested the opinion
following the assassination of UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte and other personnel in
Palestine in 1948. The central question was whether the UN had the capacity to bring an
international claim against the responsible state.

Capabilities Established by the ICJ

The Advisory Opinion established two critical capabilities for the UN, which are now widely
applied to IOs generally:

1.​ International Legal Personality: The Court held that the UN possessed international
personality because it was intended to exercise functions and rights that "can only be
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of international personality
and the capacity to operate upon the international plane." This finding provided the
necessary legal basis for the UN to function effectively.
2.​ Capacity to Bring an International Claim:
○​ The UN has the capacity to bring a claim for damage caused to the
organization itself (e.g., to its property, assets, or administrative machine).
○​ Crucially, the UN also has the capacity to claim reparation for damage suffered
by the victim (its agent or the person entitled through him). This was an exercise
of "functional protection," a right asserted by the organization based on the
agent's status as an agent of the UN and the need to ensure the independence
and efficiency of the organization's mission. This right is distinct from traditional
diplomatic protection, which only a state can exercise on behalf of its nationals.

Limitations Reaffirmed by the ICJ

While expanding the perceived powers of the UN, the Court carefully affirmed the IO's
limitations:

●​ Functional Limits: The Court stressed that the rights and duties of the organization
were not identical to those of a State and "must depend upon its purposes and
functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents." This reinforced the
functional nature of the IO's legal personality.
●​ Not a Super-State: The Court made it clear that while possessing international
personality, the UN was "certainly not a super-state." Its legal capacity is a
consequence of its functions, not an inherent attribute of sovereignty.
●​ Reconciling Claims: The Court acknowledged the theoretical risk of a conflict between
the UN's claim for functional protection and the agent's national state's right to diplomatic
protection. The Court suggested this conflict could be reconciled by agreements
between the organization and the member states, implying that the IO's power does not
supersede the state's traditional right in all cases.
 ●​ Query successful

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International Organizations (IOs) can be held responsible for breaches of their international
obligations because they possess international legal personality separate from their member
states. The principles for their responsibility are primarily codified in the International Law
Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations
(DARIO).

The framework for holding an IO responsible for an internationally wrongful act involves two
main elements: attribution of conduct and breach of an international obligation.

1. Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act

An internationally wrongful act of an IO is established when:

1.​ A conduct (act or omission) is attributable to the IO under international law.

2.​ That conduct constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the IO.

Attribution of Conduct

Attribution establishes the necessary link between the conduct of a person (since IOs, like
States, are abstract entities) and the IO itself. Conduct is attributable to an IO if it is the conduct
of:

●​ An organ or agent of the organization acting in that capacity, even if the organ or agent
exceeds its authority (ultra vires). The "rules of the organization" (constituent
instruments, decisions, resolutions, etc.) determine who qualifies as an organ or agent.
●​ An organ of a State or an organ or agent of another international organization placed at
the disposal of the IO, provided the IO exercises "effective control" over that conduct.
This is a critical point, especially in complex operations like UN peacekeeping missions,
where forces are contributed by member states.
●​ Conduct that the IO acknowledges and adopts as its own.

Breach of an International Obligation

The conduct must violate an international obligation binding on the IO. These obligations can
arise from:

●​ Treaties to which the organization is a party.

●​ Customary international law.
●​ The "rules of the organization" (its internal legal order).
2. Consequences of International Responsibility
Once international responsibility is established, the IO is subject to certain legal consequences,
which are secondary obligations:

●​ Cessation and Non-repetition: The IO must immediately stop the wrongful act and
offer assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances require.
●​ Reparation: The IO is obligated to make full reparation for the injury caused by the
internationally wrongful act. Reparation may take the form of:
○​ Restitution: Restoring the situation that existed before the wrongful act was
committed.
○​ Compensation: Covering any financially assessable damage.
○​ Satisfaction: Acknowledging the breach, expressing regret, or a formal apology,
especially for moral injury.

3. Invocation of Responsibility and Enforcement

Invocation of Responsibility

Responsibility is typically invoked by:

●​ An injured State or injured international organization (the entity to which the

breached obligation was owed).
●​ In some cases, a State or IO other than the injured party may be entitled to invoke
responsibility, particularly when the obligation is owed to the international community as
a whole (erga omnes).

Dispute Settlement and Enforcement

A major challenge in holding IOs accountable is the lack of a single, universal compulsory
dispute settlement mechanism. Unlike States, IOs generally cannot be brought before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Enforcement generally relies on:

●​ Internal Mechanisms: The IO's own dispute settlement bodies or internal claims
processes.
●​ Negotiation and Diplomacy: The most common approach.
●​ Countermeasures: An injured State or IO may be entitled to take lawful
countermeasures against the responsible IO to induce it to comply with its obligations,
though these are often difficult to implement in practice, especially by member states
against their own organization.
 ●​ Specialized Tribunals: Courts or tribunals established under a treaty for a specific IO
(e.g., the European Court of Justice for the European Union).

Role of Member States

The DARIO also addresses the complex issue of responsibility of member states in
connection with the act of the IO, holding them responsible in specific, limited circumstances,
such as:

●​ When a State aids, assists, directs, or coerces the IO in committing a wrongful act.
●​ When a State circumvents its own international obligations by having the IO commit the
wrongful act.
●​ When the State has accepted responsibility or led the injured party to rely on its
responsibility. In such cases, the state's responsibility is generally presumed to be
subsidiary to that of the organization.