University of Dhaka
Department of Law
SUMMARY OF FIVE RECENT CASES ON
THE DEFINITION OF THE TERM
“WORKER”
Course Name: Labour Law
Code: 401
Abid Hasan Jarif
Roll No: 45
4th Year
Session: 2024-2025
Table of Cases
Serial Case Name Citation Page No.
No.
01 Professor Muhammad Yunus @ Professor Dr. 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 162 1
Muhammad Yunus vs. The State.
02 Biman Bangladesh Airlines Ltd. And Others 13 ADC [2016] 481; 2
vs. Md. Abdul Khaleque and others. LEX/BDAD/0032/2016
03 Grameenphone Ltd. vs. Chairman, First 70 DLR [2018] 581; 10 3
Labour Court, Dhaka and others. SCOB [2018] HCD 7
04 Rupali Bank Ltd. vs. The Chairman, Second [2002] 22 BLD 143; 54 5
Labour Court, Dhaka. DLR [2002] 602
05 Karnaphuli Paper Mills Workers Union vs. [2002] 22 BLD (AD) 6
Karnaphuli Paper Mills Ltd. and another. 33;LEX/BDAD/0122/1998
Case No. 01
Case Name: Professor Muhammad Yunus @ Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus vs. The State.
Citation: 17 SCOB [2023] HCD 162
Facts:
A Labour Inspector conducted an inspection of Grameen Telecom Corporation (GTC) and identified
several violations of the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 (BLA). These included: (a) failure to make jobs
permanent after the probationary period; (b) failure to provide annual leave with pay or its encashment;
and (c) failure to constitute the Labour Participation Fund and Labour Welfare Fund or to deposit 5% of
the company’s net profit into those funds. Despite receiving multiple letters from the Inspector, GTC’s
responses were deemed unsatisfactory. Consequently, a complaint was filed before the Labour Court
against Professor Muhammad Yunus, Chairman of the GTC Board of Directors, along with others. The
petitioners sought to quash the proceedings under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC),
contending that no offense had been committed, that the complaint was barred by limitation, that Professor
Yunus had no managerial responsibility, and that GTC, being a non-profit company, was exempt from the
relevant provisions of labour law.
Issues:
The case raised four key questions: (1) whether the complaint disclosed offenses under the Bangladesh
Labour Act, 2006; (2) whether the case was barred by limitation under Section 314 of the Act; (3) whether
Professor Muhammad Yunus, as Chairman of the Board, could be held responsible for the alleged
violations; and (4) whether GTC, as a non-profit company, was exempt from certain labour law
obligations.
Decision:
The court discharged the Rule and declined to quash the proceedings in the Labour Court. It held that the
complaint prima facie disclosed offenses under the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006; that the question of
limitation was a mixed issue of law and fact; that Professor Yunus could be held responsible in view of
his managerial role within the company; and that GTC, being a profit-earning entity, could not claim
exemption from the statutory obligations of labour laws.
Reasoning:
The court observed that the alleged violations, if established, would constitute offenses under the BLA.
Regarding limitation, the court noted that the violations were discovered on 09.02.2020 and 16.08.2021,
while the complaint was filed on 28.08.2021—within six months of the last detection—thus satisfying the
requirement of Section 314. As to responsibility, the court referred to Clauses 33–34 of GTC’s Articles of
Association, which conferred full managerial and financial control upon the Board of Directors,
concluding that Professor Yunus could not be absolved of responsibility at this preliminary stage. Finally,
the court found that GTC’s Memorandum of Association indicated profit-earning activities, meaning that
under Section 28 of the Companies Act, it could not claim exemption from contributing to the welfare
funds mandated by law.
Analysis of the Principles on “Workers” or Employees:
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This case reinforces fundamental principles concerning the definition and protection of “workers” under
the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006, and clarifies the obligations of employers toward their employees.
Although the judgment does not expressly redefine the term “worker,” it implicitly addresses its scope and
the extent of statutory protection available to various categories of employees. The decision affirms that
employees on probation or contractual arrangements are entitled to the rights provided under the Labour
Act once they complete their probationary period. The failure to regularize employment after probation
violates Section 4(7) of the Act, which confirms that individuals who have fulfilled their probationary
requirements qualify as “workers” and are entitled to corresponding benefits.
In essence, the case highlights that the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 defines “workers” broadly to
encompass probationary, contractual, and permanent employees within profit-earning establishments.
Such workers are entitled to essential rights, including job security, paid leave, and participation in welfare
schemes. The principles derived from this judgment emphasize that employers’ statutory obligations are
non-derogable regardless of the company’s structure or nature, and that individuals in managerial positions
share accountability for compliance. Ultimately, the decision strengthens the protective framework of
labour law, ensuring comprehensive rights and safeguards for all categories of workers.
Case No. 02
Case Name: Biman Bangladesh Airlines Ltd. And Others vs. Md. Abdul Khaleque and others.
Citation: 13 ADC [2016] 481; LEX/BDAD/0032/2016
Facts:
The respondent, Md. Abdul Khaleque, joined Biman Bangladesh Airlines (then Bangladesh Biman
Corporation) in 1980 as a Cadet Flight Engineer and was subsequently promoted to Senior Flight Engineer.
In 2011, Biman issued a retirement notice requiring him to retire upon reaching the age of 57, in
accordance with its Service Regulations of 1979. The respondent challenged this directive before the High
Court Division by filing a writ petition, contending that he was a “worker” within the meaning of the
Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 (BLA) and therefore entitled to retire at age 60. He relied on a 1996 Board
resolution that recognized Flight Engineers as workers, a 2001 agreement between Biman and the Flight
Engineers Association, and the 2010 amendment to Section 28(1) of the Labour Act, which raised the
retirement age for workers to 60 years.
Issues:
The central questions before the court were: (1) whether the duties of a Flight Engineer are primarily
managerial, administrative, or supervisory in nature, thereby excluding them from the definition of
“worker” under Section 2(65) of the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006; and (2) whether a person alleging
premature retirement as a worker must seek remedy before the Labour Court under the BLA, rather than
invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division.
Decision:
The Appellate Division allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court Division. It held
that the writ petition was not maintainable, as the respondent had an alternative statutory remedy available
under Section 213 of the Labour Act. The court did not make a conclusive determination on whether Flight
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Engineers fall within the definition of “worker,” leaving that factual assessment to the Labour Court should
the respondent choose to pursue it there.
Reasoning:
The Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 is a special and self-contained legislation that provides a comprehensive
mechanism for resolving disputes concerning workers’ rights. Under Section 213, any worker can enforce
their rights through the Labour Court, while Section 33 sets out grievance procedures applicable to matters
such as wrongful termination or premature retirement, falling under the phrase “otherwise removed from
employment.” The Appellate Division emphasized that the Labour Court, endowed with powers akin to
those of a civil court under Section 216, is the proper forum for adjudicating such matters. The court found
that the High Court Division had erred in holding that premature retirement did not fall within the scope
of Section 33. It clarified that any alleged violation of a worker’s rights—including disputes over
retirement age—is squarely within the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, making the writ remedy
inappropriate where an alternative statutory remedy exists.
Analysis of the Principles on “Workers” or Employees:
Although the court did not conclusively determine whether Flight Engineers qualify as “workers,” the case
establishes significant principles concerning both the definition of “worker” and the proper forum for
labour-related disputes. The decision reiterates that the definition in Section 2(65) of the BLA covers
persons engaged in “skilled, unskilled, manual, technical, trade promotional or clerical work,” but
expressly excludes individuals employed mainly in a “managerial, administrative, or supervisory
capacity.” Importantly, the court reaffirmed that the determination of worker status depends on the actual
nature of one’s duties rather than job titles or designations. Since such a factual inquiry requires
examination of work responsibilities—such as those described in operational manuals—the Appellate
Division rightly deferred this assessment to the Labour Court.
In conclusion, the case underscores two key legal principles: first, that the classification of an employee
as a “worker” under the BLA depends on the substance of their duties rather than formal position; and
second, that disputes concerning service conditions, including premature retirement, must be adjudicated
through the specialized dispute resolution framework provided by the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006. This
ensures consistency, access to justice, and adherence to the statutory mechanisms specifically designed to
protect workers’ rights.
Case No. 03
Case Name: Grameenphone Ltd. vs. Chairman, First Labour Court, Dhaka and others.
Citation: 70 DLR [2018] 581; 10 SCOB [2018] HCD 7
Facts:
Multiple drivers filed applications under Section 213 of the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 (BLA) against
Grameenphone Ltd., seeking a declaration that they were permanent workers of the company. The drivers
claimed that they had been appointed in 2007, drove Grameenphone vehicles, wore company uniforms,
carried ID cards, and received salaries and benefits, which they argued entitled them to be treated as
permanent employees. Grameenphone, however, contested the claim, asserting that the drivers were
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employed by a third-party contractor, Smart Services Ltd./Jamosons International (Respondent No. 4), on
an outsourcing basis and had no direct contractual relationship with Grameenphone. The Labour Court
and the Labour Appellate Tribunal initially ruled in favor of the drivers, prompting Grameenphone to file
the present writ petition challenging those decisions.
Issues:
The case raised two principal issues: (1) whether the respondent drivers were employees of Grameenphone
Ltd. or of the third-party contractor (Respondent No. 4); and (2) whether an application under Section 213
of the BLA is maintainable to establish a right as a permanent worker, rather than to enforce a right already
recognized by law, award, or settlement.
Decision:
The High Court Division made the Rules absolute, setting aside the judgments of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal and the Labour Court. The court held that the drivers were not employees of Grameenphone Ltd.,
but were outsourced workers of the contractor. As a result, their applications under Section 213 of the
Labour Act were not maintainable.
Reasoning:
The court observed that the contractual relationship existed between Grameenphone and the contractor for
the provision of outsourced personnel, and that the drivers were appointed by and received salaries from
the contractor, not Grameenphone. Evidence such as uniforms without the company logo, gate passes
(rather than exclusive ID cards), and written agreements confirmed the existence of an outsourcing
arrangement. The court also relied on the introduction of Section 3A into the BLA in 2013, which gave
statutory recognition to outsourcing and clarified that employees engaged by a contractor to work in an
establishment are considered workers of the contractor. Furthermore, the court noted that Section 213 of
the BLA is designed to enforce existing rights guaranteed by law, award, or settlement, and is not a
mechanism for creating a new right. Since the drivers had not established a direct employer-employee
relationship with Grameenphone, their Section 213 applications were deemed non-maintainable.
Analysis of the Principles on “Workers” or Employees:
This case establishes an important precedent for determining the employer-employee relationship in the
context of outsourcing and clarifies the proper scope of Section 213 of the BLA. Firstly, it emphasizes that
the “real employer” is determined by the existence of a contract of employment and direct control over the
employee. Key indicators include who issues the appointment letter (the contractor), who pays the salaries
(the contractor), and who exercises control over employment terms and conditions (the contractor). Merely
performing services for a company, using its assets, or following its operational instructions does not
automatically create an employment relationship with the company if a genuine outsourcing arrangement
exists.
Secondly, the judgment gives statutory validation to outsourcing arrangements under Section 3A of the
BLA, which explicitly states that workers employed by a contractor to work in an establishment are
deemed workers of the contractor. Although the drivers were engaged prior to this amendment, the court
held that the provision merely formalized an already lawful practice. This principle reinforces the legal
framework for outsourcing and protects the principal company from direct employment claims, provided
the outsourcing arrangement is genuine.
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Case No. 04
Case Name: Rupali Bank Ltd. vs. The Chairman, Second Labour Court, Dhaka.
Citation: [2002] 22 BLD 143; 54 DLR [2002] 602
Facts:
Rupali Bank Ltd. appointed several individuals, including Sahabuddin Ahmed and Md. Yunus, as
“Temporary Godown Keepers” or “Temporary Godown Chowkidars.” These employees worked
continuously for the Bank, performed duties as directed by its management, and received salaries and
benefits from the Bank. The Bank contended that these were not its employees in the conventional sense
but were appointed temporarily against specific loans granted to borrowers, with their salaries debited to
the borrowers’ accounts, and their services terminated once the respective loans were adjusted. The
employees filed cases before the Labour Court, asserting that they had acquired the status of permanent
workers after completing their probationary period.
Issues:
The case raised two main issues: (1) whether the temporary go-down staff, engaged continuously by the
Bank, qualified as “permanent workers” under the labour law; and (2) whether the temporary nature of
their appointment, being linked to specific loan accounts, precluded them from acquiring permanent status.
Decision:
The High Court Division modified the decision of the Labour Court. It held that the employees were not
permanent workers but were regular temporary employees of the Bank. The Court directed that the Bank
recognize them as such, provide them with the benefits applicable to their category, and give them
preferential consideration for absorption into permanent posts as and when such positions became
available.
Reasoning:
The court noted that the employees had been in continuous service under the control and supervision of
the Bank, which established a direct employer-employee relationship. However, they were appointed
against temporary posts linked to specific loan transactions rather than sanctioned permanent positions.
Therefore, they could not automatically acquire permanent status merely by completing a probation period.
The Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 recognizes a distinct category of temporary employees appointed for
specific tasks, projects, or periods. While the employees’ continuous service warranted regularization
within the temporary category, it did not confer permanency. The court emphasized that recognizing them
as regular temporary employees protected their rights and benefits without contravening the organizational
structure of the Bank.
Analysis of the Principles on “Workers” or Employees:
This case establishes important principles for determining the status of workers under the BLA,
particularly in distinguishing between permanent and temporary employees and defining the scope of
regularization. First, the decision reinforces that the employer-employee relationship is determined by
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continuous service under the control and supervision of the employer, irrespective of labels or payment
methods. Despite the Bank’s argument that the employees were linked to borrowers’ accounts, the reality
of appointment, control, and salary payment established a direct employment relationship.
Second, the judgment clarifies the distinction between permanent and temporary workers. Permanent
workers are appointed against sanctioned permanent posts and are entitled to confirmation upon
completing probation under Section 4(7) of the BLA. Temporary workers, in contrast, are appointed for
specific tasks, projects, or periods, and the temporary nature of their post prevents automatic acquisition
of permanent status, regardless of service duration.
Third, the court introduced the principle of “regularization” versus “permanency.” Continuous service in
a temporary capacity does not create permanency but justifies recognition as a regular temporary
employee, entitling the worker to the benefits applicable to that category. Fourth, the court established the
principle of preferential absorption, ensuring that regularized temporary employees have priority for
consideration when permanent posts become available, balancing employees’ legitimate expectations with
organizational requirements.
Finally, the court applied the principle of substance over form, looking beyond labels and payment
mechanisms to the actual employment relationship. By recognizing the employees’ continuous, controlled
service, the court affirmed their status as employees of the Bank, thereby safeguarding them from being
treated as mere contract labor or third-party personnel.
Case No. 05
Case Name: Karnaphuli Paper Mills Workers Union vs. Karnaphuli Paper Mills Ltd. and another.
Citation: [2002] 22 BLD (AD) 33; LEX/BDAD/0122/1998
Facts:
A dispute arose between two trade unions at Karnaphuli Paper Mills (KPM) concerning the preparation of
the voter list for electing the Collective Bargaining Agent (CBA). The Registrar of Trade Unions requested
KPM to submit a list of workers, including those employed through contractors. KPM submitted a second
list containing contractors’ workers, but omitted essential details such as parentage, age, department, and
other particulars required under Section 22(5)(a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The
Employees Union challenged this list through a writ petition, arguing that workers employed through
contractors were not “workers” of KPM and, therefore, ineligible to vote in the CBA election. The High
Court Division agreed, holding that the contractors’ workers were casual in nature and their inclusion on
the voter list was unauthorized.
Issues:
The main issues before the court were: (1) whether workers employed through contractors qualify as
“workers” of the principal establishment (KPM) under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; and (2)
whether the list of contractors’ workers complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 22(5)(a) of
the Ordinance.
Decision:
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The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court Division’s conclusion that the
contractors’ workers were not employees of KPM and could not be included in the voter list. Additionally,
the court found that the voter list itself was infirm for failing to include mandatory particulars.
Reasoning:
The court noted that while the definition of “worker” in Section 2(XXVIII) of the Ordinance includes
persons employed “directly or through a contractor,” such inclusion requires the existence of a contract of
service between the worker and the principal employer. Examination of the work order (Exhibit ‘G’)
revealed that the contractors exercised full control over the workers: they recruited and terminated
employment, paid wages, maintained attendance and payroll records, and handled discipline and
compensation. KPM exercised no direct control over these workers. Consequently, no master-servant
relationship existed between KPM and the contractors’ workers; their contractual relationship was solely
with the contractor. As a result, they were not “workers” of KPM under the Ordinance and were ineligible
to vote in the CBA election. Furthermore, the submitted list failed to meet the requirements of Section
22(5)(a) by omitting essential details such as parentage, age, department, and ticket numbers.
Analysis of the Principles on “Workers” or Employees:
This case establishes a critical test for determining who qualifies as a “worker” of an establishment when
employment is routed through a contractor, under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969—a framework
largely consistent with the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006. First, the court clarified that the statutory phrase
“employed… through a contractor” does not automatically render every individual working on a
company’s premises an employee of that company. The key factor is the existence of a “contract of
service,” or a master-servant relationship, between the principal employer and the worker. Mere presence
on the premises or contribution to the work of the principal company is insufficient without this direct
contractual nexus.
Second, the judgment reinforces the primacy of the “control and supervision” test in identifying the real
employer. Determining factors include who appoints and dismisses the worker, who exercises disciplinary
authority, who pays the remuneration, and who maintains employment records. Since all indices of control
rested with the contractor, the workers were employees of the contractor, not KPM.
Third, the court emphasized substance over form, examining the actual terms of the work order. Clauses
that placed responsibility for compensation, supervision, and workplace conduct with the contractor
confirmed that the contractor was an independent employer. The case further distinguishes between a
“contract of service,” which creates an employer-employee relationship, and a “contract for service,”
which is a commercial contract for providing a service. Workers under the latter are not employees of the
service recipient.
Finally, the judgment underscores the importance of strict compliance with procedural requirements for
voter list preparation under Section 22(5)(a). A list that omits mandatory particulars such as parentage,
age, department, or ticket numbers is invalid, regardless of the employment status of the individuals listed.
This decision provides a clear framework for distinguishing between principal and contractor employees
and ensuring procedural integrity in union elections.
