Case: 1:24-cv-12489 Document #: 119 Filed: 07/23/25 Page 1 of 15 PageID #:1030

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Civil Case No. 1:24-cv-12489
Plaintiff,
Hon. LaShonda A. Hunt
v.

THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.,

ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER, and
KELLIE ANN MOORE,

Defendants.

THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.,

and ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER,

Counterclaim and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Counterclaim
Defendant,

and

ASSERTIO HOLDINGS, INC., and

BRENDAN P. O’GRADY,

Third-Party
Defendants.

SPECTRUM’S OPPOSITION TO THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.

AND ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER’S RULE 59(e)
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1

ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 2

I. BHG/Parker’s untimely objections are forfeited. .................................................................... 2

II. BHG/Parker’s objections are without merit. ........................................................................... 3

A. BHG/Parker’s proposed amendments are not mere “clarifying” edits and would
remove key protections for Spectrum. .............................................................................3

B. The Order does not address issues “wholly outside” the case. ........................................4

C. The Order’s prohibitions are sufficiently clear. ...............................................................9

D. The Order complies with the First Amendment. ...........................................................10

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 11

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

3M v. Pribyl,
259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................8, 9

Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC,

777 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 2015) ...................................................................................................11

De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States,

325 U.S. 212 (1945) ...................................................................................................................5

FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC,

284 F. Supp. 3d 907 (N.D. Ill. 2018) .........................................................................................2

LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Tr.,

49 F.3d 1263 (7th Cir. 1995) .....................................................................................................2

Maui Jim, Inc. v. SmartBuy Guru Enters, Motion Global, Ltd.,

459 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Ill. 2020) .......................................................................................2

Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki,

701 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1983) ...................................................................................................10

Wutchumna Water Co. v. Bailey,

15 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1932) .............................................................................................................8

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 1030 ............................................................................................................................11

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Am. Bar Ass’n Formal Op. 480 (2018) ...........................................................................................8

Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2016-105, 2016 WL 4268977 (2016) ...................................................8

iii
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INTRODUCTION

The Court should deny BHG/Parker’s motion under Rule 59(e) to reconsider or amend the

terms of the preliminary injunction order (“Order”).

BHG/Parker had the opportunity to but did not raise their untimely objections at any point

prior to entry of the Order, including during full briefing or at the evidentiary hearing. By waiting

to raise their concerns until weeks after the day-long evidentiary hearing, at which any of

BHG/Parker’s concerns might have been addressed—including to any extent needed through the

further development of the factual record—BHG/Parker have unreasonably burdened the Court

and Spectrum. The Court should therefore deny the motion on forfeiture grounds.

Further, the Court’s 11-page Order is fully supported by the evidence, is appropriately

tethered to the issues in this case, and preserves the status quo pending a final disposition on the

merits. As Spectrum alleged and the Court found based on the evidence presented at this stage of

the proceedings, BHG/Parker have been misusing Spectrum documents and information that they

obtained in violation of Spectrum’s rights and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The Order

thus prohibits BHG/Parker from further using, disclosing, or publishing any such information

during the pendency of this litigation. The Court should reject BHG/Parker’s proposal to amend

the Order to create loopholes that would allow them to continue harassing Spectrum by leveraging

unlawfully obtained materials. The Order already contains sufficient protection for any lawful use

BHG/Parker may have for Spectrum’s protected materials, including the right to cooperate fully

with any governmental investigation. BHG/Parker offer nothing but hypotheticals and

speculation—unsupported by any record evidence—and thus fail to carry their burden to show that

the terms of the Order are manifest errors of law or otherwise an abuse of discretion.

The Court should deny the motion.

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ARGUMENT

I. BHG/Parker’s untimely objections are forfeited.

“A Rule 59(e) motion is not an appropriate means ‘to advance arguments or theories that

could and should have been made before the district court rendered a judgment.’” Maui Jim, Inc.

v. SmartBuy Guru Enters, Motion Global, Ltd., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 2020)

(quoting LB Credit Corp. v. Resolution Tr., 49 F.3d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1995)). “[F]ailure to

object to the terms of the preliminary injunction” results in forfeiture of the objection. FTC v.

Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 284 F. Supp. 3d 907, 909 (N.D. Ill. 2018).

As BHG/Parker acknowledge (at 5), “[t]he Court adopted the language Spectrum suggested

in its Proposed Order,” which mirrored the language contained in Spectrum’s motion (ECF No.

2), both of which have been on the docket since December 5, 2024. But BHG/Parker did not object

to the language of the proposed order on the grounds they raise now in their opposition to the

preliminary injunction (ECF No. 31), at the hearing on the preliminary injunction, or in the weeks

after the hearing. Instead, they waited until 27 days after entry of the order.

The Court should therefore deem BHG/Parker’s new objections forfeited and deny the

motion on that basis. See, e.g., LB Credit Corp., 49 F.3d at 1268 (“The assertions that LB Credit

attempted to raise by way of the Rule 59(e) motion were waived for failure to raise them prior to

the entry of judgment.”); Maui Jim, 459 F. Supp. 3d at 1111 (denying Rule 59(e) motion to

reconsider or modify order on the basis of new objections, citing forfeiture and merits grounds).

BHG/Parker had the opportunity to challenge the terms of the proposed preliminary injunction at

any time before it was entered. Had they taken issue with its terms, they could and should have

raised those objections in their opposition or at the hearing so that the parties could have developed

a record to support (or rebut) different terms. BHG/Parker’s objections to the language of the

Order are untimely and should be overruled.

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II. BHG/Parker’s objections are without merit.

A. BHG/Parker’s proposed amendments are not mere “clarifying” edits and

would remove key protections for Spectrum.

To begin, BHG/Parker offer (at 3) an ostensibly modest redline of the Order that, in reality,

would likely render it toothless:

There is nothing “clarifying” about these edits. They are revisions designed to limit the protections

afforded to Spectrum.

If the Court were to adopt BHG/Parker’s revisions, BHG/Parker would likely feel

empowered to “use” documents or information obtained unlawfully to pressure third parties

associated with Spectrum and Assertio—which, as discussed in further detail below, they had

already done prior to the injunction’s entry notwithstanding the stipulation entered in this case that

was functioning as a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 27).

A similar loophole would be created if the Court were to strike the phrase “including but

not limited to any Spectrum documents” and thus imply that there are Spectrum confidential and

proprietary documents, information, and trade secrets that BHG/Parker are entitled to use, disclose,

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or publish. The evidentiary record does not support that BHG/Parker received any confidential

and proprietary documents, information, and trade secrets that he acquired other than through the

unlawful means described in Spectrum’s lawsuit. Further, to the extent that BHG/Parker’s

proposed redline could be construed to limit the scope of the Order to just documents and

information “that were on the Spectrum laptop,” the edit is not well taken. As the Court recognized

at the hearing, “this [case] is not just about a laptop . . . . It’s about the information and how it’s

being used.” Ex. A (Feb. 27, 2025 Tr.) at 36:23–25.

Finally, the Court should not limit the protections of the Order to just “confidential”

documents or information that Moore gave to BHG/Parker. That change would leave to

BHG/Parker the discretion to determine whether they may use or disclose information they

received from Moore. But that is letting the fox guard the henhouse. As BHG/Parker made clear

throughout this entire litigation, they (incorrectly) believe that none of the information Moore gave

them was confidential. In fact, the opposite is true—all documents and information from Moore

are protected by duties of loyalty and confidentiality, as there is no “public documents” exception

to an attorney’s fiduciary duties.

B. The Order does not address issues “wholly outside” the case.

BHG/Parker ask the Court (at 6–8) to “clarify” that the Order applies only to documents or

information obtained in violation of Moore’s legal duties, arguing that anything more would not

be justified. But the Order already defines “Confidential Spectrum materials subject to this Order”

as “documents or information BHG and/or Parker received directly or indirectly from Moore”

(ECF No. 96 at 11 ¶ 2). More importantly, however, the Court should reject BHG/Parker’s request

to amend the Order because their request is meritless.

As BHG/Parker correctly observe (at 6), a preliminary injunction should grant intermediate

relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally and is not appropriate when the
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preliminary injunction “deals with a matter lying wholly outside the issues in the suit.” De Beers

Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). But while that is a correct statement of

the law as a general principle, it has no application here.

Here, the Court’s Order is appropriately tailored to the issues raised. As Spectrum alleged

and the Court found, BHG/Parker claimed to possess “extensive troves” of non-public Spectrum

documents and information from Moore that they threatened to release and did, in fact, release

(ECF No. 96 at 8). As Spectrum alleged and the Court found, BHG/Parker have been using

Spectrum’s internal documents and information to wage a campaign against Assertio since June

2024. (Id. at 3). Even after the evidentiary hearing, BHG/Parker continued to try to leverage

Spectrum’s confidential materials to harm the company by threatening Assertio’s auditor (Id. at 5

n.3). The Order prohibiting BHG/Parker from using, disclosing, or publishing Spectrum’s

confidential materials pending a final resolution on the merits therefore maintains the status quo

and is directly related to the issues in this suit.

BHG/Parker’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

First, BHG/Parker suggest (at 7) that “disclosure of any Spectrum information by anyone

other than Ms. Moore” should be fair game. But Spectrum asked Parker at the hearing whether he

had received Spectrum materials from “any other whistleblowers,” and he responded, “Zero.” Ex.

A (Feb. 27, 2025 Tr.) at 164:4–11. BHG/Parker cannot now ask the Court to amend the Order

based on a hypothetical set of circumstances unsupported—contradicted, in fact—by the record.

At any rate, to the extent “anyone other than Ms. Moore” provided information to BHG/Parker

because Moore connected them to BHG/Parker, information obtained from such individuals would

still be the direct result of Moore’s breach of duty—since Moore’s breach was the direct and sole

source of that connection—and therefore not “wholly outside” the issues in this suit.

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Second, BHG/Parker argue (at 7) that the Order should not prohibit BHG/Parker’s conduct

with respect to Spectrum confidential information “that was not disclosed in violation of Moore’s

legal duties.” In their view, such confidential information would be “wholly unconnected to

Spectrum’s claims.” Not so. The record is clear that all of the Spectrum confidential materials in

BHG/Parker’s possession—not just documents from her laptop—are directly traceable to Moore’s

breaches. BHG/Parker did not raise any concerns about Rolvedon’s safety until Moore first

breached her duties and began to provide her former client’s documents and information to

BHG/Parker. See Parker Decl. ¶ 14–16 (ECF No. 31-1) (describing Moore’s “information-sharing

with BHG” at that time); Ex. A (Feb. 27, 2025 Tr.) at 163:15–17 (stating that May 2024 was when

Moore first told Parker that he “was on to something” regarding Spectrum and Rolvedon); id. at

110:1–3 (Parker testifying that he “didn’t raise any concerns” “about Rolvedon” before that). The

uncontradicted evidence is that the but-for cause of BHG/Parker’s wrongful possession of

Spectrum documents and information regarding Rolvedon was Moore. Put simply, everything

BHG/Parker learned—or thought they learned—regarding Rolvedon and its clinical data is the

direct result of Moore’s breach of her duties to Spectrum and BHG/Parker’s encouragement of and

participation in those breaches. BHG/Parker have therefore not identified any information that is

“wholly outside” the issues in this case.

Third, BHG/Parker suggest (at 7–8) that they should be permitted to “use generally (as

opposed to use publicly)” Spectrum’s confidential and proprietary materials. They cite no support

for a right to “use generally” confidential documents and information that were unlawfully

obtained. Nor do BHG/Parker explain what they mean (at 7–8) by “use publicly.” For example,

despite promising the Court that BHG/Parker would not “publicly release or disclose to any other

person any documents or information that BHG/Parker received directly or indirectly from Kellie

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Ann Moore related to Assertio Holdings, Inc. or Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc.” (ECF No. 27)

(emphasis added), and despite testifying under oath that they had “no intent to release anything,”

Ex. A (Feb. 27, 2025 Tr.) at 157:5, 157:15–16, BHG/Parker tried to leverage Spectrum materials

to manipulate Assertio’s auditor Grant Thornton in advance of Assertio’s public reporting under

the securities laws:

Mar. 7, 2025 Parker Email to M. Capone (ECF No. 62-2). It is far from clear whether BHG/Parker

would consider this to be “public” or just “general” use of Spectrum’s confidential information,

and the Court should not give BHG/Parker the chance to exploit that lack of clarity by watering

down the Order in the manner BHG/Parker request.

Fourth, BHG/Parker request (at 8) that the Court amend the Order so that hypothetical

“public Spectrum documents” received from Moore may be exempt from the Order. But as

Spectrum noted previously (ECF No. 33 at 7 n.6), there is no “It’s publicly available” exception

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to an attorney’s fiduciary duties of confidentiality and loyalty. See, e.g., Wutchumna Water Co. v.

Bailey, 15 P.2d 505, 508–509 (Cal. 1932) (“[T]he attorney’s lips are forever sealed . . . [and she]

may not do anything which will injuriously affect [her] former client in any matter in which [she]

formerly represented [it,] nor may [she] at any time use against [her] former client knowledge or

information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.”); Cal. State Bar Formal Op. 2016-

105, 2016 WL 4268977, at *1 (2016) (“A lawyer may not disclose [her] client’s secrets, which

include not only confidential information communicated between the client and the lawyer, but

also publicly available information that the lawyer obtained during the professional relationship

which the client has requested to be kept secret or the disclosure of which is likely to be

embarrassing or detrimental to the client.”); ABA Formal Op. 480 (2018) (“Significantly,

information about a client’s representation . . . , although contained in a public document or record,

is not exempt from the lawyers’ duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6.”). Therefore, all

client-related documents or information BHG/Parker received from Moore—regardless of whether

they are also publicly available—were obtained in violation of Spectrum’s rights. An injunction

against using, disclosing, or publishing such information is thus not “wholly outside” the issues in

this suit.

Fifth, BHG/Parker have not identified the supposedly non-confidential Spectrum

documents or information that they received from Moore and intend to use, disclose, or publish

while these proceedings are pending. On this record, BHG/Parker thus raise a purely hypothetical

problem that does not merit the Court’s revision of the Order under Rule 59(e). See 3M v. Pribyl,

259 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2001) (upholding against vagueness challenge the terms of an

injunction against “using or disclosing” trade secrets even though “materials falling within the

trade secret are public information,” reasoning that the “specificity requirement” could later be

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addressed in a concrete case if one ever came up).

BHG/Parker’s failure to identify the supposedly public documents they wish to use is more

than just a theoretical problem. Were the Court to accept BHG/Parker’s invitation to water down

the injunction, then BHG/Parker would be left to determine on its own which of the documents it

unlawfully obtained are public and which are private. But far from earning the benefit of the doubt,

BHG/Parker have demonstrated they cannot be trusted to make that determination on their own.

BHG/Parker have steadfastly adhered to the (mistaken) view that “all the information in [their]

possession, including all information from Moore, is entirely public.” BHG Br. at 5 (ECF No. 31).

The Court should not amend its Order on the basis of BHG/Parker’s hypotheticals to allow them

to circumvent the Order’s protections.

The fact of the matter is that BHG/Parker have no right to the Spectrum materials, and the

Order preserves the status quo and protects Spectrum from more irreparable harm pending a final

disposition on the merits. BHG/Parker’s thinly veiled attempt to create carveouts in the Order

should be rejected. As the Seventh Circuit has held, district courts do not abuse their discretion

when they decline to narrow the terms of an injunctive order to curb a defendant’s “misconduct

and evasive action,” reasoning that “no opportunity for loopholes should be allowed” under those

circumstances. 3M, 259 F.3d at 598.

C. The Order’s prohibitions are sufficiently clear.

The Order enjoins BHG/Parker “from directly or indirectly using, disclosing, or publishing

Spectrum’s confidential and proprietary documents, information, and trade secrets” (ECF No. 96

at 11 ¶¶ 1–2).

BHG/Parker take aim (at 9) at the word “using” in the foregoing language, arguing that the

word is insufficiently clear. They are incorrect. The Court’s detailed, 11-page Order gives clear

guidance as to what BHG/Parker may not do with Spectrum’s confidential documents and
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information. BHG/Parker cite no case law to support their contention that the word “using” is

ambiguous here, and for good reason because the case law holds otherwise. See, e.g., Syntex

Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 677, 679 n.1, 683–684 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding against

vagueness challenge a preliminary injunction against “using or disclosing or causing or inducing

others to use or disclose” protected information).

As if to prove Spectrum’s own point, BHG/Parker struggle to come up with any plausible

examples of ambiguity. They suggest (at 9) that it could be unclear whether BHG/Parker are

allowed to “use” Spectrum’s non-public documents and information to trade in Assertio’s stock.

But surely BHG/Parker are not arguing that they should be permitted to trade in Assertio’s stock

on the basis of material non-public information. Allowing them to do so would certainly not

preserve the status quo. And as to their second example, BHG/Parker suggest (at 9) that they

would need to “use” Spectrum’s confidential documents and information to make the list required

by Paragraph 3 of the Order. But Paragraph 3 is a specific and express exception to Paragraph 1

of the Order (ECF No. 96 at 11 ¶¶ 1, 3). There is accordingly no confusion about whether

BHG/Parker are allowed to comply with their obligations under Paragraph 3.

D. The Order complies with the First Amendment.

BHG/Parker ask (at 10–11) that the Order be amended “to clarify that the injunction does

not improperly prohibit speech in violation of the First Amendment to the United States

Constitution.” Their request is puzzling, however, because the Order expressly states that

“[n]othing in this Order shall be construed to improper[ly] limit[] Defendants’ rights to free speech

and to public discourse” (ECF No. 96 at 11 ¶ 5).

Charitably read, they appear to argue (at 11) that the Order should prohibit no more than

the “public disclosure” of non-public information they obtained from Moore. But they cite no case

law to support their argument, and for the reasons given above, such an amendment would render
10
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the Order largely ineffective to protect Spectrum or maintain the status quo pending a resolution

of the case. To take just one example, BHG/Parker’s proposed amendment would enable them to

approach Assertio and Spectrum’s auditors, vendors, stock analysts, and other third parties—

“privately,” in their view—and manipulate them, just like they tried to do with Grant Thornton

(ECF No. 62-2).

Finally, the Court should reject BHG/Parker’s argument because they do not have a First

Amendment right to traffic in materials that they obtained in violation of Spectrum’s rights and

the United States Criminal Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (CFAA). There is simply “no authority

for the proposition that an entity that acquires information by breaking the law enjoys a First

Amendment right to disseminate that information.” Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC, 777

F.3d 937, 950 (7th Cir. 2015).

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court should deny BHG/Parker’s motion.

Dated: July 23, 2025

BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.

/s/ Kevin M. Sadler

Kevin M. Sadler (pro hac vice)
1001 Page Mill Road
Building One, Suite 200
Palo Alto, California 94304
(650) 739-7500

Scott D. Powers (pro hac vice)

401 South 1st Street, Suite 1300
Austin, Texas 78704
(512) 322-2500

John B. Lawrence (pro hac vice)

2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 900

11
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Dallas, Texas 75201

(214) 953-6873

James J. Beha II (pro hac vice)

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10112
(212) 408-2500

Counsel for Plaintiff Spectrum

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Assertio Holdings,
Inc., and Brendan P. O’Grady

12
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Civil Case No. 1:24-cv-12489
Plaintiff,
Hon. LaShonda A. Hunt
v.

THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.,

ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER, and
KELLIE ANN MOORE,

Defendants.

THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.,

and ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER,

Counterclaim and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.

SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,

Counterclaim
Defendant,

and

ASSERTIO HOLDINGS, INC., and

BRENDAN P. O’GRADY,

Third-Party
Defendants.

DECLARATION OF KEVIN M. SADLER IN SUPPORT OF

SPECTRUM’S OPPOSITION TO THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC.
AND ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER’S RULE 59(e)
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER

I, Kevin M. Sadler, hereby declare under 28 U.S.C § 1746 that the following is true and

correct:
 Case: 1:24-cv-12489 Document #: 119-1 Filed: 07/23/25 Page 2 of 2 PageID #:1046

1. I am a partner at the law firm Baker Botts L.L.P., and I am counsel to Spectrum

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Assertio Holdings, Inc., and Brendan P. O’Grady in this case.

2. I am over 21 years of age and otherwise competent to make this Declaration.

3. My statements herein are based on my personal knowledge.

4. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the

transcript of the February 27, 2025 hearing in the above-captioned civil action.

Executed on July 23, 2025 /s/ Kevin M. Sadler

Kevin M. Sadler
Case: 1:24-cv-12489 Document #: 119-2 Filed: 07/23/25 Page 1 of 8 PageID #:1047

Exhibit A
Case: 1:24-cv-12489 Document #: 119-2 Filed: 07/23/25 Page 2 of 8 PageID #:1048

1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
2 EASTERN DIVISION

3
SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., )
4 )
Plaintiff, )
5 )
-vs- ) Case No. 1:24-cv-12489
6 )
THE BUXTON HELMSLEY GROUP, INC., )
7 ALEXANDER ERWIN PARKER, and )
KELLIE ANN MOORE, ) Chicago, Illinois
8 ) February 27, 2025
Defendants. ) 11:10 a.m.
9

10 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LaSHONDA A. HUNT
11

12 APPEARANCES:

13 For the Plaintiff: MR. KEVIN MARSHALL SADLER

BAKER BOTTS, LLP
14 1001 Page Mill Road
Palo Alto, California 94304-1007
15
MR. SCOTT D. POWERS
16 MR. MATTHEW HILDREBRAND
BAKER BOTTS, LLP
17 401 South Street, Suite 1300
Austin, Texas 78704
18
MR. JOHN B. LAWRENCE
19 BAKER BOTTS, LLP
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 900
20 Dallas, Texas 75201

21 For Defendants MR. EVAN GOTLOB

Buxton Helmsley LUCOSKY BROOKMAN, LLP
22 Group and Alexander 101 Wood Avenue South
Erwin Parker: Woodbridge, New Jersey 08830
23
MR. SAMUEL L. BLATNICK
24 LUCOSKY BROOKMAN, LLP
7300 West 110th Street, Suite 700
25 Overland Park, Kansas 66210
Case: 1:24-cv-12489 Document #: 119-2 Filed: 07/23/25 Page 3 of 8 PageID #:1049

36

1 viewing this because, you know, as the judge, I don't get to

2 know everything. You don't tell me everything. You tell me

3 what you want me to know so that I can rule in the case. And

4 that is what I will do.

5 But I have to say that as a former litigator, I try

6 to turn that side off; but in my mind, I'm trying to piece

7 together what seems to really be going on here. And I think

8 even when I look at the proposed order, the proposed

9 preliminary injunction order -- and I just looked at the

10 original one that was filed. I don't know if this request has

11 changed. But, you know, even there, I'm looking at it, and I'm

12 trying to understand: So, what is really at issue in this

13 case? I know that there must be something at stake because

14 I've got nine lawyers sitting in my courtroom who flew here

15 today for this hearing.

16 And so I say that because I get the basics of what

17 happened. I've read through a lot of these letters. I think,

18 you know, lawyers pull out pieces of the letter, pieces of

19 documents, or they rephrase it in their own way.

20 I have a decent sense of the fact that there are a

21 number of different issues going on here and that I think that,

22 you know, is playing a role in whatever it is that's being

23 sought from the Court. But I guess my general sense is this is

24 not just about a laptop, which is what Mr. Sadler said. It's

25 not. It's about the information and how it's being used, and I
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Parker - direct
110

1 Q. You didn't raise any concerns in the April timeframe about

2 Rolvedon, did you?

3 A. No. But the impairment charge, the largest impairment

4 charge at that time was related to Rolvedon, which tied later

5 to the matters that were later discovered.

6 Q. When you contacted Assertio in April 2024 --

7 A. Um-hum.

8 Q. -- you didn't raise any concerns with them about the safety

9 of Rolvedon, did you?

10 A. No. It was not -- no.

11 Q. And when you had the video call with Mr. Patel that

12 Mr. Patel talked about, you didn't on that video call raise any

13 safety concerns about Rolvedon, did you?

14 A. No, because I found over the course of my investigations,

15 many times the surface issues, you've got to get to the

16 details. It's not necessarily apparent at the surface until

17 you further investigation.

18 Q. Now, fair to say that following your video call with

19 Mr. Parker, you were not happy with how they'd responded to

20 your requests?

21 A. No, I was not. They told me more than once that they

22 weren't following me, and I had informed them that --

23 particularly with relation to the accounting questions; and I

24 informed them that my Certified Fraud Examiners and CPAs have

25 no issue understanding me. I did not think they were being

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1 that your lawyers are sitting on, you and they get to decide

2 when to release it and how much to release it and whether to

3 release snippets or the whole thing? You guys have decided you

4 get to decide, right?

5 A. I mean, we have no intent to release anything further, so

6 not at this point, given certain later developments, no.

7 Q. Further meaning -- I think I heard your lawyer say

8 something this morning about, "We don't care about the

9 injunction," or, "We're okay with the injunction."

10 MR. SADLER: I'm not trying to quote you, but --

11 BY MR. SADLER:

12 Q. So, are you saying you're fine with the Court entering an

13 injunction saying you can't publish any of these extensive

14 troves? Would you be okay with that?

15 A. No, I would definitely not prefer that, and there's no

16 intent to release anything further, no.

17 Q. So, you don't intend to release it, but you get to decide

18 to release it, and you don't want the Court to block you from

19 releasing it. Have I summed it up okay?

20 A. Under circumstances that I'm not able to talk about, I -- I

21 cannot release.

22 MR. SADLER: I will pass the witness, your Honor,

23 unless I forgot to offer an exhibit.

24 (Discussion between counsel, not within hearing.)

25 MR. SADLER: I think we talked about Plaintiff's --

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1 had seen when I was involved at Mallinckrodt. They had watched

2 the first bankruptcy, and then they also watched when I had

3 exposed that they were repeating the accounting fraud scheme

4 again when they re-entered bankruptcy.

5 Q. And so why did they ask you, why you, to be involved with

6 this company?

7 A. Because they knew that I was, you know, good forensically

8 in getting to the bottom of issues and had a good team

9 assembled to, you know, get to the bottom of issues, that he

10 had also seen my involvement at Fossil and how my strategy

11 evolved and that it worked.

12 Q. During your first couple of releases in this case early in

13 2024, did you know Kellie Ann Moore?

14 A. During -- I'm sorry. During what?

15 Q. During the first releases that you made against Spectrum,

16 did you know Miss Moore?

17 A. No, until May 30th, so the first couple, no.

18 Q. How did that relationship begin?

19 A. I got a Voice Mail. I saw a Voice Mail, and she basically

20 said that I was on to something, that she could point me to

21 public documents if I wanted them.

22 Q. And did she point you to private documents, to your

23 knowledge?

24 A. No.

25 Q. Did you ask her for them?

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1 A. No, I told her in the first phone call, told her multiple

2 times verbally thereafter, and it's even in writing in emails,

3 "I want nothing non-public. Please don't send me anything."

4 Q. So, have you ever received any -- and if you have, say the

5 number -- documents from Miss Moore, internal documents from

6 Spectrum?

7 A. Zero.

8 Q. Or Assertio?

9 A. Zero.

10 Q. Or any other whistleblowers?

11 A. Zero.

12 Q. And you've spoken to multiple whistleblowers, correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So, let's talk about what happened in November.

15 Exhibit 23, that's the release on the Friday of

16 November 8th, is that correct?

17 A. Exhibit what? I'm sorry.

18 Q. I think it's 23, Plaintiff's 23.

19 A. Oh, that was the second one. November 8th, there was

20 November 8th and November 11th.

21 Q. Sorry. Let's do November 8th first. What was the purpose

22 of the November 8th release?

23 THE COURT: Is that Plaintiff's Exhibit -- I'm sorry,

24 was that Exhibit 21?

25 MR. GOTLOB: Yes, Exhibit 21. Sorry.

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194

1 And again, Miss Moore, I've given you an opportunity

2 to try to seek counsel in this case. It has to move forward,

3 and so I'm not inclined to extend that deadline further by

4 March -- that March 28th deadline any further. And so if you

5 don't have counsel, I think you need to be prepared to

6 represent yourself in this case. Okay?

7 MS. MOORE: Thank you, your Honor.

8 THE COURT: All right. Okay.

9 All right. Thank you, everyone. I appreciate you all

10 coming here, the testimony today. And I -- like I said, I will

11 get you an order as soon as I possibly can.

12 MR. SADLER: Thank you, your Honor.

13 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You can have a

14 seat. Court is adjourned.

15 (Proceedings concluded at 4:15 p.m.)

16

17

18 * * * * *

19 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript

20 from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

21 /S/Charles R. Zandi March 7, 2025

22 Charles R. Zandi Date

Official Court Reporter
23

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