Masil y Aviar vs.

People
G.R. No. 241837
Jan 5, 2022
Petitioner convicted of Fencing under PD 1612 for possessing stolen jeepney parts, failing to prove
legitimate acquisition; penalty modified per Indeterminate Sentence Law. SC affirmed the conviction
of Reymundo Masil y Aviar for Fencing, modifying the penalty.

Facts:
The case of Reymundo Masil y Aviar (petitioner) vs. People of the Philippines (respondent), G.R. No.
241837, arose from a petition for review filed on January 5, 2022, contesting the decision of the Court
of Appeals dated June 13, 2018, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City's
judgment dated June 2, 2017. The RTC found petitioner Masil guilty of the offense of Fencing, an act
penalized under Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979. The charges
stemmed from an Information filed on July 12, 2010, alleging that on July 10, 2007, Masil and a co-
accused, Wilfredo Santiago, conspired to sell dismantled parts of a stolen jeepney, owned by Nimfa
Esteban, to Masil, who owned AE Junkshop. The prosecution presented evidence that Nimfa's
jeepney, which was stolen by driver Eugene Labramonte on July 4, 2010, was dismantled, with parts
sold to Masil's junk shop. Various police witnesses testified that they recovered the dismantled parts
from Masil's establishment, backed by Wilfredo’s admission that he sold parts to petitioner. Masil
denied any knowledge of Wilfredo or his illicit actions, asserting that they only met at the police
station after his arrest. The RTC found him guilty based on the evidence that established all elements
of Fencing, resulting in a conviction and an imposed sentence of an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment.

Issue:
The primary issue raised in this case is whether the Court of Appeals properly upheld the conviction
of Reymundo Masil for Fencing under PD 1612, given the evidence presented and his defense.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the Decision of the Court of Appeals and the earlier
judgment of the RTC, but modified the penalty. The Court imposed an indeterminate sentence of six
years, eight months, and one day as the minimum, and eight years, eight months, and one day as the
maximum, all of prision mayor.

Ratio:
The Court ruled that the essential elements of Fencing were established beyond reasonable doubt in
this case. It reiterated that a crime of robbery or theft had indeed occurred (the jeepney was stolen),
and Masil, as a junk shop owner, was deemed to have known or should have known that the vehicle
parts he possessed were derived from such a crime. The prosecution provided clear evidence of
Wilfredo dismantling the jeepney and subsequent admissions leading to the recovery of the stolen
parts at Masil's shop. The strong testimonies against Masil outweighed his denial, which lacked
compelling substantiation or evidence of ill motives on the part of prosecution witnesses.
Furthermore, the Court recognized the principle of malum prohibitum in Fencing offenses, which
allows for presuming guilt solely based on possession of stolen items. The law requires junk shop
owners to verify the legitimacy of their goods; Masil failed this obligation, supporting the conviction.

Doctrine:
The Court reinforced that possession of stolen goods creates a prima facie presumption of guilt in
Fencing cases (PD 1612), establishing the mandatory need for individuals in the business of dealing
in goods to ensure they are not acquiring stolen property. A strong emphasis was placed on the
critical understanding that denial of guilt is a weak defense compared to credible positive testimony
from witnesses.
Lopez y Atanacio vs. People
G.R. No. 249196
Apr 28, 2021
Petitioner acquitted of fencing charges as prosecution failed to prove bicycle's identity, ownership,
and intent beyond reasonable doubt, rebutting presumption under PD 1612. SC acquitted Dante
Lopez y Atanacio of fencing due to insufficient evidence of guilt.

Facts:
The case is between Dante Lopez y Atanacio, the petitioner, and the People of the Philippines, the
respondent, under G.R. No. 249196, with a decision rendered on April 28, 2021. The case originated
in the city of Marikina, where Lopez was accused of the crime of fencing as defined under
Presidential Decree No. 1612, or the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979. Lopez was charged with possessing
a blue Mountain bike with the frame name “ARAYA,” valued at one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), knowing or having reason to believe it was stolen property. The Information stated that
the unlawful act occurred on February 23, 2014.
During the trial, private complainant Rafael Mendoza testified that he spotted his stolen bicycle
being ridden by a driver, Magno Lopez, on February 23, 2014, and learned from Magno that the
bicycle was given to him by Lopez. Mendoza stated that the bicycle was stolen from his garage on
January 15, 2011, and he had subsequently reported the theft. Jose Manalo Martinez corroborated
Mendoza's ownership claim, confirming he biked with Mendoza.
Magno Lopez, Dante's brother, defended that he received the bike from Dante in the early 2000s
and suggested that Mendoza’s claim was without merit. Dante further insisted that the bike was
originally purchased from Bicycle Works, presenting affidavits from the shop's president and
mechanic to support his claim, although he could not produce a receipt.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled against Lopez on June 27, 2017, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of fencing. The RTC stated that Mendoza's claim of ownership outweighed Lopez's,
emphasizing the presumption of fencing due to Lopez's possession of the bicycle. This ruling was
modified by the Court of Appeals (CA) on April 30, 2019, which maintained his conviction but reduced
the penalty, asserting that Mendoza did not adequately prove the value of the bicycle.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's conviction of the petitioner based solely
on the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. 1612 despite a failure to establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt?
2. Did the Court of Appeals fail to properly consider the probative value of the petitioner's
evidence, particularly the notarized affidavit regarding ownership?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and the RTC.
The Court acquitted Dante Lopez y Atanacio of the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. 1612.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court emphasized that a conviction must be substantiated beyond reasonable doubt,
and the prosecution bears the burden to provide compelling evidence to support its case. In this
instance, while the lower courts relied on the presumption of fencing as stipulated in the Anti-Fencing
Law, the Court found that the identity of the bicycle was never sufficiently established. Not only was
there a lack of definitive evidence linking Lopez's bike to Mendoza's theft claim, but also
inconsistencies existed in the testimonies and the physical descriptions of the two bicycles that
undermined Mendoza's assertions.
The Court iterated the critical point that the presumption of fencing is applicable only when there is
a factual foundation supporting it; merely possessing an item allegedly derived from theft is not
sufficient for sustaining a conviction if that item’s connection to the alleged crime could not be firmly
established. Furthermore, the Court noted that factual findings in lower tribunals are typically given
deference, yet a misapprehension of crucial facts warrants a different outcome. The lack of clarity in
the prosecution's case highlighted that the evidence presented did not fulfill the legal standard of
moral certainty required for a conviction, thereby necessitating the petitioner's acquittal.

Doctrine:
In criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Presumptions are valid only when grounded in a factual basis,
and any failure to establish such a foundation must lead to a ruling in favor of the accused.
People vs. Macam y Lontoc
G.R. No. 91011-12
Nov 24, 1994
In 1987, five men conspired to rob Benito Macam's residence, resulting in Leticia Macam's death and
injuries to others. Convicted of Robbery with Homicide, two maintained innocence, but guilt was
proven beyond doubt. SC affirmed conviction, modified damages. SC affirmed the conviction of the
accused for Robbery with Homicide and modified civil damages to P50,000.00.

Facts:
The case "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Macam y Lontoc, Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. y Belen,
Antonio Cedro y Santos, Ernesto Roque y Mariano and Danilo Roque y Mariano" concerns the crime
of Robbery with Homicide as defined and punished under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
The events took place on August 18, 1987, in Quezon City, Philippines. Five accused individuals,
including Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque, conspired to rob Benito Macam y Sy while armed and
subsequently caused serious harm that resulted in the death of Leticia Macam y Tui.
On that date, after entering the residence of Benito Macam, the accused threatened the household
members and tied them up. Items were stolen totaling approximately P454,000. In the course of the
robbery, Leticia Macam was killed, and others suffered injuries requiring medical attention for over 30
days. During the trial, the prosecution presented detailed testimonies from victims who survived the
attack, corroborating the accused's involvement in the crime.
Initially, in Criminal Case No. Q-53781, all accused pleaded "not guilty," but Eduardo Macam,
Antonio Cedro, and Eugenio Cawilan, Jr. eventually changed their pleas to "guilty." This resulted in
separate penalties of reclusion perpetua for these individuals. The trial continued concerning Danilo
and Ernesto Roque, with only Danilo testifying in their defense.
The trial court convicted Danilo and Ernesto Roque of Robbery with Homicide, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them both to reclusion perpetua. The court also held a
separate judgment regarding Eugenio Cawilan, Sr. for his involvement in the crimes.

Issue:
1. Was the arrest of Danilo and Ernesto Roque valid without a warrant?
2. Did the prosecution prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?

Ruling:
The court affirmed the trial court's conviction of Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque for Robbery with
Homicide. Their arrest was deemed valid despite being warrantless, and the prosecution met its
burden of proof regarding their guilt.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court found that the appellants were estopped from questioning the legality of their
arrest since they later submitted themselves to the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in the evidence presentation. Hence, any procedural irregularities surrounding their
arrest were effectively waived. Additionally, the Court noted that both appellants did not object to the
in-court identification by the prosecution witnesses; thus, the prosecution wasn’t required to
demonstrate that the identifications originated independently from the tainted police line-up conducted
earlier, where the conditions led to potential biases.
More critically, the testimonies of the surviving victims were found credible, identifying the
appellants as perpetrators of the crime. The Court emphasized that the presence of conspiracy
among the accused could be inferred from their coordinated actions to commit robbery and violence
against the household.

Doctrine:
The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of recognizing that all participants in a robbery who
cause injury or death are criminally liable as principals to the special crime of Robbery with Homicide
if the homicide arises in the course of the robbery, irrespective of whether they individually engaged in
the act of homicide itself, unless they made efforts to prevent it. The ruling reinforced the
understanding that evidence of conspiracy could be established through the accused's conduct
leading up to and during the commission of the crime, thereby affirming that the actions of Danilo
Roque, as a driver and participant in the robbery, demonstrated involvement stemming from his
knowledge of the intended crime.
Additionally, the Court modified the lower court's awarded civil damages to the heirs of the
deceased to P50,000, in line with the provisions under the Revised Penal Code regarding the joint
liability of principals in criminal acts.
Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People
G.R. No. 111426
Jul 11, 1994
Norma Dizon-Pamintuan convicted of fencing stolen jewelry under P.D. No. 1612; SC upheld
conviction, adjusted penalty based on P87,000 valuation. SC affirmed the conviction of Norma Dizon-
Pamintuan for fencing, modifying her penalty to ten years and one day to eighteen years and five
months.

Facts:
Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is the petitioner in this case, while the People of the Philippines is the
respondent. The incident leading to the case occurred between February 12 and February 24, 1988,
in the City of Manila. Norma was charged with a violation of the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. No. 1612) for
knowingly possessing and selling jewelry that she was aware, or should have been aware, was
stolen. The jewelry was taken during a robbery on February 12, where the victims, Teodoro and
Luzviminda Encarnacion, were accosted in their home by armed intruders. Norma was arrested on
February 24 when police discovered stolen items in her stall in Sta. Cruz, Manila during a sting
operation. The items included a diamond ring and earrings valued at approximately P105,000.
The trial court in Manila sentenced Norma to an indeterminate penalty of 14 years of prision mayor
to 19 years of reclusion temporal after finding her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, they
did not impose civil liability since the stolen items were recovered. Norma appealed her conviction to
the Court of Appeals, arguing that the judgment was based on a mere presumption of guilt and
disputed the declared value of the jewelry.
On March 29, 1993, the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction but set aside the imposed penalty,
remanding the case to the trial court to establish the correct valuation of the jewelry.

Issue:
1. Was the judgment of conviction based on a mere presumption insufficient to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt?
2. Did the prosecution successfully demonstrate that the value of the recovered jewelry was
indeed P93,000, which is necessary for proper sentencing under the Anti-Fencing Law?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. However, it modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day of
prision mayor maximum as minimum, to 18 years and 5 months of reclusion temporal maximum as
the maximum penalty.

Ratio: The Court emphasized the elements necessary to prove the crime of fencing:

1. A crime of robbery or theft must have occurred.

In this case, it was established that a robbery occurred, Norma was in possession of the stolen
goods, and her display of these items for sale indicated her intent to gain. The Court also explained
that under P.D. No. 1612, mere possession of stolen goods creates a prima facie presumption of
knowledge regarding their illicit nature, unless the accused can satisfactorily show otherwise, which
Norma failed to do. The Court noted that the defense's arguments did not sufficiently counteract the
weight of the prosecution's evidence.

Doctrine:
The ruling established that the presumption of knowledge in fencing cases is rebutted only by clear
and convincing evidence demonstrating the accused did not know or have reason to know the items
in their possession were stolen. The Court reinforced that the possession of stolen property is
sufficient to presume culpability unless credible evidence to the contrary is presented. The judgment
highlighted the distinct nature of the offenses concerning fencing and robbery, asserting that the
State's interest in prosecuting fencing under P.D. No. 1612 reflects a commitment to curbing the
market for stolen goods and addressing the broader issue of theft and robbery.
Lim vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100311
May 18, 1993
Juanito Lim convicted under Anti-Fencing Law for possessing stolen mining equipment; Supreme
Court upheld conviction, citing presumption of fencing and intent to gain. SC affirmed Juanito Lim's
conviction and penalties for violating the Anti-Fencing Law.

Facts:
In the case of Juanito Lim vs. The Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 100311), decided on May 18, 1993,
petitioner Juanito Lim was accused of violating Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-
Fencing Law. The case originated from an incident that took place in March 1986 in Cagayan de Oro
City, Philippines. Lim was charged after it was alleged that he received, possessed, and dealt with
spare parts stolen from Loui Anton Bond, the president and general manager of BCG Mining
Corporation, during a time when Bond was held captive by insurgents.
The lower court's account detailed a series of events whereby Sergio Pabilona, having vacated his
residence due to growing insurgency issues, sought help to retrieve his belongings. With military
assistance, Pabilona and others loaded various pieces of equipment, including nine tires with rims
belonging to Bond, into a truck owned by Lim. The items were mistakenly placed in Lim's bodega
after being unloaded from the truck, and Lim was present during this handling. Ultimately, Lim was
accused of possessing these stolen items and was found guilty of fencing.
During the trial, Lim's defense of alibi was not convincing to the court, which based its decision on
the credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The trial court sentenced Lim to imprisonment
from 8 years of Prision Mayor to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal, in addition to
ordering him to pay a civil liability of P206,320.00 to Bond, minus the value of any recovered spare
parts. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's conviction of Juanito Lim for violating
the Anti-Fencing Law?
2. Was the imposition of civil liability as part of the penalty for fencing proper under Presidential
Decree No. 1612?

Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, confirming the conviction of
Juanito Lim for violating the Anti-Fencing Law and affirming the trial court's ruling.
2. The imposition of civil liability was deemed proper, aligning with the provisions of the Anti-
Fencing Law.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court reasoned that the prosecution successfully established the elements of fencing
through the testimonies and evidence presented, particularly the presumption of fencing outlined in
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, which asserts that mere possession of stolen goods is
prima facie evidence of the offense. Lim's presence during the unloading of stolen items into his
bodega reinforced this presumption, which he failed to rebut with credible evidence or witnesses.
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that intent to gain—the animus furandi—could be inferred
from Lim's actions surrounding the possession and transport of the stolen tires. The Supreme Court
rejected Lim's claims of ulterior motives among the prosecution's witnesses and reaffirmed that the
fiscal's discretion not to include other witnesses as co-defendants did not impair the case against him.
Lastly, the Court clarified that the civil liability imposed on Lim was consistent with Philippine
jurisprudence, indicating that criminal liability and civil liability often coexist in the legal framework of
the Revised Penal Code and associated decrees.

Doctrine:
The case established key principles regarding the Anti-Fencing Law, particularly the presumption of
fencing arising from possession of stolen goods, which serves as a critical rule in both prosecuting
offenders and understanding the implications of possession in criminal law. It reaffirmed that the act of
possession itself can establish intent to gain, which is a critical element in proving such offenses. The
decision also endorsed the notion that civil liabilities could form part of the penalties under specific
statutory crimes, underlining the intertwined nature of civil and criminal accountability in the Philippine
law framework.
National Power Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 122195
Jul 23, 1998
Coo purchased scrap aluminum, seized by PC; acquitted in criminal case. NPC withheld goods;
replevin granted. NPC liable for nominal damages, attorney's fees. SC affirmed Coo's ownership of
the aluminum wires and upheld the award of nominal damages and attorney's fees.

Facts:
The case involves the National Power Corporation (NPC) as the petitioner and Dennis Coo as the
private respondent. On July 23, 1984, Dennis Coo purchased six tons of assorted scrap aluminum
wires and allied accessories from New Alloy Metal Company in Manila. These goods were shipped to
Bacolod City and successfully received by Coo on July 30, 1984. However, the following day, on July
31, 1984, members of the 331st Philippine Constabulary (PC) seized the goods from Coo's residence
and subsequently deposited them at the PC headquarters. On August 6, 1984, a criminal complaint
was filed against Coo for violating the Anti-Fencing Law, which was later dismissed by the
Investigating Fiscal due to insufficient evidence. After further investigation prompted by NPC’s
representation, a new Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch
48. The trial court acquitted Coo on August 23, 1985, ruling that the wares in question belonged to
him.
Despite the acquittal, NPC retained possession of the aluminum goods, prompting Coo to write a
letter demanding the return of his property. When NPC failed to comply, Coo filed a complaint for
replevin against NPC and its officers in the RTC of Bacolod City. In the course of the proceedings,
Coo posted a surety bond for P120,000.00 and regained possession of the seized items on August 5,
1986. After trial, Coo was declared the rightful owner and possessor of the aluminum wires and allied
accessories. NPC appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling while
modifying it by absolving certain NPC officers of personal liability and deleting compensatory and
moral damages awarded to Coo; instead, NPC was ordered to pay nominal damages and attorney's
fees. NPC’s motion for reconsideration was denied, resulting in its petition for review on certiorari to
the Supreme Court.

Issue:
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming that the aluminum conductor wires belonged to Dennis
Coo based on the acquittal in the criminal case?
2. Was the Court of Appeals correct in awarding nominal damages and attorney's fees to Dennis
Coo?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding both issues. It upheld the
ruling that the aluminum wires belonged to Dennis Coo and that NPC was liable for nominal damages
and attorney's fees.

Ratio:
In addressing the first issue, the Supreme Court noted that the acquittal of Dennis Coo in the criminal
case provided sufficient ground to affirm his ownership as the two cases concerned the same subject
property. The Court explained that while the petitioner's doubt regarding the authenticity of the
ownership due to distinctions between the goods in the sales invoice and the goods seized had merit,
the evidence presented, including Coo's explanations for discrepancies, established that the items
seized were indeed the same as those covered under the sales agreement. The Court emphasized
that if the petitioner had legitimate claims regarding the ownership, these would need to be
substantiated with credible evidence rather than mere allegations.
Regarding the second issue of damages, the Court asserted that under Civil Code Article 2221,
nominal damages are specified to recognize a right that has been violated, irrespective of the
presence of actual damages suffered. The refusal of NPC to return the property, notwithstanding
Coo's established legal possession, constituted bad faith, thus justifying the award of nominal
damages and attorney's fees to Coo.

Doctrine:
The ruling reiterates the principle that in a case for replevin, a plaintiff need only demonstrate
entitlement to legal possession, not necessarily ownership. This highlights the nature of such
proceedings, which focus on wrongful detention rather than ownership disputes. Additionally, the case
reflects the legal standard that the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive
upon the Supreme Court unless they are obviously unsupported by evidence or arise from a
misapprehension of facts.