TABLE OF CONTENTS (TO BE INSERTED UPON FINALIZATION)

TO THE HONORABLE COURT, ALL PARTIES, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS

OF RECORD:

Plaintiffs SHUANNEEN GRIER, MICHAEL GRIER, ANIKA HIRIAMS, by

and through their Guardian Ad Litem SHUANNEEN GRIER, and

JOSCELYNN BRYANT (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this

Opposition to the second Motion to Strike Punitive Damages filed by

Defendants JORDAN BOX and BUILDER’S INNOVATION GROUP

(collectively, “Defendants”). While always mindful of the Court’s authority,

Plaintiffs submit that Defendants’ motion rests on a selective reading of the law,

disregards binding pleading standards, and fails to confront the well-pleaded

factual allegations in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Their arguments

amount to little more than procedural gamesmanship, unsupported by the Civil

Code or controlling authority. The motion should be denied.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Shuanneen Grier, a single mother caring for two special-needs children,

entrusted the renovation of her property—comprising two dwelling units (one

occupied by Grier, the other leased to Plaintiff Josselynn Bryant and her family

for rental income) and a third structure housing Grier’s home business

(collectively, Plaintiffs’ “property”)—to Defendant Builder’s Innovation Group

(“BIG”), led by Defendant Jordan Box. On March 3, 2022, Grier and BIG

contracted to abandon two septic tanks and connect the property to the city

sewer line for $44,113. (FAC ¶¶ 9, 13; Home Improvement Agreement, Ex. M.)

With the brazen deceit of charlatans, Defendants assured Grier that BIG held a

valid Class A or C-34 contractor’s license and would secure necessary permits

from the Eastern Municipal Water District. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 14.) Lured by these

falsehoods, Grier paid $42,723, as confirmed by BIG’s invoices. (Email from

Builder’s Innovation Group, Ex. J.) In truth, BIG lacked the requisite license

and had no intention of complying with regulatory mandates, as the FAC

alleges. (FAC ¶¶ 14, 26-27.)

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Defendants’ work was not merely incompetent—it was a travesty. They gouged

trenches in errant locations, 15 feet off planned lines, punctured septic tanks,

and severed leach lines, unleashing a deluge of raw sewage into the home. (FAC

¶¶ 15-16.) Their apparent intent to tie into a storm drain, a catastrophic error,

exacerbated the contamination. A gas line, slung carelessly over a 7-foot fence,
leaked perilously, prompting the gas company to red-tag it. (FAC ¶¶ 19-21.)

Defendants, undeterred, broke the seals and lied about the line’s safety, leaving

Plaintiffs without gas for a month. (FAC ¶¶ 20-21.) Abandoning the project,

they left a wasteland of hazards—pest infestations, health crises, and an

uninhabitable dwelling. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 22, 40-44.) A November 14, 2024,

inspection revealed a pest scourge requiring $41,609.77 to remedy, including

termite damage to fascia and eaves. Bio-One of Redlands quoted $13,750 to

decontaminate rodent droppings, noting sewage’s toll on Plaintiffs’ children.

This catastrophe inflicted profound emotional anguish, particularly on

Plaintiff’s special-needs children, who endured seizures and conjunctivitis from

toxic exposure. (FAC ¶¶ 43-44.) Damages soar: $1,200,000 in property loss,

$255,958.82 in relocation costs, $591,972.97 in remediation, $150,000 in lost

rental income, and $100,000 in medical expenses. Out-of-pocket costs include

$531,972.97 for repairs, $14,857.11 in legal fees, $4,061.21 for furnishings, and

$229,693.11 in lease payments. Plaintiffs, with saintly patience, delayed repairs

until Defendants’ Presidents’ Day 2025 inspection, incurring borrowing costs to

restore their home.

B. Procedural Background

On June 25, 2024, Plaintiffs Shuanneen Grier, Michael Grier, Anika Hiriams (by

and through their Guardian Ad Litem Shuanneen Grier), and Josselynn Bryant,

represented by former counsel, (but presently represented by Brandon A. Kline

of Bakline Law Firm PC), commenced this action, alleging fraud, breach of

contract, negligence, and violations of California Business and Professions

Code § 17200 et seq. against Defendants Jordan Box, Edgardo Cazares, Sam

Agajanian, and Builder’s Innovation Group (BIG). (Defendants Jordan Box and

Builders Innovation Group’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Punitive

Damages from Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (Defs.’ Mot.), filed Jan. 3,

2025, p. 9, lines 15-16, Lawson Decl. ¶ 2.) The FAC, filed August 21, 2024,

seeks punitive damages for Defendants’ egregious conduct. (FAC.) Prior

counsel was relieved for Plaintiffs Anika Hiriams, Josselynn Bryant, and

Michael Grier on October 14 and December 31, 2024. (Minute Orders, Oct. 14,

2024, Dec. 31, 2024.) Service attempts on Agajanian failed, and Plaintiffs

dismissed Agajanian and Cazares without prejudice on March 24, 2025; neither

has appeared or retained counsel. (Affidavit of Due Diligence; Request for

Dismissal.)

Defendant Jordan Box amassed a cadre of at least seven, possibly nine,

attorneys to defend himself and BIG: Yvette Davis and Derek T. Lawson of

Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP, supplied by Scottsdale Insurance Company,

and Elliott H. Stone, Robert S. Throckmorton, and Quinn W. Porter of Stone

LLP, with Scottsdale retaining Sheryl W. Leichenger and Joy D. Eden of

Selman Leichenger Edson Hsu Newman Moore LLP as coverage counsel. This

group of defense attorneys, their numbers and roles as elusive as shadows in a

storm-tossed mire, defies tracking and has needlessly mired this straightforward

case. The insurance policy’s waste provision further burdens Plaintiffs, who

seek only to reclaim their home, with the costs of this overlawyered quagmire.

Yet, as an example of the chaos of defendants' untenable representation issues,

defense counsel waged a brazen attempt to have it both ways; Defendants

mailed discovery requests and pleadings directly to Plaintiffs, flouting

California Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 by treating them as

unrepresented, while simultaneously claiming a single sentence in a November

25, 2024, settlement email to Kline constituted a meet-and-confer under CCP §

435.5—a risible pretense offering no clarity on the FAC’s alleged flaws. The

architect of this duplicity remains veiled within Defendants’ sprawling legal

legion. On January 3, 2025, BIG filed a cross-complaint against Cross-

Defendants ZOES 1-50, alleging breach of contract, express and implied

contractual indemnity, contribution, and declaratory relief, presumably targeting

employees like Agajanian and Cazares, though unconfirmed. (Cross-Complaint,

filed Jan. 3, 2025.) That day, Box and BIG, via Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP,

filed a Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, dismissed by this Court on February

18, 2025, for failure to meet and confer under CCP § 435.5, vacating the
February 20, 2025, hearing. (Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, p. 1; Minute Order, Feb. 18, 2025.) Also on

January 3, 2025, Leichenger and Eden rejected Plaintiffs’ December 9, 2024,

$2,000,000 policy limits demand, citing prematurity, coverage issues, and

ambiguities. (Letter from Selman Leichenger to Brandon A. Kline, Jan. 3,

2025.) On January 7, 2025, Box and BIG associated Stone LLP as co-counsel.

(Notice of Association of Counsel, filed Jan. 7, 2025.) On February 11, 2025,

Leichenger and Eden, denying coverage under Scottsdale’s policy, offered

$85,000 to settle all claims against Box, BIG, Agajanian, and Cazares. (Letter

from Selman Leichenger to Brandon A. Kline, Feb. 11, 2025.)

From February 26 to March 7, 2025, Defendants staged a hollow improper

tactic of meet-and-confer efforts, tendering a coercive ultimatum to withdraw

punitive damages or face a frivolous gambit of motions practice. On March 5,

2025, they agreed to a self-serving 60-day discovery stay for mediation but

provided no legal authority for their instant Motion. On March 11, 2025,

Defendants filed a second Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, a continuing

motion indistinguishable in substance from the first filed on January 3, 2025,

asserting the FAC fails Civil Code § 3294’s standards, with a hearing set for

May 30, 2025, alongside the Case Management Conference. (Defs.’ Mot., filed

Mar. 11, 2025.) Both Motions are near-identical, bereft of substantive legal

support and failing to specify the content to be stricken, with Defendants in each
instance demanding Plaintiffs voluntarily amend the FAC to remove punitive

damages or face a Motion to Strike. Plaintiffs opposed the January 3, 2025,

Motion, exposing its glaring procedural and substantive flaws. (Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Punitive Damages.) Defendants’ counsel, with breathtaking temerity,

claimed a single sentence in a November 25, 2024, settlement email constituted

a meet-and-confer under CCP § 435.5—a risible pretense offering no clarity on

the FAC’s alleged defects. (Id., pp. 15-16, Kline Decl. ¶¶ 16-19.)

On February 27, 2025, Plaintiffs’ absence at a Case Management Conference

triggered an Order to Show Cause for unfiled proof of service, vacated by the

Court on April 18, 2025. (Case Management Conference Minute Order, Feb. 27,

2025; Court on Its Own Motion Minute Order, Apr. 18, 2025.) Plaintiffs, with

steadfast diligence, delivered hundreds of pages of discovery, including a 32-

page settlement demand, and permitted a February 17, 2025, site inspection.

Defendants, in stark contrast, have shirked all discovery obligations, exploiting

extensions to craft vexatious ploys while spurning settlement with callous

disdain for the devastation they caused. Their refusal to propose a mediator,

flouting settlement agreements of November 26, 2024, and March 5, 2025,

betrays the very spirit of resolution. Meanwhile, each billable hour from their

overlawyered defense, fueled by the insurance policy’s waste provision, erodes

Plaintiffs’ rightful recovery, prolonging their quest to reclaim their home.

To spare this Court the Sisyphean toil of sifting through redundant attachments,

we incorporate by reference all prior filings and correspondence referenced

herein, in the interest of judicial economy: (1) First Amended Complaint, filed

August 21, 2024; (2) Home Improvement Agreement, dated March 3, 2022

(Exhibit M); (3) Email from Builder’s Innovation Group (Exhibit J); (4)

Defendants Jordan Box and Builder’s Innovation Group’s Notice of Motion and

Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, filed January 3, 2025; (5) Plaintiff’s

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Punitive Damages, filed in response to the January 3, 2025 Motion; (6)

Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive

Damages, referenced in the Minute Order of February 18, 2025; (7) Minute

Orders dated October 14, 2024, December 31, 2024, February 18, 2025,

February 27, 2025, and April 18, 2025; (8) Affidavit of Due Diligence regarding

service attempts on Defendant Agajanian; (9) Request for Dismissal of

Defendants Agajanian and Cazares, filed March 24, 2025; (10) Case

Management Conference Minute Order, dated February 27, 2025; (11) Court on

Its Own Motion Minute Order, dated April 18, 2025; (12) Notice of Association

of Counsel for Defendants Jordan Box and Builder’s Innovation Group, filed

January 7, 2025; (13) Cross-Complaint by Builder’s Innovation Group, filed

January 3, 2025; (14) Letter from Selman Leichenger Edson Hsu Newman

Moore LLP to Brandon A. Kline, dated January 3, 2025; (15) Letter from
Selman Leichenger Edson Hsu Newman Moore LLP to Brandon A. Kline, dated

February 11, 2025; and (16) Defendants Jordan Box and Builder’s Innovation

Group’s Notice of Motion and Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, filed March

11, 2025. These documents, woven into the fabric of this Opposition, stand as

reference[s] of the factual and procedural truth, sparing the Court the burden of

redundant review.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court is tasked with applying California Code of Civil Procedure § 436,

which permits striking irrelevant or improper matter from pleadings, but only

when such matter is manifestly deficient. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Quiroz v.

Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140 [Link].4th 1256, 1281.) Motions to strike are

disfavored, lest they usurp the jury’s role. For punitive damages, Civil Code §

3294 demands facts evincing malice, oppression, or fraud by clear and

convincing evidence. (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co. (1992) 4

[Link].4th 306, 327-328; CACI No. 3940.) Malice encompasses intent to

injure or despicable conduct with willful disregard for others’ safety. (Civ. Code,

§ 3294, subd. (c)(1); CACI No. 3946.) Oppression involves cruel hardship

through despicable acts. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2); CACI No. 3946.)

Fraud entails intentional misrepresentation to deprive another of property. (Civ.

Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(3); CACI No. 3940.) Pleadings need only allege

specific facts, not evidentiary minutiae. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67

[Link].4th 1253, 1255.) The FAC surpasses this threshold.

III. ARGUMENT

A. The FAC Alleges Facts of Fraud, Malice, and

Oppression with Exacting Precision

Defendants’ claim that the FAC lacks facts for punitive damages is a hollow

gambit, swiftly dismantled by the pleading’s rigor. The FAC chronicles a saga

of deceit and recklessness, meeting Civil Code § 3294 and CACI Nos. 3940 and

3946 with unassailable clarity:

• Fraudulent Misrepresentations: Defendants brazenly lied that BIG held a

Class A or C-34 license, luring Plaintiff Shuanneen Grier to part with

$42,723. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 13-14, 26-27; Email from Builder’s Innovation

Group, Ex. J.) Box and Cazares, the latter masquerading as a “master

plumber,” peddled false assurances of BIG’s competence, knowing they

lacked the license and intent to comply with EMWD. (FAC ¶¶ 10-11, 14.)

This satisfies CACI No. 3940’s elements of fraud: misrepresentation,

 knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, justifiable reliance, and

damage. (FAC ¶¶ 26-28.)

• Malicious Disregard for Safety: Defendants’ actions epitomize malice under

CACI No. 3946. They recklessly punctured septic tanks, flooding the

property with sewage, and refused to intervene, condemning Plaintiffs to

a toxic quagmire. (FAC ¶¶ 15-16, 22, 40.) Their gas line, carelessly slung

over a fence and degraded by sun exposure, leaked perilously, yet they

broke safety seals and misrepresented its safety, inviting catastrophe.

(FAC ¶¶ 19-21.) Their destruction of the air conditioning system forced

Plaintiffs to open windows amid Riverside County’s searing summer

heat, summoning from the bowels of the misery they wrought a plague of

rodents, flies, and noxious odors that infested the home. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 40,

43.) This foreseeably inflicted seizures and infections on Plaintiffs’

special-needs children. (FAC ¶ 43.) Defendant Jordan Box, overseeing

the work nearly daily from his blue Tesla, falsely posed as a competent

leader while his employee Edgardo Cazares, claiming to be a master

plumber, misrepresented their ability to connect to the city lateral—

deceptions Box never corrected, despite his calculated engagement with

Plaintiffs’ family through late-night visits and feigned camaraderie with

Grier’s special-needs son, Michael Grier. (FAC ¶¶ 10-11, 14, 26.)

• Despicable Conduct: California law deems conduct “despicable” when it is

“so vile, base, or contemptible” that reasonable people would despise it,
reflecting a conscious disregard for others’ rights or safety (Civ. Code §

3294(c); College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,

725). Defendants’ actions incarnate this standard. Abandoning the project,

they left a pestilent abyss, summoning from the bowels of their wrought

misery a plague of rodents, flies, and noxious odors that damaged the

home of Shuanneen Grier, a Black single mother whose property was her

cherished pride. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 40, 43.) Their reckless destruction of the air

conditioning system forced Grier to open windows in Riverside County’s

blistering summer heat, foreseeably inviting pests that triggered seizures

and infections in her special-needs children, including her son Michael,

with the cognitive ability of a 10-year-old. (FAC ¶¶ 16, 40, 43.)

Remediation demands $41,609.77 for termite damage, $13,750 for

biohazard cleanup, and $47,309.40 per unit for HVAC replacement. (FAC

¶ 40.) Knowing Grier’s limited construction experience and that she had

staked her life’s savings, Defendant Jordan Box, BIG’s owner and

managing agent with substantial authority, preyed on her vulnerability.

(FAC ¶¶ 9-11, 14, 26.) Arriving nearly daily in his blue Tesla to oversee

the project, Box stood by as employees falsely claimed proper licensing,

exploiting these misrepresentations through his presence and never

correcting them, while feigning camaraderie by calling Michael “buddy”

and claiming friendship to manipulate his trust. (FAC ¶¶ 10-11, 14, 26.)

Defendants, wielding a horde of seven or possibly nine attorneys,

 including Yvette Davis, Derek T. Lawson (Haight Brown & Bonesteel

LLP), Elliott H. Stone, Robert S. Throckmorton, Quinn W. Porter (Stone

LLP), and Sheryl W. Leichenger, Joy D. Eden (Selman Leichenger),

further their vile treachery by exploiting two extensions—October 30,

2024, to December 2, 2024, and November 27, 2024, to December 16,

2024—granted under Lawson’s pretext of early resolution, only to file a

surprise Motion to Strike on January 3, 2025, bilking billable hours under

the policy’s waste provision, forcing Grier to borrow to mitigate damages

and eroding her recovery. (FAC ¶¶ 20, 43; Emails from Derek T. Lawson,

Oct. 30, 2024, Nov. 27, 2024.) This predatory conduct, targeting a

vulnerable family and prolonging their suffering, is despicable under

CACI Nos. 3940 and 3946, as courts condemn such exploitation (Cloud

v. Casey (1999) 76 [Link].4th 895, 912). Box’s managing agent status,

akin to the zone manager in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th

563, 566-67, renders BIG liable for punitive damages under Civ. Code §

3294(b). (FAC ¶¶ 10-11.)

• Corporate Culpability: Jordan Box, as BIG’s owner and managing agent,

orchestrated a brazen fraud and ratified Edgardo Cazares’s reckless

misrepresentations, cementing corporate liability for punitive damages

under Civil Code § 3294(b) and CACI No. 3947. (FAC ¶¶ 10-11, 13, 15;

Home Improvement Agreement, Ex. M.) Box, wielding substantial

authority over BIG’s operations, directed the deceptive contract

 promising sewer connection for $44,113, fully aware BIG lacked the

requisite Class A or C-34 contractor’s license. (FAC ¶¶ 11, 13-14.) He

stood idly by as Cazares falsely claimed expertise as a master plumber

capable of city lateral connection, endorsing this deceit through his daily

oversight without correction. (FAC ¶¶ 10, 15, 26.) This callous

ratification of fraudulent and reckless conduct, executed with conscious

disregard for Plaintiffs’ rights, mirrors the managing agent’s authority in

White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566-67, where operational

control over significant business aspects sufficed for corporate liability.

(FAC ¶¶ 10-11.)

• Far from the “buzzwords” Defendants decry, the FAC weaves a tapestry of

specific, damning facts. To suggest otherwise is to ignore the pleading’s

plain text—a folly this Court need not indulge. (See Clauson, supra, 67

[Link].4th at 1255.) Far from conclusory, the FAC’s specific facts

satisfy Civil Code section 3294.

B. Defendants’ Legal Claims Are Baseless and Misapply

Precedent

Defendants’ arguments, quoted below from their Motion to Strike Punitive

Damages, are meritless, relying on misapplied precedent and ignoring the

FAC’s detailed allegations. Each claim is addressed, drawing on O’Hara v.

Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 [Link].3d 798, Brousseau v. Jarrett

(1977) 73 [Link].3d 864, and Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co.

(1992) 4 [Link].4th 306, with FAC citations for Box’s role.

• Lack of Specificity: Defendants assert, “Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to plead specific

facts that meet the ‘clear and convincing’ standard’s high burden of proof

to allow an award of punitive damages” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 2, lines 14-16),

and “A complaint seeking punitive damages must plead relevant facts

with particularity” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 5, line 6; Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65

[Link].3d 306, 317). They claim the FAC’s allegations are “overly

vague and conclusory” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, lines 4-5). In Cyrus, the

plaintiff offered general assertions, unlike the FAC’s detail of Box’s

misrepresentations, as “an officer and owner of BIG” who falsely claimed

licensure (First Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11 [“Defendants represented to

Plaintiff that they were licensed as either a Class A or C-34 contractor”]).

The FAC specifies unlicensed work, storm drain errors, air conditioning

destruction, and abandonment, corroborated by exhibits. (First Am.

Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 15-16, 26-27; Ex. M.) O’Hara upheld allegations of

“knowingly misrepresented the safety and security of the complex with

the intent to induce appellant to rent an apartment” as sufficient. (O’Hara

v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75 [Link].3d 798, 801.) Brousseau

rejected a “conclusory characterization” lacking facts, noting “there is no

claim or allegation of fraud or deceit.” (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73

 [Link].3d 864, 872, 876.) Mock emphasized that “Evidence that an

insurer has violated its duty of good faith and fair dealing does not

thereby establish that it has acted with the requisite malice, oppression or

fraud to justify an award of punitive damages.” (Mock v. Mich. Millers

Mut. Ins. Co. (1992) 4 [Link].4th 306, 328.) Unlike Brousseau’s vague

count, the FAC alleges: “In making the representations Defendants knew

them to be false and did so to induce Plaintiff to enter into the Agreement

and pay the Defendants.” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 26, p. 5, lines 9-11.)

This satisfies Clauson v. Superior Court, supra, 67 [Link].4th at 1255.

• Misapplication of ‘Clear and Convincing’ Standard: Defendants argue,

“California Civil Code section 3294 also requires proof of ‘clear and

convincing evidence’ that a defendant has been guilty of oppression,

fraud or malice to justify a claim for punitive damages” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 5,

lines 7-9; Mock, supra, 4 [Link].4th at 327-328). Mock clarified: “In

order to establish that an insurer’s conduct has gone sufficiently beyond

mere bad faith to warrant a punitive award, it must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence that the insurer has acted maliciously, oppressively

or fraudulently.” (Mock, supra, 4 [Link].4th at 328.) However, Mock

addressed trial evidence, not pleadings. The FAC need only allege

specific facts, as it does with Box’s fraud, where he “was responsible for

overseeing the project” and misrepresented BIG’s qualifications. (First

Am. Complaint, ¶ 10; First Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 15-16, 19-21, 26-29.)

 Clauson states: “At the pleading stage, however, the rules are different:

the complaint need only allege ultimate facts showing the plaintiff is

entitled to relief.” (Clauson, supra, 67 [Link].4th at 1255.) Brousseau’s

rejection of “conclusory characterization” supports the FAC’s detailed

allegations, including air conditioning destruction and pest harm.

(Brousseau, supra, 73 [Link].3d at 872.) The FAC meets this threshold.

• Alleged Use of ‘Buzzwords’: Defendants claim, “‘Buzzwords’ of oppression,

fraud or malice are not sufficient to state a claim for punitive damages”

(Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, lines 6-7; Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d

452, 462; Brousseau, supra, 73 [Link].3d at 872). Silberg noted: “The

mere characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and

fraudulent is patently insufficient to support an award of exemplary

damages.” (Silberg, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 462.) Brousseau rejected a count

for “conclusory characterization,” lacking facts, and noted “there is no

claim or allegation of fraud or deceit.” (Brousseau, supra, 73 [Link].3d

at 872, 876.) Mock similarly required more than bad faith, stating: “In

order to establish that an insurer’s conduct has gone sufficiently beyond

mere bad faith to warrant a punitive award, it must be shown by clear and

convincing evidence that the insurer has acted maliciously, oppressively

or fraudulently.” (Mock, supra, 4 [Link].4th at 328.) Unlike

Brousseau’s deficient count, the FAC details Box’s misrepresentations

and reckless acts, such as creating a fire hazard, as well as “punctur[ing]

the septic tanks and cut[ting] the leach lines, causing raw sewage to flood

the property” and destroying air conditioning units, foreseeably causing

pest infiltration. (First Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 15.) The FAC alleges: “The

actions of Defendants, and each of them, were fraudulent, oppressive,

wanton, willful, intentional so as to justify the imposition of punitive

and/or exemplary damages.” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 29, p. 5, lines 17-

19.) O’Hara upheld punitive damages for “conscious disregard of

appellant’s safety.” (O’Hara, supra, 75 [Link].3d at 806.) The FAC

exceeds Brousseau’s and Mock’s standards. On the other hand,

Defendants have used buzzwords, like "Meet and Confer" to supply

grounds to bring this motion, as if the very invocation of this talismani

phrase magically transforms that one phrase into legal support for a

motion to strike. Notably, Mr. Lawson's email failed to accompany a

single case or grounds for the motion, neither does the "meet and confer"

provide guidance Plaintiffs for how they could amend the FAC--short of

stipulating to remove punitive damages. The inference, of course, being

that Defendants breach of professional conduct, which drew rebuke from

the CSLB, somehow lacks grounds to hold them accountable for conduct

that meets the standard for punitive damages, as articulated above. At a

minimum, this conduct should not be inflicted on members of the public

without sanction.
• Intent and Despicable Conduct: Defendants assert, “Without a showing of

intent to cause injury, a plaintiff can only show malice or oppression by

proving the defendant engaged in ‘despicable conduct’” (Defs.’ Mot., p.

6, lines 9-10; CACI Nos. 3114, 3115), and “Plaintiffs have not pleaded

any facts to suggest the work performed by Defendants amounted to

‘despicable conduct’” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, line 19). The FAC alleges Box’s

misrepresentations to extract $42,723, reckless acts like installing a gas

line “draped over a seven-foot fence, which began leaking,” destroying

air conditioning units, and attempting to tie into a storm drain, knowing

the risks to special-needs children. (First Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11, 19,

43.) Open windows in summer foreseeably invited pests, causing seizures

and infections. (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 43.) This is “vile, base, or

contemptible” under CACI Nos. 3114 and 3115. O’Hara found malice for

“conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s safety.” (O’Hara, supra, 75

[Link].3d at 806.) Mock noted: “In order to justify an award of punitive

damages on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was

aware of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he

wilfully and deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Mock,

supra, 4 [Link].4th at 329, internal quotations omitted.) The FAC’s

detailed acts of fraud and foreseeable harm satisfy Mock’s standard.

Defendants’ reliance on G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49

[Link].3d 22 is misplaced, as Searle Involved unintentional defects,

 unlike the FAC’s intentional fraud. (Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, line 17; Searle,

supra, at 31.)

• Evil Motive: Defendants claim, “Evil motive is the central element of malice

which justifies an exemplary award” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, line 13; O’Hara,

supra, 75 [Link].3d at 806). The FAC alleges Box’s lies, as “an officer

and owner of BIG” who misrepresented licensure, and reckless acts

causing harm. (First Am. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 11, 15-21, 43.) Air

conditioning destruction foreseeably led to pest infiltration because this

caused the windows to be open, lest Plaintiffs experience severe health

issues related to unbearable heat that would foreseeably be trapped inside

the dwelling units during the inescapable heat of a Riverside County

summer. The FAC states: “In making the representations Defendants

knew them to be false and did so to induce Plaintiff to enter into the

Agreement and pay the Defendants.” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 26, p. 5,

lines 9-11.) O’Hara held: “In a case such as this one, where the injury is

not deliberately inflicted by the defendant, the plaintiff must prove that

the defendant acted with conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s safety.”

(O’Hara, supra, 75 [Link].3d at 806.) Mock affirmed that malice

requires “circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or

‘malice,’ or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or

such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his

conduct may be called wilful or wanton.” (Mock, supra, 4 [Link].4th at

 328, internal quotations omitted.) Box’s actions meet this standard,

surpassing O’Hara and Mock.

• Corporate Liability: Defendants argue, “An employer shall not be liable for

damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of

the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the

unfitness of the employee” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 6, lines 23-25; Civ. Code, §

3294, subd. (b)), and “Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to allege facts indicating that

BIG had advanced knowledge of Mr. Cazares’s unfitness” (Defs.’ Mot., p.

7, lines 4-5). The FAC alleges Box, BIG’s owner, directly participated in

and ratified the fraud and reckless acts, stating: “Defendant JORDAN

BOX … represented himself as an officer and owner of BIG, and was

responsible for overseeing the project” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 10, p. 3,

lines 8-10), and “Defendants represented to Plaintiff that they were

licensed as either a Class A or C-34 contractor” (First Am. Complaint, ¶

11, p. 3, lines 13-14), which Box knew was false. Box oversaw reckless

acts, including “punctur[ing] the septic tanks and cut[ting] the leach lines,

causing raw sewage to flood the property” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 15, p.

3, lines 23-24), installing a gas line “draped over a seven-foot fence,

which began leaking” (First Am. Complaint, ¶ 19, p. 4, lines 7-8), and

destroying air conditioning units, foreseeably causing pest infiltration.

These satisfy section 3294, subdivision (b). O’Hara upheld corporate

liability for misrepresentations made “with the permission and consent”

 of the corporation. (O’Hara, supra, 75 [Link].3d at 806.) White v.

Ultramar, Inc. held: “A corporate employer may be liable for punitive

damages based on the acts of an employee if a managing agent authorizes

or ratifies the wrongful conduct.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21

Cal.4th 563, 572.) Mock noted no evidence of “established policies or

practices” in claims handling to show malice, unlike the FAC’s specific

allegations of Box’s direct involvement. (Mock, supra, 4 [Link].4th at

329-330.) Here, Box’s role renders Defendants’ argument meritless.

In summary, as outlined above, Defendants’ appeal to precedent fails under the

weight of reasoned analysis, as each cited authority proves inapplicable when

measured against the FAC’s meticulously pleaded allegations of fraud, malice,

and reckless endangerment, now fortified by the Contractors’ State License

Board’s finding that defendants violated licensing laws for the

misrepresentations alleged. (FAC, ¶ 27; Ex. M.) The FAC’s clarity and

specificity render defendants’ arguments unavailing, as demonstrated by a

careful review of their authorities. Cyrus requires “particularity in pleading

punitive damages” (Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 [Link].3d 306, 317), a

standard the FAC satisfies with its detailed account of licensing

misrepresentations (FAC, ¶ 11: “Defendant Jordan Box convinced Plaintiff they

were properly licensed”). Mock’s demand for “clear and convincing evidence”

applies to trial, not pleadings (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992)

4 [Link].4th 306, 328), and the FAC’s fraud allegations align with CACI No.
3940’s “despicable conduct” with “willful and conscious disregard” (CACI No.

3940; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1)), as shown by deliberate deceit (FAC, ¶

15: “Defendant BIG… dug deep trenches… causing sewage to flood”). Silberg

rejects trial “buzzwords” (Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co. (1974) 11 Cal.3d

452, 460), but the FAC’s narrative of calculated misrepresentations exceeds

pleading requirements (FAC, ¶ 26: “Defendants knew [representations] to be

false… to induce Plaintiff”). Brousseau similarly dismisses conclusory fraud

(Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 [Link].3d 864, 872), yet the FAC’s robust

allegations distinguish it (FAC, ¶ 16: “Defendants refused to correct the

situation leaving Plaintiff… to live in the cesspool”). Searle’s “malice” as

“criminal indifference” (G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court (1975) 49

[Link].3d 22, 29) is met under CACI No. 3946’s “intentional

misrepresentation” (CACI No. 3946; Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a)), mirrored by

intentional fraud (FAC, ¶ 19: “BIG… placed and left the gas line… leaking

gas”). O’Hara’s “evil motive” (O’Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp. (1977) 75

[Link].3d 798, 806) is surpassed by the FAC’s reckless acts (FAC, ¶ 43:

“Defendants’… exposure caused… extreme stress and anxiety”). Civ. Code, §

3294, subd. (a) authorizes punitive damages for “oppression, fraud, or malice,”

a threshold the FAC clears, bolstered by the CSLB’s finding of unlicensed work

(FAC, ¶ 27: “Defendants were not a licensed Class A or C-34 California

contractors”). Accordingly, far from shielding defendants, these authorities

illuminate the FAC’s strength, as its allegations, grounded in CACI’s standards

and the CSLB’s adjudication, stand as a testament to plaintiffs’ rightful claim

for relief.

C. Defendants’ Meet and Confer Was a improper tactic

Defendants’ meet-and-confer efforts are a flagrant mockery of Code of Civil

Procedure § 435.5’s mandate for good-faith engagement, a litigious improper

tactic that would make even the most patient jurist recoil. Their January 3, 2025,

Motion to Strike, propped on a single, flippant sentence in a November 25,

2024, email, was bereft of legal substance, rightly cast into oblivion by this

Court on February 18, 2025. (Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities

in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive Damages, p. 60, Ex. B;

Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Strike Punitive

Damages, p. 1.) Their February 26 to March 7, 2025, antics were no less

egregious. A February 26 email vaguely assailed the fraud claim without a shred

of legal grounding, prompting Plaintiffs to seek specifics and propose a 60-day

discovery stay for mediation. In particular, Defendants' counsel agreed on

March 5, 2025, only to exploit the pause to sharpen their quill, filing a second

frivolous Motion on March 11, 2025, while hoarding discovery that could have

paved the path to resolution. A March 10, 2025, call, a perfunctory gesture,

demanded surrender of punitive damages, a cynical subterfuge masquerading as

conferral. Here we stand, at the end of April 2025, 104 days after Defendants’

October 30, 2024, pledge of early resolution—47 days amassed through

extensions to December 16, 2024, and 57 days squandered in mediation’s

mirage. (Emails from Derek T. Lawson, Oct. 30, 2024, Nov. 27, 2024.)

Plaintiffs suggested a mediator, yet Defendants, true to their dilatory form, have

done nothing, resorting to demands for more information while offering no

discovery to advance settlement, despite two robust settlement demands,

hundreds of pages of discovery, and a firsthand site inspection on February 17,

2025. Plaintiffs warned of this foreseeable dalliance, yet Defendants chose the

path of least resistance—filing frivolous motions to delay rather than resolve.

This egregious dalliance flouts § 435.5’s spirit, betraying the very purpose of

cooperative resolution. While § 435.5(a)(4) precludes denial solely for

inadequate conferral, we urge the Court to wield its discretion to condemn

Defendants’ duplicity, a brazen affront to justice’s swift march.

D. The Motion’s Procedural Flaws Are Fatal

Defendants’ Motion, with cavalier imprecision, seeks to strike “the Request for

Punitive Damages from the First Amended Complaint” (Defs.’ Mot., p. 2, lines

11-12) without pinpointing a single paragraph. Code of Civil Procedure § 436

demands surgical precision. (Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist.

(1982) 135 [Link].3d 797, 813.) Here, Plaintiffs' January 23 and March 2025

pleas for clarity went unanswered. This sloppiness alone warrants denial—a

motion so vague is no motion at all. More substantively, Defendants would have

this Court believe that Jordan Box, the owner, CEO, and managing agent of
Builder’s Innovation Group, Inc. (“BIG”), remained blissfully unaware that his

own employees lacked the licensing required to perform hazardous sewer

connection work. That proposition is as audacious as it is legally irrelevant.

Plaintiffs’ allegations — that Box personally represented licensing compliance

while authorizing and ratifying the unlawful work (FAC ¶¶ 10–11, 13, 15–16,

20–21, 26) — must be accepted as true at the pleading stage. (Evans v. City of

Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6 [“We assume the truth of all properly pleaded

material allegations of the complaint.”]; see also Aragon-Haas v. Family

Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 [Link].3d 232, 240 [allegations are

accepted as true for purposes of demurrer or motion to strike].) Defendants’

effort to dispute Plaintiffs’ facts not only fails but improperly invites the Court

to weigh credibility, which is impermissible at this juncture. Plaintiffs have

alleged Box’s personal fraud and ratification of unlicensed work; Defendants'

disbelief is no substitute for a legal defense. The motion must be denied.

E. Leave to Amend Is Warranted if Deficiencies Exist

Defendants’ Motion to Strike the FAC’s punitive damages claim is a improper

tactic, as impotent as a improper tactic against a bonfire of truth. Their bid to

obliterate allegations of “fraudulent, oppressive, wanton, willful, intentional”

conduct (FAC ¶ 29) as nonconforming drivel is doomed, for the FAC’s

chronicle of Builder’s Innovation Group’s depravity—sewage-soaked floors,

pest-ridden hovels, and gas leaks threatening catastrophe (FAC ¶¶ 15–22, 24–
29)—mirrors the facts supporting malicious conduct in Rivera v. Sassoon

(1995) 39 [Link].4th 1045, 1046–47: “The building and health code violations

found on the property included hazardous electrical wiring, seepage of raw

sewage under the buildings due to broken plumbing, infestation of rats, termites

and other vermin, broken and deteriorated doors and windows, lack of hot and

cold running water, lack of heat, leaking roofs and leaking plumbing fixtures.”

Should this Court spy any blemish in these allegations, plaintiffs demand leave

to amend, a right California law brandishes like a cudgel. (Code Civ. Proc., §

436, subd. (b) [court may strike pleadings “not drawn or filed in conformity

with the laws of this state”]; Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 [Link].4th

1373, 1385 [leave proper if plaintiffs can allege facts supporting stricken

claims]; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 [Link].3d 159, 166 [leave

warranted to plead malice].) The law’s liberal amendment ethos, binding even

here, brooks no dissent. (Code Civ. Proc., § 472a, subd. (c) [“When a demurrer

is sustained, the court may grant leave to amend the pleading upon any terms as

may be just…”]; Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 [“when [a

demurrer] is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a

reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be,

the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse”]; City of Atascadero v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 [Link].4th 445, 459

[“if there is a reasonable possibility the defect in the complaint could be cured

by amendment, it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave

to amend”].) New counsel’s lacerating strategies, the February 17, 2025 site

inspection exposing BIG’s cesspool of neglect, discovery troves—$336,284.80

repair estimates, $37,827.67 pest mitigation costs—hurled at defendants in

settlement demands, the CSLB’s scorching rebuke of BIG’s unlicensed

chicanery, and traitorous confessions from released defendants equip plaintiffs

to chisel “oppression, fraud, or malice” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a)) into the

annals of justice. To deny leave would “make a mockery of the policy of liberal

amendment,” padlocking the courthouse against tenants exploited by

defendants’ vile indifference. (Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Center (2006) 140

[Link].4th 1256, 1281.)

F. The Motion Is Frivolous, Aimed at Delay

Defendants’ Motion is not just meritless—it is a improper tactic to stall justice.

They secured 68 days of extensions, devoured hundreds of pages of discovery,

including a 32-page settlement demand, and inspected the damaged property on

Presidents’ Day 2025. Plaintiffs, forbearing repairs to accommodate Defendants,

shouldered borrowing costs. Yet Defendants, hoarding their own discovery, used

extensions to draft motions and spurned settlement, their eyes wide open to the

wreckage. Their improper service on represented Plaintiffs compounds their bad

faith. Settlement pacts on November 26, 2024, and March 5, 2025, including a

60-day discovery stay, were betrayed by this Motion’s filing. A motion filed to

delay is frivolous, and this Court’s authority under Code of Civil Procedure §
128.5 should not slumber. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637,

650.)

G. The Court Should Order Mediation to Honor the Settlement Agreement

Plaintiffs, with unwavering commitment, have sought to spare this Court’s

resources, delivering voluminous discovery, settlement demands, and a

Presidents’ Day 2025 inspection. Defendants, by contrast, have parlayed

extensions into motion practice, offering no discovery and scorning settlement.

This Motion flouts the November 26, 2024, and March 5, 2025, agreements,

including a 60-day mediation stay. Their refusal to propose a mediator, while

Plaintiffs bear out-of-pocket and borrowing costs, bespeaks bad faith. With the

Case Management Conference and this Motion’s hearing aligned on May 30,

2025, we respectfully implore the Court to order mediation, restoring the parties

to the path of resolution they pledged to tread. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.722.)

H.. Defendants’ Misapplication of § 3294, subd. (b)

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages must fall

because the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") does not allege facts showing

that Builder’s Innovation Group, Inc. ("BIG") had advance knowledge of

Edgardo Cazares’s unfitness, or that BIG ratified any wrongful conduct (Defs.’

Mot. 6:23–7:5). They are mistaken, not merely in part, but in principle. Civil

Code section 3294, subdivision (b) sets forth the rule: a corporate employer is
liable for punitive damages when its managing agent personally engages in,

authorizes, or ratifies acts of malice, oppression, or fraud. The Judicial Council's

CACI No. 3947 states this plainly: "An employer is liable for punitive damages

based on acts of an employee if ... the employer’s officer, director, or managing

agent was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice." (CACI No. 3947.)

Plaintiffs allege that Jordan Box—BIG’s owner, CEO, and managing agent—

personally committed fraud (FAC ¶¶ 10–11, 13, 26), authorized reckless

excavation leading to sewage and gas hazards (FAC ¶¶ 15–16, 20–21), and

ratified the life-threatening consequences inflicted on Plaintiffs (FAC ¶¶ 16, 22–

23, 43–44). These facts satisfy the elements of fraud under CACI No. 1901,

Concealment ("intentionally failed to disclose certain facts") and CACI No.

1902, False Promise ("promise made without intention of performing"). They

also establish "despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious

disregard of the rights or safety of others" as required by Civil Code section

3294, subdivision (c)(1). Indeed, California’s Supreme Court has left no doubt

that direct participation by a corporate managing agent obviates the need for

separate proof of employee unfitness (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th

563, 572 [corporate employer liable where managing agent personally acted

oppressively]; see also College Hosp., Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th

704, 723 [pleading intent or conscious disregard suffices at demurrer stage]).

Defendants’ attempt to fixate on Cazares while ignoring Box’s central role reads
section 3294 selectively, at best, and dishonestly, at worst. Plaintiffs have

alleged enough; the motion must be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendants’ renewed Motion to Strike Punitive Damages,

filed March 11, 2025, is a near-carbon copy of their January 3, 2025, attempt,

which this Court rightly dismissed. Both motions are virtually indistinguishable,

bereft of legal authority or specific identification of the content to be stricken,

relying instead on vague assertions that the First Amended Complaint (FAC)

fails to meet Civil Code section 3294’s standards. In both instances, Defendants

demanded that Plaintiffs voluntarily amend to excise punitive damages or face a

Motion to Strike, wielding the motion as a cudgel to burden the Court and delay

justice rather than engage in substantive resolution. Their invocation of “meet

and confer” is a hollow incantation, devoid of the clarity or good faith required

by Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5. As Defendants themselves misapply

in their motions, buzzwords like “meet and confer” in a perfunctory email lack

the talismanic power to provide Plaintiffs with meaningful notice or guide them

toward avoiding needless litigation. Instead, Defendants have weaponized the

Motion to Strike to generate busywork, sidestepping earnest settlement

discussions.
On the merits, the FAC meticulously alleges fraudulent, oppressive, and

malicious conduct, surpassing the thresholds of Civil Code section 3294 and

CACI Nos. 3940, 3946, and 3947 with unassailable detail. The motion is a

procedural nullity, a substantive mirage, and a improper tactic to stall.

Defendants exploited settlement extensions not to negotiate in good faith, but to

craft repetitive, baseless attacks, all while turning a blind eye to the havoc their

own Presidents’ Day 2025 inspection confirmed. Their meet-and-confer efforts

were a improper tactic, and their settlement promises were equally bereft of

good faith.

The Court should deny the motion in its entirety. Should any technical flaw be

perceived, Plaintiffs respectfully request leave to amend. At the May 30, 2025,

Case Management Conference, Plaintiffs urge the Court to order mediation to

honor the parties’ prior agreements and consider sanctions under Code of Civil

Procedure section 128.5 for Defendants’ vexatious tactics and bad-faith conduct,

which have needlessly prolonged this litigation.

DATED: April 26, 2025