Comey Burn Bags
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cvdh64Case 1:25-cr-00272-MSN-WEF Document 138-12 Filed 11/03/25 Page 1 of 5 PageID#
1603
GOVERNMENT
EXHIBIT
12
1:25-CR-272-MSN
Case 1:25-cr-00272-MSN-WEF Document 138-12 Filed 11/03/25 Page 2 of 5 PageID#
1604
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Title: (U//FOUO) Opening Electronic Communication
Re: , 07/21/2025
Case Predication:
(U//FOUO) On or about April 15, 2025, the Director’s Advisory Team was
informed of the unusual discovery of highly classified and sensitive
documents found inside five "burn bags" located in Room 9582, a certified
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at the FBI
Headquarters building in Washington, DC.
(U//FOUO) A cursory inventory of the 9582 SCIF revealed the existence of
classified documents, including documents believed to be official
records, inside "burn bags" which appeared to have been placed in the
SCIF around the timeframe of the 2025 presidential inauguration - Friday,
January 17, 2025 through Wednesday, January 22, 2025. A brief review of
the contents of the "burn bags" revealed that some of the documents left
behind may have come from a collection of records held by certain
unidentified senior government officials at FBI Headquarters.
(U//FOUO) The discovery of these "burn bags" containing highly sensitive
records, presumably intended for destruction, precipitated an internal
management review to determine whether there was a legitimate purpose and
underlying motivation for storing such records in this manner inside
9582. This limited review was undertaken by the Director’s Advisory Team
for approximately 60 days to examine badge access entry logs and to
confer with the FBI's Information Management Division (IMD) and the
Security Division (SecD) to establish a chronology of events involving
the activities inside 9582. The preliminary steps also included a limited
number of FBI employee interviews and an assessment of the nature of the
documents found inside the "burn bags" which revealed a variety of
classified and unclassified records. Among the records found were many
related to the FBI’s Mar-a-Lago search, the January 06 capitol breach,
the Crossfire Hurricane investigation, as well as a copy of the
Classified Appendix to the John Durham Special Counsel investigation.
Moreover, an additional record discovered as part of this management
review process was an original referral by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) to former FBI Director James Comey, known as a
Counterintelligence Operational Lead (CIOL). This CIOL, believed to have
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
2
Case 1:25-cr-00272-MSN-WEF Document 138-12 Filed 11/03/25 Page 3 of 5 PageID#
1605
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Title: (U//FOUO) Opening Electronic Communication
Re: , 07/21/2025
been missing for several years, was dated September 07, 2016 and
contained certain intelligence related to the 2016 U.S. presidential
election campaign. The CIOL was found in a storage closet adjacent to the
Director’s office and was subsequently transported to the 9582 SCIF.
Former Director Comey previously testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee that he was unfamiliar with this CIOL as well as its related
intelligence.
(U//FOUO) There are conflicting accounts arising from three employee
interviews conducted to establish a chronology and a reliable summary of
the activities involving the 9582 SCIF. The FBI’s IMD division is charged
with the responsibility for securing, cataloguing, and preserving senior
official records (also referred to as Capstone records) under the rules
set forth in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). IMD
officials maintain that they were not made aware of the existence of the
"burn bags" found inside 9582 nor were they consulted to examine the
contents for their relevance to the Capstone provisions of the NARA
policies. The overarching context for the irregularities involving 9582
appears to be a hasty and chaotic effort by certain employees to collect
senior management officials’ records in advance of the anticipated
transition of a new team of FBI executives taking control after the
presidential inauguration.
(U//FOUO) It is unclear, without further investigation, what the
motivations and intent were for placing these records in "burn bags"
inside the 9582 SCIF. The Director’s Advisory Team recommends a
preliminary investigation be opened to expand on the initial internal
management review to determine whether criminal activity exists in the
fact pattern developed to date. Pursuant to DIOG Section 6, the internal
directed review has established adequate predication exists for a
preliminary investigation to determine whether deliberate attempts were
being made to conceal or destroy official records, contrary to the FBI’s
responsibility to preserve these records, in advance of the new
administration and the transition to a new leadership team.
Authorized Investigative Methods:
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
3
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1606
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Title: (U//FOUO) Opening Electronic Communication
Re: , 07/21/2025
(U) As required in DIOG Section 6.8, Standards for Opening or Approving
the Use of an Authorized Investigative Method in Preliminary
Investigations, case agents foresee utilizing the following authorized
investigative methods in this investigation:
• (U) Public information (DIOG subsection 18.5.1)
• (U) Records or information – FBI and DOJ (DIOG subsection 18.5.2)
• (U) Records or information – Other federal, state, local, tribal, or
foreign government agency (DIOG subsection 18.5.3)
• (U) Online services and resources (DIOG subsection 18.5.4)
• (U) Interview or request information from the public or private
entities (DIOG subsection 18.5.6)
• (U) Information voluntarily provided by governmental of private
entities (DIOG subsection 18.5.7)
• (U) Grand Jury Subpoenas (DIOG Subsection 18.6.5)
• (U) Polygraph Examinations (DIOG subsection 18.6.11)
(U) The use of the investigative methods outlined above are likely to
further the authorized purpose of the preliminary investigation. These
methods are reasonable, and the least intrusive methods available based
upon the circumstances of the investigation. The methods to be utilized
are an appropriate use of personnel and financial resources. Washington
Field Office will assist and provide evidentiary management for any
collected items obtained during the course of the investigation.
Sensitive Investigative Matter (SIM) Designation:
(U//FOUO) Per DIOG Section 10.1.1, this investigation involves former
domestic public officials who held executive level positions within the
FBI and includes allegations of obstruction and/or corruption and
therefore is considered a SIM. The FBI's General Counsel has reviewed the
matter and concurs with the opening of the preliminary investigation as a
SIM.
Case Participants:
(U//FOUO) The primary investigators assigned to this matter are SA Miles
Starr and Senior Advisor Jack Eckenrode. The supervisory management chain
for this investigation includes
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
4
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1607
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Title: (U//FOUO) Opening Electronic Communication
Re: , 07/21/2025
Required Notifications:
(U) Pursuant to the FBI's Public Corruption Policy Guide, Section 7.6.2,
the required Letter Head Memorandum (LHM) will be provided to PCU within
15 days of case initiation. Per DIOG Section 6.7.1.1, PCU will notify the
responsible United States Attorney's Office of the opening of this matter
as well as all known SIMs no later than 30 calendar days after the
initiation of the investigation. Additionally, prior to initiation, the
Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI's Washington Field Office was
notified of this investigation.
♦♦
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
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