During Akbar's reign, his policy towards the indigenous landed elite evolved in response to various
factors: expanding Mughal territorial control, shaping his religious policy, developing the mansabdari
system, and fostering political accommodation between the Mughals and the landed elite. While the
Rajputs formed a significant portion of the indigenous nobility, other groups also played crucial roles.
Satish Chandra highlights how historical accounts often overemphasise the Mughal-Rajput alliance,
overlooking the contributions of other Hindu and Muslim elites. For instance, Todar Mal, a Khatri
from a modest background, became a leading revenue expert and active participant in military
operations. Similarly, Patar Dass, another Khatri, rose from supervising elephant stables to becoming
diwan of Bengal, Bihar, and Kabul, eventually earning the title 'Raja Bikramjit.'
This broader inclusion illustrates Akbar’s efforts to integrate diverse cultural groups into the Mughal
state, employing varied methods of control and accommodation to consolidate power.
Nurul Hasan classifies the Mughal-period landed interests into three main categories: (1)
autonomous chieftains, (2) intermediary zamindars, and (3) primary zamindars. Ahsan Raza Khan,
in his article “Akbar’s Initial Encounters with the Chiefs”, highlights that the Mughal Empire
consisted of numerous principalities ruled by hereditary autonomous and semi-autonomous chieftains,
often titled rajas, ranas, rawats, and raos. While "zamindars" is the term most frequently used in
Persian chronicles, these chiefs formed a powerful class. Abul Fazl notes that some chieftaincies
spanned hundreds of kilometres. Over time, Akbar developed a policy towards these chieftains, which
remained largely unchanged until the Mughal Empire's decline.
Intermediary and primary zamindars became key to the Mughal land revenue system, which was
directly controlled by the Imperial Administration and treated as subjects of the emperor. While their
relationship with the Mughals was not always smooth, they were easier to maintain than independent
chiefs.
Iqtidar Alam Khan highlights Akbar's transformation of the Mughal nobility into a more
homogeneous entity from its earlier multiracial and religiously diverse composition. Under Humayun,
the nobility was dominated by foreign groups, primarily Turanis and Persians, with the Turanis
holding a dominant position—a composition that persisted under Bairam Khan. However, Akbar
sought to balance power by diversifying the nobility.
Between 1560 and 1575, Akbar incorporated Rajput chiefs and Indian Muslims, mainly Shaikhzadas
with madad-i-mash grants or zamindari rights, into imperial service, alongside Afghan nobles.
Shaikhzadas were Indian Muslims from prominent clans like the Sayyids of Barha and Kambus, some
of whom had come from Arabia. Under Akbar, the Barhas held military roles but did not rise high. By
1575-80, the Shaikhzadas gained prominence, strengthening Muslim support for Akbar—his 1579
Mahzar declaration further consolidated power, claiming leadership of India's orthodox Muslims.
Akbar’s strategy also integrated Rajputs and other indigenous groups into his nobility, preferring them
over Afghans due to past conflicts, including Humayun's exile and Afghan alliances with Rajputs and
Shaikhzadas against the Mughals.
This preference for Rajputs is also linked to advice Humayun is said to have received from Shah
Tahmasp of Iran, who recommended forming alliances with the Rajputs rather than the Afghans.
According to Shah Tahmasp, subjugating the Rajputs, as key zamindars, was crucial for maintaining
stability in India. Gopinath Sharma points out that Humayun’s attempts to ally with the Rajputs were
often met with suspicion, as they sought to preserve their independence and cultural identity. It is
believed that Humayun followed this advice and passed it on to Akbar in his will (wasiyat) before his
death.
Several strategic and economic factors drove Akbar's integration of the Rajputs into his court and
administration. Rajputana's proximity, strategic location and natural barrier provided by the Aravallis,
made it vital for Mughal security. It served as a gateway to Sindh, connected to the Western coast, and
linked the Gangetic Valley with the prosperous regions of Malwa and Gujarat, crucial for trade and
military access to the Deccan.
Economically, Rajput chieftains, familiar with local conditions, culture, and language, were valuable
for ensuring efficient revenue collection in their regions. The region's formidable forts, like Chittor
and Ranthambore, further added to its military significance, as did the Rajputs' reputation for chivalry
and valour, making them an ideal "sword arm" for the Mughal state.
According to I. A. Khan, Akbar needed a loyal Rajput base to counterbalance rebellious factions like
the Turani nobility. By recruiting Rajputs, he sought to turn their resistance into active support,
incorporating them into the Mughal state as partners in governance, while simultaneously creating a
more efficient bureaucracy to stabilize his empire.
A.L. Srivastava notes that Akbar’s treatment of the Rajputs was not driven by sentimentality or mere
admiration for their valour, generosity, and patriotism. Instead, it resulted from a carefully crafted
policy based on enlightened self-interest, recognition of merit, and a commitment to justice and fair
play.
It is important to note that the Mughal-Rajput relationship was not one-sided. Norman P. Ziegler
observes that many Rajputs viewed Mughal rule as a period of tolerance and national unification.
They served as soldiers and administrators under their clan leaders, motivated by the prestige and
benefits gained through association with the Mughal throne. The mansabdari system exemplifies this,
with Rajput nobles receiving high ranks.
For instance, Raja Bhara Mal, the Kachhwaha ruler of Amber, was made a high grandee, his son
Bhagwan Das attained a rank of 5000, and his grandson Raja Man Singh became a mansabdar of the
first order with a rank of 7000 zat and 7000 sawar. A similar policy extended to other Rajput clans,
such as the Rathors, with Rai Singh of Bikaner, Pratap of Baglana, and Raja Suraj Singh of Jodhpur
granted ranks of 4000, 3000, and 2000/2000, respectively. The Mughal hierarchy also represented
other clans like the Bhadurias, Hadas, Pundirs, Tunwars, Bhatis, Baghelas, and Chandrawats.
From the early 1570s, Rajput chiefs were entrusted with significant offices. For example, Raja Bhara
Mal was made Vazir-i-Mutlaq of Agra in 1572–73, granting him administrative control over the city.
Raja Bhagwan Das and Rai Singh of Bikaner served as governors of Lahore, while Raja Askaran and
Man Singh governed the subas of Agra and Kabul, respectively. The Mughal state also respected
Rajput autonomy, refraining from interfering in the administration of Rajput territories.
I.A. Khan highlights how Akbar recognized the services of the Rajput chiefs by promoting them to
higher mansabs and increasing their jagirs, which provided them with income far exceeding that of
their previous chiefdoms. However, Akbar did not offer special privileges to the Rajput principalities,
treating them as integral parts of the Mughal Empire. The revenue from these territories was adjusted
against their salaries, with only a small portion assigned to the Rajput chiefs in their home territories
to ensure their families were not displaced. This proximity allowed for easier accommodation of their
traditional military personnel within the Mughal forces.
Akbar's policy also ensured that the resumed revenues of these principalities were integrated into the
khalisa (imperial land) and reassigned to other nobles. A crucial aspect was Akbar's assertion of
paramount power over succession, meaning he had the right to resume or alter the territorial holdings
of the Rajputs and create new watan jagirs for his favoured nobles. This arrangement benefited both
parties: Rajputs could retain autonomy in their homelands while participating in Mughal governance,
extending their influence over North Indian politics. At the same time, Akbar maintained suzerainty
and the right to intervene in internal Rajput conflicts.
Some smaller Rajput states ceased to be vassals of larger Rajput states and instead looked to the
Mughal Empire for protection. The material prosperity provided by the Mughal state led some Rajputs
(Thakurs) to regard Akbar as an incarnation of Lord Rama or Krishna.
I.A. Khan noted that Akbar's recruitment strategy extended beyond the Rajput chiefs to include other
clan members, aiming to break tribal solidarity and integrate them into the Mughal system. He treated
all racial groups equally, including Turani, Irani, and Rajput tribes. Akbar also established
matrimonial ties with Rajputs to secure alliances with local zamindars, as seen in the marriage of
Bhara Mal's daughter, Harkha Bai, to Akbar in 1562. These marriages were mutually agreed upon, not
imposed, and helped strengthen political bonds.
Rajput clans such as the Rathors, Bhatis, Gehlots, and Baghelas were involved in these alliances, and
Rajput princesses enjoyed significant freedom in the Mughal harem. Their influence led to the
celebration of Hindu festivals like Dussehra, Diwali, and Holi at the Mughal court. Social ties were
also fostered, with Rajput wives visiting their families and Akbar also fostered social bonds, visiting
Rajput families in times of grief and offering condolences, such as when Rajput chiefs shaved their
heads after the death of his mother. The relationship was further solidified by familial titles like
Mirza, Farzand, and Bhaiya, which signified a close bond between Akbar and his Rajput allies.
Akbar’s strategic approach to integrating the Rajputs into the Mughal Empire is noteworthy. He
employed both soft and hard methods, depending on the circumstances. Akbar preferred diplomacy
and conciliation, especially with those who submitted easily but resorted to force when resistance
persisted. As Asif Qandhari explained, Akbar opted for conciliation because the Rajputs controlled
hundreds of strong forts, and conquering them by force would have been impractical and time-
consuming. Satish Chandra categorized the history of Mughal-Rajput relations during Akbar’s reign
into three broad phases, reflecting the varying nature of these interactions.
The first phase (1556–1567) saw many Rajput rajas accepting Mughal suzerainty and maintaining
their roles as rulers of their principalities. They provided military service within Rajasthan, but not
beyond. Akbar, dealing with rebellions from his foster family, Turani nobles, and Uzbeks, realized he
needed Rajput support to counter the Turanis. Rajput’s were involved in the conquest of Mertha
(1562) and Jodhpur (1563), but not larger Rajput states like Chittor and Ranthambore. Matrimonial
alliances, like Akbar’s marriage to Bhara Mal’s daughter Harkha Bai in 1562, strengthened these ties.
Akbar also introduced liberal reforms, such as abolishing the pilgrimage tax and jaziya (1562–1564),
but these did not immediately secure broader Rajput alliances, laying the groundwork for the second
phase of his policy.
The second phase (1568–1580) marked a significant turning point in Mughal-Rajput relations,
especially following the conquest of Chittor. During this period, Akbar adopted a more forceful
approach, utilizing diplomatic and military strategies to assert control over Rajput states. The siege of
Chittor in 1567 and the assault on Ranthambore in 1569 exemplify the violent methods employed.
After these victories, many Rajput states, including Jodhpur, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer, entered into
alliances with the Mughals, with Rajputs becoming a crucial part of the Mughal military and
administration.
However, the Sisodias of Mewar, led by Rana Pratap, continued to resist Mughal authority. Despite
efforts by Akbar’s emissaries, including Man Singh and Bhagwan Das, Rana Pratap refused to submit,
with the famous Battle of Haldighati in 1575 serving as a symbol of this resistance. As Gopinath
Sharma notes, Rana Pratap's alliance with the Bhils, a major local community in southwestern
Mewar, played a crucial role in his defiance.
Akbar’s efforts to integrate the Rajputs into his court were exemplified by Man Singh of Amber's
appointment as a Mughal army commander. Abul Fazl, in Volume 3 of the Akbarnama, commends
Man Singh for his wisdom, loyalty, and bravery, and grants him the title "Farzand" (son) as he takes
on this important role. Despite his qualities, some officers resisted his promotion due to his Hindu
background, a sentiment noted by Badayuni in Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh. Nizamuddin, however,
praised Man Singh’s courage, wisdom, and dynamic leadership.
Despite his success in the Battle of Haldighati, Akbar faced resistance from Mewar, which did not ally
with the Mughal Empire.
The third phase of Mughal-Rajput relations (1580–1605) saw Rajputs gain prestige and influence
within Akbar’s court. Following a Turani revolt in Bengal and Bihar in 1580, Akbar promoted Rajputs
in his military and administrative ranks. Rajputs, once allies, became integral partners in the Mughal
state, with significant administrative roles and military responsibilities. GSL Devra notes that while
Akbar’s relations with Mewar and Jodhpur remained strained, his ties with smaller Rajput states were
cordial.
The Kachhwaha clan, particularly Raja Birbal and Raja Man Singh, played a crucial role in supporting
the Mughal Empire. As the political influence of the Rajputs expanded, they recognized the mutual
benefits of aligning with the empire. Through statistical analysis, Iqtidar Alam Khan and M.
Athar Ali revealed that the representation of Rajputs in the Mughal nobility increased from 8% to
16%. Among Rajput clans, the Kachhwahas were the most prominent supporters.
S. Inayat Ali Zaidi emphasizes the role of the Jagirdari system in integrating the Rajputs, as they
were granted mansabs and jagirs, including watan-jagirs that were non-transferable. Akbar's policy of
assigning jagirs beyond the Rajputs' traditional territories ensured that their interests aligned with
those of the empire, while still safeguarding their control over their ancestral lands. Harbans
Mukhia argues that Akbar’s Rajput policies, a blend of diplomatic strategy, political accommodation,
and cultural integration.
Norman P. Ziegler sees the Rajput alliance as a key Mughal success, while Zaidi highlights its role
in territorial expansion and enduring social and cultural ties.
In conclusion, Akbar’s reign marked the rise of a participatory ruling class, as noted by Satish
Chandra, where Rajputs, Hindus, and Muslims collaborated. His effort to create a composite ruling
class, uniting diverse religious and social groups, was challenging but successful. By integrating
regional chieftains into his nobility, not merely as local rulers but as contributors to the empire’s
broader interests, Akbar’s diverse nobility stands as one of his greatest achievements.
