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Corruption
[Link] Corruption
from the Winter 2023 Edition of the First published Wed Sep 14, 2005; substantive revision Fri Oct 13, 2023

The causes and effects of corruption, and how to combat corruption, are
Stanford Encyclopedia issues that have been very much on the national and international agendas
of Philosophy of politicians and other policymakers in recent decades (Heidenheimer and
Johnston 2002; Heywood 2018). Moreover, various historically influential
philosophers, notably Plato (The Republic), Aristotle (The Politics),
Machiavelli (The Prince and The Discourses), Hobbes (The Leviathan)
and Montesquieu (The Spirit of the Laws), have concerned themselves
with political corruption in particular, albeit in somewhat general terms
Co-Principal Editors: Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (Sparling 2019; Blau 2009). For these philosophers corruption consisted in
Associate Editors: Colin Allen, Hannah Kim, & Paul Oppenheimer large part in rulers governing in the service of their own individual or
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collective—or other factional—self-interest, rather than for the common
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Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054 legally enshrined moral principles. They also emphasized the importance
of virtues, where it was understood that the appropriate virtues for rulers
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- might differ somewhat from the appropriate virtues for citizens. Indeed,
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ruthlessness, that are inconsistent with common morality.[1] And Plato
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requisite moral and intellectual virtues required to play an important role
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy in political institutions; hence his rejection in The Republic of democracy
Copyright © 2023 by the publisher in favor of rule by philosopher-kings. Moreover, these historically
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Department of Philosophy important political philosophers were concerned about the corruption of
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 the citizenry: the corrosion of the civic virtues. This theme of a corrupt
Corruption citizenry, as opposed to a corrupt leadership or institution, has been
Copyright © 2023 by the author notably absent in contemporary philosophical discussion of the corruption
Seumas Miller
of political institutions until quite recently. However, recently the
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 Corruption Seumas Miller

corruption of political institutions and of the citizenry as a consequence of In the modern period, in addition to the corruption of political institutions,
the proliferation of disinformation, propaganda, conspiracy theories and the corruption of other kinds of institutions, notably market-based
hate speech on social media, in particular (Woolley and Howard 2019), institutions, has been recognised. For example, the World Bank (1997)
has become an important phenomenon which philosophers have begun to some time back came around to the view that the health of economic
address (Lynch 2017; Cocking and van den Hoven 2018; Miller and institutions and progress in economic development is closely linked to
Bossomaier 2023: Ch. 4). Social media bots are used inter alia to corruption reduction. In this connection there have been numerous anti-
automatically generate disinformation (as well as information), propagate corruption initiatives in multiple jurisdictions, albeit this is sometimes
ideologies (as well as non-ideologically based opinions), and function as presented as politically motivated. Moreover, the Global Financial Crisis
fake accounts to inflate the followings of other accounts and to gain and its aftermath have revealed financial corruption, including financial
followers. The upshot is that the moral right of freedom to communicate benchmark manipulation, and spurred regulators to consider various anti-
has frequently not been exercised responsibly; moral obligations to seek corruption measures by way of response (Dobos, Pogge and Barry 2011).
and communicate truths rather than falsehoods have not been discharged, And in recent decades there have been ongoing efforts to analyze and
resulting in large-scale social, political and, in some cases, physical harm. devise means to combat corruption in in police organizations, in the
One key set of ethical issues here pertains to an important form of professions, in the media, and even in universities and other research-
institutional corruption: corruption of the democratic process. For focused institutions.
instance, revelations concerning the data firm Cambridge Analytica’s
illegitimate use of the data of millions of Facebook users to influence While contemporary philosophers, with some exceptions, have been slow
elections in the U.S. and elsewhere highlighted the ethical issues arising to focus on corruption, the philosophical literature is increasing, especially
from the use of machine learning techniques for political purposes by in relation to political corruption (Thompson 1995; Dobel 2002; Warren
malevolent foreign actors. The problem here is compounded by home- 2006; Lessig 2011; Newhouse 2014; Philp and David-Barrett 2015; Miller
grown corruption of democratic institutions by people who wilfully 2017; Schmidtz 2018; Blau 2018; Philp 2018; Thompson 2018; Sparling
undermine electoral and other institutional processes in the service of their 2019; Ceva & Ferretti 2021). For instance, until relatively recently the
own political and personal goals. For instance, Donald Trump consistently concept of corruption had not received much attention, and much of the
claimed, and continues to claim, that the 2020 U.S. presidential election conceptual work on corruption had consisted in little more than the
which he demonstrably lost involved massive voter fraud. The problem presentation of brief definitions of corruption as a preliminary to extended
has also been graphically illustrated in the U.S. by the rise of home-grown accounts of the causes and effects of corruption and the ways to combat it.
extremist political groups fed via social media on a diet of disinformation, Moreover, most, but not all, of these definitions of corruption were
conspiracy theories, hate speech, and propaganda; a process which led to unsatisfactory in fairly obvious ways. However, recently a number of
the violent attack in January 2021 on the Capitol building which houses more theoretically sophisticated definitions of corruption and related
the U.S. Congress. notions, such as bribery, have been provided by philosophers. Indeed,
philosophers have also started to turn their minds to issues of anti-
corruption, e.g., anti-corruption systems (often referred to as “integrity

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systems”), and in doing so theorizing the sources of corruption and the One response to this is to distinguish public corruption from private
means to combat it. corruption, and to argue that the above definition is a definition only of
public corruption. But if ordinary citizens lie when they give testimony in
1. Varieties of Corruption court, this is corruption; it is corruption of the criminal justice system.
2. Institutional Corruption However, it does not involve abuse of a public office by a public official.
2.1 General Features of Institutional Corruption And when police fabricate evidence out of a misplaced sense of justice,
2.1.1 Personal Corruption and Institutional Corruption this is corruption of a public office, but not for private gain.
2.1.2 Institutional Corrosion and Structural Corruption
2.1.3 Institutional Actors and Corruption In the light of the failure of such analytical-style definitions it is tempting
2.2 Causal Theory of Institutional Corruption to try to sidestep the problem of providing a theoretical account of the
2.3 Theories of Political Corruption concept of corruption by simply identifying corruption with specific legal
2.3.1 Proceduralist Theories of Political Corruption and/or moral offences. However, attempts to identify corruption with
2.3.2 Thompson: Individual versus Institutional Corruption specific legal/moral offences are unlikely to succeed. Perhaps the most
2.3.3 Lessig’s Dependence Corruption plausible candidate is bribery; bribery is regarded by some as the
2.3.4 Ceva & Ferretti: Office Accountability quintessential form of corruption (Noonan 1984; Pritchard 1998; Green
3. Noble Cause Corruption 2006). But what of nepotism (Bellow 2003)? Surely it is also a
4. Integrity Systems paradigmatic form of corruption, and one that is conceptually distinct from
5. Conclusion bribery. The person who accepts a bribe is understood as being required to
Bibliography provide a benefit to the briber, otherwise it is not a bribe; but the person
Academic Tools who is the beneficiary of an act of nepotism is not necessarily understood
Other Internet Resources as being required to return the favor.
Related Entries
In fact, corruption is exemplified by a very wide and diverse array of
phenomena of which bribery is only one kind, and nepotism another.
1. Varieties of Corruption Paradigm cases of corruption include the following. The commissioner of
taxation channels public monies into his personal bank account, thereby
Consider one of the most popular of the standard longstanding definitions, corrupting the public financial system. A political party secures a majority
namely, “Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private vote by arranging for ballot boxes to be stuffed with false voting papers,
gain”.[2] No doubt the abuse of public offices for private gain is thereby corrupting the electoral process. A police officer fabricates
paradigmatic of corruption. But when a bettor bribes a boxer to “throw” a evidence in order to secure convictions, thereby corrupting the judicial
fight this is corruption for private gain, but it need not involve any public process. A number of doctors close ranks and refuse to testify against a
office holder; the roles of boxer and bettor are usually not public offices. colleague who they know has been negligent in relation to an unsuccessful

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surgical operation leading to loss of life; institutional accountability economic crime or misdemeanor; and she might be committing plagiarism
procedures are thereby undermined. A sports trainer provides the athletes simply in order to increase her academic status. There might not be any
he trains with banned substances in order to enhance their performance, financial benefit sought or gained.
thereby subverting the institutional rules laid down to ensure fair
competition (Walsh and Giulianotti 2006). It is self-evident that none of We can conclude that many of the historically influential definitions of
these corrupt actions are instances of bribery. corruption, as well as attempts to circumscribe corruption by listing
paradigmatic offences, fail. They fail in large part because the class of
Further, it is far from obvious that the way forward at this point is simply corrupt actions comprises an extremely diverse array of types of moral and
to add a few additional offences to the initial “list” consisting of the single legal offences undertaken in a wide variety of institutional contexts
offence of bribery. Candidates for being added to the list of offences including, but by no means restricted to, political and economic
would include nepotism, police fabricating evidence, cheating in sport by institutions.
using drugs, fraudulent use of travel funds by politicians, and so on.
However, any such list needs to be justified by recourse to some principle However, in recent times progress has been made. Philosophers, at least,
or principles. Ultimately, naming a set of offences that might be regarded have identified corruption as fundamentally a moral, as opposed to legal,
as instances of corruption does not obviate the need for a theoretical, or phenomenon. Acts can be corrupt even though they are, and even ought to
quasi-theoretical, account of the concept of corruption. be, legal. Moreover, it is evident that not all acts of immorality are acts of
corruption; corruption is only one species of immorality.
As it happens, there is at least one further salient strategy for demarcating
the boundaries of corrupt acts. Implicit in much of the literature on An important distinction in this regard is the distinction between human
corruption is the view that corruption is essentially a legal offence, and rights violations and corruption (see the entry on human rights). Genocide
essentially a legal offence in the economic sphere. Accordingly, one could is a profound moral wrong; but it is not corruption. This is not to say that
seek to identify corruption with economic crimes, such as bribery, fraud, there is not an important relationship between human rights violations and
and insider trading. corruption; on the contrary, there is often a close and mutually reinforcing
nexus between them (Pearson 2001; Pogge 2002 [2008]; Wenar 2016;
But many acts of corruption are not unlawful. Bribery, a paradigm of Sharman 2017). Consider the endemic corruption and large-scale human
corruption, is a case in point. Prior to 1977 it was not unlawful for U.S. rights abuse that have taken place in authoritarian regimes, such as that of
companies to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts; indeed, elsewhere Mobutu in Zaire, Suharto in Indonesia and Marcos in the Philippines
such bribery was not unlawful until much later.[3] So corruption is not (Sharman 2017). And there is increasing empirical evidence of an
necessarily unlawful. This is because corruption is not at bottom simply a admittedly sometimes complex, but sometimes not so complex, causal
matter of law; rather it is fundamentally a matter of morality. connection between corruption and the infringement of both negative
rights (such as the right not to be tortured, suffer arbitrary loss of one’s
Secondly, corruption is not necessarily economic in character. An freedom, or have one’s property stolen) and positive rights, e.g.,
academic who plagiarizes the work of others is not committing an

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subsistence rights (such as the right to a sufficient supply of clean water to Note here the pivotal role of habits (Langford & Tupper 1994). We have
enable life and health); there is evidence, that is, of a causal relation just seen that the corruption of persons and institutions typically requires a
between corruption and poverty. Consider corrupt authoritarian leaders in pattern of corrupt actions. More specifically, corrupt actions are typically
developing countries who sell the country’s natural resources cheaply and habitual. Yet, as noted by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics, one’s
retain the profits for themselves and their families and supporters (Pogge habits are in large part constitutive of one’s moral character; habits make
2002 [2008]: Chapter 6; Wenar 2016). As Wenar has forcefully argued the man (and the woman). The coward is someone who habitually takes
(Wenar 2016), in the first place this is theft of the property (natural flight in the face of danger; by contrast, the courageous person has a habit
resources) of the people of the countries in question (e.g., Equatorial of standing his or her ground. Accordingly, morally bad habits—including
Guinea) by their own rulers (e.g., Obiang) and, therefore, western corrupt actions—are extremely corrosive of moral character, and therefore
countries and others who import these resources are buying stolen goods; of institutional roles and ultimately institutions. Naturally, so-called
and, in the second place, this theft maintains these human rights-violating systemic corruption would typically involve not simply the habitual
rulers in power and ensures that their populations continue to suffer in performance of a corrupt action by a single individual but the habitual
conditions of abject poverty, disease etc. performance of a corrupt action by many individuals in an institution or,
conceivably, an entire society or polity. Moreover, this pattern of
Thus far, examples of different types of corrupt action have been individuals engaged in the performance of habitual corrupt actions might
presented, and corrupt actions have been distinguished from some other have a self-sustaining structure that gives rise to a collective action
types of immoral action. However, the class of corrupt actions has not problem, if the pattern is to be broken. Consider widespread bribery in
been adequately demarcated within the more general class of immoral relation to competitive tenders for government contracts. Bribes are paid
actions. To do so, a definition of corrupt actions is needed. by competing companies in order to try influence the outcome of the
tender process. Any firm that chooses not to pay a bribe is not given
An initial distinction here is between single one-off actions of corruption
serious consideration. Thus, not to engage in corruption is to seriously
and a pattern of corrupt actions. The despoiling of the moral character of a
disadvantage one’s company. Even those who do not want to engage in
role occupant, or the undermining of institutional processes and purposes,
bribery do so. This is a collective action problem (Olson 1965).
would typically require a pattern of actions—and not merely a single one-
off action. So a single free hamburger provided to a police officer on one Notwithstanding the habitual nature of most corrupt actions there are some
occasion usually does not corrupt, and is not therefore an act of corruption. cases in which a single, one-off action would be sufficient to corrupt an
Nevertheless, a series of such gifts to a number of police officers might instance of an institutional process. Consider a specific tender. Suppose
corrupt. They might corrupt, for example, if the hamburger joint in that one bribe is offered and accepted, and the tendering process is thereby
question ended up with (in effect) exclusive, round the clock police undermined. Suppose that this is the first and only time that the person
protection, and if the owner intended that this be the case. offering the bribe and the person receiving the bribe are involved in
bribery. Is this one-off bribe an instance of corruption? Surely it is, since it
corrupted that particular instance of a tendering process.

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Ontologically speaking, there are different kinds of entities that can be specific institutional roles, e.g., impartiality in a judge or objectivity in a
corrupted. These include human beings, words of a language, artefacts, journalist. Corrosion of these virtues amounts to institutional personal
such as computer discs, and so on. However, our concern in this entry is corruption, i.e., corruption of a person qua institutional role occupant.
with the corruption of institutions since this is the main focus of the
philosophical and, for that matter, the non-philosophical, literature. Of In order to provide an adequate account of institutional corruption we need
course, institutions are comprised in large part of institutional roles a serviceable notion of an institution: the thing corrupted. For our purposes
occupied by human beings. So our focus on institutional corruption brings here it is assumed that an institution is an organization or structure of
with it a focus on the corruption of individual human beings. (I refer to the organizations that reproduces itself (e.g., by training and recruitment
corruption of individual human beings as personal corruption.) However processes) and is comprised of a structure of institutional roles defined in
in the case of institutional corruption, the focus on the corruption of terms of tasks (Harré 1979; Giddens 1984; Miller 2010). Accordingly, the
human beings (personal corruption) is on human beings qua institutional class of institutions is quite diverse and includes political institutions,
actors(and on those who interact with institutional role occupants qua (e.g., legislatures), market-based institutions, (e.g., corporations),
institutional role occupants)(Miller 2017: 65). institutions of learning, (e.g., universities), security agencies, (e.g., police
and military organizations), and so on. Importantly, as we noted above, the
The upshot of this is that there are three sets of distinctions in play here. various different types of, and even motives for, institutional corruption
Firstly, there is the distinction between institutional corruption and non- vary greatly from one kind of institution to another.
institutional corruption—the latter being the corruption of entities other
than institutions, e.g., corruption of artefacts. Secondly, there is the Note that in theorizing institutional corruption the distinction between an
distinction between personal and non-personal corruption—the former entire society or polity, on the one hand, and its constituent institutions, on
being the corruption of human beings as opposed to, for instance, the other, needs to be kept in mind. A theory of democracy, for instance,
institutional processes. Thirdly, with respect to personal corruption, there might be a theory not only of democratic government in the narrow sense
is the distinction between the corruption of persons qua institutional actors of the legislature and senior members of the executive, but also of the
and non-institutional personal corruption. Non-institutional personal public administration as a whole, the judiciary, the security agencies
corruption is corruption of persons outside institutional settings. Personal (police and military), civil society and so on. Obviously, a theory of the
corruption pertains to the moral character of persons, and consists in the corruption of democratic political institutions (in the narrow sense of the
despoiling of their moral character. If an action has a corrupting effect on a legislature and the senior members of the executive) might not be
person’s character, it will typically be corrosive of one or more of a generalizable to other sorts of institution within a democracy, e.g., to
person’s virtues. These virtues might be virtues that attach to the person security agencies or market-based institutions. Moreover, fundamental
qua human being, e.g., the virtues of compassion and fairness in one’s differences regarding the specific form that a democracy ought to take,
dealings with other human beings. Corrosion of these virtues amounts to e.g., between those of a republican persuasion (Pettit 1997; Sandel 2012)
non-institutional personal corruption. Alternatively—or in some cases, and libertarians (Nozick 1974; Friedman 1970), might morph into disputes
additionally—these virtues might attach to persons qua occupants of about what counts as institutional corruption. For instance, on one view

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market-based institutions exist to serve the common good, while on mind, impartiality) then institutional corruption will frequently involve the
another they exist only to serve the individual self-interest of the displacement of those virtues in these role occupants by corresponding
participants in them. Thus on the latter, but not the former, view market vices, (e.g., dishonesty, weak mindedness, bias); that is, institutional
intervention by the government in the service of the common good might corruption will frequently involve institutional personal corruption.
be regarded as a species of corruption. Further, a theory of the corruption
of democracy, and certainly of the corruption of one species of democracy As noted above, the relationship between institutional corruption and
such as liberal democracy, is not necessarily adequate for the personal corruption is something that has been emphasized historically,
understanding of the corruption of many of institutions within a e.g., by Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli. However, some recent theorists
democracy and, in particular, those institutions, such as military and police of structural corruption have tended to downplay this relationship. Lessig’s
institutions, hierarchical bureaucracies and market-based institutions, notion of dependence corruption (Lessig 2011), in particular, evidently
which are not inherently democratic either in structure or purpose, decouples structural corruption from (institutional) personal corruption
notwithstanding that they exist within the framework of a democratic (see section 2.3.3 below).
political system, are shaped in various ways by that framework and,
Personal corruption, i.e., the state of having been corrupted, is not the
conversely, might be necessary for the maintenance of that framework.
same thing as performing a corrupt action, i.e., being a corruptor.
Typically, corruptors are themselves corrupted, but this is not necessarily
2. Institutional Corruption the case. Consider, for example, a parent who pays a one-off bribe to an
immigration official in order to be reunited with her child. The parent is a
2.1 General Features of Institutional Corruption corruptor by virtue of performing a corrupt action, but she is not
necessarily corrupted by her, let us assume, morally justifiable action.
2.1.1 Personal Corruption and Institutional Corruption
Does personal corruption imply moral responsibility for one’s corrupt
Our concern here is only with institutional corruption. Nevertheless, it is character? This issue is important in its own right but it also has
plausible that corruption in general, including institutional corruption implications for our understanding of structural corruption. Certainly,
frequently, if not typically, involves the despoiling of the moral character many, if not most, of those who are corrupted are morally responsible for
of persons and in particular, in the case of institutional corruption, the being so. After all, they do or should know what it is to be corrupt and
despoiling of the moral character of institutional role occupants qua they could have avoided becoming corrupt. Consider, for instance,
institutional role occupants. To this extent institutional corruption involves kleptocrats, such as Mobuto and Marcos, who have looted billions of
personal corruption and, thereby, connects institutional corruption to moral dollars from the public purse (Sharman 2017), or senior members of multi-
character. If the moral character of particular institutional role occupants, national corporations who have been engaged in ongoing massive bribery
(e.g., police detectives), consists in large part of their possession of certain in China and elsewhere (Pei 2016). These kleptocrats and corporate
virtues definitive of the role in question (e.g., honesty, independence of

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leaders are not only corruptors, they are themselves corrupt; moreover, are echoes of weaker forms of structuralism in some of these accounts
they are morally responsible for being in their state of corruption. when it comes to the issue of the moral responsibility of human persons
for institutional corruption. One influential contemporary theorist of
However, there appear to be exceptions to the claim that personal corruption who apparently does not accept the view that corruptors are
corruption necessarily or always brings with it moral responsibility for necessarily or always morally responsible (or, therefore, blameworthy) for
one’s corrupt character, e.g., adolescents who have been raised in criminal their corrupt actions is Lessig (Lessig 2011) (see section 2.3.3 below).
families and, as a result, participate in the corrupt enterprises of these
families. These individuals perform actions which are an expression of The upshot of our discussion of (institutional) personal corruption and
their corrupt characters and which also have a corrupting effect. moral responsibility is as follows. We now have, at least notionally, a
fourfold distinction in relation to corruptors: (1) corruptors who are
What of the moral responsibility of corruptors for their corrupt actions? It morally responsible for their corrupt action and blameworthy; (2)
is plausible that many, if not most, corruptors are morally responsible for corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt action but not
their corrupt actions (e.g., the legions of those rightly convicted of blameworthy; (3) corruptors who are not morally responsible for having a
corruption in criminal courts—and therefore, presumably, morally corrupt character, but whose actions: (a) are expressive of their corrupt
responsible for their actions—in jurisdictions around the world), but there character, and; (b) have a corrupting effect; (4) corruptors who do not have
appear to be exceptions, e.g., those who are coerced into offering bribes. a corrupt character and are neither morally responsible nor blameworthy
for their corrupt actions, yet whose actions have a corrupting effect, e.g.,
One school of thought in the theory of social institutions that might well
by virtue of some form of structural dependency for which individual
reject the view that corruptors are necessarily or even typically morally
human persons are not morally responsible.
responsible (or, therefore, blameworthy) for their corrupt actions is
structuralism (Lévi-Strauss 1962 [1966]) and especially structural
Marxism (Althusser 1971). According to the latter view institutional 2.1.2 Institutional Corrosion and Structural Corruption
structure and, in particular, economic class-based relations largely
determine institutional structures and cultures, and regularities in the Naturally, in the case of institutional corruption typically greater
actions of institutional actors. On this anti-individualist conception neither institutional damage is being done than simply the despoiling of the moral
institutional corrosion nor institutional corruption—supposing the two character of the institutional role occupants. Specifically, institutional
notions can be distinguished (see below)—are ultimately to be understood processes are being undermined, and/or institutional purposes subverted.
by recourse to the actions of morally responsible individual human agents. A further point is that the undermining of institutional purposes or
Strong forms of structuralism are inconsistent with most contemporary processes typically requires the actions of multiple agents; the single
philosophical accounts of institutional corruption, not the least because action of a single agent is typically not sufficient. The multiple actions of
these accounts typically assume that institutions have an inherently the multiple agents in question could be a joint action(s) or they could be
normative—rather than merely ideological—dimension. However there individual actions taken in aggregate. A joint action is one in which two or
more agents perform a contributory individual action in the service of a

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 Corruption Seumas Miller

common or collective end (Miller 2010: Chapter 1) or, according to some aware of the diminution in the quality of their adjudications, could cause
theorists, joint intention (Bratman 2016: Chapter 1). For instance, additional resources to be provided and yet chose to do nothing, then
motivated by financial gain, a group of traders within the banking sector arguably the process of corrosion might have become a process of
might cooperate with one another in order to manipulate a financial corruption.
benchmark rate, such as LIBOR (London Interbank Borrowing Rate)
(Wheatley 2012). An important question that arises here is whether or not institutional
corruption is relative to a teleological or purpose-driven conception of
However, arguably, the undermining of institutional processes and/or institutions and, relatedly, whether the purposes in question are to be
purposes is not a sufficient condition for institutional corruption. Acts of understood normatively. Arguably, the institutional purposes of
institutional damage that are not performed by a corruptor and also do not universities include the acquisition of new knowledge and its transmission
corrupt persons might be thought to be better characterized as acts of to students; moreover, arguably, knowledge acquisition is a human good
institutional corrosion. Consider, for example, funding decisions that since it enables (indirectly), for instance, health needs to be met. However,
gradually reduce public monies allocated to the court system in some large it has been suggested that the purposes of political institutions, in
jurisdiction. As a consequence, magistrates might be progressively less particular, are too vague or contested to be definitive of them (Ceva &
well trained and there might be fewer and fewer of them to deal with the Ferretti 2017; Warren 2004). One response to this is to claim that
gradually increasing workload of cases. This may well lead to a governments are in large part meta-institutions with the responsibility to
diminution over decades in the quality of the adjudications of these ensure that society’s other institutions realize their distinctive institutional
magistrates, and so the judicial processes are to an extent undermined. purposes. On this view, an important purpose of governments is provided,
However, given the size of the jurisdiction and the incremental nature of in effect, by the purposes of other fundamental institutions. For instance,
these changes, neither the magistrates, nor anyone else, might be aware of an important purpose of governments might be to ensure market-based
this process of judicial corrosion, or even able to become aware of it institutions operate in a free, fair, efficient and effective manner (Miller
(given heavy workloads, absence of statistical information, etc.). At any 2017: 14.1).
rate, if we assume that neither the judges nor anyone else can do anything
to address the problem then, while there has clearly been judicial 2.1.3 Institutional Actors and Corruption
corrosion, arguably there has not been judicial corruption. Why is such
corrosion not also corruption? Naturally, there are many different kinds of entities which might causally
undermine institutions, including other collective entities. However,
For institutional corrosion to constitute corruption, it might be claimed
collectivist accounts of institutions go beyond the ascription of causal
(Miller 2017: Chapter 3), the institutional damage done needs to be
responsibility and, in some cases, ascribe moral responsibility. Firstly,
avoidable; indeed, it might also be claimed that the relevant agents must
such collectivist accounts of institutions ascribe intentions, beliefs and so
be capable of being held morally responsible for the damage, at least in the
on to organizations and other collective entities per se. Secondly, this
generality of cases. So if the magistrates in our example were to become
ascription of mindedness to collective entities leaves the way open to

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 Corruption Seumas Miller

ascribe moral agency to these entities (French 1979; List & Pettit 2011). abuse of public office. Moreover, our example of an attempted bribe to
On such collectivist accounts corruptors include collective entities; indeed, secure a gun permit involves a public official. However, we have
corruptors who are morally responsible for their corrupt actions. Thus canvassed arguments in section 1 that contra this view acts of corruption
Lockheed Corporation, on this view, was a moral agent (or, at least, an might be actions performed by persons who do not hold public office, e.g.,
immoral agent) which corrupted the Japanese government (a second moral price-fixing by market actors, a witness who gives false testimony in a law
agent) by way of bribery. Other theorists, typically referred to as court. At this point in the argument we need to invoke a distinction
individualists, reject minded collective entities (Ludwig 2017; Miller between persons who hold a public office and persons who have an
2010). Accordingly to individualists, only human agents are possessed of institutional role. CEOs of corporations do not hold public office but they
minds and moral agency.[4] Thus collective entities, such as organizations, do have an institutional role. Hence a CEO who embezzles his company’s
do not have minds and are not per se moral agents. Accordingly, it is only money is engaged in corruption. Again, citizens are not necessarily holders
human agents who culpably perform actions that undermine legitimate of public offices, but they do have an institutional role qua citizens, e.g., as
institutional processes or purposes. voters. Hence a voter who breaks into the electoral office and stuffs the
ballot boxes with falsified voting papers in order to ensure the election of
An important related issue that arises at this point pertains to the human her favored candidate is engaged in corruption, notwithstanding the fact
agents who perform acts of corruption. Are they necessarily institutional that she does not hold public office.
actors? It might be thought that this was not the case. Supposing a criminal
bribes a public official in order to get a permit to own a gun. The criminal 2.2 Causal Theory of Institutional Corruption
is not an institutional actor and yet he has performed an act of institutional
corruption. However, in this example the public official has accepted the The causal theory of institutional corruption (Miller 2017) presupposes a
bribe and she is an institutional actor. So the example does not show that normative teleological conception of institutions according to which
institutional corruption does not necessarily involve the participation of an institutions are defined not only as organizations or systems of
institutional actor. What if the criminal offered the bribe but it was not organizations with a purpose(s), but organizations or systems of
accepted? While this may well be a crime and is certainly an attempt at organizations the purpose(s) of which is a human good. The goods in
institutional corruption, arguably, it is not an actual instance of an act of question are either intrinsic or instrumental goods. For instance,
institutional corruption but rather a failed attempt. Moreover, it is universities are held to have as their purpose the discovery and
presumably not an instance of institutional corruption because the transmission of knowledge, where knowledge is at the very least an
institutional actor approached refused to participate in the attempted instrumental good. (For criticisms see Thompson 2018 and Ceva &
corrupt action. Let us pursue this issue further. Ferretti 2021.)

As we saw in section 1, corruption, even if it involves the abuse of public If a serviceable definition of the concept of a corrupt action is to be found
office, is not necessarily pursued for private gain. However, according to —and specifically, one that does not collapse into the more general notion
many definitions of corruption institutional corruption necessarily involves of an immoral action—then attention needs to be focused on the moral

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effects that some actions have on persons and institutions. An action is the offence of, say, lying is an infringement of a law, rule, and/or a moral
corrupt only if it corrupts something or someone—so corruption is not principle. However, the offence is only an act of institutional corruption if
only a moral concept, but also a causal or quasi-causal concept. That is, an it has some institutionally undermining effect, or is of a kind that has such
action is corrupt by virtue of having a corrupting effect on a person’s a tendency, e.g., it is performed in a courtroom setting and thereby
moral character or on an institutional process or purpose. If an action has a subverts the judicial process.
corrupting effect on an institution, undermining institutional processes or
purposes, then typically—but not necessarily—it has a corrupting effect A third feature of the causal theory of institutional corruption pertains to
also on persons qua role occupants in the affected institutions. the agents who cause the corruption. As noted in section 2.1.3, there are
many different kinds of entities which might causally undermine
Accordingly, an action is corrupt only if it has the effect of undermining institutions, including other collective entities. However, it is an
an institutional process or of subverting an institutional purpose or of assumption of the causal theory of corruption that only human agents are
despoiling the character of some role occupant qua role occupant. In light possessed of minds and moral agency. Accordingly, on the causal theory it
of the possibility that some acts of corruption have negligible effects, such is only human agents who culpably perform actions that undermine
as a small one-off bribe paid for a minor service, this defining feature legitimate institutional processes or purposes.
needs to be qualified so as to include acts that are of a type or kind that
tends to undermine institutional processes, purposes or persons (qua A fourth and final feature of the causal theory also pertains to the agents
institutional role occupants)—as well as individual or token acts that who cause corruption. It is a further assumption of the causal theory that
actually have the untoward effects in question. Thus qualified, the causal the human agents who perform acts of corruption (the corruptors) and/or
character of corruption provides the second main feature of the causal the human agents who are corrupted (the corrupted) are necessarily
theory of institutional corruption, the first feature being the normative institutional actors (see discussion above in section 2.1.3). More precisely,
teleological conception of institutions. I note accounts predicated on these acts of institutional corruption necessarily involve a corruptor who
two assumptions have ancient origins, notably in Aristotle (Hindess 2001). performs the corrupt action qua occupant of an institutional role and/or
someone who is corrupted qua occupant of an institutional role.
In keeping with the causal account, an infringement of a specific law or
institutional rule does not in and of itself constitute an act of institutional In light of the above discussion the following normative theory of
corruption. In order to do so, any such infringement needs to have an corruption suggests itself: the causal theory of institutional corruption
institutionally undermining effect, or be of a kind that has a tendency to (Miller 2017: Chapter 3).
cause such an effect, e.g., to defeat the institutional purpose of the rule, to
An act x (whether a single or joint action) performed by an agent (or set of
subvert the institutional process governed by the rule, or to contribute to
agents) A is an act of institutional corruption if and only if:
the despoiling of the moral character of a role occupant qua role occupant.
In short, we need to distinguish between the offence considered in itself 1. x has an effect, or is an instance of a kind of act that has a tendency to
and the institutional effect of committing that offence. Considered in itself have an effect, of undermining, or contributing to the undermining of,

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some institutional process and/or purpose (understood as a collective truthfully, of the rights of the accused being respected, and so on. This
good) of some institution, I, and/or an effect of contributing to the otherwise morally legitimate judicial process may be corrupted, if one or
despoiling of the moral character of some role occupant of I, agent more of its constitutive actions are not performed in accordance with the
(or set of agents) B, qua role occupant of I; process as it ought to be. Thus to present fabricated evidence, to lie under
2. At least one of (a) or (b) is true: oath, and so on, are all corrupt actions. In relation to moral character,
a. A is a role occupant of I who used the opportunities afforded by consider an honest accountant who begins to “doctor the books” under the
their role to perform x, and in so doing A intended or foresaw the twin pressures of a corrupt senior management and a desire to maintain a
untoward effects in question, or should have foreseen them; lifestyle that is only possible if he is funded by the very high salary he
b. B could have avoided the untoward effects, if B had chosen to receives for doctoring the books. By engaging in such a practice he risks
do so.[5] the erosion of his moral character; he is undermining his disposition to act
honestly.
Note that (2) (a) tells us that A is a corruptor and is, therefore, either
(straightforwardly) morally responsible for the corrupt action, or A is not 2.3 Theories of Political Corruption
morally responsible for A’s corrupt character and the corrupt action is an
expression of A’s corrupt character.
2.3.1 Proceduralist Theories of Political Corruption
Notice also that the causal theory being cast in general terms, i.e., the
undermining of institutional purposes, processes and/or persons (qua Let us term theories of corruption which focus on the undermining of
institutional role occupants), can accommodate a diversity of corruption in institutional procedures or processes, as opposed to institutional purposes,
a wide range of institutions in different social, political and economic proceduralist theories of institutional corruption. Mark Warren has
settings, past and present, and accommodate also a wide range of elaborated a proceduralist theory of the corruption of democracies, in
mechanisms or structures of corruption, including structural relations of particular; a theory which he terms “duplicitous exclusion” (Warren 2006).
dependency, collective action problems and so on. (Relatedly and more recently, Ceva & Ferretti speak of bending public
rules in the service of “surreptitious agendas” as definitive of corruption
A controversial feature of the causal account is that organizations that are (Ceva & Ferretti 2017: 6), although in a recent work they have shifted to a
entirely morally and legally illegitimate, such as criminal organizations, notion of corruption in terms of lack of accountability (Ceva & Ferretti
(e.g., the mafia), are not able to be corrupted (Lessig 2013b). For on the 2018; Ceva & Ferretti 2021). See discussion below in 2.3.4.)
causal account the condition of corruption exists only relative to an
uncorrupted condition, which is the condition of being a morally Democratic political institutions are characterized by equality (in some
legitimate institution or sub-element thereof. Consider the uncorrupted sense) with respect to these processes. Warren offers a particular account
judicial process. It consists of the presentation of objective evidence that of democratic equality and derives his notion of corruption of democratic
has been gathered lawfully, of testimony in court being presented political institutions from this. According to Warren, democracies involve
a norm of equal inclusion such that

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every individual potentially affected by a collective decision there is often little or no need for secrecy or deception in relation to the
should have an opportunity to affect the decision proportional to pursuit of corrupt practices; corruption is out in the open. Consider
his or her stake in the outcome. (Warren 2004: 333) Colombia during the period of the drug lord, Pablo Escobar’s, “reign”; the
period of the so-called “narcocracy”. His avowed and well-advertised
Corruption of democracies occurs under two conditions: (1) this norm is policy was “silver or lead”, meaning that politicians, judges, journalists
violated and; (2) violators claim to be complying with the norm (Warren and so on either accepted a bribe or risked being killed (Bowden 2012).
2004: 337). Warren contrasts his theory of duplicitous exclusion with what Against this it might be suggested that at least corruption in democracies
he terms “office-based” accounts (Warren 2004:329–32).The latter might always involves hiding one’s corrupt practices. Unfortunately, this seems
be serviceable for administrative agencies and roles but is, according to not to be the case either. As Plato pointed out long ago in The Republic,
Warren, inadequate for democratic representatives attempting to “define democracies can suffer a serious problem of corruption among the
the public interest” (Warren 2006: 10) and relying essentially on the citizenry and when this happens all manner of corrupt practices on the part
political process, rather than pre-existing agreement on specific ends or of leaders and others will not only be visible, they will be tolerated, and
purposes, to do so. This latter point is made in one way of another by other even celebrated.
theorists of modern representative democracies, such as Thompson (2013)
and Ceva & Ferretti (2017: 5), and is an objection to teleological accounts Warren’s theory is evidently not generalizable to many other institutions,
(such as the causal account—section 2.2 above). namely, those that are not centrally governed by democratic norms and, in
particular, by his norm of equal inclusion. Consider, for instance, military
Warren’s other necessary condition for the corruption of institutions, institutions. Most important decisions made by military personal in
namely duplicity, resonates with the emphasis in the contemporary anti- wartime—as opposed to those made by their political masters, such as
corruption literature and, for that matter, in much public policy on whether to go to war in the first place—are made in the context of a
transparency; transparency can reveal duplicity and thereby thwart hierarchical structure; they are not collective decisions, if the notion of a
corruptors. Moreover, the duplicity condition—and the related collective decision is to be understood on a democratic model of decision-
surreptitious agenda condition of Ceva & Ferretti—is reminiscent of making, e.g., representative democracy. Moreover, with respect to, for
Plato’s ring of Gyges (Plato Gorgias); corruption is something done under instance, the decision to retreat or stand and fight a combatant does not
a cloak of secrecy and typically involves deception to try to ensure the and cannot reasonably expect to have “an opportunity to affect the
cloak is not removed. Unquestionably, corruption often flourishes under decision proportional to her stake in the outcome”. The combatant’s
conditions of secrecy. Moreover, corruptors frequently seek to deceive by personal stake might be very high; his life is at risk if he stands and fights
presenting themselves a committed to the standards that they are (secretly) and, therefore, he might prefer to retreat. However, military necessity in a
violating. But contra Warren—and, for that matter, Ceva & Ferretti— just war might dictate that he and his comrades stand and fight and,
corruption does not necessarily or always need to be hidden in order to therefore, they are ordered to do so by their superiors back at headquarters
flourish. Indeed, in polities and institutions suffering from the most serious and, as virtuous combatants, they obey. I note that Machiavelli contrasts
and widespread forms of corruption at the hands of the very powerful, combatants possessed of the martial virtues with corruptible mercenaries

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who only fight for money and who desert when their lives are threatened I note that in the case of institutional corruption and, presumably,
(Machiavelli The Prince: Chapter 12). individual corruption (in so far as it involves the bribery of public or
private officials) the actions in question must undermine some institutional
2.3.2 Thompson: Individual versus Institutional Corruption process or purpose (and/or perhaps institutional role occupant qua role
occupant). Thus Thompson says of institutional corruption:
Thompson’s groundbreaking and influential theory of institutional
It is not corrupt if the practice promotes (or at least does not
corruption takes as its starting point a distinction between what Thompson
damage) political competition, citizenship representation, or other
refers to as individual corruption and institutional corruption. When an
core processes of the institution. But it is corrupt if it is of a type
official accepts a bribe in return for providing a service to the briber, this is
that tends to undermine such processes and thereby frustrate the
individual corruption since the official is accepting a personal benefit or
primary purposes of the institution. (Thompson 2013: 7)
gain in exchange for promoting private interests (Thompson 2013: 6).
Moreover, the following two conditions evidently obtain: (i) the official While Thompson has provided an important analysis of an important
intends to provide the service (or, at least, intends to give the impression species of institutional corruption, his additional claim that officials who
that he will provide the service) to the bribee; (ii) the official and the accept personal benefits in exchange for promoting private interests, i.e., a
bribee intentionally create the link between the bribe and the service, i.e., common form of bribery, is not a species of institutional corruption is
it is a quid quo pro. By contrast, institutional corruption involves political open to question (and a point of difference with the causal theory). As
benefits or gains, e.g., campaign contributions (that do not go into the mentioned in section 1, this species of bribery of institutional actors
political candidates’ own pockets but are actually spent on the campaigns) utilizing their position—whether that position be one in the public sector
by public officials under conditions that tend to promote private interests or in the private sector—can be systemic and, therefore, extremely
(Thompson 2013: 6). The reference to a tendency entails that there is some damaging to institutions. Consider the endemic bribery of police in India
kind of causal regularity in the link between acceptance of the political with its attendant undermining of the provision of impartial (Kurer 2005;
benefits and promotion of the private interests (including greater access to Rothstein & Varraich 2017), obligatory (Kolstad 2012) and effective
politicians than is available to others (Thompson 2018)). However, the police services, not to mention of public trust in the police. Some police
officials in question do not intend that there be such a link between the stations in part of India are little more than unlawful “tax” collection or,
political benefits they accept and their promotion of the private interests of better, extortion agencies; local business people have to pay the local
the provider of the political benefits. Rather police if they are to guarantee effective police protection, truck drivers
have to pay bribes to the police at transport checkpoints, if they are to
the fact that an official acts under conditions that tend to create
transit expeditiously through congested areas, speeding tickets are avoided
improper influence is sufficient to establish corruption, whatever
by those who pay bribes, and so on. Moreover, endemic bribery of this
the official’s motive. (Thompson 2013: 13)
kind is endemic in many police forces and other public sector agencies

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throughout so-called developing countries, even if it is no longer present regulatory authority was replaced. However, two years later the assets of
in most developed countries. the company in question were seized and authorities filed a civil
racketeering and fraud suit against Keating accusing him of diverting
Thompson invokes the distinction between systemic and episodic services funds from the company to his family and to political campaigns.
provided by a public official in support of his distinction between Thompson argues that the Keating case involved: (1) the provision or, at
individual and institutional corruption. By “systemic” Thompson means least, the appearance of the provision of an improper service on the part of
that the service provided by the official legislators (the senators) to a constituent (Keating), i.e., interfering with
the role of a regulator on his behalf; (2) a political gain in the form of
is provided through a persistent pattern of relationships, rather than
campaign contributions (from Keating to the senators), and; (3) a link or,
in episodic or one-time interactions. (The particular relationships
at least, the appearance of a link between (1) and (2), i.e., the tendency
do not themselves have to be ongoing: a recurrent set of one-time
under these conditions for the service to be performed because of the
interactions by the same politician with different recipients could
political gain.
create a similar pattern.) (Thompson 2013: 11)
Accordingly, the case study involves at least the appearance of corrupt
However, as our above example of bribery of police in India makes clear,
activity on the part of the senators. Moreover, Thompson claims that such
Thompson’s individual corruption can be, and often is, systemic in
an appearance might be sufficient for institutional corruption in that
precisely this sense. In more recent work Thompson has drawn attention to
damage has been done to a political institution by virtue of a diminution in
mixed cases involving, for instance, both a personal and a political gain—
public trust in that institution. Thus the appearance of a conflict of interest
the political gain not necessarily being a motive—and suggested that if the
undermines public trust which in turn damages the institution. The
dominant gain is political rather than personal then it is institutional
appearance of a conflict of interest arises when legislators use their office
corruption or perhaps a mix of individual and institutional corruption
to provide a questionable “service” to a person upon whom they are, or
(Thompson 2018). Fair enough. However, this does not remove the
have been, heavily reliant for campaign contributions. Evidently, on
objection that systemic bribery (for instance) involving only personal gain
Thompson’s account of institutional (as opposed to individual) corruption
(both as a motive and an outcome) are, nevertheless, cases of institutional
it is not necessary that the legislators in these kinds of circumstance ought
corruption.
to know that their actions might well have the appearance of a conflict of
Thompson uses the case of Charles Keating to outline his theory interest, ought to know that they might have a resulting damaging effect,
(Thompson 1995 and 2013). Keating was a property developer who made and ought to know, therefore, that they ought not to have performed those
generous contributions to the election campaigns of various U.S. actions. Certainly, the senators in the Keating case ought to have known
politicians, notably five senators, and then at a couple of meetings called that they ought not to perform these actions. However, the more general
on a number of these to do him a favor in return. Specifically, Keating point is that it is not clear that it would be a case of corruption, if it were
wanted the senators to get a regulatory authority to refrain from seizing the not the case that the legislators in question ought to have known that they
assets of a subsidiary of a company owned by Keating. The chair of the ought not to perform the institutionally damaging actions in question. On

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the causal account (section 2.2 above), if legislators or other officials Newhouse has attempted to generalize Thompson’ theory, but in doing so
perform institutionally damaging actions that they could not reasonably be also narrows it. Newhouse argues that Thompson’s theory is best
expected to know would be institutionally damaging then they have not understood in terms of breach of organizational fiduciary duties
engaged in corruption but rather incidental institutional damage (and (Newhouse 2014). An important underlying reason for this, says
perhaps corrosion if the actions are ongoing). Newhouse, is that Thompson’s (and, for that matter, Lessig’s) account of
institutional corruption presuppose that institutions have an “obligatory
As outlined above, Thompson has made a detailed application of his purpose” (Newhouse 2014: 555) Fiduciary duties are, of course,
theory to political institutions and, especially to campaign financing in the obligatory. Moreover, they are widespread in both the public and private
U.S.. However, he views the theory as generalizable to institutions other sector; hence the theory would be generalized. On the other hand, there are
than political ones. It is generalizable, he argues, in so far as “public many institutional actors who do not have fiduciary duties. Thus if
purposes” can be replaced by “institutional purposes” and “democratic Newhouse is correct in thinking that Thompson’s theory of institutional
process” with “legitimate institutional procedures” (Thompson 2013: 5). corruption provides a model for breach of organizational fiduciary duty
Certainly, if the theory is to be generalizable then it is necessary that these and only for breach of organizational fiduciary duty, the ambition to
replacements be made. The question is whether making these generalize Thompson’s theory will remain substantially unrealized.
replacements is sufficient. Moreover, the particular species of institutional
corruption that he has identified and analyzed might exist in other
2.3.3 Lessig’s Dependence Corruption
institutions but do so alongside a wide range of other species to which his
analysis does not apply—including, but not restricted to, what he refers to
Lawrence Lessig has argued that the U.S. democratic political process and,
as individual corruption. Thompson has recently identified some other
indeed, Congress itself, is institutionally corrupt and that the corruption in
forms of institutional corruption to which he claims his theory applies
question is a species of what he calls “dependency corruption” (Lessig
(Thompson 2018). For instance, the close relationship that might obtain
2011 and 2013a). Lessig argues that although U.S. citizens as a whole vote
between corporations and their auditing firms. The salient such
in the election of, say, the U.S. President, nevertheless, the outcome is not
relationships are those consisting of auditing firms undertaking profitable
wholly dependent on these citizens as it should be in a democracy or, at
financial consultancy work for the very corporations which they are
least, as is required by the U.S. Constitution. For the outcome is
auditing; hence the potential for the independent auditing process to be
importantly dependent on a small group of “Funders” who bankroll
compromised. These relationships certainly have the potential for
particular candidates and without whose funding no candidate could hope
corruption. However, they do not appear to be paradigms of institutional
to win office. Accordingly, there are really two elections. In the first
corruption in Thompson’s sense since, arguably, undertaking such
election only the Funders get to “vote” since only they have sufficient
consultancy work is not prima facie an integral function of auditing firms
funds to support a political candidate. Once these candidate have been
qua auditors in the manner in which, for instance, securing campaign
“elected” then there is a second election, a general election, in which all
finance is integral to political parties competing in an election (to mention
the citizens get to vote. However, they can only vote on the list of
Thompson’s paradigmatic example of institutional corruption).

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candidates “pre-selected” by the Funders. Lessig’s account of the U.S. corruption. (Although, perhaps, it might not be individual corruption in
election is complicated, but not vitiated, by the existence of a minority of Thompson’s sense, if it involves a regularity and hence tendency).
candidates, such as Bernie Sanders, who rely on funding consisting of
small amounts of money from a very large number of Funders. It is further Lessig offers a plausible analysis of the corruption of the U.S. electoral
complicated but not necessarily vitiated by the rise of demagogues such as system by the Funders. Two related questions now arise. Is Lessig’s theory
Donald Trump who, as mentioned above, can utilise social media and of dependence corruption correct? Is the notion of dependence corruption
computational propaganda to have an electoral influence much greater generalizable to institutions other than political institutions and, if so, to
than otherwise might have been the case (Woolley and Howard 2019). what extent?

On Lessig’s view there are two dependencies in play, namely, the The extent to which Lessig’s notion of dependence corruption is
dependency of the outcome of the election on the citizenry and the generalizable is ultimately an empirical question; it is a matter of seeking
dependency of this outcome on the Funders. However, these two to apply it widely and waiting on the outcome (see, for instance, Light’s
dependencies are inconsistent. Therefore, the question that now arises is analysis of corruption in the pharmaceutical industry (Light, Lexchin, &
which dependency is legitimate. Clearly, the dependency on the citizenry Darrow 2013)). However, as mentioned above in the comparison of
as a whole is legitimate since this is what the Constitution clearly Lessig’s account with that of Thompson, Lessig does not see his
intended. Since these funders are not representative of the U.S. citizenry dependence account as entirely generalizable.
the dependency on the Funders is illegitimate and a corruption of the
Unlike the causal account of corruption (see section 2.2 above), Lessig’s
democratic process in the U.S..
notion of institutional corruption commits him only to normatively neutral
Lessig states that his notion of dependency corruption cuts across institutional purposes (Lessig 2014; Lessig 2013b: 14) rather than to
Thompson’s notions of individual and institutional corruption (Lessig morally good or otherwise valuable institutional purposes. Accordingly, by
2013a: 14). Regarding the relation to Thompson’s notion of institutional Lessig’s lights, to say of a university that it has as a fundamental purpose
corruption: On the one hand, dependence corruption involves a tendency, to educate (to some objectively acceptable, minimum standard) is merely
as does Thompson’s notion of institutional corruption (see above section to say that this is a de facto fundamental purpose. Therefore, being
2.3.2). On the other hand, on Thompson’s theory, a politician, or set of market-based it could change its order of priorities; i.e., it would be
politicians, can receive campaign contributions from Funders and further perfectly entitled to prioritize profit over educational standards, just as, for
their private interests without being dependent on them. So in this respect instance, a retail store is perfectly entitled to prioritize profit over its
Thompson’s notion of institutional corruption is wider than Lessig’s standards of service to its customers.
notion of dependence corruption. Regarding the relation to Thompson’s
According to Lessig, dependence corruption does not necessarily involve
notion of individual corruption: A politician, or set of politicians, may
corrupt persons. As we have seen, Lessig’s favored example of
come to depend on personal benefits from Funders. This is dependence
dependence corruption is the dependency of the outcome of U.S. elections
corruption but on Thompson’s theory it is presumably individual
on a small group of large funders of those campaigning for political office

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rather than on the American people. Lessig suggests that those who So apparently direct participation in the corruption of the electoral system
engage in dependence corruption could be “good souls” (Lessig 2011: 17). by legislators and (?) Funders is not a sin. Lessig’s claim here might be
Here we need to keep in mind distinctions between being evil and being that the corruptors of the U.S. electoral system are not engaged in sinful
corrupt, and between being corrupt and being morally responsible for acts because they are not morally responsible for this wrongdoing. This
one’s corruption. A corrupt person is not necessarily an evil person. After claim is open to question. The actions of the legislators and Funders (and,
all, as we have seen, a corrupt person might only be corrupt qua for that matter, the lobbyists) that are constitutive of dependence
institutional actor. Thus a corrupt police officer might be a good father and corruption (offering and receiving (directly and indirectly) campaign
husband. Moreover, corruption admits of degrees. So a corrupt police funds) are avoidable and the legislators and Funders are, or ought to be,
officer might be a so-called grass-eater rather than a so-called meat-eater; aware of the institutional damage being done by their combined actions.
their corrupt character might only manifest itself in relatively minor forms Moreover, in suggesting that the legislators have a moral responsibility to
of corruption, e.g., minor bribe-taking, rather than in major forms of change the system, Lessig, in effect, concedes as much. How could they
corruption, e.g., on-selling large quantities of heroin seized from drug have a moral responsibility to change the system if they were not aware of
dealers. it and their role in it?

What of moral responsibility and corruption? Consider Lessig’s own What might be influencing Lessig at this point is the degree of the moral
favored example of dependence corruption. Surely, moral responsibility responsibility, specifically, full and partial responsibility. It is the
for corruption of the U.S. electoral system can be assigned to U.S. combined effect of the many individual actions of a large number of
legislators, in particular, as well as the Funders who finance campaigns in legislators (and Funders and lobbyists) that does the institutional damage.
the expectation (presumably) of favorable legislation if their candidates Therefore, each only makes a small causal contribution and each,
are elected. Lessig distinguishes between therefore, only has a small share in the moral responsibility for the
outcome. Moreover, in relation to changing the system, there is a need for
responsibility for changing individual behavior within the system joint action; it is a joint moral responsibility involving shared partial
and responsibility for changing the system itself. (Lessig 2013a: individual responsibility. Thus legislators could, and know they could,
15) jointly act to enact campaign finance reform to address the problem of
dependency by, for example, restricting campaign contributions.
According to Lessig
Accordingly, the moral responsibility in play is a species of collective
the sin of a Congressman within such a system is not that she responsibility; specifically, joint moral responsibility (Miller 2010:
raises campaign money. It is that she doesn’t work to change the Chapter 4).
corruption that this dependence upon a small set of funders
produced. (Lessig 2013a: 15)

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2.3.4 Ceva & Ferretti: Office Accountability accountability governs the institutional relations between office holders.
As participants in these relations, officeholders are established with the
Ceva & Ferretti understand political corruption widely to include not only authority to require that one another ‘gives an account’ of their actions”
the corruption of politicians but of public officials in general, including (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 25). They provide the example of a physician: “By
police officers, members of the professions, such as doctors and teachers, following this course of action, the physician is also in the position of
and others in the public sector. They define political corruption in terms of justifying her conduct to her colleagues with reference to the terms of her
two individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: “There must power mandate, thus fulfilling office accountability. By her action, the
be a public official who (1) acts in her institutional capacity as an physician is accountable not only to the other doctors…but also to the
officeholder (office condition) (2) for the pursuit of an agenda whose hospital staff” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021:26).
rationale may not be vindicated as coherent with the terms of the mandate
of her power of office (mandate condition)” (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: 19). Ceva & Ferretti also address the question, What is wrong with corruption?
The first condition, namely that political corruption involves a public In doing so they offer a distinctive theory. According to them political
official who acts in her institutional capacity, is familiar (see above). What corruption is inherently wrong (as opposed to wrong by virtue of its
of condition (2), the mandate condition? consequences) because it is “a specific form of interactive injustice
consisting in a violation of the duty of office accountability” (Ceva &
The mandate condition concerns the motive or reason guiding the office Ferretti 2021: 122). Thus, it turns out that political corruption is inherently
holder’s action; the action is performed for the pursuit of an agenda with a wrong because it is unjust. More specifically, political corruption involves
rationale. So the officeholder’s action considered in itself might or might an action by an institutional member which is unjust to his colleagues
not be an exercise of a constitutive institutional right or duty of the office since each member owes it to every other member to do his duty.
in question. But what is this rationale that would render the action corrupt?
The rationale in question is one that “may not be vindicated as coherent A question might arise at this point in relation to the scope of the notion of
with the terms of the mandate of her power of office”. The key notion here an institution that Ceva & Ferretti’s employ in their account of political
is that of coherence with the mandate of the powers of office. Here the corruption (understood as corruption of public institutions). For instance,
powers of office are presumably simply the institutional rights and duties are those who are entitled to vote in a democracy themselves institutional
constitutive of an office, e.g., the right of legislators to vote on legislation, role occupants of the institution of government? Are patients in a public
the duty not to take bribes. So, in summary, corruption involves the hospital themselves role occupants of the hospital or students in a public
performance of an action(s) the motivating reason for which does not school role occupants of the school? Ceva & Ferretti deploy an account of
cohere with the mandate authorizing an office holder’s rights and duties a public institution according to which the answer to these questions is in
qua office holder. each case in the negative. For on their account of the corruption of public
institutions there must be an officeholder possessed of a mandate who
Ceva & Ferretti further argue that the relations between organizational engages in corruption. But citizens, hospital patients and school students
roles generate a deontic dimension. For instance, they say: “Office are not office holders with mandates. Indeed, citizens are the source of the

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mandate as, arguably (supposing there is a mandate), are patients and if 3. Noble Cause Corruption
not students, at least their parents (on the students’ behalf). One untoward
consequence of this view is that evidently citizens, patients and students As we saw earlier, in the paradigm cases corrupt actions are a species of
cannot themselves directly engage in acts of corruption (understood as morally wrong, habitual, actions. What of the motive for corrupt actions?
corruption of public institutions) or, at least, if they can their actions We saw above that there are many motives for corrupt actions, including
would fall outside Ceva & Ferretti’s theory of institutional corruption. desires for wealth, status, and power. However, there is apparently at least
one motive that we might think ought not to be associated with corruption,
At any rate, to return to the question of the wrongness of corruption, we namely, acting for the sake of the good. Here we need to be careful. For
saw above that on Ceva & Ferretti’s view this consists in corruption being sometimes actions that are done for the sake of the good are, nevertheless,
a form of interactive injustice. Accordingly, interactive justice goes hand morally wrong actions. Indeed, some actions that are done out of a desire
in glove with office accountability. On this view a teacher who fails to achieve the good are corrupt actions, namely, acts of so-called noble
students who do not provide her with sexual favors, and gives high marks cause corruption.
to those who do, is performing corrupt actions by virtue of her unjust
treatment of her teaching colleagues. Ceva & Ferretti argue that the This is not the place to provide a detailed treatment of the phenomenon of
normative source (relevant to the inherent wrongness of corrupt actions) of noble cause corruption (Kleinig 2002; Miller 2016: Chapter 3). Rather let
the principle of impartiality in the practice of the assessment by teachers us simply note that even in cases of noble cause corruption—contra what
of their students’ work lies in the role-based relations that the teacher has the person who performs the action thinks—it may well be the case that
with her fellow teachers (and other school staff) (Ceva & Ferretti 2021: the corrupt action morally ought not to be performed; or at least the
98). So this teacher’s action is not corrupt by virtue of the injustice done to corrupt action is pro tanto morally wrong, even if it is morally permissible
the students (although Ceva & Ferretti agree that it would be unfair to the all things considered. Accordingly, the person who performs it may well
students), but rather by virtue of the injustice done to the teacher’s be deceiving him or herself, or be simply mistaken when they judge that
colleagues. Contrary to Ceva & Ferretti it could reasonably be claimed the action morally ought to be performed. So their motive, i.e., to act for
that the primary form of institutional corruption involved here lies in the the sake of what is right, has a moral deficiency. They are only acting for
corruption of the teacher-student relationship (and its harmful the sake of what they believe is morally right, but in fact it is not morally
consequences). More generally, Ceva & Ferretti’s theory of political right; their belief is a false belief. So we can conclude that corrupt actions
corruption evidently privileges relationships between office holders at the are habitual actions that are at the very least pro tanto morally wrong and
expense of those whom they serve. quite possibly morally wrong all things considered, and therefore in all
probability not motivated by the true belief that they are morally right.

Here there are more complex excuses and justifications available for what
might first appear to be an act of noble cause corruption. Perhaps a police
officer did not know that some form of evidence was not admissible. The

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 Corruption Seumas Miller

police officer’s false belief that an action is right (putting forward the judge accepts the bribe and is duly convicted of a criminal offence and
evidence in a court of law) was rationally dependent on some false non- jailed. (Let us also assume that the judge is already so corrupt that he will
moral belief (that the evidence was admissible); and the police officer not be further corrupted by being offered the bribe.) The police officer
came to hold that non-moral belief as a result of a rational process (he was offers the bribe for the purpose of achieving a moral good, i.e., convicting
informed, or at least misinformed, that the evidence was admissible by a a corrupt official. However, we are disinclined to call this a case of
senior officer). This would incline us to say that the putative act of noble corruption. Presumably the reason for this is that in this context the
cause corruption was not really an act of corruption—although it might “bribe” does not have a corrupting effect; in particular, it does not succeed
serve to undermine a morally legitimate institutional process—and in undermining the judicial process of sentencing the crime boss. So this is
therefore not an act of noble cause corruption. This intuition is consistent a case in which a prima facie act of noble cause corruption turns out not
with the causal account of corruption in particular. The police officer in be an act of corruption, and therefore not an act of noble cause corruption.
question did perform an action that undermined a legitimate criminal A less straightforward case is the one where the action does have a
justice process. However, his action was not corrupt because he is not a corrupting effect. Consider two possibilities: (i) The sting is continued for
corruptor. He did not intend to undermine the process, he did not foresee a while (to catch other corrupt judges) and paid for (by bribes) verdicts are
that the process would be undermined, and (let us assume) he could not temporarily enforced during the sting; (ii) The process of considering and
reasonably have been expected to foresee that it would be undermined. accepting the money offered by the disguised police officer further
Nor is his action the expression of a corrupt character. despoils the judge’s character but has no further effect on court
proceedings (because the judge is arrested within minutes). In both cases,
Earlier, it was suggested that acts of noble cause corruption are pro tanto arguably, the officer conducting the sting operations committed an act of
morally wrong and that this is typically contra what the actor believes. corruption.
However, it is conceivable that some acts of noble cause corruption are
morally justified all things considered. Perhaps the act of noble cause What of morally justified acts of noble cause corruption. Suppose
corruption while wrong in itself, nevertheless, was morally justified from someone bribes an immigration official in order to ensure that his friend—
an all things considered standpoint. If so, we might conclude that the who is ineligible to enter Australia—can in fact enter Australia, and
action was not an act of corruption (and therefore not an act of noble cause thereby have access to life-saving hospital treatment. This act of bribery is
corruption). Alternatively, we might conclude that it was an act of evidently an act of institutional corruption; a legitimate institutional
corruption, but one of those few acts of corruption that was justified in the process has been subverted. However, the person acted for the sake of
circumstances. Perhaps both options are possibilities. doing what he believed to be morally right; his action was an instance of
noble cause corruption. Moreover, from an all things considered
Suppose an undercover police officer offers a “bribe” to a corrupt judge standpoint—and in particular, in the light of the strength of the moral
for the purpose, supposedly, of getting the judge to pass a lenient sentence obligations owed to close friends when their lives are at risk—his action
on a known mafia crime boss. The police officer is actually engaged in a may well be morally justified. Accordingly, his act of corruption may well
so-called “sting” operation as part of an anti-corruption strategy. The not have a corrupting effect on himself. Plausibly, this explains any

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 Corruption Seumas Miller

tendency we might have not to describe his action as an action of However, at a more general level there is an apparent need on the part of
corruption. But from the fact that the person was not corrupted it does not philosophers to conceptualize the notion of an anti-corruption system or,
follow that the act did not corrupt. Moreover, it does not even follow that more broadly, an integrity system for institutions (Klitgaard 1988; Pope
some person or other was not corrupted. Clearly, in our example, the 1997; Anechiarico & Jacobs 1998; Klitgaard et al. 2000; Preston &
immigration official was corrupted and, therefore, the action was pro tanto Sampford 2002; Baker 2005; Miller 2017). An integrity system is an
morally wrong, even if the action was morally right all things considered. institutional arrangement the purpose of which is to promote ethical
attitudes and behavior and, crucially, to prevent or, at least, reduce
In this section the following propositions have been advanced: (a) the institutional corruption. For instance, an integrity system for a police
phenomenon of noble cause corruption is a species of corruption, and it is organization might consist of a set of laws and regulations, an internal
seen to be so by the lights of the causal account of corruption in particular; affairs department comprised of corruption investigators, an external
(b) conceivably, some acts of noble cause corruption are morally justified oversight body, professional reporting mechanisms, an enforceable code of
all things considered; (c) instances of structural corruption favored by ethics, a complaints and discipline process, and so on. The contribution of
Lessig and/or Thompson are potentially cases of noble cause corruption, philosophers to integrity systems has been threefold. Firstly, they have
but this is not necessarily the case. offered synoptic or “birds-eye” views of the architecture of such systems
and in so doing determined whether they are fit for normative institutional
4. Integrity Systems purpose. Naturally, this work presupposes theories of the normative
institutional purposes of the institutions in question (Lessig 2011;
Thus far our concern has been with theorizing institutional corruption.
Thompson 1995). Secondly, they have addressed a variety of ethical issues
Indeed, most of the philosophical work undertaken to date has consisted in
that have arisen in the design and implementation of integrity systems and
such theorizing. However, there are some salient exceptions to this. For
their various institutional components. Consider, for instance, the range of
instance, Pogge has suggested undermining the international borrowing
ethical issues that arise in relation to anti-corruption systems for police
privileges of authoritarian governments who have removed democratic
organizations, e.g., entrapment, privacy/surveillance (Miller 2016).
governments (Pogge 2002 [2008]: Chapter 10); Wenar (2016) argues for
Thirdly, they have identified the underlying causal and/or rational basis of
the enforcement of property rights (popular resource sovereignty) in
the corruption and, in light of this, designed appropriate anti-corruption
relation to the resources curse; Lessig (Lessig 2011) has elaborated a raft
measures. (Pogge 2002 [2008]: Chapter 6; Lessig 2011); van den Hoven,
of specific measures to reform the system of campaign contributions in the
Miller, & Pogge 2017). An important set of structural problems facilitating
U.S.; Alexandra and Miller (2010) have outlined ways to utilize
corruption are collective action problems, e.g., regulatory arbitrage in the
reputational devices in some sectors in which reputational loss hurts the
global financial system and tax havens (Obermayer & Obermaier 2016;
“bottom line” (see also Brennan & Pettit 2005 for an account of the
Rothstein & Varraich 2017). One kind of solution proposed is that of an
theoretical underpinnings of such practical reforms).
enforceable cooperative scheme at the international level (Eatwell &
Taylor 2000).

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Integrity systems can be thought of as being either predominantly reactive whether or not the integrity system in question pertains to a single
or predominantly preventive, albeit the distinction is somewhat artificial organization, an industry, an occupational group, or an entire society.
since there is always a need for both reactive elements, e.g., investigations However, the reactive and preventive elements need to cohere in an
of corrupt actions, and preventive elements, e.g., ethics training and overall holistic integrity system (Miller 2017). A further point often
transparency mechanisms. Reactive systems are fundamentally linear. overlooked is that if an integrity system is to be effective it presupposes a
They frame laws and regulation that set out a series of offences, wait for framework of accepted social norms in the sense of socially accepted
transgressions, investigate, adjudicate and take punitive measures. In moral principles. Social norms provide the standards which determine
many areas, including institutional corruption, resources are limited and, what counts as corruption. Moreover, in so doing they determine whether
thus, ethically informed decisions have to be made in relation to the or not such behavior will be tolerated or not. Revealing corruption has
prioritization of corrupt activity to be investigated and to what extent. This very little effect if the wider community to whom the corruption is
ethical problem is to be distinguished from the problem of under- revealed are tolerant or otherwise accepting of it.
resourcing motivated by a desire to hamstring anti-corruption initiatives.
Moreover, both problems are to be distinguished from the debate between 5. Conclusion
those who favor increased laws and regulations to combat, for instance,
financial corruption, and those who argue for a decrease in such laws and Corruption is a highly diverse phenomenon, including bribery, nepotism,
regulations since they unnecessarily increase the cost of doing business. false testimony, cheating, abuse of authority and so on. Moreover,
corruption takes different forms across the spectrum of institutions giving
Preventive institutional mechanisms for combating corruption can be rise to political corruption, financial corruption, police corruption,
divided into four categories. Mechanisms designed to reduce the academic corruption and so on. The causal theory of corruption is a
motivation to engage in corruption, e.g., ethics education programs; sustained attempt to provide an account which accommodates this
mechanisms to reduce the capacity of those motivated to engage in diversity. In doing so it emphasizes the causal as well as the normative
corruption, e.g., legislation to downsize oligopolies to prevent cartels dimension of institutional corruption. The most influential contemporary
(Rose-Ackerman 1999), exploitation of the lack of trust between philosophical theories of political corruption are those of Dennis
corruptors (Lambsdorff 2007), democratization and the separation of Thompson and Lawrence Lessig. Moreover, Lessig’s notion of
powers (“power corrupts” (Acton 1887 [1948: 364]) to reign in powerful, dependence corruptions looks to be generalizable to a degree to
corrupt governments (Johnston 2014); mechanisms to eliminate or reduce institutions other than political institutions. Likewise the mechanism that
the opportunity to engage in corruption, e.g., conflict of interest lies at the heart of Thompson’s theory may be generalizable to a degree to
provisions; mechanisms to expose corrupt behavior, e.g., oversight bodies, institutions other than political institutions. However, as they stand,
media organizations (Pope 1997; Spence et al. 2011). neither of these theories provides a general or comprehensive theory of
institutional corruption (and Lessig’s theory, at least, is not intended to do
It is self-evident that there is need for both reactive and preventive
so). The wide diversity of corrupt actions implies that there may well need
elements if an integrity system is to be adequate. This point obtains
to be a correspondingly wide and diverse range of specific anti-corruption

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 Corruption Seumas Miller

measures to combat corruption in its different forms, and indeed in its Doubleday.
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 Corruption Seumas Miller

to its database. 5. Regarding the definition, note that agent B could in fact be agent A.
Regarding clause (1), note that agent A is not necessarily morally
Other Internet Resources responsible for the effect E1 or E2 that his or her action x produces.

Convention Against the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Copyright © 2023 by the author
International Business Transactions, Organization for Economic Co- Seumas Miller
operation and Development, 15 February 1999.

Related Entries
ethics: virtue | integrity | moral dilemmas

Notes to Corruption
1. Machiavelli has received considerable attention among philosophers in
relation to his arguments, notably in The Prince, regarding so-called
“Dirty Hands”, i.e., rulers, in particular, doing wrong to achieve good. See
the entry on the problem of dirty hands.

2. For one of the most influential statements of the abuse of public office
for private gain definitions see Nye 1967: 417–27.

3. See the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Public Law 95–213
(5305), December 19, 1977, United States Code 78a, Section 103. See also
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Convention Against the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions of 15 February 1999. See the Other
Internet Resources.

4. There might be exceptions, such as higher mammals or Martians. If so,

this would be irrelevant to my concerns here.

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2023 Edition 55