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Shakespeare in Hate

Hate, malice, rage, and enmity: what would Shakespeare’s plays be with-
out these demonic, unruly passions? Shakespeare in Hate studies how the
tirades and unrestrained villainy of Shakespeare’s art explode the decorum
and safety of our sanitized lives and challenge the limits of our selfhood.
Everyone knows Shakespeare to be the exemplary poet of love, but how
many celebrate his clarifying expressions of hatred? How many of us do not
at some time feel that we have come away from his plays transformed by
hate and washed clean by savage indignation? Saval fills the great gap in the
interpretation of Shakespeare’s unsocial feelings. The book asserts that emo-
tions, as ­Aristotle claims in the Rhetoric, are connected to judgments. Under
such a view, hatred and rage in Shakespeare cease to be a “blinding” of
judgment or a loss of reason, but become claims upon the world that can be
evaluated and interpreted. The literary criticism of anger and hate provides
an alternative vision of the experience of Shakespeare’s theater as an intensi-
fication of human experience that takes us far beyond criticism’s traditional
contexts of character, culture, and ethics. The volume, which is alive to the
judgmental character of emotions, transforms the way we see the rancorous
passions and the disorderly and disobedient demands of anger and hatred.
Above all, it reminds us why Shakespeare is the exemplary creator of that
rare yet pleasurable thing: a good hater.

Peter Kishore Saval is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at

Brown University, USA. In addition to Shakespeare in Hate, he is the author
of Reading Shakespeare through Philosophy, also published by Routledge.
Routledge Studies in Shakespeare

1 Shakespeare and Philosophy 9 Reading Shakespeare through

Stanley Stewart Philosophy
Peter Kishore Saval
2 Re-playing Shakespeare in Asia
Edited by Poonam Trivedi and 10 Embodied Cognition and
Minami Ryuta Shakespeare’s Theatre
The Early Modern
3 Crossing Gender in Shakespeare Body-Mind
Feminist Psychoanalysis and the Edited by Laurie Johnson,
Difference Within John Sutton, and
James W. Stone Evelyn Tribble

4 Shakespeare, Trauma and 11 Mary Wroth and Shakespeare

Contemporary Performance Edited by Paul Salzman and
Catherine Silverstone Marion Wynne-Davies

5 Shakespeare, the Bible, and the 12 Disability, Health, and

Form of the Book Happiness in the
Contested Scriptures Shakespearean Body
Travis DeCook and Alan Galey Edited by Sujata Iyengar

6 Radical Shakespeare 13 Skepticism and Belonging in

Politics and Stagecraft in the Shakespeare’s Comedy
Early Career Derek Gottlieb
Christopher Fitter
14 Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet,
7 Retheorizing Shakespeare and Civic Life
through Presentist Readings The Boundaries of
James O’Rourke Civic Space
Edited by Silvia Bigliazzi and
8 Memory in Shakespeare’s Lisanna Calvi
Histories
Stages of Forgetting in Early 15 Shakespeare in Hate
Modern England Emotions, Passions, Selfhood
Jonathan Baldo Peter Kishore Saval
Shakespeare in Hate
Emotions, Passions, Selfhood

Peter Kishore Saval

First published 2016
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2016 Taylor & Francis

The right of Peter Kishore Saval to be identified as author of this work

has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or

utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or

registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Saval, Peter Kishore.

Shakespeare in hate: emotions, passions, selfhood / Peter Kishore Saval.
pages cm. — (Routledge studies in Shakespeare; 15)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Shakespeare, William, 1564–1616—Criticism and interpretation.
2. Hate in literature. 3. Anger in literature. 4. Self knowledge in
literature. I. Title.
PR3069.H38S28 2014
822.3'3—dc23 2015023536

ISBN: 978-1-138-85087-3 (hbk)

ISBN: 978-1-315-72450-8 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by codeMantra
Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Rage in the World 18

3 The Arrival of Enigma 52

4 Hating without Hope 78

5 Expose Thyself 100

Epilogue: Not to Trust 135

Bibliography 149
Index 167
This page intentionally left blank
1 Introduction

Shakespeare is the greatest of all dramatists of anger and hate. Everyone

speaks of Shakespeare as the exemplary poet of love, but as a young man,
I was transfixed by his hatreds. My life had not prepared me for the new
feelings I found in Shakespeare’s rancorous and disobedient tirades: Timon
inviting his flatterers to feast on empty bowls of water as he assails them
with stones; Coriolanus telling the people of Rome that he hates them as
he banishes them: these demonic, unruly passions challenged the antiseptic
safety of my world.1 As I moved on to other plays, the spite, the rage, the
enmity again intensified me. The willingness of these characters to expose
their most undecorous feelings was addictive and uncomfortable at once,
because I knew that I had these feelings in myself, but my white-collar
education valued equanimity and coolness, and made passion seem stu-
pid or immoral. “No one is born hating,” said so many sanctimonious
teachers. “People have to learn to hate.” But in Shakespeare learning to
hate seemed like one of the conditions of a fully lived life. Later, when
I discovered the poetry of Dante, the tragedies of Aeschylus, or the charac-
ters of ­Dostoevsky, I realized that to appreciate their greatness was to be
implicated in hatred.
I found that discussions of Shakespeare by teachers and critics had little
to do with my experience of his dark, unsocial passions. Hate rarely got
its due. Anger, of course, had the more respected pedigree: I was taught
about the rage of Achilles, and the savage indignation of Juvenal; I read in
Blake that the tigers of wrath are wiser than the horses of instruction. Si
natura negat, I learned, facit indignatio versum: if nature denies, indignation
will make verse. But hate rarely ever occasioned the response of wonder or
pleasure. “Anger occasionally gets a better press,” says the classical scholar
David Konstan, “but hatred is almost universally condemned.”2 Jack Levin
has a theory why:

Until recently, the term ‘hate’ referred to any intense dislike or hos-
tility, whatever its object … Beginning in mid-1980s, the term “hate”
became used in a much more restricted sense to characterize an indi-
vidual’s negative beliefs and feelings about members of some other
group of people because of their race, religious identity, ethnic origin,
gender, sexual orientation, age, or disability status.3
2 Introduction
The meaning of “hatred” has been transformed in our minds to be synon-
ymous with prejudice.4 So much of the study of early modern literature
has focused on hate from this perspective. Anyone daring to suggest that
hate can be thrilling and clarifying risks being called a reactionary. Yet
wasn’t there something to Flaubert’s remark that “hatred of the bourgeois
is the beginning of wisdom”?5 Isn’t there more than “prejudice” in Satan’s
celebration of “immortal hate / And courage never to submit or yield”
(1. 107–8)? Hatred in these cases has the power to lift us out of servility
and ennoble us.6
Such lines show us that there is an aesthetic pleasure in hating, and
that part of the appeal of the greatest works of art is that they revitalize
our capacity to hate. In 1939, the critic D.W. Harding insisted, in an essay
entitled “Regulated Hatred,” that the pleasure we should take in Jane
Austen is inseparable from the pleasure of hating. The readers who would
be most likely to appreciate the art and power of her work are “those
who would turn to her not for relief and escape but as a formidable ally
against things and people which were to her, and still are, hateful.”7 He
reminds us of a passage in Emma whose actual force so many readers are
likely to miss:

Miss Bates stood in the very worst predicament in the world for hav-
ing so much of the public favor; and she had no intellectual superiority
to make atonement to herself or to compel an outward respect from
those who might despise her.8

Except, says, Harding, that’s not what Jane Austen says. The passage above
ends like this:

… she had no intellectual superiority to make atonement for herself,

or to frighten those who might hate her into outward respect.9

Frighten; hate: “This eruption of fear and hatred into the relationships of
everyday social life is something that the urbane admirer of Jane Austen
finds distasteful; it is not the satire of one who writes securely for the enter-
tainment of her civilized acquaintances.”10 Yet unsocial passions like fear
and hatred are everywhere in Austen. According to Harding, Jane Austen’s
work does not just represent hatred as a quality that various characters
feel: her work is meant to educate us in ways of hating, to teach just which
people we are to hate, how to hate them, or how to see characters as plea-
surable and detestable simultaneously. The element of hate in the work, says
Harding, is not to be misread as satire: it is rather fundamental to her art
that hate is taken seriously as a judgment.11
To assess the value of Harding’s claims, and their validity for the art of
Jane Austen, is, of course, outside the scope of my book. I mention the essay
not in order to read Austen’s work, but to point to a possibility in literary
 Introduction 3
criticism that may have escaped us: that part of the pleasure of great works
of art is the pleasure of hating, and the delight and instruction of learning
to hate well. The greatest Shakespeare critic, William Hazlitt, pointed to
similar possibilities in his essay, On the Pleasure of Hating:

Nature seems … made up of antipathies: without something to hate,

we should lose the very spring of thought and action. Life would turn
into a stagnant pool, were it not ruffled by the jarring interest of the
unruly passions of men. The white streak in our own fortunes is bright-
ened. Pure good soon grows insipid, wants variety and spirit. Pain
is a bittersweet, which never surfeits. Love turns, with a little indul-
gence, to indifference or disgust; hatred alone is immortal. Animals
torment one another without mercy: children kill flies for sport …
Even when the spirit of the age (that is, the progress of intellectual
refinement) no longer allows us to carry our vindictive and head-
strong humors into effect, we try to revive them in description, and
keep the old bugbears, the phantoms of our terror and our hate, in
the imagination.12

Though Hazlitt is one of my favorite writers, here he is carried away, even

false. The tone is cynical, even a little posturing. But still, there is style,
verve. This celebration of hate as a joyful rapture is delicious and breezy.
It reminds me of E.R. Dodds on menos, the ancient “anger” that enlivens
the soul:

When a man feels menos in his chest, or “thrusting pungently into his
nostrils,” he is conscious of a mysterious access of energy; the life in
him is strong, and he is filled with a new confidence and eagerness. The
connection of menos with the sphere of volition comes out clearly in
the related words menoinan, “to be eager,” and dusmenes, “wishing
ill” … In man it is the vital energy, the “spunk,” which is not always
there at call, but comes and goes mysteriously and (as we should say)
capriciously. But to Homer it is not a caprice: it is the act of a god,
who “increases or diminishes at will a man’s arete (that is to say, his
potency as a fighter).”13

The passage provides a window into the vehement passions as a claim about
the world and a mysterious access of energy; at its most sublime, anger is
not a failure of deliberation but a supernatural power. The unruly and fight-
ing emotions are not just pathologies to be stigmatized, but forms of life to
be celebrated.
The greatest art often brings us close to those forms of life. About William
Butler Yeats, Joseph Hassett rightly pointed out, “Hate is Yeats’s passion of
preference – so much so that when he dreamed of his goals as a poet, he
‘dreamed of enlarging Irish hate.’ … Yeats’s letters and essays bristle with a
4 Introduction
hatred that is never far beneath the taut surface of his poetry.”14 In one of
his great verses hate is not even beneath the surface:

Why should I seek for love or study it?

It is of God and passes human wit;
I study hatred with great diligence,
For that’s a passion in my own control,
A sort of besom that can clear the soul
Of everything that is not mind or sense.

Yeats felt that hate connected him to a tradition of writers like Jonathan
Swift. Hassett identifies this tradition of hate with the very form of Dio-
nysian frenzy: “The use of hate as a wellspring of creative activity did not
begin with Yeats. It is at least as old as the process by which the angry frenzy
of Dionysac ritual gave birth to the Greek practice of ecstatic prophecy and
the related notion of the divine madness of the inspired poet. Yeats force-
fully asserted his place in this tradition when, in ‘Blood and the Moon,’
he declared himself an heir of ‘Swift beating on his breast in sybilline
frenzy blind.’”15
Like Yeats, Robert Browning famously identified not only his own verses
but the very spirit of poetry with the power of hating, as in his encomium
that Dante is the greatest poet-lover because he is the greatest hater:

Dante once prepared to paint an angel:

Whom to please? You whisper ‘Beatrice.’
While he mused and traced it and retraced it,
(Peradventure with a pen corroded
Still by drops of that hot ink he dipped for,
When, his left hand I’the hair o’ the wicked,
Back he held the brow and pricked its stigma,
Bit into the live man’s flesh for parchment,
Loosed him, laughed to see the writing rankle,
Let the wretch go festering through Florence) –
Dante, who loved well because he hated,
Hated wickedness that hinders loving,
Dante standing, studying his angel, –
In there broke the folk of his Inferno.
Says he – ‘Certain people of importance’
(Such he gave his daily, dreadful line to)
Entered and would seize, forsooth, the poet,
Says the poet – “Then I stopped my painting.” (32–49)16

The poet hearkens back to Dante as the great precursor, not only of the
spirit of love, but of poetry, and insists that this poet “loved well because
he hated,” in order to identify the poet’s creativity with that spirit. Daniel
 Introduction 5
Karlin says: “Here, at the heart of Browning’s tenderest and personally most
expressive lyric, is a figure of astonishing violence and cruelty, a figure of
hatred, blistering, savage, demonic. … What … is the figure of hatred doing
here? And what larger questions does it raise about Browning’s creativ-
ity?”17 Asking that question, Karlin goes on to identify hatred not only with
the impulses to creativity in Browning but to the very pleasure we take in
his poetry.

Gr-r-r—there go, my heart’s abhorrence!

Water your damned flower-pots, do!
If hate killed men, Brother Lawrence,
God’s blood, would not mine kill you! (1–4)18

Despite the fact that Brother Lawrence’s activities seem comically incon-
gruous with the speaker’s rage, all the thrill and power of this poetry comes
from the enlivening power of the speaker’s hate. Yeats and Browning place
themselves in a literary tradition that links the pleasure of art with hate, and
finds its creative impulses in the capacity for hatred and rage. The feelings of
literary power can connect us to fighting emotions.
The fighting emotions; the darker and more demonic drives: did not so
great a thinker as Freud teach us that we could not evade them? Yes, but
what Freud gives me in his account is powerful and limiting at once. His
most comprehensive study is in “Instincts and their Vicissitudes.” There he
insists that hate is an instinct older and more fundamental to the establish-
ment of the ego than love:

The relation of hate to objects is older than that of love. It is derived

from the primal repudiation by the narcissistic ego of the external
world whence flows the stream of stimuli. As an expression of the
pain-reaction induced by objects, it remains in constant intimate
relation with the instincts of self-preservation, so that sexual and
ego-instinct readily develop an antithesis which repeat that of love
and hate.19

So hate is older than love. It comes about from the separation of the ego
from the outside world. Before that separation, Freud tells us, we are indif-
ferent, closed, solipsistic beings who do not experience the external world
as external. That state is called the “original reality-ego.” Eventually the
“pleasure principle” begins to assert itself, and we experience an “outside”
that the ego identifies with “unpleasure.” The ego wishes to incorporate that
which gives pleasure and expel that which gives unpleasure: to suck at plea-
sure and to spit out what disgusts us.
The problem is that not everything unpleasurable can be expelled, and
not everything pleasurable can be incorporated. There is an actual world
over which the ego has no power and an actual body that it cannot wish
6 Introduction
away. The ego is no longer satisfied with dividing objects into those that
exist inside and out, but begins to discriminate among those things that
are outside: some external things are more pleasurable than others. This
moment of the ego is what Freud calls the move from “judgments of exis-
tence” to “judgments of attribution.”20 Without judgments of attribution,
what is external to the ego would offer no pleasure. Without the capacity
for pleasure in the external world, there would be no possibility of desire,
or love. Behind every experience of desire for someone or something outside
of ourselves is the original experience of hating. Hate, as the philosophers
like to say, is the “condition of possibility” of loving, of desire, or even of
pleasure in external things. Underlying every desire for what is outside us is
that original spitting that establishes in the first place our separation from
what we desire.
I said that Freud’s account is both powerful and limiting. Powerful
because it argues that the primordial source of our hatred comes from our
original condition of dependency. Freud reminds us that the darkest and
most unsocial feelings may have a source in a prehistoric need, and our
refusal to confront the fact that our self-sufficiency is an illusion. In my
chapter on King Lear I explore the reality that such a refusal can be a source
of our most vehement and aggressive passions. At the same time, Freud is
limiting. By giving hatred a clinical, latent cause, a Freudian explanation
deprives individual hateful feelings of their capacity to leave the psyche and
become specific judgments about our world.
I find the same simultaneous power and difficulty of a Freudian reading
of emotion in Janet Adelman’s excellent essay on Coriolanus, of which I
will quote a little here.21 Adelman makes much of the following lines by
Volumnia about her son after he is wounded:

The breasts of Hecuba

When she did suckle Hector look’d not lovelier
Than Hector’s forehead when it spit forth blood
At Grecian sword contemning. (1. 3. 40–3)

Adelman reads the lines above very much in line with Freud’s account
of self-sufficiency and hate as a kind of original denial of dependency. In
the lines above, the sucking from a breast and the spitting of a wound are
brought together. Both loving and hating then become impossible to distin-
guish. Says Adelman:

The metaphoric process suggests the psychological fact that is, I

think, at the center of the play: the taking in of food is the primary
acknowledgment of one’s dependence upon the world, and as such
it is the primary token of one’s vulnerability. But at the same time
as Volumnia’s image suggests the vulnerability inherent in feeding,
it also suggests a way to fend off that vulnerability. In her image,
 Introduction 7
feeding, incorporating, is transformed into spitting out. … expelling:
the wound once again becomes the mouth that “spits forth blood / At
Grecian sword contemning.”22

Wounds are compared to breasts; sucking to spitting. Dependency and

self-assertion, pleasure and unpleasure, loving and hating, are mixed. The
Freudian reading, then, leads where you might expect: Coriolanus is caught
between a relationship of dependency and a striving for self-sufficiency that
creates an ambivalence of love and hate in his relationship both toward
Rome and to enemies like Aufidius. The play transforms Coriolanus’s love
to hate, and his friendship to enmity, when he turns to fight on behalf of
Aufidius, the general who was previously the man of his “soul’s hate,” and
when he makes Rome, which he previously claimed to love, his enemy. But
this transformation, as the reading suggests, is not a contingent accident
but the outer expression of inward drives. By talking about dependency,
Adelman identifies a feature I consider central to Shakespeare’s art. My
study of Lear is about how self-knowledge in that play cannot arrive until
characters confront a dependency that can never be managed or adjudicated.
The reading above, too, shows how an original dependency can become a
primary fact about his relationship to Rome that Coriolanus refuses to con-
front. On the other hand, by transforming an emotion from a claim that
is patent into the sign of something latent, Adelman can avoid becoming
implicated in Coriolanus’s anger. She can treat Coriolanus’s rage as a sign of
his own evasion and insufficiency, and therefore evade it herself. Seeing the
patent judgment in emotions evades what is latent, and seeing emotions as
signs of something latent evades what is patent.
But whether we see them as patent evaluations of our lives with others, or
signs of a latent cause, I am not writing the book simply to celebrate anger
and hatred.23 Hate can also be destructive prejudice or petty malice; anger
can be trivial or damaging. There is nothing inherently noble or grand in
any emotion. The name of an emotion, like “anger,” implies no necessary set
of values. The value of an emotion is in the judgment it renders about the
world, the claim it makes upon our experience.24
To say that emotions evaluate our experience is to say that they
are judgments.25 We find the canonical expression of such a view in
Aristotle’s Rhetoric:

Let the emotions (pathe) be all those things on account of which peo-
ple change their minds and differ in regard to their judgments, and
upon which attend pain and pleasure: for example, anger, pity fear,
and all other things and their opposites. (2. 1. 1378a20–3)26

Emotions are those things about which people differ with respect to their
judgments. They are attended by pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are
sensations. In emotions, sensation and judgment are yoked. That vision of
8 Introduction
judgment as central to emotional experience remains a challenge to our
assumptions. Emotions can be judgments in Stoic philosophy, too, but they
are almost invariably bad judgments. As Robert Solomon points out, ­“Seneca
the Stoic argued a more elaborate general thesis, about the nature of emotions,
following the forerunner Chryssipus. On the Stoic analysis, too, emotions are
judgments, ways of perceiving and understanding the world. Unlike ­Aristotle,
however, Seneca saw these emotional judgments as essentially ­irrational –
misinformed or in any case mistaken attitudes, distorted by desire, which
philosophical reason, properly applied, would correct.”27
Still, the matter is obscure. The passage from Aristotle would have meant
nothing to me had I not read two books: one by Daniel Gross and another
by David Konstan. Daniel Gross’s book The Secret History of Emotions
takes Descartes’ account of the emotions as a shorthand for the kind of per-
spective that Aristotle helps us to challenge. Descartes’ study The Passions
of the Soul begins by insisting that ancient perspectives on the passions have
misled thinkers by turning them away from the body and toward the world:

There is nothing in which the defective nature of the sciences which

we have received from the ancients appears more clearly than in what
they have written on the passions; for although this is a matter which
has at all times been the object of much investigation, and though it
would not appear to be one of the most difficult, inasmuch as since
everyone has an experience of the passions within himself, there is no
necessity to borrow observations from elsewhere in order to discover
their nature.28

The truth of the passions lies in the science of the body: there is no neces-
sity for appealing elsewhere. Gross says: “With this preliminary remark,
Descartes renders human nature in its quintessential modern form: it is
something housed in a body and subject to the self-evidence of a descriptive
science.”29 The assumption leads Descartes to his principle: “The ultimate
and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is none other than
the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland which is in the
middle of the brain” – namely, the pineal gland.30 The passions are external
signs of a cause that is internal to the body, and whose elaboration depends
upon the language of science.
By contrast, take both Aristotelian account above and Aristotle’s specific
definition of anger:

Anger is a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on

account of a perceived slight on the part of people not fit to slight
one or one’s own.
(Rhetoric 2. 2. 1287 a 21–3)

How is Aristotle different?

 Introduction 9
First, anger in Aristotle is public rather than private. Daniel Gross says,
“Anger presumes a public stage rather than private feelings. Alone on a des-
ert island, [a] king would not be subject to anger, because he would lack any
social standing that might be concretely challenged.”31 John Elster says that
the social world implied by Aristotle’s conception of emotions is “intensely
confrontational, intensely competitive, and intensely public; in fact much of
it involves confrontations before a public. It is a world in which everybody
knows that they are constantly judged, nobody hides that they are acting like
judges, and nobody hides that they seek to be judged positively. It is a world
with very little hypocrisy or ‘emotional tact.’”32 David Konstan’s book, The
Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, is a study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. Konstan
writes, like Elster, that Aristotle’s world changes when the competitive atmo-
sphere ­Aristotle presupposes becomes more suspicious and disguised; where
“people tend to assume a demeanor comfortable to the ruler,” and there is
a “new premium placed on identifying an inner emotional state from the
close examination of outer signs.”33 In a world of court foppishness, or
white-collar niceness, where flattery replaces frankness, emotions become
inner disturbances to be “managed” rather than judgments to be countered
with competing judgments.34
That is another difference: emotions for Aristotle are social rather than
psychological. Gross says, “Aristotle’s anger does not presume our familiar
psychological individual whose feelings are expressed in a fit. And despite its
cognitive movement … anger is not the expression of an opinion, as Stoics
and contemporary philosophers would argue. Rather, its presumptions are
thoroughly psychosocial. … [A man] is angry because his entitlement is con-
cretely threatened, and without that extra-cognitive entitlement manifest in
the world around him … [he] would have no angry thoughts at all.”35 When
we speak of anger in Aristotle’s sense, we leave the solitude of the body and
enter social reality. Aristotle’s account presents a world where the response
to an emotion is not a clinical description but a competing judgment. This
is not because Aristotle doubts that emotions have a physical basis (cf. De
Anima 403a16-b12, esp. 403a25). In fact, he Aristotle says elsewhere
that emotions are “reasonings set in matter [ta pathe logoi enuloi eisin].”
[De Anima 1.1. 403a16-b2]. Nevertheless, as David Konstan points out, he
does not reduce emotions to such bodily states but rather emphasizes what
can be gained by considering their non-material dimension.
This approach to emotions, as I suggested, is both insightful and limited.
To see emotions as “social” rather than “psychological” allows us to con-
front the open, patent claims of an emotion. As a result it allows us to see
them as moral evaluations rather than as psychological disorders. On the
other hand, as I have said before, not every emotional judgment is patent.
We do not always really feel what we claim or appear to feel. Our emotional
judgments are not just the ones we openly avow, like our public anger, but
the ones that we hide, like our fear of humiliation, or our refusal to confront
certain kinds of incapacity. The fact that some emotional judgments are
10 Introduction
latent is connected to another limitation of the approach I describe above:
Aristotle’s connection between judgment on the one hand, and rhetoric and
persuasion on the other. Aristotle connects emotions to judgments in the
Rhetoric, and he defines rhetoric as the discipline of finding, in each case,
the available means of persuasion. But the emotional power of some of
Shakespeare’s greatest plays, like King Lear, comes from the disjunction
between emotion and persuasion. Cordelia’s love for her father has nothing
to do with persuasion, because it is based upon a dependency that precedes
our entry into the world of rhetoric and persuasion. Seeing emotions as
patent judgments can be reductive, but also insightful, so long as we do not
tether ourselves too strictly to Aristotle’s frames and categories.
So we have encountered Aristotle on anger, and emotions as judgments.
What about Aristotle on hate?

Concerning enmity [ekthra] and hatred [to misein] one can under-
stand them on the basis of their opposites. Anger, spite, and slander
are productive of enmity. Anger, however, derives from what happens
to ­oneself, whereas enmity also arises without [the offense] being
directed to oneself. For if we believe that someone is a certain kind
of person, we hate him. Also, anger is always about however, derives
from what happens to oneself, whereas enmity also arises without [the
offense] being directed at oneself. For if we believe that someone is
a certain kind of person, we hate him. Also, anger is always about
individuals, for example Callias or Socrates, whereas hatred [misos]
I also felt towards types: for everyone hates a thief and an informer.
Moreover one is healed by time, while the other is incurable. Also,
the one is a desire to inflict harm: for a person who is angry wishes
to perceive [his revenge] but to the one who hates this is a matter of
indifference … Besides this, the one is accompanied by pain, while the
other occurs unaccompanied by pain: for someone who is angry feels
pain, but someone who hates does not. Also, the one might feel pity
if enough [misfortunes misfall the other], but the other in no case: for
the one wishes that the person with whom he is angry should suffer in
return, but the other wishes that he should cease to exist.
(Rhetoric 2.4. 1382 a 1–14)

So much in this passage is wearisome and complicated. Everything is obscured

in bewildering subtleties and over-fine distinctions: the Aristotelian disease.
Why differentiate between “pain” and “harm”? Why must anger be directed
only at individuals, while hatred can be directed at groups? Why is hatred
“not accompanied by pain,” a fact that, Konstan points out, would seem to
“exclude hatred from the category of the emotions”? There are also the dis-
tinctions for the philologists: Greek language distinguishes between ekthros
as personal hatred, and polemios as the hatred for a military enemy.36 But
 Introduction 11
what is that to me? My interest is elsewhere than Greek philology. Every-
thing becomes hair-splitting. The resonance of the emotions is lost. I begin to
grasp the Renaissance distaste for those scholastics who cared more about
Aristotle than the world. I abhor the pedantry that would bind itself in a
servile way to Aristotle’s concepts. But the lines still give me an insight. The
passage, says David Konstan, “is a salutary reminder that there may be peo-
ple deserving of our antagonism.”37 One sees a related point, says Konstan,
in Euripides’ Electra, where Clytemnestra remarks that “when people under-
stand a matter, then it is right to hate it, it is just to feel disgust [stugein] at
it.” [1015–17]. The idea that anger or hatred is a judgment, Konstan shows
us, means that it is possible to hate well as well as poorly; that there is good
anger as well as bad. But what if there exists no independent metric that
will establish those values? The grand emotions on the Shakespearean stage
become a challenge to our own limited emotional range.
In studying the unsocial passions, we use words like “anger” and “hate.”
But these words are only provisional terms for a wide variety of possi-
ble judgments and feelings.38 As spectators designating the name of an
emotion, we do not mean that single state underlies a plurality of experi-
ences that we might name, say, “anger.” A variety of names in Greek alone
designates what we might characterize as anger or a feeling that attends
anger: orge, menis, cholos, thumos, nemesis, achos, menos, chalepainein,
­ochthein, choesthai, and others. And that list tells us nothing of our own
synonyms for the same word.39 Consider, also that we and even other
Greek thinkers might call “anger” what Aristotle does not. Aristotle’s
anger is an emotion provoked by a personal “slight.” What then, about the
emotions we feel are provoked at the feeling of a public injustice? Other
Greek rhetoricians, but not Aristotle, have included such a notion in their
­conception of the word. Moreover, in talking about the Iliad, we might
use, with dangerous vagueness, the same word “rage” to describe Achilles’
anger (orge) at being slighted by Agamemnon, and the hero’s outraged
grief (lupe) at Patroclus’ murder.40
A great work of art reveals that words like “anger” or “hate” lead us
to emotions too subtle and various to be encompassed by these names. I
believe, however, that the best way to confront such emotional subtlety is
not through a fastidiousness about the terms we will use, but the sensitiv-
ity with which we interpret the emotional judgments in the work that we
read.41 Philosophers often explain how emotions are judgments by provid-
ing simple examples: a woman crossing the street is pushed from behind
and does not know why, or by whom. If she turns around and discovers
that she was pushed by someone trying to get her out of the way of a mov-
ing car, she will not feel the emotion we designate as “anger.” If she turns
around and discovers she was pushed by someone who wished to injure her,
she will. That is what it means to speak of the emotion of anger here not as
a mere bodily sensation, but a judgment about intentions of another, and
12 Introduction
a claim about a relationship.42 But instructional anecdotes are by necessity
bloodless and anemic. No one would watch a play about a woman cross-
ing the street. The potency of rage in art and life is more fluid and alive
than in these anecdotes. The serpent of “anger” in Shakespeare uncoils with
greater demonic energy because its universe is more complex. We discover
the fullness of a play’s emotional life in its richness of human delineation:
we specify the emotion by specifying the world that it judges. We go from
the simplicity of a name to the complexity of an emotion by providing a
context. But that context comes from the passion and the claims that it
makes upon us.
At the same time, in a work of art, seeing an emotion as a judgment
requires more than giving it a context. Being implicated in a judgment
requires that we see, not just how we arrive at an emotion, but rather what
is of value in that emotion. Charles Altieri says: “Suppose that, rather than
judging how Othello goes wrong, we ask what might be of value in the
experiences he has by virtue of going wrong.”43 That sentence means: what
happens if we confront the value of feeling Othello’s jealousy and anguish
before we explain how he has arrived at the feeling? The explanation of
how the feeling arrived, says Altieri, has the danger of presenting “the
sense of pathos seen from the outside.” By contrast, “Othello’s awareness
of the tragedy he is enacting gives him access to ecstatic states completely
lost in a moral or strictly action-oriented account of his situation.”44 In
Shakespeare’s theater we often access emotions as judgments before we see
them as signs of particular motives or causes. Most criticism explains how
­Othello’s jealousy is rooted in his sexual anxiety, his relationship to the com-
mercial politics of Venice, his encounter with Iago, or his sense of internal
division between his status as foreigner and Venetian. “Yet the play,” says
Altieri, “is not at all content with stressing what Othello leans about r­ eality
as a set of limits or what the audiences can learn through him, but all this is
a means to an end that takes us far beyond concerns for k ­ nowledge.”45 Oth-
ello when he feels jealousy has access to “ecstatic states” that are preferable
to the sanitized, antiseptic safety of our professional lives. If they were not
preferable, we would not go to the theater to experience them: or do we go
to the theater only to receive explanations about the causes of Othello’s jeal-
ousy? No: we experience Othello’s emotions in a way that takes us beyond
our desires for self-protection, and when we are taken beyond a desire for
safety, we do not care only that the emotion of ­jealousy is “self-destructive”
and we do not experience it as a form of blindness or an impediment to
knowledge of the world: we experience it as an ­intensification of the world.
When we see Shakespeare’s passions as an intensification of our world,
rather than a problem to be solved, we may look differently upon one of the
most frequently described “problems” in the plays: the enigma of an apparently
causeless passion. Critics have described the enigma as Hamlet’s lack of an
“objective correlative” for his anger, the “motiveless malignity” of Iago’s hatred,
and so on.46 As I have said, our perspective sees an emotion as an evaluative
 Introduction 13
judgment and an intensification of experience. When we refuse to evade
seeing emotions as judgments in their own right, we don’t allow ourselves
the refuge of dispassionately seeing them as “problems” requiring a solu-
tion, or replace our feeling of being taken out of ourselves by another’s
anger and hatred with the safety of searching for a “ground” for that anger
and hatred. What adjectives like “problem,” “groundless,” “excessive,” or
“unmotivated” give away in our description of Shakespearean emotion is
our inability to experience how distant the emotions in our ordinary lives
are from those in Shakespeare’s plays.
Richard Nettleship, a nineteenth-century philosopher, has an observation
about Antony and Cleopatra that helps me clarify the point:

If you take Antony and Cleopatra, for instance, I should have thought
you could safely say to anyone, “By all means go and live like Antony
if you feel disposed to do so by reading Shakespeare; only remember
that you must be ready to die like him; otherwise it is not Shakespeare’s
Antony that you are imitating.” And I should be inclined to point the
moral, not by saying, “You see what lust can bring a great man to,”
but, “You see what you must be prepared to face if you are going to
make lust a grand thing, a thing to throw away an empire for.”
What I feel very strongly is that most people, when they take what
they call the artistic point of view, really do no such thing. They have
no conception, as a rule, of the distance of their ordinary life from
that which the artist represents. They are often just as bad, though in
a different way, as the Philistine who sees in Cleopatra nothing but a
common prostitute.”47

Nettleship implies that our enlightened, condescending compassion toward

Antony as a “flawed hero” is as narrow as the philistine’s desire to moral-
ize about his sexual behavior. Neither attitude takes seriously that a passion
might impinge on us, challenge us, and not just be a minatory example. The
passions of Antony and Cleopatra present us, among other things, with a
judgment that lust is worth it. Those passions judge that lust is worth throw-
ing away an empire for, worth every personal and worldly consequence. They
make us ask: what if a passion were not the sign of a character’s opacity, or
a bodily experience that offers us the safety of a clinical description, but a
vision that marks the distance between our own lives and the work of art?
Seeing a passion as marking such a distance means feeling its demands upon
us. Shakespeare’s emotions in my book are not the things to be explained, but
the things doing the explaining.

Notes
1. References to Shakespeare in the text will be to Shakespeare 2008.
2. Konstan 2006, 191.
14 Introduction
3. Levin 2002, 1.
4. There has, in the last decade, been a growing interest in the interdisciplinary
study of hatred that often goes under the name of “hate studies.” Hate studies
attempts to promote, from many disciplines, a study of human hatred. However,
it has tended to focus more on prejudice than on other dimensions of human
hatred. For a good description of some of the aims of this journal, see Stern
2004.
5. Flaubert, letter to Georges Sand, May 10, 1867.
6. I do believe that the remarks I have quoted feel like a challenge to servility.
As my book makes clear, however, I believe that the attempt to redescribe the
hatred of Shakespeare’s characters in the metaphysics of freedom is a mistake.
See my chapters on Othello and Timon.
7. Harding 1998, 25.
8. Id., 9.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id., 10–26.
12. Hazlitt 2005, 88.
13. Dodds 1951, 8–10. Transliteration of Greek in this book is largely done without
marks to indicate the length of vowels.
14. Hassett 1986, 4.
15. Id., 14.
16. Browning 1995, 478.
17. Karlin 1993, 2.
18. Browning 1988, 199.
19. Freud 1958, Vol. 12, 109–40, 139.
20. Freud 1958, Vol. 19, 233–9. See the account in Recalcati 2012, 151–82. However,
Recalcati’s Lacanian interpretation of the passage is less important for my
purposes.
21. Adelman 1976, 353–373.
22. Id., 359.
23. The rehabilitation of anger and other unsocial passions has been a small part
of the tradition of literary criticism. Knight (1977) sings the praises of Timon’s
rage. Braden (1985) studies anger in Renaissance drama and its indebtedness to
the Senecan tradition. Outside the field of Shakespeare studies, Fisher (2002) is
important for my work, and seeks to rehabilitate anger, rashness, and related
“vehement passions.” Ngai (2005) discusses negative affect.
24. The reader may wonder about my use of the terms “emotion,” “passion,” and
“feeling,” which I tend to use rather interchangeably. Burke 2005, passim, has
surveyed the range of related words and concepts. Some scholars, like Mullaney
(Paster et. al. 2004, 4), object to using the term “emotion” for early modern
literature, claiming that the word did not come to designate feelings in our sense
until 1660. The appropriate early modern words, it is claimed, are “passion”
and “affection.” I do not find such historicist relativism to be particularly help-
ful, since the very term “passion” embraces conceptions as widely divergent as
the Cartesian, clinical perspective, and the Aristotelian vision of passions as
judgments. I follow the tendency of non-academic speakers, who use “passion,”
“emotion,” and “feeling” interchangeably, because I dislike turning everyday
words into technical jargon. Finally, in this book I tend to refrain from use of
 Introduction 15
the term “affect,” which frequently brackets out what the vision of emotions as
judgments is interested in exploring. Rei Terada (2001, 82) has pointed out that
affects are “bodily feelings, whereas emotions…are conscious states.” Since I am
more frequently exploring conscious states than bodily feelings (see my discus-
sion of Descartes, below), I find the term “emotion” more appropriate for my
purposes than “affect.” Affect theory has produced some perceptive work (see
Terada 2001, Sedjwick 2003, Altieri 2003, Ngai 2004, Jameson 2013). But the
implicit assumptions of affect theory have not gone unchallenged, particularly
in a recent account by Ruth Leys. In “The Turn to Affect: A Critique” (Leys
2011, 436–7), Leys remarks that “affects must be viewed independent of, and
in an important sense, prior to ideology – that is, prior to intentions, meaning,
reasons, and beliefs – because they are nonsignifying autonomic processes that
take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning…Whatever
else is mean by…affect…the affects must be non-cognitive corporeal processes
or states.” In opposition to affect theory, many Aristotelian thinkers from whom
I take my lead, like Martha Nussbaum, Jonathan Gross, and David Konstan,
are interested precisely in the cognitive, political, and social dimension of an
emotion. All of those elements that affect theory wishes to push away (“inten-
tions, meanings, reasons, and beliefs”) are often fundamental to the attempt to
see an emotion as a judgment. That difference between affect theory and the
approaches I have discussed above is no doubt why Leys singles out Gross’s
Aristotelian approach as one study that opposes “the tendency to separate
affect from meaning” so central to affect theory (Id., 440). The perspectives
I have quoted from Gross and Konstan are also close to Martha Nussbaum’s
approach. In Upheavals of Thought, as Nussbaum summarizes in a later book
(2013, 299), she defends “a conception of emotion according to which they [i.e.
emotions] all involve intentional thought or perception directed at some object
and some type of evaluative appraisal of that object made from the agent’s own
viewpoint.” I have largely confined this kind of academic throat clearing to the
footnotes, rather than the body, of the book.
25. I take my lead from the quasi-Aristotelian position that emotions are judg-
ments. But the range of early modern perspectives on emotion is wide, and too
great to account for here. Seneca cautions against anger in De Ira (1. 1. 3–5),
but on the more complicated place of this condemnation in Senecan thought,
see Braden 1985. Richard Strier (2005, 23) points out that the “Renaissance
revived anti-Stoicism as well as Stoicism.” Seneca’s condemnation of anger
depends upon the identification of anger with madness. But although the
Renaissance revived the distrust of madness it also restored, in Ficinian and
other revivals of Platonism, the celebration of madness. See Allen 1984. It is
no accident that Montaigne’s condemnations of anger are written by a man
distrustful of the exaltations of Platonism. We encounter another early mod-
ern revival of vehement or negative emotion in Reformation theology. Streier
(2005, 23) remarks: “One of the great paradoxes of Reformation theology is
that it is the doctrine of total depravity that yields such humane and comfort-
ing consequences.” Luther’s willingness to acknowledge his susceptibility to
the concupiscentia of the flesh, and his expansive notion of “flesh” to include
negative passions like “wrath, hatred, or envy against any brother,” relaxed
the condemnation against such negative passions (see Id., 23–31). In short
the Renaissance discussion of vehement passions includes not just Stoic and
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