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Erwin Schrodinger

•
THE INTERPRETATION
of
QUANTUM MECHANICS

Dublin seminars.( 1949-1955) and other

unpublished essays

Edited and with Introduction by Michel Bitbol

Ox-Qow Press
Woodbridg~C.onnecticut06525
Published by
OXBOW PRESS
P.O. Box 4045
Woodbridge, Connecticut 06525
203 387-5900 jvoice)
203 387-0035 (fax)

Copyright © 1995 by Ruth Braunizer

Printed in the United St£tcs of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-P,ublication Data

Schrodinge~Erwin, 1887-1961
The interpretation of quantum mechanics : Dublin seminars
(1949-1955) and other unpublished essays/ Erwin Scbrodinger; with
introduction and notes by M. Bitbol.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references Ip. ).
ISBN 1-881987-08-6. -ISBN 1~881987-09-4 (pbk.)
1. Quantum theory. I. Title.
QCl74.12.S35 1995
530.1'2-dc20 95-18611
CIP

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of
the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council
on Library Resources.

Cover phot0graph by Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Pfaundler.

 • Contents

• INTRODUCTION • I
1 Interpretations or Interpretation? 1
2 The Fading of the Concept of Particle 5
3 An Ontology of \II-Waves 9
4 The Measurement Problem 13
5 Sources 18
Typographic Conventions 18

• JULY 1952 COLLOQUIUM • 19

1 Introduction 19
2 How It Came About 22
3 The Alleged Energy Balance-A Resonance
Phenomenon 24
4 Removing Some Difficulties 26
S Chemistry, Photochemistry, and the Photoelectric
Effect 28
6 (Individuality and Samenessl 31
7 Thermodynamics 36

. • TRANSFORMATION AND INTERPRETATION

IN QUANTUM MECHANICS (C. 1952) • 39
Introductory Remark 39
1 The Wave Function; Linear Operators; Eigenfunctions
and Eigenvalues 40
2 The Transformation to Another Frame 44

V
vi • Contents

3 The Transformation of the Wave Function 46

4 The Inte:rpretation of the Wave Function 49
5 Illustrations 54
6 (Harmonic Oscillators) 63,
7 (Interpreting the Wave Function) 70
8 (Laws and Changes with Time) 82

3 • NOTES FOR 1949 SEMINAR • 97

The Problem of Matter in Quantum Mechanics 9 7
The Nature of the Elementary Particles 99
The Difficulties in Interpreting the Blur (Quantum
Uncertainty) 104

4 • NOTES FOR 1955 SEMINAR • I 09

Introduction 109
On Measuring Velocities by the Police or Race-Course
Method 110
Introduction to Statistics 114
Planck-Black-Body-Radiation (Without
Discontinuity!) 115

5 • FROM A LETTER TO ARTHUR S. EDDINGTON,

MARCH 22ND 1940 • 121

6 • WILLIAM JAMES LECTURES • 123

1 First Lecture; Science, Philosophy and the Sensates 123
2 Second Lecture: The Technique of Measurement 131
3 Third Lecture: The Part of the Human Mind 141

• ABOUT THE BOOK • 151

 • Introduction

Erwin Schrodinger1 apparently changed his mind four times

about the interpretation of quantum mechanics during the
quarter of a century after the birth of the theory. In order to put the
writings of Schrodinger published in the present volume in their intel-
lectual context, it is necessary to state these four interpretations, and
then to clarify their nature. As we shall see, these interpretations can
be construed as successive steps in a single project of ontological recon-
struction Tather than as completely distinct frameworks of thought.
According to this analysis, the texts of the eatly 1950s, and especially
the Dublin seminars of that period, are to be regarded as Schrodinger's
most elaborate and lucid attempt at expounding his project.

I • Interpretations or Interpretation?
Schrodinger's first interpretation of quantum mechanics was
sketched in January and February of 1926, in the pioneering pa-
pers entitled "Quantization as a problem of proper values" (I and 11).2 It
amounted to taking the v,--function at face-value and considering it as a
direct description of standing wave-like processes occurring within the
boundary of atoms. However, in the early spring of 1926, Schrodinger

1 Further developments on Schrodinger's interpretationlsl of quantum mechanics

and general philosophy can be found in: M. Bitbol, Schrodinger's philosophy of quan~
tum mechanics, Kluwer, 1996 (to be published), M. Bitbol &. 0. Darrigol (eds.), Erwin
Schrodinger, Philosophy and the birth of quantum mechanics, Editions Frontieres
(1992); M. Bitbol, L'elision, introductory essay to: E. Schrodinger, L'esprit et la mati.ere,
Seuil, 1990.
2 E. &chrodi.nger, "Quantization as a problem of proper values" II and II), in= Col-
lected papers on wave mechanics, Blackie .and son, 1928.

L
2 ,. Introduction

realized that this way of dealing with the wave-mechanical formalism

could only lead one to the proper modes of the vibrating system; i1
provided no clue for a satisfactory account of line intensities and po•
larizations. As soon as he had demonstrated the mathematical equiv•
alence of his wave mechanics with Heisenberg's, Born's, and Jordan'~
matrix mechanics, Schrodinger concluded that the t-function had tc
be taken as an intermediate-level concept (hilfbegriff), and that the cor·
rect description of the atomic processes was actually afforded by the:
product - evn/r*, considered as an electric charge density.3 This sec•
ond approach was only partially successful, however, and it did no1
remove all the difficulties that plagued the original wave int-erpreta•
tion. Schrodinger's initial attempts came to an abrupt end with tht
onset of Born's probabilistic interpretation of ,f,, the pressure of stronE
criticism from the Gottingen-Copenhagen physicists, and their elab-
oration of a full-blown synthetic apprehension of quantum mechanicf
whose two cornerstones were Heisenberg's "uncertainty .relations" anc
Bohr's complementarity principle. F.rom 1928 on, Schroclinger decidec
to teach quantum mechanics according to the mainstream "Copen-
hagen interpretation." We can consider this to be his third interpre•
tation of quantum mechanics, even though it was one that he bor-
rowed from the Gottingen-Copenh.agen group. The year 1935 markec
a noticeable change. A few weeks after the appearance of the ~instein•
Podolsky-Rosen paper and a rich subsequent correspondence with Ein·
stein, Schrodinger published both his "cat-paper" 4 and a more tech
nical article about the "entanglement" of wave-functions.5 In th.est
two pieces of work, Schrodinger expressed a well.documented skep-
ticism about the current interpretation of quantum mechanics, ever
though he was admittedly unable to offer any satisfactory alternative
Finally, in the late forties and early fifties, he became increasingly self·
assertive, and clung to a personal conception of quantum mechanics

3
See L. Wessels, Schradinger's interpretation s of quantum mechanics, Indiaru
University, Ph.D., 1975.
4
The two papers are: A. £in.stein, B. Podolsky1 and N. Rosen, "Can quantum
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?" Phys. Rev. 47
777- 780, 1935; E. Schrodinger, 1 ' Die gegenwartige Situation in der Qua.ntenmecb
anik," Naturwissenschaften, 23, 807-812, 823-8281 844-849, 1935. They are botl
reprinted, in English translation, in: J. A. Wheeler and W. K. Zmek, Quantum m e
chanics a11.d measurement, Princeton University Press, 1983.
5 E. Schrodinger, '1Discu.ssion of probability relations between separated systems, '
Proc. Cambridge Phil. Soc., 31, 555-563, 1935.
 lnte.rpretations or lnterpretationt , 3

Many of his colleagues6 assumed that it was merely a revival of his

first 1926 wave-interpretation.
A closer analysis, however, shows that this account of Schro-
dinger1s successive interpretations of quantum mechanics is superfi-
cial, overlooking two significant points.
First, very soon after he proposed his second (or electrody-
namic) interpretation, Schrodinger became fully aware that it could
not work alone, that somehow it had to be combined with the orig-
inal wave interpretation. Whereas the electrodynamic interpretation
enabled one to make sense of the line intensities and polarizations, the
wave representation was still needed to calculate the relevant charge
distributions as well as the evolution between two measurements of
line intensities.7 The problem Schrodinger had to face was the fol-
lowing: we need not one but two representations of the atomic phe-
nomena. One of them, namely the electrodynamic representation, is
directly related with the "observed facts," but it does not provide the
link between subsequent observed facts; in a word, it is 11factual" but
not "effective." The second one, namely the wave representation, is
perfectly able to provide a link between the observed facts, but not to
account for all the aspects of the facts themselves; it is "effective'' but
not "factual." As long as Schrodinger wanted to merge the "effective"
and the "factual" into a single representation, according to the classi-
cal ideal, the persistent duality of the models had to be considered as a
symptom of failure.
But in the 1950s, he accepted the complete dissociation of
the rep.r esentation !namely the wave picture) from the facts and the
natural processes underlying them: "We do give a complete descrip-
tion, continuous in space and time without leaving any gaps, conform-
ing to the classical ideal--a description of something. But we do not
claim that this 'something' is the observed or observable factsi and
still less do we claim that we thus describe what nature ( . . . ) really

6 See, e.g., M. Bom, "The interpretation of quantum mechanics," Brit. l- Phil. Sci..
4~ 95-106, 1953.
7 A typical example of this combined use of the wave and electrodynamic inter•
pretations can be found in: E. Schrodinger, "The Compton effect,,, Ann. der Phys.,
82, 1927; in: Collected papers on quantum mechanics. op. cit. p. 124. For a valu-
able comment, see J. Dorling, "Schrodinger's original interpretation of the Schrodinger
equation: a rescue attempt," in: C.w. Kilmister led.), Schrodinger, centenary celebra-
tion of a polymath., Cambridge Univexsicy Press, 1987.
4 • Introduction

is. 118 Schrodinger1 s aim was thus no longer to unify his two original
representations but rather to understand. the necessity of using both.
One of them {namely the " effective" wave representation) accordingly
gained a. privileged status, whereas the other one (the "factual 11 elec-
trodynamic representation, which is formally equivalent to the Born
probabilistic rules) was considered as nothing more than a formulation
of the link between the wave representation and the observed facts.
lt is now clear that Schrodinger's two initial interpretations
of quantum mechanics were not two completely distinct conceptions,
but that from the outset they had to be used jointly. As for Schro-
dinger's last interpretation of the 1950s, it appears that it was not
a mere rehearsal of the first wave interpretation, but rather a self-
conscious and systematic application of the idea that, in general, a
representation does not mimic directly the experimental facts; that its
connection with facts rather occurs through highly non-trivial empiri-
cal correspondence rules.
Second, it is usually stated that Schrodinger's successive at-
tempts at giving a satisfactory interpretation of quantum mechanics
are associated with a kind of epistemological wavering, and that his
first and last interpretations arise from a realist attitude; whereas his
intermediate acceptance of the Copenhagen interpretation is strongly
linked with an anti-realist outlook. Indeed, one can extract from the
1926 and 1950 papers some sentences which sound like an expression
of a very strong realist commitment, whereas some conferences dur-
ing the beginning of the 1930s are sometimes more extremist in their
anti-realist formulation than the texts of the most extremist members
of the Copenhagen group. It is, however, quite easy to make sense
of these apparent changes if one remembers Schrodinger's metaphys-
ical background. He called the kind of view he favored an "idealis-
9
tic monism, " inspired by Mach's doctrine of sensations-elements, by
Russell's Analysis of Mind, and by the post-Kantian philosophy of
early nineteenth-century Germany. His insistence on the reality of the-
oretical entities such as the wave-function was therefore not depen-
dant on a metaphysical realism, but rather on a methodological scien-
tific realism which involved a strong belief in the intellectual value
of models and representations in science. 10 Saying that the wave func-

8 E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanistn., Cambridge University Press, 1951, p. 40.

9 E. Schrodinger, My View of the Woxld, Ox Bow Press, 1983, Il-1.
10 See this volume, p. 121, about the influence Boltzmann exerted on his thought

togetl,.er with Mach.

 The Fadi.ng of the Concept of Particle • 5

tions are "real" was thus by no means equivalent to ascribing them the
status of Ding-an-sicb. It was rather a way of underlining that, as the-
oretical constructs, they are not inferior to the constructs that we had
to form during our childhood in order to survive in our environment,
namely the material bodies of our everyday life. 11 The anti-realist step
of the 1930s then appears in a very different hght. Rather than a tem-
porary renunciation of realism, it can be viewed as an intermediary
period of analysis of the data that could be used in the future to recon-
struct something out of it; that is, used to reconstruct entities which
one would have good reasons to consider exactly as if they were "real."
At the heart of Schrodinge:r's fate reflections on the interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics, therefore, lies the question whether one
can form a new ontology in strict correspondence with the symbolic
system of standard quantum mechanics.
The preliminary step in this direction consisted in dismantling
more carefully than ever the traditional ontology of localized bodies,
and in seeing whether its elements could be transferred as they stand
to a novel system of entities. In this light, we shall state Schrodinger's
attitude toward the concept of particle and then analyze in detail the
arguments Schrodinger gave in favor of his new ontology of 'II-waves.
Thus we shall see that the main difficulty that hindered Schrodinger's
undertaking was the lack of a proper solution to the measurement
problem. We will further explore Schrodinger's original method of ad-
dressing, if not solving, the measurement problem.

2 • The Fading of the Concept of Particle

What is a particle? It is a small localized body with three con-
stitutive features, none of which are necessarily independent
of one another:
(i) It can be ascribed a set of properties which embody virtual ob-
servations expressed by counterfactual empirical propositions.
(ii) It has individuality.
(iii) It can be re-identified through time.
Our strategy of exploration must consist of studying the three
listed ontological features while mentioning, whenever necessary,
their deep-lying inter-relations.

11 See this volume, p. 148.

6 • In.txoduction

The concept of virtuality was very soon recognized as a corner-

stone in the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. As
early as 1926, Einstein challenged Heisenberg's positivist-like strict ad-
herence to actual results of ~xperiments. He believed that one could
not dispense with introducing some version of the modal category of
the possible in the reasonings, and retain just the actual, 12 lest one lose
the very content of the notion of a real object on which experiments are
performed. In a conference of 1928, Schrodinger went even further than
Einstein by stressing the decisive importance of vi.rtualities as a basic
ontological constituent. Whereas Einstein considered the "virtual" or
the "foreseeable'' as a component of reality, Schrodinger defJ.ned reality
as a construct made out of a proper combination of actual and virtual
material: "That is the reality which surrounds us: some actual percep-
tions and sensations become automatically supplemented by a number
of virtual perceptions and appear connected in independent complexes,
which we call existing objects.,, 13 This sentence, together with other
similar ones, defines Schrodinger's peculiar use of the concept of virtu-
alities. Firstly, the ''virtual" perceptions, observations, or experimental
results, which constitute a real object, are associated in "complexes";
they are construed as co-existent; in short, they are listed in terms
of conjunction rather than dis;unction. Secondly, the justification of
their being linked in such a way is that they are experimentally ac-
cessible at any moment. Virtualities are conceived by Schroclinger as
a modal expression of expectations: "We .are not usually aware of all
these expectations; we focus them unconsciously into what we call a
fruit basket which really exists.'' 14
Of course, one has to qualify this condition of permanent ac-
cessibility to the virtual observations in order to make it applicable to
most familiar situations of daily life. An ideal accessibility presupposes
that no changes whatsoever happen between the instant when the ac-
tual observation is made and the instant when the conditions of the
expected observation are fulfilled. But generally this is not true. Some
distutbances may occur, or the system may be subject to a law of evo-
lution which modifies its state in the interval. It is thus indispensable

12 W. Heisenberg, Physics C211.d beyond, encounters and conversations, George

Allen&. Unwin, 1971, Chapter 5.
13 E. Schrodinger, ''Conceptual models in physics and their philosophical \talue, 11
in: Science, theory l1Ild man, Dover, 1957.
14 Jbid. p. 120.
 The Fading of the Concept of Particle • 7

to modulate the condition of accessibility by a certain relevant evolu•

tion factor.
Faced with the fact that any pair of measurements of two
conjugate variables such as position and momentum is submitted to
Heisenberg's uncertainty relations, Schrod.inger had found good reason
to be pessimistic about " ( . . . ) whether in this case, in principle, vir-
tual observations are at all conceivable, on which the real existence
of these objects can be based." 15 True, the idea that particles have
underlying properties of the usual sort, but that each one property is
disturbed 16 in an uncontrollable way by the measurement of the other
conjugate one, could still be sustained at this early stage of the debate
about the meaning of quantum mechanics; such a possibility would
have been sufficient to maintain, at least formally, the concept of vir-
tuality in spite of the uncertainty relations. But Schrodinger found it
increasingly difficult to accept. He had formulated his own version
of the von Neumann no-hidden-variable theorems in his 1935 "Cat's
paper, 11 and he thus underlined repeatedly in the l 950s that the idea
that particles possess values of every observable is just a "belief." 17
When applied to the observables q and p, these remarks led him to the
conclusion that the particles cannot even be ascribed anything like a
continuous trajectory: "Observations are to be regarded as discrete, dis-
connected events. Between them there are gaps which. we. cannot fill
in.1118
It is at this point that Schrodinger's hyper-revolutionary atti-
tude arises. Is it coherent to keep on speaking of "particles" if they
have nothing like a trajectory? Schrodinger's answer is a de.finite no.
When he asked "what is a particle which has no trajectory or no
path?"19, it was just a somewhat ironical way of emphasizing that
"( ... ) the particles, in the naive sense of the old days, do not exist. 1120
Some years later, he confirmed most clearly this equivalence between

15 Ibid. -p.121.
16 For a criticism of the disturbance conception of measurements, see E. Schro•
dinger, 11What is an elementary particle?" Endeavour, XI, 110-116, p. 111.
17 See this volume, p. 79.
18 E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanism, Cambti.dge University Press, 1951,
p.27.
19 E. Schrodinger, "L'im.age actuelle de la matiere" in: Gesammelte abhandlil11gen.
Friedr. Wievweg &. Sohn, 1984, vol. 4, p. 507.
20 Ibid. p. 506.
8 • Introduction

no trajectory and no particle at all in a letter to Henry Margenau: "To

me, giving up the path seems giving up the particle."2 1
The reason for this strict implication is to be found in Schro-
dinger's meditation about individuality. The ''individual sameness" of
the macroscopic bodies which surround us is ascertained, ac9ording to
him, by their "form or shape (German: Gestalt),"22 including some im-
perceptible details which distinguish them from other bodies of the
same kind. The elementary particles can also be ascribed a form in
the broad sense of set of actual properties. But this form can only de~
fine their kind; it is not sufficient in general to single out each one
of them. Thus one has to revert to another criterion in order to as-
certain the individuality of the particles. The alternative criterion is
simply based on their having distinct past histories or distinct trajec-
tories. As Scluodinger himself noticed in his letter to Margenau, this
criterion was already widely recognized in the time of classical me-
chanics, and it was explicitly proposed by Boltzmann in his Vorlesun-
gen iiber die Principe der Mechanik of 1897.23 But Schrodinger stressed
that, due to the uncertainty relations (supplemented with his version
of no-hidden-variable theorem), the particles, if any, cannot be ascribed
a well~defined trajectory. The ultimate criterion of individuality thus
collapses.
Of course, one possibility of rescuing the old concept of indi-
vidual body remained. It was to say that two groups of circumstances
are to be distinguished: the circumstances where the range of uncer-
tainty of two trajectories overlap on the one hand, and the circum-
stances where they do not overlap op, the other hand. In the first case,
the particles have no definite individuality, whereas in the second case,
they have one. But Schrod.inger rejected this expedient. According to
him, 11 ( • • • l there is no sharp boundary, no clear-cut distinction be-
tween !the two types of circumstances), there is a gradual transition
over intermediate cases.1124 Even if two "particles11 are experimentally
located very ,far apart from each other, even if their .6.x's do not over-
lap, there is still a small probability that an "exchange" has occurred
between them. The distinction can thus be performed in practice, but

11
E. Schrodinger t-0 H. Margenau, April 12, 1955, AHQP, microfilm 37, section 9.
22
E. Schrodinger, Science and Humanism, op, cit. p. 19.
23
See: L. Boltzmann, Theoretical physics and philosophical problems (B. Mac
Guinness, ed.), Reidel, 1974, p. 230-231.
14 E. Schrodinger; Science and Humanism, op. cit. p. 17.
 An Ontology of \JI.Waves • 9

its possibility is ruled out in principle: "1 beg to emphasize this and
I beg to believe it: It is not a question of our being able to ascertain
the identity in some instances and not being able to do so in others.
It is beyond doubt that the question of 'sameness,' of identity, really
and truly has no meaning.1125 In principle, there is nothing like two
distinct particles. There is thus nothing like an individual and trans-
temporally reidentifiable particle; and, Schrodinger concludes, there is
thus nothing like a particle, only chains of instantaneous events. 26

3• An Ontology of 'II-Waves
Insofar as the previous analysis has left one with only scattered
events, the question of their lawlike connection arises. Admit-
tedly, no pure corpuscularian representation can afford the sought-afte·r
connection. This is so because, even if the concept of trajectory could
be maintained, it would only provide one with a longitudinal link-
age between: the events, whereas quantum phenomena also display
a transversal linkage which manifests itself through the interference
pattems.27 Are we then compelled to adopt something like Bohrian
complementarity, between a symbolic particle picture expressing the
longitudinal linkage of events, and a symbolic wave picture expressing
their transversal linkage? Schrodinger did not think so. Waves can do
both jobs at once. Indeed, while the concept of particle path only bears
longitudinal linkage, the concept of jmulti-dimensional) wave synthe-
sizes the two types of linkages: "In a wave phenomenon you have-not
always, but in many cases-the two complementary features of wave-
(or phase-) surfaces and of wave-normals or rays.1128
The multi-dimensional wave-functions, however, remained up
to this point abstract entities, embodying the quantum mechanical
lawlike connection between otherwise isolated experimental events.
But Schrodinger found that they have at least four characteristics
which support their being ontologically construed (at least if one takes

25 Ibid. p. 18.
26 E. Schrodinger, "What is an elementary particle?" loc. cit.
27 E. Schrodinger, "L'image actuelle de la matiere" in: Gesammelte abhandlungen,
op. cit., vol. 4, p. 506.
28 See this volUJI1e, p. 20.
10 • Introduction

"ontology" in its modern semantical acceptation rather than with its

traditional metaphysical connotations29 ).

{i) Wave-functions are so defined that they do not share the ma-
jor defect of the corpuscularian representation, namely that the
latter "( .. . ) constantly drives our mind to ask for informa-
tion which has obviously no significance." 30 The co:rpuscular-
ian representation drives our mind to ask for the precise value
of the momentum of a particle at the very instant when the
position observable has been measured; and the fact one can-
not answer this question is ascribed to the measuring devices'
being mutually incompatible. By contrast, a wave-function is
perfectly defined when only one of the two canonically conju-
gated observables (position or momentum) has been ascribed a
precise value. No mention of the incompatibility of our instru-
ments is required.
In order to avoid being compelled to adopt a reflex-
ive or epistemological attitude, one has to make sure that
the newly defined ontology does not leave any occasion to
ask questions which are experimentally unanswerable. It must
reflect so perfectly the available experimental circumstances
that it becomes superfluous to refer explicitly to them: "An ad-
equate picture must not trouble ui, with this disquieting urge;
it must be incapable of picturing more than there is; it must
refuse any further addition.1131
(ii) The "effectiveness" of the wave functions, namely their abil-
ity to embody the lawlike connection between experimental
events was considered by Schrodinger as a good reason for call-
ing them "real," even if it is in a very prudent sense of the
word real that is much more akin to Simon BlackbumJs quasi-
realism32 than to any metaphysical version of realism. Com-
menting on de Broglieis concept of "guiding wave," he noted:

19 Schrodinger explicitly rejected the project of "framing ontologically" the ele-

ments of om physical pictUJ:es, if uontologically" is taken in the roet(lphysical sense,
see, e.g., ''Might perhaps energy be a merely statistical concept?" in; Gesammelte ab-
handlunge1;1, vol. 1, p. 508.
30 E. Schrodi.nger, ''What is an elementary particle?" loc. cit. p. 111.
31 Jbid.
32 Simon Blackburn, Essays in quo.st-realism, Oxford University Press; M. Bitbol,
"Quasi-re.alisme et pensee physique, 11 Critique, 564, 34<h361, 1994; M . Bitbol, Schro-
dinge-r's philosophy of qu(lIJtum mechanics, Kluwer 1996 Ito be published).
 An Onto logy of 'II-Waves • 11

"So met hing that influ ence s the phy sica l beh avio
ur of som e-
thin g else mus t not in any resp ect be call ed less
real than
the som ethi ng it infl uen ces- wha teve r mea ning we
give to the
dangerous epit het 'rea l' .1133
This feat ure of law like orde ring was a muc h mor
e mo-
men tous feat ure of phe nom ena, according to Schrodin
ger, than
the occu rren ce of isol ated expe rime ntal events: "We
are inte 1-
este d in gene ral laws, not in special facts. 1134
Our onto logy mus t then rely exclusively on law
like
conn ecti ons, rath er than on com posi te aggregates
of experi-
men tal even ts. An onto logy of wav e func tion s is
fully cons is•
tent with this con ditio n, sinc e wha t the qua ntum
mec han ical
law s rule is just the evo lutio n of thes e wav e func tion
s in time .
(iii) The yr-function of qua ntum mec han ics dire
ctly indi cate s "si•
mul tane ous happ enin gs" on wave-surfaces, rath er
than "alte r-
nati ves"35; it is this circ ums tanc e whi ch give s
rise to inte r-
ference patt erns . Con sequ entl y, the said !virt ual) "hap
pen ings "
are to be liste d in the form of a con junc tion rath er
than in the
form of a disjunction . Schrodinger noti ced very earl
y that the
use of conj unct ions of coex iste nt (virtual) happ enin
gs was the
cruc ial feat ure that dist ingu ishe s wave mec han ics
from part i-
cle mec han ics: "We are conf ront ed with the prof
ound logical
anti thes is betw een

Bith et this or that (particle mechanics)

(aut-aut)
and
This as wel l as that (wave mec hani cs)
(et-et)." 36

Later on, in 1952, he und erlin ed the onto logi cal sign
ifi-
canc e of thes e conj unct ions , quit e con siste ntly with
his form er
defi nitio n of real objects as con stru cts mad e of sim
ulta neo us
occu rren ces: "He re 'rea l' is not a cont rove rsia l phil
osop hica l
term . It mea ns that the wav e acts sim ulta neo usly
thro ugh out

33 E. Schrodinger, "Wh at is an elem entar y particle?" loc.

cit,
34 See
this volu me, p. 81.
35 See this volu me, p. 20.
36.E.. Schrodinger, "The fund amen tal
idea of wave mech anics '' {Nobel lectu re,
.933), in: Science and the hum an temperament, G .
Alle n&. Unw in, 1935.
12 • Introduction

the whole region it covers, not either here or there. ( ... ) So

the epithet 'real' means the momentous difference between
'both-and' (et-et} and 'either or' (aut-aut). 1137
There was a very important difficulty, however, which
Schrodinger fully recognized. Whereas his conception of real-
ity involved an aggregate of simultaneously occurring virtual
and actual happenings, the actual happenings of quantum me-
chanics could not be treated on the same footin.g as the virtual
ones. The wave formalism articulated conjunctions of !virtual)
happenings, but on the other hand, whenever actual facts axe
concerned, there is no way by which one can avoid making
use of disjunctions. As he noticed in 1935, during the mea-
surement process, "The expectation-catalog of the object has
split into a conditional disjunction of expectation-catalogs. 1138
This difficulty is intricate indeed, and it is obviously related
to the measurement problem. Schtodinger did not really tackle
it; he contented himself with proclaiming again the priority of
general laws over particular facts: "If you accept the current
probability views (aut-aut) in quantum mechanics, the single
event observation becomes comparatively easy to tackle, but
all the rest of physics I . . . } is lost to sight."39
{iv) The v,-waves are individuals. They are individuals in virtue of
their having a form, namely a jfrequency or amplitude) mod-
ulation.40 There is, however1 a big difference between these
genuinely quantum mechanical individuals and the corpuscu-
larian individuals of classical mechanics. Classical particles
are individualized by the position they occupy in ordinary
space at each point in time, namely by their trajectory, whereas
the v,-waves are individualized by their form in configuration
space. An interesting particular case is that of standing waves,
which are completely ubiquitous in the volume of configura-
tion space they occupy, and yet have individuality in virtue of
their form. 41

37 E. Schrodinger, "Are there quantum jumps?" Brit. f. Philos. Sci. 3, 1952, p. 242.
38 E. Scbrodinger, ' The present situation in quantum mechanics," in: J. A. Wheeler
1

and W. H. Zurek (eds.), Quantum theory and measurement, Princ-e ton University
Press, 1983, p. 159.
39 E. Schrodinger, "Are there quantum jumps1" loc, cit. p. 242.
40E. Schrodinger, "L'image actuelle de la. matiere" in: Gesammelte abhandlungen,
vol. 4; also this volume, p. 32.
41 See this volume, p. 32.
 The Measurement Problem • 13

To su1nmarize: l/f-waves are able to avoid having recourse ex-

plicitly to epistemological considerations in the formulation of quan-
tum mechanics; they are ruled by the la.w of evolution of this theory;
they bear coexistent virtualities; and they are reidentifiable individu-
als. According to Schrodinger, these circumstances support ascribing
vr-waves the status of entities of a new ontology.
As we mentioned previously, the only weakness of this ap-
proach is related to the measurement problem: the actual happenings
cannot be united to the virtual ones in a single conjunction of coexis-
tent occurrences; accordingly, it cannot be said that they inhere in a
single "real" entity.
Therefore, we must now attend to the measurement problem.

4 • The Measurement Problem

In agreement with Schrodinger's decision to dismiss any con-
cession to the ontology of localized bodies, the experimental
discontinuities could not reflect any corpuscular aspect of the micro-
scopic processes; they had to arise from a peculiar feature of the inter-
action between the (wave-like} system and the (wave-like) apparatus:
"One must regard the 'observation of an electron' as an event that
occurs within a train of de Broglie's waves when a contraption is in-
terposed in it which by its very nature cannot but answer by discrete
responses. 1142 Obviously, this sentence was by no means intended as
a solution of the difficulty, but as a statement of the result which
should eventually be reached. And Schrodinger was fully aware of the
long dista.nce which had to be covered before one can come to a sat-
isfactory outlet in the direction he indicated. In particular, he thought
that no metaphorical account of the transition from the continuous de-
scription to the experimental discontinuities, such as the "reduction
of the wave packet" (or ''wave packet collapse") initially suggested by
Heisenberg, 43 could prove acceptable. But is there any alternative left?
Schrodinger's arguments against the concept of "wave packet collapse"
may at least help us outline, by contrast, the most likely features of
this sought-after alternative.

42 E. Schrodinger, "The meaning of wave mechanics," in: A. George (ed.), Louis de

Broglie pbysicien et penseu.r, Albin Michel, 1953, p. 26.
4.lW. Heisenberg, "The physical content of quantum kinematics and dynamics"
(1927), in: J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek (eds.), Quantum theory and measurement,
op. cit. p. 74.
14 • Introduction

In the 1950s, Schrodinger stated most clearly his reluctance to

accept the "reduction of the wave packet11 among_ the elements of the
physical description. His position relied on a requirement of internal
coherence of the theory, and of unity in its law of evolution: "If one
accepts this law-and it is universally accepted as a general law-one
must stick to it. It must not be occasionally infringed upon by a man
making a measurement. " 44
As a consequence of this choice, he insisted on formulating
the probabilistic correspondance rules 45 in such a way that they au-
tomatically rule out the idea of II collapse." This proved perfectly pos-
sible. It is indeed well known that one can choose between two (for-
mally) equivalent formulations of the correspondence rules.46 The first
one requires an expression for the expectation value of an observable1
whereas the second one (namely the Born's rule) is founded on a sta-
tistical axiom in the diagonal frame of the observable. Now, according
to Schrodinger, even though the two formulations are formally equiv-
alent, they are not physically equivalent: "(T)he second is shorter, but
decidedly more arti.6.cial. You have to swallow a greater lump at a time.
You have to assume explicitly that the system can never be found in a
non-eigenstate, when this quantity is measured!" 47 The first formula-
tion does not share this defect, for it does not incorporate any mention
of the eigenstates.
In the same spirit, Schrodinger remarked that a pure wave-
mechanical description of the interaction between the system and a
measuring apparatus does not yield a "collapse'' of the system's wave
function, but rather its entanglement with the wave function of the
apparatus. Following the norms of this type of description, the wave
function of the system di.sappears in the melting pot of the wave func-
tion of the whole. True, one can perfectly use the information provided
by the actual outcome of the measurement in order to extract a new
wave function for the system alone out of the compound wave func-
tion. But this is by no means a change of the initial wave function
of the system; this is a zedefinition of it; this is a renewed decision

44 See this volume, p. 83; see also E. Sehrodinger, "The meaning of wave mechan•
ics, in: A. George (ed.), Louis de Broglie physicien et penseuz, op. cit., p. 181 and also
11

this volume, p. 35).

45 Or the "interpretatio~ 11 in the restricted sense Schrodinger ascribed to this wonl:
see this volume, p. 52.
46 See this volume, p. 53.
47Jbid.
 The Measurement Problem • 15

to separate the elements of information which had been entangled by

the measuring process: "( ... ) it would not be quite right to say that
the ¢--function of the object which changes otherwise according to a
partial differential equation, independent of the observer, should now
change leap-fashion because of a mental act. For it had disappeared;
it was no more. Whatever is not, no more can it change. It is born
anew, is reconstituted, is separated out from the entangled knowledge
that one has ( .. . ). "48 One can perfectly well reconstitute a system's
wave-function by a "mental act," in order to predict as economically
as possible the outcomes of subsequent measurements performed on
this system, but it would be a category mistake in G. Ryle's sense
to mix this choice !or "mental act") with the objective description:
"(They say) one must not call it a physical change, it is only a change
in our knowledge. I consider this an unfair subte.rfuge-or plainly: non..
sense."49
Hence Schrodinger's general attitude towards quantum me-
chanics: push the description of its entities to its ultimate conse-
quences; don't bother about their connection with experimental out-
comes until the very last stage of the description; postpone the neces-
sity of making the connection explicit as far as you can. "jO)ne must,
to repeat this, hold on to the wave aspect throughout. "50 At most, one
may rely on some loose stopping criteria which are sufficient for all
practical purposes: "quantum mechanics stops as soon as anything
reaches your senses (that has been said by Schopenhauer long ago). " 51
As a consequence Schrodinger appeared as one of the few quan-
tum physicists who felt motivated by formulating a genuine quantum
theory of measurement. Actually, he was the physicist who made the
very first step toward the modern quantum theory of measurement,
as early as 1927.52 The immediate purpose of this 1927 paper was to
show that "without quantum postulates" one can arrive "at an effect
which is exactly the same as ilthe quantum postulates was in force." 53

48 E. Sch.rodinger, "The present situation in quantum mechanics" in: J. A. Wheeler

and W. H. Zurek (eds.I, Quantum theozy and measuzement, op. cit. p. 162.
49
See this volume, p. 83.
50 E. Schrodinger, "The meaning of wive mechanics," in: A. George led.), Louis de
Broglie physicien et pense11r, op. cit. p. 26.
51 See this volume, p. 97, particularly the footnotes.
52 E. Schrodinger, "The exchange of energy according to wave mechanics1" in: Col-
lected papers on wave mechanics, op. cit.
53 Ibid.
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