Case Title: In re: Atty. Lorenzo G.

Gadon’s Viral Video Against Raissa Robles

A.C. No. 13521
Decision date: June 27, 2023

Facts / Background

1. Viral video of profane remarks

On January 4, 2022, the Supreme Court en banc issued a Resolution taking cognizance motu
proprio of a video clip in which Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon (hereafter “Gadon”) was seen inside a
parked car, speaking to the camera in an angry tone and directing profanities at journalist
Raissa Robles.
In the video, Gadon lashed out while jabbing his finger toward the camera, uttering statements
such as:

“Hoy, Raissa Robles, puki ng ina mo, hindot ka. Putang ina mo. Ano’ng pinagsasabi mong
hindi nagbayad si BBM ng taxes? … Magpakantot ka sa aso! … Putang ina mo.”

2. Prior history of misconduct

In its January 4, 2022 Resolution, the Court noted that this was not the first time Gadon had
been involved in publicly offensive or intemperate behavior. Among the prior incidents cited:
o He vowed to “pulverize Muslim communities” if they did not cooperate with the
government in anti-insurgency efforts and threatened violence, including burning down
houses and harm to innocents.
o He had publicly insulted supporters of former Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno,
calling them “bobo” and making obscene gestures outside the Supreme Court
compound in Baguio.
o He made statements that he did not care about disbarment, and even threatened to ask
the Court to disbar him, preferring personal comfort over dependence on law practice.
o He was allegedly dishonest, arrogant, and rude during impeachment proceedings
targeting Chief Justice Sereno.
o He maliciously imputed that former President Benigno C. Aquino III died of HIV—an
unsubstantiated and damaging public statement.
3. Procedural steps by the Court
o The Court ordered Gadon to show cause why he should not be disbarred, citing the
video as prima facie evidence of misconduct.
o Gadon was immediately placed on preventive suspension from the practice of law,
effective immediately.
o The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
were directed to submit updated lists and status reports on existing pending
administrative cases against Gadon.
o Gadon filed a Comment in response, raising primarily procedural/due process
objections (e.g. that preventive suspension was imposed prematurely before his
answer) and denying that his remarks constituted gender-based harassment.
Issue(s)

• Whether Atty. Gadon’s conduct in the viral video justifies disbarment under applicable lawyer
disciplinary rules.
• Whether the preventive suspension imposed by the Court was valid notwithstanding
procedural arguments.
• Whether Gadon’s motion for inhibition of Justices Leonen and Caguioa is justified.
• Whether his statements also amount to gender-based online sexual harassment under RA
11313 (Safe Spaces Act).

Ruling / Holding

The Supreme Court unanimously found:

1. Gadon is unfit to remain a member of the Bar and imposed the ultimate penalty of
disbarment.
2. He is also found guilty of direct contempt of court for making unsubstantiated insinuations
of bias against Justices Leonen and Caguioa, and is fined ₱2,000.00 under Rule 71, Section 1
of the Rules of Court.
3. The preventive suspension imposed immediately was proper, given the manifest nature of the
misconduct and the viral and public dissemination of the video.
4. The CPRA (new Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability) applies retroactively
to pending cases including this one; thus Gadon’s acts are evaluated under its standards even
though the conduct occurred under the prior Code.
5. The Court rejected Gadon’s request to inhibit Justices Leonen and Caguioa, finding no valid
ground for disqualification or bias.

Ratio / Legal Reasoning

1. Law practice is a privilege, not a right

The Court reiterated that admission to the Bar is a privilege conferred by the Court and is
contingent on the lawyer’s demonstrated fitness, integrity, and adherence to ethical standards.
2. Manifest scandalous, indecorous, or discreditable conduct
The Supreme Court found that the language used by Gadon in the video—replete with
profanity, misogynistic overtones, and insulting epithets—was “indisputably scandalous” and
clearly discredited the legal profession. The Court cited that his repeated use of “puki ng ina
mo,” “hindot ka,” “putang ina mo,” and “magpakantot ka sa aso,” among others, violated the
duty of propriety and decorum expected of lawyers.
3. Application of the CPRA
Although the acts occurred under the previous Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court
adopted the CPRA in April 2023 and declared it applicable to pending cases, including this
one, unless its retroactive application would work injustice.
 4. Preventive suspension is appropriate where misconduct is clear and public
Because the misconduct was glaring, publicly disseminated, and of serious consequence to
the dignity of the legal profession, the Court held that preventive suspension before receipt of
answer was justified (res ipsa loquitur). Delay would risk the further spread of the video.
5. Direct contempt for improper insinuations against justices
In his Comment, Gadon asked for the inhibition of Justices Leonen and Caguioa on
speculative grounds, essentially insinuating bias. The Court found this to be an act of direct
contempt, as it tends to degrade the Court and undermine its authority.
6. Aggravating and prior misconduct
Gadon’s prior administrative disciplinary record (including a prior three-month suspension) and
the numerous pending administrative complaints served as aggravating circumstances. The
volume of complaints reflects on his character.
7. Public interest and preservation of bar integrity
The Court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings aim to protect the public, maintain
confidence in the Bar, and deter similar misconduct. Disbarment is warranted only in clear
cases of misconduct affecting moral character.

Significance / Doctrine / Key Takeaways

• Lawyers must maintain decorum and propriety both in public and private life; offensive,
profane, or scandalous utterances—even outside the courtroom—can form the basis of
disbarment.
• Preventive suspension can be imposed immediately in disciplinary proceedings when
misconduct is manifest, especially in the digital and social media age.
• The CPRA’s retroactive application to pending cases underscores the Court’s commitment to
updated standards of lawyer accountability.
• Insinuating bias or impropriety against members of the judiciary without substantiation may
amount to contempt of court.
• Prior disciplinary history and frequency of complaints are relevant aggravating factors in
imposing sanctions.
 Case Title: Maria Victoria B. Ventura v. Atty. Danilo S. Samson
A.C. No. 9608, November 27, 2012

Facts

1. Parties and complaint

o The complainant is Maria Victoria B. Ventura.
o The respondent is Atty. Danilo S. Samson.
o Ventura filed, on July 29, 2004, a complaint for disbarment or suspension before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), accusing
Samson of “grossly immoral conduct.”
2. Alleged misconduct
o Ventura alleged that when she was 13 years old, Samson committed rape upon her
person.
o Sammy (respondent) admitted that there was sexual intercourse but claimed it was
consensual and with mutual understanding.
o The complaint further characterized the act as a betrayal of his marital fidelity and
abuse of the legal-professional relationship (i.e. taking advantage of moral ascendancy)
3. Criminal proceedings parallel / dismissal / desistance
o The rape charge was dismissed by the provincial prosecutor, on finding probable cause
instead for qualified seduction (i.e. a lesser offense).
o Ventura filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied, and elevated the
resolution via a petition for review with the Department of Justice, which was still
pending when the Supreme Court decided.
o Ventura also executed an Affidavit of Desistance, meaning she abandoned further
criminal pursuit of the matter.
4. Defense and respondent’s contentions
o Samson contended that there is no law penalizing consensual intercourse between
consenting persons, and therefore the act should not be deemed immoral per se.
o He argued that Ventura consented, accepted certain compensation, and that the act
was not “grossly immoral.”
o He also claimed that he was unaware of the complainant’s minor age (13 years) and
alleged that she was “very prolific” in sexual relations, trying to discredit or diminish her
innocence.
o He further claimed that he gave her money after the intercourse and requested her to
keep it secret.
5. Ethics / Bar disciplinary process
o The IBP-CBD and the Integrated Bar Board of Governors evaluated the complaint. The
IBP recommended suspension, and the Board of Governors modified that.
o Motions for reconsideration by both parties were filed before elevation to the Supreme
Court.
 Issue / Issues

Whether or not Atty. Danilo S. Samson should be held liable for grossly immoral conduct
under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court (as amended) and be disbarred (or
suspended), given his sexual relations with a minor, even if claimed consensual, and
considering he is an attorney subject to the standards of moral character required by the
profession.

Subsidiary issues include whether a lawyer’s private misconduct (off the courtroom) may serve
as basis for disbarment, and how to assess moral character, consent, and aggravating
circumstances in the disciplinary context.

Ruling / Decision

The Supreme Court DISBARRED Atty. Danilo S. Samson for gross immoral conduct.

Key points of the decision:

• The Court affirmed that the possession and maintenance of good moral character is both a
condition precedent for bar admission and a continuing requirement for an attorney to
retain his status.
• The Court held that gross immoral conduct is conduct that is willful, flagrant, shameless, or
unprincipled, and that shows moral indifference to the views of the upright members of society.
• Whether or not there was consent is immaterial in the disciplinary setting; the Court
emphasized that the act is disgraceful, especially given the complainant’s minor age and the
attorney’s position of trust and moral ascendancy over her.
• The Court underscored that the legal profession demands the highest moral standards;
lawyers commit to serve not only legal functions but also act as moral exemplars.
• Given the gravity of the misconduct—sexual relations with a minor under his care or
influence—the Court found that disbarment (i.e. removal from the practice of law) is the
appropriate penalty to protect public trust, rather than a lesser sanction.

Ratio / Legal Principles / Doctrine

1. Moral character as continuing obligation

o Admission to the bar is not a one-time qualification; an attorney must maintain moral
integrity throughout his career.
o A lapse in moral character—whether occurring in professional or private life—may
justify discipline, including disbarment, when the misconduct is sufficiently serious.
2. Gross immoral conduct
o Defined as acts that are “so corrupt as to constitute a crime, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or scandalous or revolting in circumstances that shock
decency.”
o The Court looks at the nature of the act, the relationship of the parties (especially if one
is in a position of trust or moral ascendancy), the age of the victim, and whether the act
undermines confidence in the legal profession.
3. Consent doctrine is irrelevant in disciplinary proceedings
o In the bar discipline setting, even if a respondent claims consent or mutual agreement,
that does not absolve liability when the act is otherwise immoral or abusive in context,
especially involving a minor.
o The Court stated that consent is no defense to gross immoral conduct here because it
does not change the reprehensible nature of the act in view of professional duty.
4. Position of trust / abuse of moral ascendancy
o A lawyer occupies a role of influence, trust, and moral authority. When that role is
abused—especially vis-à-vis a minor—the misconduct is aggravated and demands strict
discipline.
o The betrayal of marital fidelity by a practicing lawyer further compounds the moral
breach.
5. Appropriate penalty
o The Court selects disbarment when the misconduct is grave, shocking to public sense,
and irreparable in terms of public confidence in the bar.
o Lesser penalties (suspension) are reserved for less serious violations.

Observations / Significance / Takeaways

• This case reaffirmed that attorneys are held to higher moral standards than ordinary
citizens; even private or personal acts may lead to disbarment if they gravely betray the public
trust.
• The decision signals that sexual misconduct, especially involving minors or abuse of power,
is among the more severely sanctioned offenses in legal ethics jurisprudence.
• It clarifies that consent is not a strong defense in the context of bar discipline; the nature of
the act and the relational dynamics (age, influence) are weightier factors.
• The ruling also emphasizes the preventive function of disciplinary power: not just to punish
but to preserve the integrity and public confidence in the legal profession.
• Because the complaint was filed many years before and because criminal proceedings had
been dismissed or abandoned, this case shows that even in the absence of a criminal
conviction, disciplinary action is still viable in the bar context, provided there is sufficient
evidence.
Case title: Espejon v. Judge Lorredo. A.M. No. MTJ-22-007
A.M. No. MTJ-22-007
Marcelino Espejon & Erickson Cabonita vs. Hon. Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo, Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 26
Date of Decision: March 9, 2022

Facts / Background

1. Complainants (Marcelino Espejon and Erickson Cabonita) were parties in Civil Case No. M-
MNL-18-08450-SC, an ejectment case (i.e. an action to vacate property). During the
preliminary conference proceedings, Judge Lorredo made a number of remarks that were
the subject of complaint.
2. Among the statements of Judge Lorredo during the preliminary conference (based on the
transcripts) were questions and statements about the complainants’ sexual orientation. For
example:

“Mag-ano ba kayo?” / “Wala naman kayong relationship na bawal sa Bible?

Homosexual relationship?” … “Wala bang bading sa inyong dalawa?”

He also reportedly said:

“Being a homosexual pervert … may be one of the reasons why a person is being
punished by God with not having a home of his own and with being ejected.”

He admitted in his Comment that he had “settled 101 cases using the Bible.”

3. In addition, in his pleadings and comments, Judge Lorredo made insulting and disparaging
remarks about parties and their pleading, referring to them as “petty, dull and slow thinking,” or
their allegations as “incredibly, super silly.”
4. This was not Judge Lorredo’s first administrative case involving inappropriate remarks during a
preliminary conference. In the prior administrative case, he had been fined P5,000 and given a
stern warning for insulting remarks toward a party litigant.
5. The Judicial Integrity Board (JIB) evaluated the complaint, and recommended that Judge
Lorredo’s actions amounted to grave misconduct, faulting him for prejudging the case (by
declaring ownership issues outright), for using the Bible in deciding cases, and for inserting
irrelevant and discriminatory remarks about the complainants’ sexual orientation. The JIB
recommended a fine of P40,000.

Issue:

Whether Judge Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo should be held administratively liable for misconduct (or
other offenses) for his remarks and conduct during the preliminary conference, particularly for
manifesting bias or prejudice toward complainants’ sexual orientation, prejudging the case, and
allowing religious beliefs to influence his judicial functions.
Holding / Ruling

Yes. The Supreme Court found Judge Lorredo administratively liable. However, the Court did not
agree fully with the JIB’s characterization of his acts as grave misconduct. Instead, the Court
classified his acts into simple misconduct, conduct unbecoming a judge, and a less grave
offense of work-related sexual harassment (CSC Resolution No. 01-0940) and imposed
appropriate penalties.

Reasoning

(A) Violations of Judicial Canons & Rules

1. Canon 4 (Propriety)
Judges must preserve the dignity of the judicial office and avoid impropriety or appearance
thereof. The Court held that Judge Lorredo’s remarks—particularly his repeated questioning
about sexual orientation, invoking the Bible to condemn homosexuality, and linking sexual
orientation to the litigation (i.e. ejection case)—were offensive, irrelevant, and inconsistent with
decorum.
2. Canon 5 (Equality)
Judges must not manifest bias or prejudice on irrelevant grounds (such as sexual orientation).
His statements were seen as prejudicial and discriminatory, inconsistent with the duty to treat
all persons equally before the court.
3. Canon 2 (Integrity)
Judges must conduct themselves in a manner that maintains public confidence in the judiciary.
Even aside from the biased content of the remarks, the gratuitous insults, condescending
language, and use of religious beliefs in adjudication harmed that confidence.
4. Work-Related Sexual Harassment (CSC Resolution No. 01-0940)
Judge Lorredo’s remarks relating to sexual orientation (homophobic slurs, innuendos) were
categorized as “derogatory or degrading remarks or innuendoes directed toward the members
of one sex, or one’s sexual orientation” — a less grave offense under Section 53(B)(3), Rule
X.
5. Prejudgment / Partiality
The JIB had faulted Judge Lorredo for declaring that the complainants were not owners and
must vacate, thereby prejudging issues that should be left for proper adjudication. The Court
agreed that such actions were improper in the context of a preliminary conference, where the
judge should facilitate settlement, not preemptively decide merits.

However, the Court found that the evidence did not establish gross misconduct, noting that (i) there
was no proven corrupt motive, bad faith, fraud or deliberate intent to deny justice; and (ii) Judge
Lorredo’s prior actions (though improper) did not display the extreme degree of willful wrongdoing
required for grave misconduct classification. The Court also emphasized that judges must be mindful
not only of actual impropriety or bias but also the appearance of such, because public confidence
may be undermined.
(B) Penalties

Because separate violations exist, separate penalties under Rule 140 (as amended) are imposed:

• For simple misconduct (Judge Lorredo’s overbearing demeanor, attempts to force

settlement, prejudgment) — fined P 40,000.00
• For conduct unbecoming of a judge (insults, inappropriate religious remarks interfering with
judicial function) — fined P 10,000.00
• For less grave offense of sexual harassment (work-related) — suspension without pay
for 30 days

Additionally, Judge Lorredo was sternly warned that future repetition shall be met with more severe
sanction.

Significance / Legal Principles

• The case underscores that judges must exercise restraint and decorum, especially in
preliminary proceedings, and must avoid remarks or behavior that reveal bias, impregnable
assumptions, or infiltration of personal beliefs (religious or otherwise) into judicial function.
• Even if judges have freedom of belief or expression, those freedoms are constrained by their
duty to preserve the dignity, impartiality, and public confidence in the judiciary.
• The decision illustrates how discriminatory or derogatory remarks (here, targeting sexual
orientation) may be treated as a form of work-related sexual harassment under CSC rules.
• The Court’s refusal to classify the acts as grave misconduct emphasizes the threshold for that
classification (requiring more than mere error or impropriety — it demands a showing of
deliberate wrongdoing, malice or bad faith).
• The case sends a strong message that both actual and apparent impartiality are crucial for
maintaining public trust in the judiciary.
Case title: Mendoza v. Gadon
A.C. No. 11810, August 19, 2019

Parties

• Complainant: Dr. Helen Mendoza, a dermatologist with clinic rights at Clinica Manila under
Ambulatory Health Care Institute, Inc. (AHCII).
• Respondent: Atty. Lorenzo “Larry” Gadon, corporate secretary and vice-president of AHCII.

Facts

1. Dr. Mendoza practiced in Clinica Manila under AHCII, paying rent and investing equity. She
also shared part of her professional fees with the corporation.
2. March 7, 2009: Dr. Mendoza treated a patient who had an allergic reaction to prescribed
medicine. The patient complained to Clinica Manila.
3. March 13, 2009: AHCII suspended Dr. Mendoza from practice. She alleged that Atty. Gadon
ordered her suspension without board authority and without cause.
4. April 4, 2009: AHCII allowed her to resume practice but with reduced clinic hours. She
demanded full restoration of her schedule, otherwise threatened legal action.
5. April 23, 2009: Atty. Gadon wrote a letter revoking Dr. Mendoza’s privilege to practice at
Clinica Manila and refunding her equity. The letter used insulting and arrogant language, such
as boasting about resources to outlast her in litigation and disparaging the justice system.
6. August 3, 2009: Dr. Mendoza filed a disbarment complaint charging Atty. Gadon with
violating:
o Lawyer’s Oath
o Canon 1, Canon 8, Rule 8.01, and Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR).
o She pointed to Gadon’s offensive language, lies about the dissolution of AHCII, and
insulting remarks toward her and her counsel.
7. Atty. Gadon’s Answer:
o Defended his letter as “frank and straightforward.”
o Argued that Dr. Mendoza had no shareholder rights due to corporate revocation.
o Attacked complainant’s counsel as arrogant, an “ambulance chaser,” and “ignorant.”
8. IBP Proceedings:
o Commissioner recommended suspension for 4 months.
o IBP Board of Governors modified the penalty to 3 months.

Issues

1. Whether Atty. Gadon violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 1 and
Canon 8).
2. Whether disbarment is the proper penalty.
Ruling

1. Violations of the CPR

• Canon 1 & Rule 1.02: Lawyers must uphold respect for the law and legal processes.
o Atty. Gadon’s April 23 letter insinuated that justice could be delayed for 10 years and
cases could be won through “resources.” These remarks undermined public confidence
in the legal system.
• Canon 8 & Rule 8.01: Lawyers must not use abusive, intemperate, or offensive language.
o In pleadings and letters, Atty. Gadon called Dr. Mendoza’s counsel “dumbest and most
stupid,” suggested they should “commit suicide,” and repeatedly mocked their
arguments as “outrageously funny” and “ridiculous.”
o Such language was arrogant, malicious, and unbecoming of a lawyer.
• His repeated insults toward opposing counsel violated the duty of courtesy and candor toward
fellow members of the Bar.

2. On the proper penalty

• The Court ruled that disbarment is too severe for the misconduct.
• Following jurisprudence (e.g., Francia v. Abdon), disbarment should be imposed only in clear
cases of grave misconduct seriously affecting a lawyer’s fitness to practice law, and where no
lesser penalty would suffice.
• Considering the gravity of the remarks but also that this was not the gravest form of
misconduct, the Court imposed suspension.

Disposition

The Supreme Court SUSPENDED Atty. Lorenzo G. Gadon from the practice of law for three (3)
months for violation of Canon 1, Canon 8, and Rule 8.01 of the CPR, with a stern warning that
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Gadon was directed to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of the resolution to determine
when his suspension would take effect. Copies were furnished to the IBP, OCA, and attached to his
records with the Bar Confidant.

Doctrine / Significance

• Lawyers must refrain from arrogant, offensive, or intemperate language, even in

adversarial settings.
• Criticisms of the justice system that undermine confidence in law and courts are a violation
of Canon 1.
• Disbarment, being the ultimate penalty, is reserved only for the gravest cases; suspension is
appropriate when misconduct, though serious, does not permanently destroy a lawyer’s
fitness to practice law.
• Respect, courtesy, and candor must always be observed in dealings with clients, colleagues,
and opposing counsel.
Case Title: Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General
G.R. No. 217910
Date of Decision: September 3, 2019

Facts / Background
1. On May 18, 2015, Atty. Jesus Nicardo Falcis III (petitioner) filed a petition under Rule 65
(Certiorari / Prohibition) directly before the Supreme Court.
2. The petition sought to declare unconstitutional Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code (which
define marriage as between a man and a woman) and, as consequence, nullify related
provisions (Articles 46(4) and 55(6)) concerning homosexuality/lesbianism as grounds for
annulment or legal separation.
3. Petitioner argued that the restrictive definition of marriage violated his rights to due process,
equal protection, and religious freedom.
4. Petitioner claimed that as an openly homosexual individual, the Family Code’s prohibition has
a “normative impact” on his life prospects (inability to marry, form recognized family, settle
down) and that his desire to marry same-sex should merit protection.
5. Intervenors joined the case (e.g. LGBTS Christian Church, same-sex couples) to support the
challenge.
6. However, no application for a same-sex marriage license was ever made; no lower tribunal or
administrative action had been taken that denied him a marriage license or directly affected
him under the challenged provisions.

Issues
1. Whether the petition presents an actual case or controversy (i.e. meets the justiciability
requirement).
2. Whether petitioner has standing / locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of the Family
Code’s marriage provisions.
3. Whether the challenged provisions violate petitioner’s constitutional rights (due process, equal
protection, religious freedom).
4. Whether a facial challenge (without a concrete act) is permissible in this context.

Holding / Decision

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of justiciability (no actual case or controversy)
and lack of standing. It did not reach the merits of the constitutional arguments.

Additionally, the Court found petitioner and his counsel guilty of indirect contempt of court for
failures in their handling of the case (notably failure to file the required memorandum) and imposed
fines / admonitions.
Reasoning / Ratio
(A) Justiciability — Actual Case or Controversy & Ripeness
• The Court reiterated that judicial review of statutes must be invoked only in the context of an
actual case or controversy, i.e. a real dispute between adverse parties, with concrete rights
to protect.
• Here, because petitioner had never applied for a marriage license or been denied by the civil
registrar, there was no concrete act that had adversely affected him. His claims were largely
speculative, premised on future possibilities rather than present injury.
• The Court observed that mere normative impact of a law, or generalized grievances, do not
suffice to ground a case.
• Because the controversy lacked concrete factual underpinning, adjudication would amount to
an advisory opinion, which the Court does not issue.

(B) Standing / Locus Standi

• The Court emphasized that a party must show “direct and substantial injury” from the
challenged law to have standing.
• Petitioner’s asserted injuries—e.g. inability to find a partner, impediment to marrying, intangible
“normative impact”—were not sufficiently direct, particularized, or legally demandable.
• The Court noted that the petitioner was not the proper person to assert a constitutional liberty
interest in same-sex marriage because he had not been denied any concrete legal act (i.e.
marriage license).
(C) Indirect Contempt
• The Court found that petitioner’s counsel failed to timely file the required memorandum after
oral arguments, thereby undermining the case and disrespecting the Court’s rules.
• For this, petitioner (and co-counsels) were held guilty of indirect contempt, fined (petitioner
P5,000, others reprimanded), admonished and warned.

Disposition
• Petition dismissed for lack of justiciable controversy and lack of standing.
• Petitioner Atty. Falcis and co-counsels found guilty of indirect contempt:
o Atty. Falcis fined P5,000 within 30 days.
o Co-counsels reprimanded / admonished, and sternly warned against repetition.

Significance / Legal Principles

• The case reaffirms the doctrine that courts must decline cases that do not present real,
concrete controversies (i.e. no advisory opinions).
• It underscores that standing / direct injury is essential: generalized grievances or speculative
effects are insufficient.
• It signals judicial restraint in tackling socially contentious issues (such as same-sex marriage)
in absence of a factual record and in deference to legislative role.
• The doctrine demands that litigants must respect court rules (e.g. filing memoranda), lest they
be sanctioned for contempt even in public interest litigation.
• This decision remains a leading precedent in Philippine jurisprudence on attempts to legalize
same-sex marriage via judicial route.
Case Title: Go Lea Chu, et al. v. Corazon Gonzales, et al.
G.R. No. L-23687
Date of Decision: February 26, 1968

Parties
• Petitioners: Go Lea Chu; Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila;
City Sheriff of Manila
• Respondents: Corazon Gonzales; Court of Appeals

Facts / Background
1. The case originated in a dispute over a leased stall in the Manila Shopping Center. Gonzales
was the lessee, and she verbally sub-leased the stall to Go Lea Chu on a month-to-month
basis.
2. Later it became necessary to demolish the stall due to construction (Cinerama). Gonzales
assigned her 15-year leasehold rights to R & R Realty Company for ₱11,000, with half
(₱5,500) paid immediately, and the other half to become payable “only after final judgment” in
the pending civil case.
3. Also, R & R Realty Company paid ₱2,000 to Go Lea Chu (respondent) in consideration of
vacating the stall on August 21, 1963.
4. When the case was called for hearing on February 28, 1964, Gonzales’ counsel was about ten
minutes late. The trial court (Judge Cloribel) dismissed her complaint (with prejudice) and
ordered that Go Lea Chu be permitted to present her counterclaim before the Deputy Clerk
(i.e. ex parte hearing on the counterclaim)
5. Shortly after, Gonzales’ counsel arrived and pleaded for reconsideration, but the judge
declined and advised to file a motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed that same day
(February 28).
6. On March 2, 1964, Gonzales received copies of the order and decision dismissing her
complaint (dated February 28).
7. On March 9, 1964, she filed another “Second Motion for Reconsideration.” The judge heard
oral arguments on March 21, and on May 11 denied the second motion (on the ground that it
was pro forma). Gonzales received notice of the denial on May 15.
8. On June 2, 1964, Gonzales filed her Notice of Appeal, cash appeal bond, and a motion for
extension of time to file the record on appeal (which was granted on June 10).
9. Meanwhile, on June 5, 1964, Judge Cloribel issued a writ of execution on the February 28
decision (which he deemed final) and on June 6 a garnishment order. The garnishment was
served on R & R Realty Company, which paid ₱3,500 to Go Lea Chu.
10. On June 10, 1964, the same trial judge issued an order granting Gonzales another 30 days to
file her record on appeal, even though execution had already been commenced.
11. Gonzales then elevated via certiorari to the Supreme Court, challenging (among others) the
dismissal of her complaint (for tardiness) and the issuance of execution while the judgment
was not final and executory.
12. The Court of Appeals, in its decision, annulled the order and decision of the trial court, ordered
a retrial, and directed Go Lea Chu to deposit ₱3,500 (illegally collected) with the Clerk of Court
of the CFI.
Issues
1. Whether the dismissal of Gonzales’ complaint and permitting ex parte hearing on the
counterclaim based solely on ten minutes’ tardiness was proper.
2. Whether the writ of execution issued June 5 (and garnishment) was valid, given that the
decision was not yet final and executory.
3. Whether certiorari was the proper remedy.
4. Whether the Court of Appeals could, under its supervisory jurisdiction, direct deposit of funds
collected under void execution.
5. Whether a party may be granted relief not prayed for in pleadings when judicial authority
incites or compels it.

Holding / Decision
The Supreme Court granted the certiorari petition. It:
• Annulled the order and decision of the trial court (dismissing the complaint and awarding the
counterclaim).
• Declared the execution (writ and garnishment) null and void (grave abuse).
• Affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals ordering a retrial.
• Upheld the power of the Court of Appeals to direct the deposit of ₱3,500 collected under void
execution to the Clerk of Court of the First Instance.
Hence, judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Costs were imposed on Go Lea Chu.

Reasoning / Rationale
(A) On Dismissal for Tardiness & Ex Parte Hearing on Counterclaim
• The Court emphasized that ten minutes’ delay by counsel is not a just ground for summary
dismissal of a party’s complaint or to permit ex parte prosecution of the counterclaim.
• The judge should have called off or delayed the ex parte hearing before the Deputy Clerk,
or permitted Gonzales’ counsel to enter and cross-examine, present evidence, etc. She was
not in default on the counterclaim, so she had the right to be heard.
• The Court referred to Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which requires
punctuality, but held that excusable negligence (short tardiness) should not lead to automatic
dismissal.
• The judge must exercise patience, temperance, and impartiality, not manifest arbitrary power.
• Therefore, the trial judge’s action amounted to grave abuse of discretion.
(B) On the Writ of Execution & Garnishment
• The Court found that at the time the trial judge issued the writ of execution (June 5), the
judgment was not final and executory because (i) Gonzales had filed a motion for
reconsideration (on March 9) that was not pro forma (i.e. a motion that presented substantial
grounds), thus suspending the lapse of the appeal period; (ii) She later perfected an appeal
(June 2), and was granted extension for record filing (June 10).
• Since the judgment was still appealable and not final, the issuance of the writ was a grave
abuse of discretion (it was not “execution pendente lite” under the Rules).
• Moreover, the trial judge himself later granted an extension for appeal record filing, further
contradicting his earlier execution order.
(C) On Certiorari as Remedy
• Because the trial judge had committed grave abuse in dismissing the complaint and issuing
execution prematurely, the extraordinary remedy of certiorari was proper.
• Ordinary appeal would not provide adequate relief because the damage (execution, loss of day
in court) had already occurred.
(D) On Court of Appeals’ Supervisory Power & Deposit Order
• The Court of Appeals, in its supervisory capacity over lower courts, may correct errors
committed by the Court of First Instance. It was proper for CA to order the deposit of ₱3,500
which Go Lea Chu had received by virtue of the void execution.
• Even though Gonzales had not prayed for that deposit, courts may grant relief to which a party
is entitled, even if not demanded, under the inherent power to do substantial justice.
• This is consistent with the inherent power of courts (and Section 6, Rule 135, R.R.C.) to use
auxiliary processes necessary to carry into effect jurisdiction and achieve justice.

Key Legal Principles / Takeaways

1. Short tardiness of counsel (e.g. 10 minutes) is not a valid ground for summary
dismissal of complaint or refusal to allow participation in counterclaim hearing, unless delay is
inexcusable and prejudicial.
2. Judges must uphold fairness and cannot deprive a party of opportunity to be heard based
solely on minor, excusable delay.
3. Judgment not yet final and executory cannot be enforced by writ of execution; to do so is
grave abuse.
4. Motion for Reconsideration (not pro forma) suspends the period to perfect appeal and
prevents the judgment from becoming final immediately.
5. Certiorari may be availed of to correct grave abuse when ordinary remedies are inadequate.
6. Supervisory power of appellate courts can correct lower court errors and order equitable
relief (e.g., deposit of funds) even if not specifically prayed for.
7. Courts have inherent power to ensure substantial justice, and may use auxiliary writs or
grant relief beyond pleadings when warranted.
Case Title: Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120654
Decision date: September 11, 1996

Facts
• The petitioner, Maria Lourdes Paredes-Garcia, was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Rizal, but she was deputized in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati and assigned to
RTC Branch 58, Makati City.
• On a certain day, she arrived 10 minutes late to a scheduled hearing. By the time she arrived,
the second case in the court’s calendar was already on first call.
• The respondent judge (presiding over Branch 58) immediately ordered her to explain her
tardiness within 72 hours.
• Petitioner submitted an explanation, which the judge considered false or unsatisfactory.
• There were then verbal clashes between the petitioner and the branch clerk, and incidents
where the petitioner was refused entry to the judge’s chambers, contributing to tension and
confrontations.
• Ultimately, the judge held her in contempt of court.
• The petitioner moved to annul or reverse the contempt order via a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals limited the contested issues to (1) whether she
was indeed tardy, and (2) whether her explanation was false. The CA ruled in favor of the
respondent judge.
• She then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

Issues
1. Was the petitioner’s tardiness (10 minutes late) enough ground for a contempt citation?
2. Did the respondent judge comply with due process in the contempt proceedings?
3. If due process was not observed, should the contempt order be annulled?

Holding / Decision
The Supreme Court granted the petition: the contempt order was set aside (annulled). However, the
Court emphasized that the petitioner should be reassigned to another branch (i.e., not be allowed to
continue under the same judge).

Ratio / Legal Principles

• A judge exercising contempt powers must observe due process. If a contempt proceeding is
conducted without adequate notice or opportunity to be heard, it constitutes grave abuse of
discretion or acting without jurisdiction.
• In this case, the respondent judge acted hastily: ordering explanation and immediately citing
contempt without ensuring proper safeguards or formal procedural requirements. The judge
“disregarded the requirements of due process in contempt proceedings” and thus acted with
grave abuse.
 • The Court clarified that pronouncements in this decision should not be taken as immunity for
the petitioner from liability or accountability for her tardiness. The petitioner, as a lawyer and
officer of the court, has obligations under the Code of Professional Responsibility (e.g. Rule
11.02 on punctuality) and the Canons of Professional Ethics.
• The Court reserved for the respondent judge (or proper disciplinary body) the right to deal with
any breach of duty by the petitioner in accordance with established procedure.
• Because of the breakdown in relations and the appearance of bias or conflict (personal
attacks, confrontations), the Court directed that the petitioner be reassigned so that a fresh,
impartial relationship may be reestablished.

Disposition
• The petition is granted: the contempt order issued by the respondent judge is annulled.
• The petitioner should be reassigned to another court or branch to avoid conflicts of interest or
bias.

Significance / Doctrine
• This case is often cited as a landmark in defining the limits of contempt powers and the
necessity of observing due process safeguards when dealing with contempt proceedings.
• It underscores that a court may not summarily impose contempt penalties on officers of the
court (or others) without proper procedural care—even if misconduct (e.g. tardiness) arguably
occurred.
• It also reinforces that lawyers and prosecutors are bound by ethical rules (e.g. punctuality) and
may be disciplined for transgressions, but due process must be respected in doing so.
Case Title: Marife A. Venzon, Complainant, vs. Atty. Amador B. Peleo III, Respondent
A.C. No. 9354
Date of Decision: August 20, 2019

Facts
1. The complainant, Marife A. Venzon, filed a complaint before the Supreme Court’s Office of
the Bar Discipline (OBD) against Atty. Amador B. Peleo III.
2. The complaint alleged multiple acts of misconduct by respondent, namely:
o Having sexual relations with the complainant (who was a client) while married, and
maintaining multiple extramarital liaisons;
o Misusing legal processes by filing a divorce without intent to pursue it;
o Falsifying public documents (relating to his son’s birthdate and parentage)
o Failure to provide child support for his son as required by law
o Disrespecting the authority of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines by disregarding an
agreement
o Deceiving the government and private entities by claiming a senior citizen discount
when ineligible
3. The OBD, after investigation, recommended that the respondent be held liable for violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), and Section 3(d)
thereof (which relates to gross misconduct, dishonesty, deceit).
4. The Supreme Court took the case and, after considering the record, found respondent guilty of
gross, unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in relation to the practice of law.

Issue
Whether Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is guilty of violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 (and its Section 3(d)) of
the CPR, such that he should be disbarred or subjected to other disciplinary penalties.

Holding / Decision
The Supreme Court disbarred Atty. Amador B. Peleo III from the practice of law.

Ratio / Legal Principles

• Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Section 3(d), CPR mandates that a lawyer must not engage in “gross
misconduct, dishonesty, or deceit.” The Court held that respondent’s conduct falls squarely
within these prohibitions.
• The Court emphasized that extramarital sexual relations per se may not always be grounds for
discipline, but when the relationship is with a client (i.e. involving a fiduciary relationship), it is a
serious breach of professional duty and undermines the integrity and decorum of the
profession.
• Misrepresentation, falsification of documents, failure to discharge legal obligations such as
child support, and deceit in claiming benefits (e.g. senior citizen discount) were regarded as
aggravating circumstances showing a pattern of dishonesty.
• The Court noted that a lawyer must preserve public trust and confidence in the legal
profession, and violations that erode this trust warrant the most severe penalty (i.e.
disbarment).
Disposition
• Respondent Atty. Amador B. Peleo III is disbarred from the practice of law.
• Other adjunct penalties (if any) as recommended may be imposed consistent with disciplinary
rules.

Significance / Commentary
• This case is often cited as a strong precedent for disciplining lawyers whose misconduct
involves moral turpitude, dishonesty, or abuse of client-lawyer relationships.
• It underscores that the legal profession demands higher standards of integrity and ethical
conduct, especially in personal relations with clients.
• The decision illustrates that the Supreme Court will not hesitate to impose the harshest
penalty (disbarment) when multiple serious breaches of duty, involving deceit and violation of
public trust, are proven.
Case Title: Roger Chavez, Petitioner vs. The Court of Appeals, The People of the Philippines,
and the Warden of the City Jail of Manila
G.R. No. L-29169
August 19, 1968

Facts
1. Roger Chavez and eight others were charged (by an Information) with the crime of theft
(specifically, of a “Thunderbird” car together with its accessories) under the theory of qualified
theft.
2. At the arraignment, all the accused, except those not yet identified or apprehended, pleaded
“not guilty.”
3. During the trial, the prosecution (the fiscal) unexpectedly (and without prior notice to Chavez’s
counsel) called Chavez to the witness stand as an ordinary (non-accused) witness.
4. Chavez’s counsel (Atty. Carbon) objected to this procedure, but the trial court overruled the
objection and compelled Chavez to testify.
5. On cross-examination and continued examination, Chavez testified, furnishing evidence that
was used by the prosecution in its case against him.
6. There was no prior warning or admonition to Chavez of his right to remain silent or of his
privilege against self-incrimination before he was called to testify by the prosecution.
7. On that basis, Chavez petitioned for habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, contending that
his right against self-incrimination had been violated, rendering his detention unlawful.

Issue
Whether Chavez’s constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when he was
compelled by the court (at the instance of the prosecution) to testify as a witness in his own case,
without prior warning or protection, thus vitiating the proceedings and the conviction.

Holding / Rule
The Court (Supreme Court) granted the writ of habeas corpus, held that Chavez’s right against self-
incrimination had been violated, declared his conviction void, and ordered his release.
The decision reaffirmed the fundamental principle that an accused cannot be compelled to testify
against himself, especially when no prior admonition or protection is accorded, and any evidence thus
compelled is inadmissible.

Reasoning / Analysis
1. Constitutional / Statutory Guarantee
o The right against self-incrimination is a core protection in criminal proceedings; an
accused should not be compelled to be a witness against himself.
o Under the procedural rules (e.g. Rule 115, Rules of Court), an accused must be duly
warned before being required to testify, and may invoke this privilege.
 2. Violation in This Case
o Chavez was called without prior notice to his counsel and without admonition of his
rights.
o The trial court overruled his objections and compelled him to testify. The fact that he
was treated as a prosecution witness (rather than as an accused) is legally improper
under these circumstances.
o The testimony thus obtained was used against him—this transforms a forced self-
examination into an inquisitorial procedure, forbidden by due process.
3. Consequences
o Because the constitutional violation is of fundamental dimension, the Court held that the
entire conviction based in part on such compelled testimony must be declared void.
o The remedy in this case is to release Chavez (i.e. grant the habeas corpus).
4. Policy / Principle
o The ruling underscores that the privilege against self-incrimination is not merely
procedural but constitutional, and courts must scrupulously guard against
encroachments.
o It also signals that formal protections (warning, counsel’s presence, voluntariness) are
not mere technicalities but essential to ensure fairness.

Disposition
• The petition for habeas corpus was granted.
• Chavez’s conviction for qualified theft was declared invalid (void).
• He was ordered released from custody in relation to that case.

Significance / Legal Doctrine

• This case is a landmark in Philippine jurisprudence on the right against self-incrimination
(or privilege against self-accusation).
• It establishes that compulsion of an accused to testify, without prior admonition or
protection, is a fatal violation that vitiates a conviction.
• It emphasizes that even when the prosecution calls the accused as a “witness,” procedural
safeguards must be respected, lest the trial become inquisitorial in nature.
• The judgment stands as a reminder that constitutional rights in criminal procedure cannot be
ignored under guise of prosecutorial strategy.
Case Title: Michelle A. Buenaventura, Complainant
vs. Atty. Dany B. Gille, Respondent
A.C. No. 7446
Decided December 9, 2020 (En Banc)

Facts / Antecedents
1. In 2006, Michelle Buenaventura (“Michelle”) consulted Atty. Gille concerning a property that
was mortgaged (in her favor).
2. Atty. Gille offered his legal services to Michelle for a fee of ₱25,000.00, which she accepted.
3. After that, Atty. Gille borrowed ₱300,000.00 from Michelle.
4. As collateral for that loan, he gave Michelle a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
N-272977, allegedly covering a 1,000-square meter lot in Quezon City, valued at about ₱20
million. He also provided a postdated check (dated August 10, 2006).
5. Michelle (with her father) went to the Register of Deeds (RD) in Quezon City and discovered
from the RD (via Atty. Quilala) that the TCT was a forgery, issued by a syndicate.
6. Michelle and her father demanded the return of the ₱300,000, but Atty. Gille failed to pay on
the promised date (July 18, 2006).
7. Instead, he executed a notarized promissory note, acknowledging the postdated check and
promising payment on September 10, 2006, and gave Michelle a copy.
8. On the due date, Michelle deposited the check, but it was dishonored because the account
was “Account Closed.”
9. Michelle filed a criminal complaint for estafa before the Quezon City City Prosecutor’s Office.
10. Simultaneously, Michelle filed a petition for suspension or disbarment against Atty. Gille,
alleging deceit, gross immorality, violations of the Lawyer’s Oath, and the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) (e.g. misrepresenting the TCT, defaulting on the loan, issuing a
dishonored check).
11. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), through its investigating process, gave respondent
a non-extendible 10-day period to submit his answer. Atty. Gille failed to file his answer and his
verified position paper.
12. The IBP’s Investigating Commissioner found him liable for Gross Misconduct for (a) issuing a
postdated check which was dishonored and (b) presenting a fraudulent certificate of title to
obtain money from Michelle. The Investigating Commissioner recommended a 2-year
suspension and return of the ₱300,000.
13. The IBP Board of Governors adopted the Investigating Commissioner’s findings but modified
the recommendation so that Atty. Gille also pay legal interest on the ₱300,000 from demand.

Issues
1. Whether Atty. Gille is guilty of Gross Misconduct for his acts (borrowing from client, using a
forged title as collateral, issuing a dishonored check, defaulting on repayment).
2. If found guilty, what is the proper disciplinary penalty (suspension, disbarment, fine) to
impose.
3. Whether his non-compliance with IBP procedural orders (failure to answer, failure to
participate) should aggravate the penalty.
Rule / Legal Standards
• A lawyer’s possession of good moral character is not only a qualification for admission but a
continuing requirement to remain in good standing.
• Gross misconduct is conduct that is more than mere error of judgment; it is a willful, improper
act that violates a definite professional standard or rule and shows a wrongful intent.
• The burden of proof in administrative (disbarment) proceedings rests on the complainant,
who must prove his claims by substantial evidence.
• Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from
borrowing money from a client unless the client’s interests are fully protected (e.g.,
independent advice, safeguards).
• Rule 1.01, Canon 1 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful conduct, whether in professional or private life, when such conduct reflects on his
fitness to practice.
• Rule 7.03, Canon 7 provides that a lawyer should not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law or brings disrepute to the profession.
• A respondent’s disregard of IBP procedural orders, non-cooperation, or silence may be
considered aggravating factors in assessing the penalty.

Holding / Ruling
• The Supreme Court adopted the findings of the IBP (Investigating Commissioner + IBP Board)
that Atty. Gille is guilty of Gross Misconduct for his acts.
• But the Court modified the penalty: instead of a 2-year suspension, the Court disbarred Atty.
Gille (i.e. struck his name off the Roll of Attorneys).
• The Court also imposed a fine of ₱5,000.00 for his disobedience to IBP orders.
• The Court ordered the return of the ₱300,000.00 loan to Michelle with legal interest from
demand.
• Effective immediately, Atty. Gille is disbarred, his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.

Reasoning / Ratio
1. On misconduct and abuse of client trust
o The Court emphasized that borrowing money from a client is presumptively an abuse
of the fiduciary relationship, especially if safeguards are lacking.
o In this case, there were no protections or independent advice to Michelle; the
arrangement was entirely to the advantage of Gille, placing Michelle at risk.
o The collateral (TCT) turned out to be forged, meaning Gille represented something
false to obtain the money. That is a clear deceitful act incompatible with the ethical
duties of a lawyer.
o The issuance of a postdated check that was dishonored due to a closed account further
demonstrates Gille’s dishonest conduct and lack of integrity.
o Collectively, these actions show a pattern of bad faith, breach of trust, deceit, and
unfitness to practice law.
2. On the aggravating factor of non-cooperation
o Respondent’s failure to file his answer and to comply with IBP orders is taken as a
wilful disregard of disciplinary process and professional responsibility.
o Such inaction aggravates his culpability and supports imposition of a harsher penalty.
 3. On disciplinary policy and public interest
o The Court reiterated that maintenance of public confidence in the legal profession
demands strict enforcement of ethical standards. Lawyers must be both technically
competent and morally upright.
o Because Gille’s misconduct was not sporadic but rather involved multiple acts of deceit,
default, and disregard for process, the more severe penalty of disbarment is justified.
o The Court is the guardian of public interest and must ensure that those who betray
the trust placed in attorneys be removed from the profession.

Significance / Legal Doctrine

• Continuing moral character requirement: This case underscores that being a lawyer is not
just about legal knowledge but about maintaining integrity throughout one’s life.
• Strict prohibition on borrowing from clients: Rule 16.04 is reaffirmed — borrowing from
clients is highly suspect and must be closely scrutinized; absent safeguards, it is unethical.
• Dishonest acts even outside of professional representation are disciplinable: The Court
holds that behavior in a lawyer’s private dealings, when reflecting dishonesty or deceit, is
grounds for discipline.
• Non-cooperation aggravates: Silence or refusal to engage with disciplinary proceedings can
aggravate the penalty.
• Disbarment as a remedy for serious misconduct: In cases of repeated or compounded
unethical acts, especially involving deceit, disbarment (the severest penalty) is appropriate to
protect the public and maintain the integrity of the bar.
Case Title: Evangeline Leda (Complainant) vs. Atty. Trebonian Tabang (Respondent)
A.C. No. 2505
February 21, 1992 (En Banc)

Facts / Antecedents
1. Complainant, Evangeline Leda, filed complaints against respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang
regarding his moral character and fitness to practice law. One was Bar Matter No. 78 (filed
January 6, 1982), the other is this present petition for disbarment filed February 14, 1983
under A.C. No. 2505.
2. On October 3, 1976, Tabang and Leda contracted a marriage in Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage
was solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro, under Article 76 of the Civil Code (i.e. an
exceptional character marriage).
3. The parties agreed that the marriage would be kept secret until Tabang completed his law
studies (he started in 1977) and took the Bar (in 1981). They admitted that they had not lived
together as husband and wife during that period.
4. In his Bar Examination application, Tabang declared that he was “single.” Leda contended that
this was a misrepresentation because he was married (secretly) at that time.
5. After Tabang passed the Bar, Leda attempted to block his being sworn in, on grounds of his
fraudulent declaration, and raised the issue before the Supreme Court via this
administrative/dismissal proceeding.
6. In addition, Leda alleged that Tabang had employed conflicting positions in pleadings across
the different matters and used duplicitous tactics to deceive the Court and herself, violating
obligations of candor, good faith, and fairness as a member of the Bar.

Issues
1. Whether Tabang’s misrepresentation in his Bar application (declaring himself “single” when
married) constitutes a gross misrepresentation of material fact, in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Rule 7.01, Canon 7).
2. Whether his adoption of conflicting positions in different pleadings and manipulative tactics
violates ethical duties (Canon 10, Rule 1001, etc.).
3. If found guilty, what is the appropriate disciplinary penalty (suspension or disbarment),
considering the circumstances.
4. Whether the secrecy of the marriage (under Article 76) can be invoked to excuse or justify his
misrepresentation, or whether the marriage should be presumed valid and known.

Rule / Legal Principles

• Good moral character is an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar and must be
continuously maintained.
• Rule 7.01, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the Bar.
• A gross misrepresentation is a misstatement or concealment of material fact made in utter
bad faith.
 • Canon 10, Rule 1001 (Code of Professional Responsibility) mandates that a lawyer in his
pleadings must act with candor, fairness and good faith, and must not mislead the court by
artifice.
• In matters involving marriages of exceptional character (Article 76, Civil Code), there is a
presumption that all requisites and conditions have been met, and the judge’s performance of
his duties is presumed regular.
• Courts have the power to discipline attorneys for misconduct, including misrepresentation,
duplicitous or unfaithful behavior.

Holding / Ruling
• The Supreme Court held that Tabang’s declaration of being “single” on his Bar application was
a gross misrepresentation of material fact made in bad faith, and was a violation of Rule
7.01, Canon 7.
• The Court also found that Tabang’s taking of conflicting positions in different pleadings, and his
devious tactics to serve his purposes, violated Canon 10 and Rule 1001 (duty of candor, no
misleading).
• The attempt to invoke secrecy of the marriage (i.e. that the marriage was secretly made under
Article 76) did not absolve him: the presumption is that the marriage and its formalities were
regular. The fact of marriage is presumed valid unless convincingly rebutted.
• Because of the gravity of the misconduct and his demonstrated lack of fitness, the Court
imposed indefinite suspension from the practice of law (i.e. suspended until further orders).

Reasoning / Analysis
• The Court emphasized that the Bar application is a solemn instrument: declarations therein
must be truthful and complete. By declaring himself single, Tabang concealed a fact that, if
known, would have disqualified him from taking the exam or entering the Bar because it
raises doubts about his moral character.
• The misrepresentation was material: marital status is relevant to assessing honesty, integrity,
and character.
• Tabang’s later behavior — presenting different stances in separate cases to suit his ends —
further demonstrated lack of good faith and sincerity toward the Court and the complainant.
• The secrecy of the marriage does not justify hiding material facts in a Bar application,
especially one that demands disclosure of status. The Court presumes all marriages having
the required conditions and the judge’s acts were regular (i.e. that the marriage was valid).
• The Court regarded the misconduct as sufficiently serious to merit a severe disciplinary
sanction, but because disbarment is the most extreme penalty, it imposed an indefinite
suspension (which means he might apply for reinstatement later under conditions).
• The decision also serves to maintain confidence in the bar and to deter lawyers from
misrepresenting in applications or using deceit.
Disposition / Order
• Atty. Trebonian Tabang is suspended indefinitely from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
• The decision is to be entered in the records of Tabang, and copies furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for circulation.

Significance / Legal Doctrine

• This case is a landmark on the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation in Bar applications: it
affirms that hiding or misrepresenting material facts (such as marital status) is a ground for
disciplinary action.
• It underscores that good moral character is not just nominal, but must be evident and
consistently maintained.
• It also shows that even extraneous matters (e.g., marital secrecy) cannot justify
misrepresentation in a lawyer’s credentials.
• The decision reflects the Court’s role as guardian of the public interest and of the integrity of
the legal profession—lawyers must be honest not only in court but in their very credentials and
life.
Case Title: Plaridel C. Nava II (Complainant)vs.Atty. Ofelia M. D. Artuz (Respondent)
A.C. No. 7253 / A.M. No. MTJ-08-1717

Facts / Antecedents
1. The case arises from administrative (disciplinary) proceedings initiated against Respondent,
Atty. Ofelia M. D. Artuz, for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Lawyer’s
Oath, and related ethical rules.
2. One key issue was that Respondent, when she applied for appointment or in her Personal
Data Sheet (PDS) for public office (or judicial appointment), allegedly failed to disclose certain
pending cases against her.
3. The nondisclosure was material because it related to her integrity, fitness for office, and
candor.
4. The complainant (Nava II) brought charges of disbarment (or analogous administrative
penalties) grounded on grave misconduct, dishonesty, falsification, and violation of Lawyer’s
Oath, arising from her misrepresentations/omissions.
5. The Supreme Court took cognizance of the administrative complaint and resolved the matter
on February 18, 2020.

Issues
1. Whether the nondisclosure of pending cases in her PDS / appointment documents constitutes
a violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, ethical rules or professional responsibility sufficient for
disbarment or other disciplinary penalty.
2. Whether her actions amount to grave misconduct, dishonesty, and/or falsification
warranting severe penalty (like dismissal from service or disbarment).
3. What is the appropriate penalty given the circumstances and gravity of her misconduct.

Ruling / Ratio decidendi

The Supreme Court held in favor of the complainant (Nava II) and found the Respondent (Artuz)
guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and falsification, warranting her dismissal (i.e. removal from
service) or disbarment (depending on her office) as penalty.

Key Legal Reasoning / Principles:

• Duty of Candor & Full Disclosure: Lawyers, and especially those seeking public office or
appointment, must fully and truthfully disclose any pending administrative, civil, or criminal
cases against them. Failure to do so reflects badly on their integrity and fitness for public trust.
• Materiality: The omitted information was material to evaluating her integrity and suitability.
Because the nondisclosure could mislead the appointing authority or evaluators, it is not a
mere oversight but a serious breach.
• Grave Misconduct / Dishonesty / Falsification: The Court found the nondisclosure
tantamount to falsification (i.e. misrepresenting one’s status) and dishonesty, which are
grounds for grave misconduct.
• Penal Consequence: Given the seriousness of the offense, the Court imposed the penalty of
dismissal (from service) or its equivalent (disbarment) to preserve the integrity of the legal
profession and public trust.
The Court’s decision underscores that lawyers, as officers of the court, must maintain high ethical
standards, including truthfulness in all documents submitted to government or judicial authorities.

Disposition / Judgment
• Respondent Atty. Ofelia M. D. Artuz was found guilty of violations of the Lawyer’s Oath, Code
of Professional Responsibility, and committed grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
falsification.
• She was accordingly dismissed from service (or removed) and/or subjected to disbarment
(depending on the office she held).

Observations / Comment
• This case is often cited in Philippine disciplinary jurisprudence as an example of how
nondisclosure or omission in appointment documents—especially concerning pending cases—
can be fatal to a lawyer’s professional career.
• It reinforces the principle that integrity and honesty are nonnegotiable in the legal profession.
• The penalty is harsh, but justified given the direct assault on trust and public confidence.
Case Title: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Complainant)
vs. Atty. Leo J. Palma (Respondent)
A.C. No. 2474

Facts / Antecedents
1. Relationship / Background
o The complainant, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., engaged Atty. Leo J. Palma as his
personal counsel.
o Over time, Palma grew close to Cojuangco’s family and tutored Cojuangco’s daughter,
Maria Luisa (“Lisa”) Cojuangco.
2. Bigamous / Secret Marriage
o On June 22, 1982, while Palma was still married to Elizabeth Hermosisima (his first
wife), he secretly married Lisa in Hong Kong.
o To facilitate this, Palma apparently misrepresented himself as a “bachelor” to the
marriage registry/authorities in Hong Kong, despite his existing marriage.
o It was undisputed that his first marriage (to Elizabeth) was still subsisting.
3. Legal Proceedings / Delay
o Cojuangco filed a disbarment complaint on November 8, 1982, alleging deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his oath, and grossly immoral conduct.
o The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
o In 1984, the Supreme Court issued a restraining order enjoining further OSG
proceedings, on the ground of a related civil case (for nullity) raising a prejudicial
question.
o Upon the effectivity of Rule 139-B (Rules of Court) governing lawyer disciplinary
proceedings, the complaint was eventually transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline.
o On October 19, 1998, the IBP Commissioner required parties to manifest whether they
would pursue the case.
o From 1998 to 2002, at least 15 settings were scheduled, and Palma repeatedly sought
postponements (eight times) and failed to present his “direct testimony in affidavit form.”
o On January 24, 2002, because Palma did not appear or submit the testimony, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
o In March 2003, the IBP Commissioner submitted a Report & Recommendation, finding
Palma guilty of gross immoral conduct and violation of his oath. He recommended
suspension for 3 years.
o The IBP Board of Governors adopted that but reduced the penalty to one (1) year
suspension.
Issues
1. Whether Atty. Palma committed grossly immoral conduct and a violation of the Lawyer’s
Oath by secretly marrying his client’s daughter while still married to another.
2. Whether the procedural handling (delays, restraining order, submission without his testimony)
violated his right to due process.
3. Whether laches or procedural impediments (statute of limitations, intervening restraining order)
should bar the proceedings.
 4. Whether the penalty of disbarment—or a lesser penalty—was proper, considering the gravity
of the offense and delays.

Ruling / Ratio decidendi

The Supreme Court found in favor of the complainant, and held:
1. Improper Party?
o Palma contended that Cojuangco, as the father, lacked standing because he was not
the “offended party.” The Court rejected that, holding that disciplinary proceedings
concern public welfare, not private interest. Any citizen may initiate, and lack of
standing does not bar the Court from acting.
2. Due Process / Submission
o The Court held that Palma was given ample opportunity to present his side. His
repeated delays and failure to submit his testimony were of his own doing. The IBP’s
deeming the case submitted was justified given the long delay and repeated
rescheduling.
o The presence of counsel for Palma, who filed motions and addressed proceedings, also
showed the procedural rights were respected.
3. Restraining Order / Laches
o The restraining order that halted OSG proceedings (issued in 1984) was ultimately not a
valid impediment indefinitely. The Court noted that the related civil nullity case was
dismissed without prejudice, so the foundational basis for the restraining order no longer
had effect.
o As to claims of laches (undue delay), the Court held that moral delinquency of a
lawyer—especially in matters involving bigamy or betrayal of trust—is not amenable to
being phased out by time. The misconduct (bigamy, misrepresentation) speaks to his
fitness to remain in the Bar.
4. Merits — Grossly Immoral Conduct & Violation of Oath
o The Court emphasized that the practice of law is a privilege, not a right, and that
lawyers must maintain high moral character continuously.
o Palma’s secret marriage to his client’s daughter, while still married, and his
misrepresentation of marital status, constituted a serious breach of honesty, decency,
morality, and public trust.
o The Court found that the betrayal was magnified by Palma’s close relationship with the
complainant’s family. He exploited trust placed in him and acted in a manner contrary to
the dignity of the profession.
o The Court found that the misconduct warranted the most severe penalty (disbarment),
rather than mere suspension. It deemed the IBP’s one-year suspension
recommendation insufficient for the gravity of the act.
Disposition / Judgment
• Respondent Atty. Leo J. Palma was found guilty of grossly immoral conduct and of
violating his oath as a lawyer.
• He was disbarred from the practice of law; his name was ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys.
Observations / Commentary
• This case is one of the classic Philippine Bar disciplinary decisions illustrating that a lawyer’s
private life can be subject to scrutiny when it reflects on moral fitness and public trust.
• The Court reaffirmed that moral character is a continuing requirement for lawyers—not just at
admission, but throughout their careers.
• The decision underscores that bigamy, deceit, and betrayal of fiduciary trust are especially
serious acts meriting disbarment, not mere suspension.
• Also, the procedural delays and attempts to stall or avoid presentation of testimony do not
excuse or bar disciplinary action. The Court may treat the case as submitted when the
respondent causes undue delay.
• The case is often cited in Philippine jurisprudence in matters of lawyer immorality and
betrayal of fiduciary relationships (especially involving clients and their families).
Title: Milagros Melad-Ong, Complainant vs.Atty. Placido M. Sabban, Respondent
A.C. No. 10511

Facts / Antecedents
1. The complainant, Milagros Melad-Ong, is one of the heirs (through her father, Jose Melad) in a
land dispute concerning a parcel originally owned by Fe Tuyuan.
2. In 1984, Jose Melad filed a suit (Civil Case No. 3413, RTC Tuguegarao, Branch 2) for
reconveyance, reivindication, and annulment of instrument against Concepcion Tuyuan,
alleging an illegal transfer of title over a 272,045-sq. m. property (TCT No. T-52533).
3. The respondent, together with his father (Atty. Benito Sabban), intervened in that civil case on
behalf of the Maguigads (a set of persons claiming to be rightful heirs of Fe Tuyuan).
4. In May 1995, Concepcion executed a Deed of Confirmation of Attorney’s Fees, via which
she transferred 10 hectares (100,000 sq. m.) of the subject property to Atty. Benito (as
compensation for legal services). This was done outside the knowledge of the court and
without consent of all parties.
5. Thereafter, Atty. Benito (and on behalf of his son, respondent) applied for retention of that 10-
hectare portion before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Meanwhile, Concepcion
applied for retention of 7 hectares.
6. After Atty. Benito’s death (in 2006), Respondent resumed his father’s role in the litigation.
Around 2008, a Compromise Agreement was drafted and judicially approved by RTC on April
1, 2008, settling the case among claimants, including the heirs of Jose.
7. Complainant contends that:
o The retention by respondent (through his father) over the 10 hectares was made
secretly, without full disclosure to co-heirs or to the court, and while the property was
still under litigation.
o The respondent acted for conflicting interests: he represented the Maguigads (as
intervenors) and later represented Concepcion in the compromise and motion for
reconsideration of execution.
o The compromise agreement and its execution were misleading, as the respondent
failed to inform the parties of the prior retention and transfers.
o She and her co-heirs were prejudiced by these acts; had full disclosure been made,
they might not have agreed to the compromise or would have negotiated differently.
8. The complaint was filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant. Respondent submitted an
answer and later participated in an investigating hearing.
9. The investigating Commissioner limited the issue (by agreement of parties) to whether
respondent is responsible for the alleged loss to the heirs under the compromise.
10. The IBP / investigating body recommended suspension (originally one year). The Board of
Governors of the IBP also made its determinations based on the evidence and
recommendations.
Issues
1. Whether Respondent is administratively liable for acquiring interest in property under
litigation (in violation of Article 1491, Civil Code).
2. Whether he violated the rules on conflict of interest (representing opposing or conflicting
parties) under the Code of Professional Responsibility (Canon 15, Canon 17, Rule 15.03, etc.).
3. Whether he committed falsehood / non-disclosure / misleading acts (violating Rule 10.01)
in the compromise agreement or in withholding facts.
4. What disciplinary penalty is appropriate in light of the gravity and multiplicity of misconducts.

Ruling / Ratio decidendi

The Supreme Court, in en banc decision, affirmed that Respondent is guilty of multiple violations and
suspended him from practice of law for two (2) years.
Key Legal Reasoning / Principles:
• Acquisition of interest (Article 1491, Civil Code)
The Court held that a lawyer must not acquire a property subject of litigation in a case he is
handling, or allowed to be handled by related persons (e.g. his father). Doing so is contrary to
public policy and undermines the fiduciary relationship.
In this case, the retention via Atty. Benito and the subsequent transfer to respondent, without
disclosure, evidenced that respondent had interest over the property even while the case was
pending.
• Conflict of interest / representation of opposing parties
The respondent was originally counsel for the Maguigads (intervenors). He later represented
Concepcion in the compromise and in moves to reconsider execution, effectively acting for
adverse parties without proper withdrawal or consent. This breached Canon 15 / Rule 15.03
and Canon 17, in relation to Rule 1.01 (duty of loyalty) of the CPR.
The Court stressed that respondent failed to explain or justify how he could represent both
sides or obtain consent in writing.
• Falsehood / concealment / misleading acts (Rule 10.01)
The Court found that respondent failed to disclose his or his father’s retention applications, and
omitted such critical fact in the drafting and approval of the compromise, misleading the parties
and the court.
Such concealment is a breach of the lawyer’s duty of candor and honesty.
• Multiplicity / gravity / aggravating circumstances
Because respondent committed several interrelated violations (conflict, acquisition, falsehood)
over many years, and given the significant prejudice to co-heirs, the Court considered that a
two-year suspension is proper.
The decision notes jurisprudential precedents where suspension periods ranged depending on
severity, and the Court tailored the sanction to the facts.
• Warning against recurrence
The Court imposed a stern warning that a similar violation would be dealt with more severely.
Disposition / Judgment
• Respondent Atty. Placido M. Sabban was found GUILTY of violations of Rule 1.01, Rule
10.01, Rule 15.03, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of Article
1491 of the Civil Code.
• He was suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective from his receipt of
the decision.
• A stern warning was issued that any recurrence of similar transgression would merit harsher
penalty.
• The decision was to be entered in his personal record, disseminated to lower courts, and
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Observations / Commentary
• This case reinforces the principle that lawyers must not acquire interest in litigated property,
even indirectly, nor act for conflicting clients, especially without disclosure or consent.
• It shows that concealment or misleading behavior in the settlement process (compromise
agreements) is a serious ethical breach.
• The Court’s sanction (two-year suspension) reflects a balanced approach: the offense was
serious (multiplicity of violations), but not necessarily warranting disbarment in light of
circumstances.
• The case is often cited in Philippine administrative legal ethics doctrine on conflict,
concealment, and lawyer fiduciary duty.
Case Title: Judge Ariel Florentino R. Dumlao, Jr. (C) vs. Atty. Manuel N. Camacho (Respondent)
A.C. No. 10498

Facts / Antecedents
1. A Verified Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment was filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) against Atty. Camacho, alleging violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Rules 10.01, 11.03, 13.01, 19.01) for acts of bribery, attempts to influence a judge, and
disrespect toward court officers.
2. The complainant, Judge Dumlao, was then the presiding judge of RTC, Dagupan City (Branch
42), hearing CV Case No. 2004-0181-D (“Pathways Trading International, Inc. vs. Univet
Agricultural Products, Inc., et al.”). Camacho was counsel for the plaintiff Pathways.
3. During the pendency of the case:
o Camacho allegedly sought to fraternize with Judge Dumlao, dropping names of
prominent persons (e.g. Justices of the Supreme Court), highlighting his ties with the
UP College of Law, and trying to create an impression of influence.
o After the RTC granted Pathways’ motion for summary judgment, the defendants filed a
Notice of Appeal. Camacho allegedly then approached Judge Dumlao, offering to share
a portion of his attorney’s fees if the judge would deny the appeal and issue the writ of
execution.
o He also threatened that, if the judge refused, he would file a disbarment case against
him.
o Camacho is alleged to have barged into the judge’s chambers and demanded that the
court sheriff (Sheriff Nabua) sign a garnishment order (prepared by Camacho),
threatening dismissal of the sheriff if she did not comply.
o Text messages were also sent (e.g. “You are as guilty as your sheriff … call me”) to
pressurize the judge.
4. Judge Dumlao filed an Incident Report with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recounting these events.
5. In the Supreme Court proceedings, Camacho was required to file a comment within 10 days
but failed to do so. The Court deemed his right to file a comment waived and referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
6. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Camacho guilty of violating the Code and
Lawyer’s Oath, recommending disbarment, but the IBP Board of Governors reduced the
proposed penalty.

Issues
1. Whether Camacho’s acts constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, 13, 19 (and corresponding
rules) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (i.e. attempted bribery, influence peddling,
disrespect to court officers).
2. Whether Camacho’s failure to comment or respond violates his right to due process or justifies
the waiver of his defenses.
3. What penalty is appropriate, especially considering Camacho’s prior disbarment (i.e. whether
the suspension penalty can be imposed or only recorded).
4. Whether the Supreme Court should modify the recommended penalty given the
circumstances.
Ruling / Ratio decidendi
The Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, found Camacho guilty of the cited violations. However,
because he had been previously disbarred in a separate case, the Court modified the remedy:
while the penalty of suspension could no longer be effectively imposed, it ordered a two (2) year
suspension to be recorded in his personal file for reference should he seek reinstatement in the
future.

Key Legal Reasoning:

• On the misconduct
o Influence peddling / attempted bribery: Camacho’s overtures (offering a portion of
attorney’s fees, name-dropping, implied pressure) violate Canon 13 / Rule 13.01 —
lawyers must refrain from any impropriety that tends to influence, or gives the
appearance of influencing, a court.
o Candor, fairness, respect toward the court: His threats, intrusions into chambers,
and demand on court officers infringe Canon 10 (Rule 10.01), Canon 11 (Rule 11.03),
and Canon 19 (Rule 19.01) — a lawyer must not mislead the court, must respect court
officers, and must not resort to intimidation.
o The Court underscored that such acts seriously undermine the integrity and
independence of courts, erode public confidence, and demean the legal profession.
• Due process / waiver of comment
o Camacho’s failure to file a comment despite receipt of the resolution was taken as a
waiver of that right. The Court found that adequate notice was given and that procedural
opportunities had been afforded.
• On penalty in light of prior disbarment
o The Court reaffirmed the doctrine: no double or multiple disbarment. Once disbarred,
a lawyer cannot be disbarred anew.
o Nevertheless, when new misconduct is shown, the proper penalty (e.g. suspension)
may be recorded in the lawyer’s file for future consideration if reinstatement is sought.
o Considering the seriousness of the infractions and precedents, the Court deemed two
years’ suspension appropriate.

Doctrine / Legal Principles

• Lawyers must not resort to influence peddling, bribery, threats, or other improper means to
gain advantage in pending cases — such acts strike at the heart of judicial independence and
public confidence.
• A lawyer’s first duty is to the administration of justice, not merely to the interests of a client.
• Even when a lawyer is already disbarred, new ethics violations (distinct from those that led to
disbarment) may be punished via recording of the penalty (e.g. suspension) to inform future
reinstatement action.
• Failure to timely respond when given opportunity is a valid basis for assuming waiver in
disciplinary proceedings, so long as notice is proper.