CHAPTER 4 STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The meaning of the law in statutes should be clear but this may not always be achieved. In such cases,
the court’s task is to decide the exact meaning of a particular word or phrase. To do so, over the years
judges have developed some tools for interpreting statutes.
These are:
1. The rules of statutory interpretation- Literal rule, Golden Rule, Mischief Rule and the purposive
rule.
2. The rules of language, Ejusdem Generis rule, Expressio Unius and noscitur a Socis
3. Aids to statutory interpretation, intrinsic aids and extrinsic aids
We start by looking at the rules of statutory interpretation.
THE LITERAL RULE
This rule developed in the early nineteenth century and has been the main rule applied ever since then.
Using this rule, a judge will give words their plain, ordinary or literal (dictionary) meaning, even if the
result is not very sensible. This idea was expressed by Lord Esher in R v Judge of the City of London
Court (1892) when he said: ‘If the words of an act are clear then you must follow them even though they
lead to a manifest absurdity. This is illustrated in Whiteley v Chappell (1868) where the defendant was
charged under a section which made it an offence to impersonate ‘any person entitled to vote’. The
defendant had pretended to be a person whose name was on the voters’ list, but who had died. The
court held that the defendant was not guilty since a dead person is not, in the literal meaning of the
words, ‘entitled to vote’.
In London and North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946), where a railway worker was killed while
oiling points along a railway line. His widow tried to claim compensation because there had not been a
lookout man provided by the railway company. The law stated that a lookout should be provided for
men working on or near the railway line ‘to relay or repair it’. The court said that the oiling points were
maintaining the line and not relaying or repairing so the widow’s claim failed.
ADVANTAGES OF THE LITERAL RULE
The rule follows the words that Parliament has used. Since Parliament is a democratic law-making
body, it is right that the judges should apply the law exactly as it is written. Using the literal rule to
interpret Acts of Parliament prevents unelected judges from making law. This also respects the
doctrine of separation of powers under which the three organs of the state, the judiciary, the
executive and the legislature are to be regarded as working separately.
Using the literal rule should make the law more certain, as the law will be interpreted exactly as it is
written by Parliament. This makes it easier for lawyers and the public to know what the law is and how
judges will interpret it.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE LITERAL RULE
The literal rule assumes every Act will be perfectly drafted. In the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991,
Parliament used the word ‘type’ of dog, whereas it should have used the word ‘breed’, as there is no
such thing as a type of dog. Thus it became difficult for the court to understand what was meant here
by the word ‘type’.
When the law is drafted, it is not always possible to cover every situation that Parliament intended;
for example in Whitely v Chappel, the law did not provide on whether or not it was a crime to
impersonate a dead person who had a right to vote. It was left up to the court to hold that there was
no crime since the dead person was not entitled to vote.
Words may have more than one meaning so that the Act is unclear.
Following the words in an Act exactly can lead to unfair decisions; in London and Northeastern Railway
Co. v Berriman (1946), the court did not allow the claim of the widow by restricting the meaning of the
word oiling. It could be argued that the claim should have been allowed because the worker was still
working on the rail track in the course of his duties, and to differentiate oiling from repairing and
relaying seems at most a technicality. Professor Michael Zander has denounced the literal rule as
being mechanical and divorced from the realities of the use of language.
THE GOLDEN RULE
The golden rule starts by looking at the literal meaning but the court is then allowed to avoid an
interpretation which would lead to an absurd result. There are two views on how the golden rule
should be used.
The first view states that the golden rule will be used in a very narrow sense i.e. if a word or phrase in
statute is capable of more than one meaning, the judge can choose one between them.
The second view states that the golden rule will be used where the words have a clear meaning, but that
meaning would lead to an absurdity if applied literally.
About the first view If there is only one meaning then that must be taken. In Adler v George (1964),
where the Official Secrets Act 1920 made it an offence to obstruct Her Majesty’s forces ‘in the vicinity’
of a prohibited place, the defendants had obstructed HM forces actually in the prohibited place. It was
argued that they were not guilty as the literal wording of the act did not apply to anyone in the
prohibited place, only to those ‘in the vicinity’. The court found that it would be absurd if those
obstructing the prohibited place were guilty, but anyone inside was not. The word should be read as
being ‘in or in the vicinity of’ the prohibited place.
Concerning the Second View, In Re Sigsworth (1935) the Administration of Act 1925 had clearly stated
that the next of kin will inherit the estate of a deceased, yet in the present circumstances where the son
had murdered his mother, the court to prevent the son from inheriting, held that he will not be entitled
to inherit the property as the act did not allow for someone to inherit property by killing the deceased.
ADVANTAGES OF THE GOLDEN RULE
This rule respects the exact words of Parliament except in limited situations. It allows the judge to
choose the most sensible meaning. For example, in R v Allen (1872), The defendant tried to marry again
while he was still married. He was charged under s 57 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,
which makes it an offence for ‘whosoever being married shall marry again without the previous
marriage being ended’. The defendant argued that he could not be guilty, as his second ‘marriage’ was
void. The court, using the narrow application of the golden rule, decided that ‘shall marry’ should be
interpreted as going through a ceremony of marriage, so the defendant was guilty. If any other meaning
were given to these words, the offence was incapable of being committed.
It can also provide sensible decisions in cases where the literal rule would lead to a repugnant situation.
As mentioned earlier in Re Sigsworth (1935), the court to avoid the appalling situation of the son
inheriting, effectively wrote into the act by holding that he would not be entitled to inherit the property
as the act did not allow for someone to inherit property by killing the deceased.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE GOLDEN RULE
It is very limited in its use, so it is only used on rare occasions, and it is not always possible to predict
when courts will use the golden rule over the literal rule.
The Golden Rule requires judges to make subjective judgments about what constitutes an absurd result
or inconsistency with the statute's purpose, which can lead to inconsistent or unpredictable outcomes.
The Golden Rule can lead to judges overriding the legislature's intent by interpreting the statute in a way
that the legislature did not intend.
Michael Zander has described it as a ‘feeble parachute’. In other words, it is an escape route but it
cannot do very much.
The Golden Rule won’t help if there is no absurdity in the statute. For example, the London and North
Eastern Railway v Berriman (1946) case, where the widow couldn’t get compensation because the
wording of the statute didn’t allow for this circumstance.
THE MISCHIEF RULE
The definition of the rule comes from Heydon’s Case (1584), where it was said that there were four points the
court should consider when interpreting statutes:
1. What was the common law before the making of the Act?
2. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
3. What was the remedy the Parliament provided to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
4. What was the true reason for the remedy?
Under this rule, the court looks at what the law was before the Act was passed to discover what gap or
mischief the Act was intended to cover. The court should then interpret the Act in such a way that the
gap is covered. An application of this approach is seen in Smith v Hughes (1960), where the issue was
to interpret 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 which said, ‘it shall be an offence for a common
prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for prostitution”. The women had not been on the
street: one had been on a balcony and others had been at the windows of ground-floor rooms. The
court decided they were guilty. The court held that the act was passed by parliament to clean the streets
and prevent innocent people from being bothered by prostitutes while walking along the streets. It
therefore mattered little whether they were standing in a street or some other place. Interestingly, a
different result would have been achieved if the literal approach was used because then by limiting itself
to the words, the court would have held that the woman was not guilty as she was not in a street or
public place. So, to some extent when applying the mischief rule, the judge will use their views to reach
a decision as opposed to the literal rule, where they just stick to the words of the law.
ADVANTAGES OF THE MISCHIEF RULE
One of the main benefits is that it allows judges to consider the intention of the legislature when
enacting a law. This approach investigates the problem that the law is meant to solve, and in doing
so, it enables judges to perform the role of law reformers.
Additionally, the Mischief Rule is flexible, allowing judges to interpret laws considering changing
circumstances and developments in society. This feature ensures that the law remains relevant and
applicable to contemporary issues.
Moreover, the Mischief Rule provides judges with a discretionary power to choose the interpretation
that is most consistent with the spirit of the statute. As a result, this rule recognizes that not every
Act is correctly phrased and assists in avoiding unfairness and illogical conclusions. As such, it helps in
avoiding absurd or unjust outcomes that could result from a strict application of the law.
The Law Commission prefers the mischief rule and, as long ago as 1969, recommended that it should
be the only rule used in statutory interpretation.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE MISCHIEF RULE
However, there are problems with using the mischief rule.
First, there is the risk of judicial law-making. Judges are trying to fill the gaps in the law with their views
on how the law should remedy the gap.
Also, judges may not agree on the use of the mischief rule [ Royal College of Nursing v DHSS [1981]. In
this case, the Abortion Act 1967 required the procedure of abortion to take place through a registered
medical practitioner. However, advancements in science meant that the doctor was only present during
the first phase of the procedure, while the next stage was handled by the nurse. The House of Lords by a
majority of 3 to 2 decided that the second stage handled by the nurse was lawful by applying the
mischief rule. However, the minority disagreed and applied the literal rule to hold that the second stage
was unlawful.
The use of the mischief rule may lead to uncertainty in the law. It is impossible to know when judges will
use the rule or what result it might lead to. This makes it difficult for lawyers to advise clients on the law.
Finally, the mischief rule is not as wide as the purposive approach as it is limited to looking back at the
gap in the old law. It cannot be used for a more general consideration of the purpose of the law.
PURPOSIVE APPROACH/RULE
This goes beyond the mischief rule in that the court is not just looking to see what the gap was in the
old law; the judges are deciding what they believe Parliament meant to achieve. To understand what
the Parliament wants to achieve, the judges will often consider sources that are most likely to provide
insight into parliamentary intentions when passing an act like Hansards, which records debates between
MPs arguing for the need for certain laws to be passed and law commission reports which will highlight
the need for certain acts of Parliament.
One case where the purposive approach was adopted was the case of R v Registrar General - Ex parte
Smith (1990). In this case, the judges used this approach in deciding to deny a serial killer (who was
adopted) from obtaining information about his birth parents even though the Adoption Act 1976
allowed an adopted child to have an absolute right to access his birth records. The reason behind this
decision was that through the act parliament could not have intended to put the natural parents at risk
by allowing a serial killer to have information about them but rather to create closer family
relationships.
It is important to note here that the mischief that the Parliament had tried to correct through this act
was to prevent illegal adoptions and to give a person a right to check their birth parents in case their
adoptive parents tried to hold information from them. It did not contemplate the mischief that a killer
would exercise his absolute right of wanting access to his birth records.
ADVANTAGES OF PURPOSIVE APPROACH
1. As can be seen from the case of R v Registrar General Exparte Smith, the usage of the purposive
approach led to what could be viewed as the ‘right result’. Applying the literal rule here would
have resulted in the killer obtaining the information needed for carrying out a potential murder.
Therefore, denying the killer seemed the best result; and the use of a purposive approach
achieved this result easily.
2. Judges can take account of new technology introduced after the passing of the Act, as evidenced
by the case of R v (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health (2003). In this case, the House of
Lords considered the definition of ‘embryo’ in the Human Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990.
When the act came into force, CNR (Cell nuclear replacement) was not possible, and a live
human embryo could not be created without fertilization. When CNR later became available it
was evident that it involved no fertilization was needed to create an embryo. The issue was
whether CNR was unlawful since the Act stated that a human embryo could only be formed
when fertilization was complete. The court applying the purposive approach held that CNR
would be lawful. At the time of the act, Parliament could not have intended to distinguish
between those methods that create embryos without fertilization and those that can because it
was unaware of the former.
3. Using the Purposive approach, judges can fill any gaps in the law left by Parliament. As is evident
from the case of Quintavalle and Ex parte Smith, the statutes had not provided for the situation
that came before the court and were hence a ‘gap’, subsequently filled by the courts.
DISADVANTAGES OF THE PURPOSIVE APPROACH
1. The Purposive approach allows unelected judges to make new laws and so allows for judicial
creativity as they decide what the law should be rather than what was written down. This would
then undermine that notion of Parliamentary Sovereignty which says that only Parliament can
make laws. Lord Simmonds has famously stated that if there is any gap in the statute, it is to be
filled by an amending act and not by judges using the purposive approach. In Registrar General
Exparte Smith, if Parliament had intended for there to be exceptional circumstances where
adopted people could not obtain details of their birth parents then they should have said so in
the Adoption Act 1976 and it should have not been for the court to invent such a way.
2. Each judge could come to a different conclusion about Parliament’s intentions; therefore,
another disadvantage is that this approach can lead to inconsistent and unjust interpretations of
Acts of Parliament. For example, a different set of judges may have allowed R v Registrar
General ex parte Smith to have access to his birth records. This creates uncertainty in the law.
3. Another disadvantage is that it can be difficult for judges to identify what Parliament intended
when they passed the Act of Parliament. Referring to what a minister has said in Parliament may
not reflect what Parliament intended. It would be reasonable to argue that what Parliament
intended can only be seen in the Act of Parliament itself.
Should there be one preferred rule?
It is entirely up to the individual judge who is hearing the case to use whichever rule or approach they
want. Some judges may use the literal rule; other judges may use the mischief rule or the modern
purposive approach. This makes it difficult for lawyers to advise on what meaning a court may put on a
disputed phrase in an Act of Parliament. It can also be said that because of this freedom to use whatever
approach they wish, judges usually decide what result they want in the case and then find the rule that
brings about that result.
RULES OF LANGUAGE
Apart from these approaches, there are also other tools available to judges for statutory interpretation.
One of them is the rules of language which help to make the meaning of words and phrases used in law
clear.
These rules are:
1. Ejusdem Generis Rule
2. The Express Mention of One thing excludes the others (Expressio unius exclusio alterius)
3. A word is known by the company it keeps. (Noscitur a sociis)
1. EJUSDEM GENERIS
This rule states that where specific words are followed by general words, then the general words are
limited to the same kind of items as the specific words. In Hobbs v CG Robertson Ltd (1970), where the
law stated employers must provide goggles for workmen when ‘breaking, cutting, dressing or carving of
stone, concrete, slag or similar material’. The court held that the word ‘similar material’ could only be
used to describe things that had similar properties to stone, concrete or slag and thus would not include
brick as it was a soft material. In contrast, all other materials were hard in that bits would not fly off
from them if broken, cut, dressed, or carved.
2. EXPRESSION UNIUS EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (the mention of one thing excludes others)
In Tempest v Kilner (1846), the court had to consider whether the Statute of Frauds 1677 (which
required a contract for the sale of ‘goods, wares and merchandise’ of more than 10 GBP to be evidenced
in writing) applied to a contract for the sale of stocks and shares. The list ‘goods, wares and
merchandise’ was not followed by general words. So the court held that only contracts for those three
types of things were affected by the statute; not the contract for stocks and shares.
3. A word is known by the company it keeps [NOSCITUR A SOCIIS]
This means that the word must be looked at in the context and interpreted; accordingly, it involves
looking at other words in the same section or at other sections in the act. In Inland Revenue
Commissioners v Frere (1965) where the section sets out rules for ‘interest, annuities or other annual
interest’. The use of the word ‘interest’ on its own could have meant any interest paid, whether daily,
monthly or annually. Because of the words ‘other annual interest’ in the section, the court decided
that ‘interest’ only meant annual interest.
INTRINSIC AIDS
Judges can also use certain features within the statute to help make the meaning of some words clearer:
1. The Long title of an act may briefly explain Parliament’s intentions.
2. A preamble in the act will set out Parliament’s purpose in enacting that statute.
3. Headings before a group of sections, and schedules attached to the Act can also help
4. Marginal Notes explaining different sections, but these are not generally regarded as giving
Parliament’s intention as they will have been inserted after the parliamentary debates.
5. An interpretative section in the Act which sets out the meanings of different terms used in the
statute.
EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids are matters outside the Act which may help a judge explain the meaning of words in an
Act. They include previous Acts of Parliament on the same topic, earlier case law, the historical setting of
the Act, and dictionaries of the time the Act was passed.
Apart from these, there are also other sources which initially the court was reluctant to use, but over
time they decided to consult them as aids to interpretation These include (i)Hansard, (ii) Law reform
reports (iii) International Conventions and (iv) Explanatory notes.
Hansards are the official report of what was said in Parliament when the Act was debated. Before 1993,
the use of these as an extrinsic aid was disallowed by the courts and in Davis v Johnson (1979) when
Lord Denning tried to use them, the HOL in the same case rejected his approach. In Pepper v Hart 1993,
the HOL accepted that Hansard could be used for understanding acts of Parliament in the following
situations:
Only where words of the Act are ambiguous or obscure or lead to absurdity.
And only if a clear statement by the Minister introducing the legislation could shed light on the
purpose of introducing the act.
In Pepper v Hart, on the issue of whether teachers would be taxed on a benefit that allowed them to
obtain education for their children at a reduced rate, the court used the statements of the minister to
determine how they could be taxed on such a benefit.
While Hansards have been used regularly since Pepper v Hart, the cost of using them is great and it is
stated that a Hansard can add almost 25% per cent to the total bill. Furthermore, Hansards have not
been helpful in certain cases because they made no difference to the final decisions of the courts.
LAW REFORM REPORTS
It used to be the case that reports by law reform agencies should not be considered by judges. However, this
rule was relaxed in the Black Clawson case in 1975, when it was accepted that such a report should be
looked at to discover the mischief or gap in the law that the legislation based on the report was designed to
deal with.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
In Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd (1980) the HOL decided that the original conventions should be
considered as it was possible that in translating and adapting the convention into a local law, the true
meaning of the original convention might have been lost.
EXPLANATORY NOTES
Since 1998 explanatory notes have been attached alongside bills, these notes usually explain the
background to any proposed law, summarize its main provisions and where a point is complicated, give
worked examples.
Example of the Use of Extrinsic Aids:
Laroche v Spirit of Adventure 2009
The claimant had been injured as the result of the sudden landing of a hot-air balloon in which he was
travelling. The meaning of the word ‘aircraft’ was important. Was a hot air balloon within the meaning
of aircraft?
If so, then the claim would fail as it had not been made within two years of the accident.
In deciding the case, the CA first looked at the definition of ‘aircraft’ in the Oxford Dictionary, Air
Navigation Order 2000, and the International Warsaw Convention, all of these supported the view that
an air balloon was an aircraft, therefore they also decided that it was an aircraft, and the claim would
fail as it had not been made within two years of the accident.
TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC AIDS USEFUL IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION?
INTRINSIC AIDS
Judges usually start by looking at intrinsic aids when interpreting a law, but these are often not very
helpful.
Intrinsic aids aren’t very helpful because they rarely show what Parliament really meant. The wording of
the Act is most important, but it’s often unclear or too general, and things like headings or schedules
usually don’t solve this confusion.
In older acts, a preamble was sometimes included to set out the purpose and intentions behind the
legislation. This could be highly useful for a purposive approach. However, as noted, these are uncommon
in modern acts, which severely limits the current applicability of this specific intrinsic aid.
A significant development that enhances the usefulness of intrinsic aids is the new approach as shown in
the Arbitration Act (1996). This Act breaks from tradition by explicitly detailing principles and including an
interpretative section (Section 1). This provides judges with a clear, internal statement of Parliament's
purpose and the core principles that should guide interpretation. This model is far more useful than
traditional intrinsic aids as it directly addresses the problem of discerning intention and should be
considered a best practice for future drafting.
EXTRINSIC AIDS
Extrinsic aids have become increasingly accepted, particularly with the rise of the purposive approach, and
are generally more helpful than intrinsic aids in uncovering the reason behind a law.
Earlier case law that has already interpreted the statute or a related common law principle is immensely
useful as it provides binding or persuasive precedents. Furthermore, understanding the historical setting
is crucial for the mischief and purposive approaches, as it allows judges to identify the "gap" or "mischief"
the Act was designed to remedy.
As established in Laroche v Spirit of Adventure (2009), dictionaries of the time are a useful extrinsic aid
for the literal rule, helping to establish the ordinary meaning of a word as it would have been understood
when the Act was passed.
Law Commission reports are also valuable extrinsic aids. As shown in Black Clawson (1975), these reports
help judges understand what problems the new law is supposed to fix, making it easier to see what
Parliament intended.
Hansard, which records what is said in Parliament, can help clarify the meaning of a law. Lord Denning
supported using Hansard in Davis v Johnson (1979). But there are limits—judges can only use Hansard
when the law is unclear, and only if the Minister’s words are clear and directly explain the law’s purpose.
For example, in Jackson & Others v HM Attorney General (2005), Hansard was used to show what the
government meant by the Parliament Act 1949. Judges cannot use speeches from other MPs or earlier
debates when interpreting a law.
QUESTIONS ON CHAPTER 4
1. Identify two cases in which the literal rule of interpretation was used. [2]
2. Discuss the Advantages of the Literal Rule [10]
3. Discuss the Disadvantages of the Literal Rule [10]
4. Describe two methods of application of the Golden rule with one case example [6]
5. Discuss the Advantages of the Golden Rule [10]
6. Discuss the Disadvantages of the Golden Rule [10]
7. Identify two of the four points in the Heydons Case relating to the Mischief Rule [2]
8. Explain the mischief rule and one case law where it was used [6]
9. Assess the advantages of the Mischief Rule [10]
10. Assess the disadvantages of the Mischief Rule [10]
11. Assess the advantages and disadvantages of literal, golden, mischief and Purposive
approach and comment whether there should be one preferred rule [15]
12. Assess using case law, whether purposive approach is an effective way of interpreting law [15]
13. Identify three Rules of Language used in Statutory Interpretation. [3] [MAY/JUNE 2024/13/Q3]
14. Describe, with case law examples two rules of language [6]
15. State five types of intrinsic aids [5]
16. State five types of extrinsic aids [5]
17. Describe how the literal rule and purposive approach help judges interpret statutes. [10]
[MAY/JUNE 2023/13/Q6]
Assess the advantages and disadvantages of both the literal rule and the purposive approach
[15] [MAY/JUNE 2023/13/Q6]
18. (a) Explain the intrinsic and extrinsic aids used by judges in statutory interpretation. [10]
[MAY/JUNE 2024/12/Q7]
(b) Discuss how useful intrinsic and extrinsic aids are in the task of statutory interpretation.[15]
[MAY/JUNE 2024/12/Q7]
19. Assess whether it is appropriate for a judge to use a creative approach when interpreting statutes. [15]
20. (a) Explain the literal and mischief rules of statutory interpretation. [10] [MAY/JUNE 2024/11/Q6]
(b) Assess the extent to which the rules of statutory interpretation prevent judges from making law.
[15] [MAY/JUNE 2024/11/Q6]
21. Identify one extrinsic aid used in statutory interpretation. [1] [OCT/NOV 2024/12/Q1]
22. Identify one case in which the mischief rule of statutory interpretation was used by a judge. [1]
[MAY/JUNE 2025/11/Q1]
23. Identify two common law rules used by judges to interpret statutes. [2] [MAY/JUNE 2025/12/Q2]
