Department of Computer Sciences THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
CS 378 (Spring 2003)
Linux Kernel Programming
Yongguang Zhang
([email protected])
Copyright 2003, Yongguang Zhang
This Lecture
• Linux Security (kernel)
– Capabilities
– LSM
• Questions?
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 2
Capabilities
• Fine grain control of who can do what
– Traditional: all-or-nothing: super user (root) can do
everything, normal user (non-root) can do nothing
– Capabilities: define a set of distinct priviledges in the
system (if a task has a capability, it is permitted to do
certain action)
• Definition
– POSIX 1.e defines a list of capabilies
– Linux 2.4 impliments 8 from POSIX, and adds 21
Linux-specifics (total 29)
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 3
Capability Definitions
• All definitions in include/linux/capability.h
– CAP_CHOWN: allow changing file ownership
– CAP_SETUID: allow making setuid() call
– CAP_SETPCAP: allow modifing other task's
capability (under the same set of capilities it owns)
– CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE: allow binding to
TCP/UDP port below 1024
– CAP_NET_BROADCAST: allow broadcasting
– CAP_NET_RAW: allow raw sockets
– CAP_SYS_NICE: allow changing nice level
– ...
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 4
Data Type for Capability Set
• A set of capabilities: kernel_cap_t
– Defined in include/linux/capability.h
– 32-bit integer
– Bitmap: 1 bit per capability: 1 means having the
corresponding capability, 0 means no
– Maximum 32 capabilities support in Linux 2.4
• Operations:
– cap_raise(c, flag): Include the capability in c
– cap_lower(c,flag): Remove the capability from c
– cap_raised(c, flag): c having the capability?
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 5
Capability Sets in Task
• Each task has 3 sets of capabilities
– In struct task_struct, fields related to capabilities:
kernel_cap_t cap_effective, cap_inheritable, cap_permitted;
• POSIX capability model
– Permitted set: capabilities the task can use
– Effective set: capabilities that the task currently choose
to use (so as to bracket operations)
– Inheritable set: capabilities that are allowed through
program execution (via execve() system call)
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 6
Use Capabilities
• Kernel can check the capability before doing
priviledged action:
...
if (!capable(CAP_XXX))
return -EPERM;
...
• capable(cap): does this task has the capability?
int capable(int cap)
{
if (cap_raised(current->cap_effective, cap))
return 1;
return 0;
}
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 7
Capability Example
• Controlling system call nice()
– In kernel/sched.c:
asmlink long sys_nice(int increment)
{
if (increment < 0) {
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_NICE))
return -EPERM;
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 8
File Capabilities
• Executable files can have capabilities too
– Also have 3 sets: permitted, effective, inheritable
– Theoretically stored as file attributes in file systems
– Change the task's capabilities after execve()
• Capability rules
– Inheritable set does not change after execve()
– New permitted set = file permitted set OR (file
inheritable set AND task permitted set)
– New effective set = file effective set AND new
permiteed set
– Implementation: compute_creds() (fs/exec.c)
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 9
File Capability Implementation
• Executable file data structure struct linux_binprm
– Defined in include/linux/binfmts.h
– Fields related to capabilites:
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective;
• When an executable file is loaded:
– Fill in linux_binprm from file system and call
compute_creds()
– Example: load ELF file: function load_elf_binary()
• Reality check
– Linux 2.4 VFS does not support capability attributes
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 10
New Direction in Security Kernel
• Linux 2.5: LSM (Linux Security Modules)
– Fine-grained nondiscretionary access controls
– General kernel framework for implementing security
modules
• Goal
– To replace the Linux 2.4 capability model
– Plugable kernel modules to provide different security
models: superuser logic, POSIX capability logic,
SELinux model, etc.
• LSM project: http://lsm.immunix.org
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 11
LSM Basics
• Add a “security” field to major data structures:
– task_struct, super_block, inode, file, sk_buff,
net_device, ...
– Type: void *security;
• Add hooks in kernel critical points
– To manage the security field
– To perform access control
• Security module register and unregister functions
• New security() system call
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 12
Global Security Ops Table
• A table of all security operations (127)
– Stored in a global variable security_ops
– Defined in include/linux/security.h
– Data type:
struct security_operations {
...
int (*sb_mount)(...);
...
int (*inode_unlink)(...);
...
int (*task_setnice)(...);
...
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 13
security_ops Example
• Controlling system call nice()
– In kernel/sched.c:
asmlink long sys_nice(int increment)
{
...
retval = security_task_setnice(current, nice);
if (retval)
return retval;
...
}
– security_task_setnice(p, nice) defined in
include/linux/security.h to be
return security_ops->task_setnice(p,nice);
Spring 2003 © 2003 Yongguang Zhang 14
LSM Modules
• How to write a new LSM module:
– Define a security_operations data object
– Fill in all 127 functions
– Call register_security() in module init and
unregister_security() in module exit
• Existing LSM modules (in Linux 2.5)
– In Linux 2.5: Dummy, Capability
– As a patch: Openwall, SELinux
– Source code: under security/
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