Compendium of Cases on Matrimonial Disputes

Index

Sr. Case Name Case No. Court Type Of Judgment Outcome

No Matter Date
.
1 Lachman Utamchand Civil appeal Supreme Desertion 1963 it is not necessary that
Kirpalani Vs. Meena 262 of 1961 Court Of desertion would
India commence when
separation and animus
desired to coexist.
They don’t need to
begin at the same
time.
2 Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Criminal Supreme Stridhan 1985 The appeal is allowed, the judgment
of the High Court is set aside, and
Kumar and Ors. Appeal no. Court of India the complaint filed by the appellant
684 of 1982 is restored.

3 K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Civil Appeal Supreme Mental 2013 Divorce granted.
Deepa No. 1794 of Court of India Cruelty &
2013 irretrievable
breakdown
4 V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat I.A. No. 1 of Supreme Mental 1993 The appeal was Allowed, and
(Treatment of this 1993 in Civil Court of India cruelty divorce was granted.
judgment by the Appeal No.
Supreme Court in the 424 of 1987
case mentioned in a
row no. 3)
5 Lily Thomas and ors. W.P. (C) No. Supreme Bigamy 2000 Petitions Disposed
Vs. Union Of India and 798 of 1995 Court of India
Ors.
6 Raghavendra Prasad V. Criminal High Court Of Dowry 2021 Petition Partly accepted
and Ors. Vs. Hemalatha Petition No. Karnataka at
and Ors. 7657/2020 Bengaluru
7 Rajnesh Vs. Neha and criminal Supreme Maintenance 2020 decree of care may be enforced
like a decree of a
Ors. Appeal no. Court Of
civil court, through the
(The court has used 730 0f 2020 India
provisions which are available
the interpretation of for implementing money. The
“shared household” law, including civil detention,
given by the supreme attachment of property, etc
court in the case
mentioned in a row no.
17)
8 Vinita Saxena Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Irretrievable 2006 A workable situation is
Pankaj Pandit No. 1687 of Court of India breakdown & impossible; divorce due to
2006 cruelty irretrievable breakdown is
 granted.

9 N.G. Dastane Vs. S. Civil Appeal Supreme Cruelty 1975 The appeal was Dismissed
Dastane No. 2224 of Court of India and directed the appellant
1970 was to pay the respondent’s
costs.
10 B.S. Joshi and Ors. Vs. Criminal Supreme Divorce by 2003 Appeal Allowed and Fir
State Of Haryana and Appeal No. Court of India mutual quashed.
Ors. 383 of 2003 consent &
Inherent
Power of
court
11 Sharda Vs. Dharmpal Civil Appeal Supreme Divorce 2003 Appeal Dismissed
no. 5933of Court Of under 13(3)
2000 India of HMA
12 Gaurav Nagpal Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Custody Of 2008 appeals are
Sumedha Nagpal nos. 491 of Court Of Child dismissed, and the
2006 and India
5099 of child’s welfare
22007 should be
considered in
granting custody.
13 Nimeshbhai Bharatbhai R/Criminal High Court Of Marital Rape 2018 Writ application is disposed
Desai Vs. State Of Misc. Gujarat At of- as marital rape is not
Gujarat Application Ahmedabad covered under section
Nos. 26957,
375 of the IPC.
24342 of
2017 and
R/Special
Criminal
Application
No. 7083 of
2017
14 Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Irretrievable 2009 The husband treated
Manju Sharma No. 1330 of Court Of breakdown responded with cruelty, so no
2009 India divorce based on the
irretrievable breakdown as it
would set a precedent and a
clause to the sec. 13
15 Sunita Kachwaha Vs. Criminal Supreme Maintenance 2014 Appeal is allowed
Anil Kachwaha Appeal No. Court Of (Earning
2310 of 2014 India Wife)
16 Vinod Kumar Subbiah Civil Appeal Supreme cruelty 2015 The appeal is allowed, and
Vs. Saraswathi Nos. 511- Court Of The appeal court decision is
Palaniappan 5512 of 2015 India restored.
17 S.R. Batra and Ors. Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Shared 2006 Petition dismissed
Taruna Batra No. 5837 of Court Of Household
2006 India Dispute
18 Shamima Farooqui Vs. Criminal Supreme Maintenance 2015 the appeals are allowed,
Shahid Khan. Appeal Nos. Court Of - the orders
passed by the High Court
(Supreme court treated 564-565 of India By retired
 the judgment of 2015 husband are set aside, and that of
Shabana Bano Vs. the
Family Court is restored.
Imran Khan mentioned
Maintenance granted.
in row no. 21 as a
precedent.)

19 Narendra Vs. K. Meena Civil Appeal Supreme Mental 2016 The appeal is,
No. 3253 of Court Of Cruelty- accordingly, allowed with
no order as to
2008 India threat to
costs.
commit
suicide
20 Krishna Bhattacharjee Criminal Supreme Judicial 2015 the appeal is allowed
Vs. Sarathi Choudhary Appeal No. Court Of Separation and the orders passed
and Ors. 1545 of 2015 India by the
High Court and the
courts below are set
aside
21 Shabana Bano VS. Criminal Supreme Maintenance 2009 Appeal allowed, held
Imran Khan Appeal No. Court Of of a working High Court was
(Law applicable to 2309 of 2009 India Muslim unjustified
Muslim divorced woman
women is as declared
by the court in Shah
Bano’s case mentioned
in row no. 24)
22 Darshan Gupta Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Irretrievable 2009 Decree of divorce not
Radhika Nos. 6332- Court Of breakdown granted
India
6333 of
2009
23 Gullipilli Sowria Raj Civil Appeal Supreme Essentials to 2008 Appeal disallowed.
Vs. Bandaru Pavani Nos. 2446 Court Of marriage Marriage held void-ab-
India under Hindu intio.
of 2005
Law
24 Mohd. Ahmed Khan Criminal Supreme Maintenance 1985 Maintenance granted.
Vs. Shah Bano Appeal No. Court Of of a Muslim
India woman
Begum and ors. 103 of
1981
25 Lakshmi Sanyal Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Law 1972 Marriage was held valid
Sachit Kumar Dhar No. 8(n) of Court Of governing the
India marriage
1971
26 Amaardeep Singh Civil Appeal Supreme Wavering of 2017 Six month period before
VS. Harveen Kaur No. 11158 Court Of six months the divorce was waived
stipulated off
(Supreme Court of 2017 India
period
followed
judgmentment the
in case mentioind
at row no. 27)
27 Amit Kumar Vs. Civil Appeal Supreme Wavering of 2021 Six month period before
Suman Beniwal No. 7650 of Court Of six months the divorce was waived
2021 India stipulated off
period

1
Case Number: Civil appeal 262 of 1961
Party Name: Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani Vs. Meena
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 1963
Fact: The parties were married in 1946 at Hyderabad in Sind (now in Pakistan), and a
child, a son, was born in 1947. The couple's married life was not as hbeen. It soon tr
more harmoniousanspired that much of the trouble arose out of the fact that while
the appellant and his parents appear to have been of an oand conservative outlook
and bent of mind, the respondent and her parents did not set many stores by
orthodoxy and were liberal and modern. As a result of the partition in 1947, the
parties had to leave Sind. The appellant and his parents stayed in a house in Bombay
while the respondent's parents went to Poona. The appellant complained that the
respondent frequently went to her parent's house. On February 26, 1954, the
respondent left the appellant's house and went to Poona. The evidence was
conflicting as to whether she obtained the appellant’s permission before going to
Poona, but the facts showed that the respondent did not return to the appellant's
house after that date. The appellant and a friend, Dr. Lulla, went to Poona to bring
back the respondent. The evidence of what transpired during the interview with the
respondent was somewhat conflicting. The appellant's case was that the respondent
intimated her fixed determination not to go back to him. On July 7, 1954, th
respondent, and her father wen abroad to the Far Eastern countries to recoup her
health, according to her. Before going abroad, the respondent had to go to Bombay
g, , get a passport, and go through the formalitiend while she was staying, she was in
a house very near the appellant's but d not visit him, o r see their child. On learning
that the respondent had gone abroad without intimation to him he cabled to her
asking her to come back immediately but the respondent did not do so as required
by the appellant. There was some correspondence' about the matter and the
respondent continued to say in her letters that she would soon come back to his
place. By his letter dated April 1, 1955, the appellant used strong language passing
severe strictures against her conduct &id in her continuing to be abroad without
obeying his instructions. The respondent replied by letter dated April 12, 1955,
saying: "As soon as my health has completely improved I shall, of course come back
to you and to our son." After this there was no further correspondence between the,
parties. In April, 1956, the respondent returned to India but she did not o the
appellant’s home nor did meetorn September 20, 1956, the appellant filed the
present petition praying for judicial separation under s. 10(1)(a) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955. The respondent's defenses to the petition, inter alia, were that
she never left the appellant's matrimonial home with the intention of breaking it and
that, in any case, the appellant charged her falsely with immorality in his letter dated
April 1, 1955, and so she was justified in living separately.

Summary Of Outcome: The evidence was clear that the respondent left her
matrimonial home with her husband's and his parents' permission and that it was
impossible to infer from the evidence given by Dr. Lulla that the respondent decided
to abandon the appellant. The letters demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt
that the wife did not demonstrate beyond band with the requisite animus, but on
the other hand, showed her willingness to go over to Bombay as soon as she
regained her health. Given the false allegations made by the appellant in his letter
dated April 1, 1954, in which he charged the respondent with unchastity and leading
a fast and reckless life, from that date the desertion, if any, on the part of the
respondent came to an end and from that date the appellant was guilty of desertion.
2
Case Number: Criminal Appeal no. 684 of 1982
Party Name: Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Kumar and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 1985

Fact: The complainant was married to Suraj Kumar, Accused No. 1 (respondent) on
4.2.72 at Ludhiana according to Hindu rites and customs in the presence of
respectable persons. Accused No. 2 was the father and accused Nos. 3 to 5 were
brothers and No. 6 was the brother-in-law of accused No. 1 It is further alleged that
all the accused attended and actively participated in the marriage of the complainant
and demanded dowry. The most important allegation made by the appellant was
that her parents and relatives gave by way of dowry articles wroth Rs. 60,000/-
inclusive of gold ornaments, clothes and other things which were entrusted to
accused Nos. 1 to 6 on 5.2.72 which were taken into possession by them. Soon after
the marriage, accused No. 1 started harassing, teasing and beating the complainant
and ultimately turned her out along-with her children sometime in the year 1977. It
was averred in para 4 of the complaint that accused never returned the articles to
her. The list revealed that so far as the jewellery and clothes, blouses, nighties and
gowns are concerned they could be used only by the wife and were her stridhan and
refused to be returned to the wife by the husband and his parents, it amounted to an
offence of criminal breach of trust.
Summary Of Outcome: 'Stridhan' is a property that always remains within the
possession wife and if a husband or any other member of her family fails to hand
over 'stridhan' to the wife they will be liable for the offense of criminal breach of
trust under Sections 405 and 406 - Court in exercise of power under Section 482 to
quash a complaint should proceed entirely on basis of allegations and if ingredients
of Section 405 and 406 were made out then High Court not justified in quashing the
proceedings - Evidence showed that there was prima facie there was a case under
Section 406 and allegations were both specific and unambiguous and thus appellant
cannot be denied the right to prove her case by preempting it - Held, Order of High
Court set aide - Appeal allowed.

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 1794 of 2013

Party Name: K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A. Deepa
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2013

Fact: The marriage between the Appellant-husband and the Respondent-wife was
solemnized on 25/4/1999 as per Hindu rites and customs. Unfortunately, on the very
next day , disputes arose between the elders on both sides, resulting in their abusing
each other and hurling chappals at each other. Consequently, on 27/4/1999, the
newly married couple separated without consummation of the marriage and started
living separately. On 4/10/1999, the Respondent-wife lodged a criminal complaint
against the Appellant-husband before the Women Protection Cell alleging inter alia
that the Appellant-husband is harassing her for more dowry. This complaint is very
crucial to this case. We shall advert to it more in detail a little later. Escalated
acrimony led to complaints and counter complaints. The Respondent-wife filed a
petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for restitution of conjugal
rights before the Family Court, Secunderabad. The Appellant-husband filed a
counter-claim seeking dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty and desertion
under Section 13(1)(i-a) and (b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Decree of divorce
granted by family court in favour of appellant-husband on ground of cruelty and
desertion by wife. High Court set aside decree of divorce held that because husband
and wife did not stay together therefore no question of parties causing cruelty to
each other. According to the High Court, the conclusion that the Respondent-wife
caused mental cruelty to the Appellant-husband is based on presumptions and
assumptions.

Summary Of Outcome: The High Court wrongly held that because the appellant-
husband and the respondent-wife did not stay together, there is no question of the
parties causing cruelty to each other. Staying together under the same roof is not a
pre-condition for mental cruelty. The spouse can cause mental cruelty by his or her
conduct even while he or she is not staying under the same roof. In a given case,
while staying away, a spouse can cause mental cruelty to the other spouse by
sending vulgar and defamatory letters or notices or filing complaints containing
indecent allegations or by initiating number of judicial proceedings making the other
spouse's life miserable. In a given case, while staying away, a spouse can cause
mental cruelty to the other spouse by sending vulgar and defamatory letters or
notices or filing complaints containing indecent allegations or by initiating number of
judicial proceedings making the other spouse's life miserable. In the instant case, the
marriage has irretrievably broken down. A marriage which is dead for all purposes
cannot be revived by the Court's verdict, if the parties are not willing. This is because
marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up, there is
hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion
created by the Court's decree. The marriage between the Appellant-husband - K.
Srinivas Rao and the Respondent-wife - D.A. Deepa is dissolved by a decree of
divorce. The Appellant-husband shall pay to the Respondent-wife permanent
alimony in the sum of Rs. 15,00,000/-, in three instalments.

Court also led down general direction, which courts dealing with matrimonial
matters shall follow:

(a) In terms of Section 9 of the Family Courts Act, the Family Courts shall make all
efforts to settle the matrimonial disputes through mediation. Even if the Counsellors
submit a failure report, the Family Courts shall, with the parties’ consent, refer the
matter to the mediation centre. In such a case, however, the Family Courts shall set a
reasonable time limit for mediation centres to complete the mediation process
because otherwise the resolution of the disputes by the Family Court may get
delayed. In a given case, if there is good chance of settlement, the Family Court in its
discretion, can always extend the time limit.

(b) The criminal courts dealing with the complaint under Section 498-A of the Indian
Penal Code should, at any stage and particularly, before they take up the complaint
for hearing, refer the parties to mediation centre if they feel that there exist
elements of settlement and both the parties are willing. However, they should take
care to see that in this exercise, rigour, purport and efficacy of Section 498-A of the
Indian Penal Code is not diluted. The discretion to grant or not to grant bail is not in
any way curtailed by this direction. It will be for the concerned court to work out the
modalities considering each case’s facts.

(c) All mediation centres shall set up pre-litigation desks/clinics; give them wide
publicity and make efforts to settle matrimonial disputes at pre-litigation stage .

4
Case Number: I.A. No. 1 of 1993 in Civil Appeal No. 424 of 1987
Party Name: V. Bhagat Vs. D. Bhagat
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 1993

Fact: The respondent worked in a Television Company at the time of her marriage.
After the birth of a child she left the job in August, 1967. The respondent started
working again from the year, 1972 onwards. To start with she was employed in a
Travel Agency. Somewhere around 1978-79, the petitioner began suspecting her of
infidelity. According to him, when he questioned the respondent of her adulterous
behaviour, she admitted the same and asked to be pardoned. The wife denies this.
She says, she never made any such admission and that the allegation is a totally false
one. From 1980 onwards the petitioner was making attempts to obtain a divorce by
consent. The respondent was not willing. On May 28. 1985, he instituted the present
petition for divorce in the District Court, Delhi. The divorce petition runs into more
than 160 paragraphs. The main ground is adultery. According to husband, the wife is
an incorrigible adulteress. The respondent filed the written statement denying the
allegations. The written statement, if anything, is even lengthier and more
voluminous than the divorce petition. She had denied the allegation in toto.
According to her, the husband is like Othello - a pathologically suspicious character.
Subsequently, petition was modified and divorce sought on grounds of mental
cruelty.

Summary Of Outcome: To constitute cruelty under Section 13 (1) apprehension of

harm to physical and mental health is not essential; facts and circumstances of every
individual case is to be considered before decreeing divorce on cruelty, in a present
case alleging appellant of mental insanity in her defense was not necessary and
caused acute anguish and pain to him. Also, the respondent’s attitude is causing
more pain and sorrow to appellant by continuing to live with him in spite of her
allegations and knowing that marriage is irretrievably broken down counts as mental
cruelty. Divorce granted

Case Number: W.P. (C) No. 798 of 1995

Party Name: Lily Thomas and ors. Vs. Union Of India and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2000
Fact: That a writ petition was being filed by Smt. Sushmita Ghosh, the wife of Shri GC
Ghosh in the concerned Court, stated that the marriage between them
was solemnized on 10.05.1984 in accordance with the religious rites and ritual of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. On 01.04.1992, Mr. Ghosh asked the petitioner
for divorce by mutual consent while stating that he had converted to Islam with an
intention of contracting a second marriage with Miss Vanita Gupta, a divorcee with two
children in the second week of July 1992.
The respondent also produced the certificate before the concerned
court, certifying that he had embraced Islam. It was further contended that the
petitioner and her family made several attempts to convince the respondent not to end
their marital ties, but all in vain. Instead, he insisted the petitioner should divorce,
otherwise, she will have to put up with the second wife. Thus, it was amply clear from
the above-stated facts that the Respondent has converted to Islam solely to remarry
and had actually no faith in Islam. The petitioner asserts her fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article 15(1) not to be discriminated against on the grounds of religion
and sex alone. She avers that part of Muslim Personal Law which is enforced by the
State Action by issue of the Muslim Personal Law Act 1937, has discriminated against
her. Such action is contrary to Article 13(1) and is unconstitutional. Hence, through this
petition, it is prayed by the petitioner that there should be interdiction of the proposed
second marriage, which is scheduled to take place on 10.07.1992. It is also urged that
the respondent, whose marriage with the petitioner is legal and subsisting, cannot take
advantage of the feigned conversion so as to be able to take a second wife.

Summary Of Outcome: The court found no substance in the submissions made on

behalf of the petitioner regarding the judgment being violative of the fundamental
rights guaranteed to the citizens of India. Thus, the court states that the alleged violation
of Article 21 is misconceived. What is guaranteed under Article 21 is that no person shall
be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure
established by law. It is conceded that, actually and factually, none of the petitioners has
been deprived of any right of his life and personal liberty so far. However, the aggrieved
persons are apprehended to be prosecuted for the commission of offence punishable
under Section 494 IPC. Considering the above-mentioned facts and circumstances, it
was held that the conversion or apostasy does not automatically dissolve a marriage
already solemnized under the Hindu Marriage Act but only provides a ground for
divorce under Section 18. Till a decree of divorce is passed, the marriage subsists. Any
other marriage, during the subsistence of the first marriage would constitute an offence
under Section 494 read with Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the person,
despite his conversion to some other religion, would be liable to be prosecuted for the
offence of bigamy.

Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 7657/2020

Party Name: Raghavendra Prasad V. and Ors. Vs. Hemalatha and Ors.
Court: High Court Of Karnataka at Bengaluru
Year: 2021

Fact: The marriage of respondent No. 1 was solemnized with accused No. 1 in 2016.
In the complaint respondent, No. 1 has made an allegation that before marriage, the
accused demanded an amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- to purchase a flat for accused No.
1, and it was decided in the panchayat to give Rs. 6,00,000/- and 150 grams of gold
and apart from that one site at Mysore to be transferred in the name of respondent
No. 1. Thereafter, the petitioners looked after respondent No. 1 for a period of six
months and thereafter the petitioners started harassing complainant/respondent
No. 1 and insisted her to get additional dowry of Rs. 2,00,000/- by selling the site or
to get amount from the bank by availing loan. They also insisting her to hand over
the entire salary to them. It is also an allegation that they were abusing her in filthy
language. A particular allegation is made against the father-in-law that he was
causing a threat to life to bring additional dowry from the parents' house. It is also an
allegation against the sister-in-law that on 3rd June, she called over the phone and
abused her in a filthy language and also threatened that if she does not get the
money, they are going to give divorce to her. It also implies that they have driven her
out of the house after snatching all the gold ornaments. Meanwhile, she gave birth
to a boy child on 19.08.2017. It is also an allegation that the complaint was given on
issued.2017 and the police had called the husband’s family members, and they had
given an undertaking. Despite agreeing to make a separate house, not they make
made it a detached house. Based on the complaint, the police have registered the
case against the petitioners, investigated the matter, and filed the charge sheet.

Summary Of Outcome: The learned counsel for the petitioners would vehemently
contend that for having paid Rs. 6,00,000/-, there is no averment. On perusal of the
records, it discloses that it was agreed and whether they have paid or not, is the
disputed question to be decided in the trial. At this stage, this Court exercising power
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., cannot determine the same. The allegation made
against sister-in-law Sowmya (petitioner No. 4) was that she called over the phone
and abused the complainant. She also used an allegation to instigate accused No. 1
and other family members. Having noted that petitioner No. 4 is married and staying
separately, I think it is a fit case to exercise discretion in respect of sister-in-law -
petitioner No. 4. Otherwise, it amounts to an abuse of process which leads to
miscarriage of justice. The Petition was allowed partly in respect of petitioner No. 4

Case Number: Criminal Appeal no. 730 0f 2020

Party Name: Rajnesh Vs. Neha and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2020
Fact: The Respondent No. 1-wife left the matrimonial home shortly after the birth of
the son-Respondent No. 2. The wife filed an application for interim maintenance
under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure on behalf of herself and the minor son.
The Family Court vide a detailed Order awarded interim maintenance to the
Respondent No. 1-wife and Respondent No. 2-son. The Appellant-husband challenged
the Order of the Family Court vide Criminal Writ Petition filed before the High Court,
Nagpur Bench. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and affirmed the
Judgment passed by the Family Court. This Court issued notice to the wife and
directed the Appellant-husband to file his Income Tax Returns and Assessment
Orders. He was also directed to place a photocopy of his passport on record. By a
further Order, the Appellant-husband was directed to make payment of the arrears
towards interim maintenance to the wife and a further amount which was due and
payable to the wife towards arrears of maintenance, as per his own admission. By a
subsequent Order, it was recorded that only a part of the arrears had been paid. A final
opportunity was granted to the Appellant-husband to make payment of the balance
amount, failing which, the Court would proceed under the Contempt of Courts Act for
wilful disobedience with the Orders passed by this Court. In the backdrop of the facts
of this case, it was fit to frame guidelines on certain aspects pertaining to the payment
of maintenance in matrimonial matters.

Summary Of Outcome: (i) The Judgment and order passed by the Family Court,
affirmed by the High Court for payment of interim maintenance to the Respondent
No. 1-wife, and Respondent No. 2-son, was affirmed by this Court. The husband was
directed to pay the entire arrears of maintenance within a period of twelve weeks
from the date of this Judgment, and continue to comply with this Order during the
pendency of the proceedings under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure before
the Family Court. If the Appellant-husband fails to comply with this Court’s
directions, it would be open to the Respondents to have the Order enforced under
Section 128 Code of Criminal Procedure and take recourse to all other remedies
which are available per the law.

(ii) To overcome the issue of overlapping jurisdiction, and avoid conflicting orders
being passed in different proceedings, it had become necessary to issue directions in
this regard, so that there was uniformity in the practice followed by the Family
Courts/District Courts/Magistrate Courts throughout the country. It was directed
that

(a) where a party made successive claims for maintenance under different statutes,
the Court would consider an adjustment or set-off, of the amount awarded in the
previous proceeding/s, while determining whether any further amount was to be
awarded in the subsequent proceeding.

(b) it was made mandatory for the Applicant to disclose the previous proceeding and
the orders passed therein, in the subsequent proceeding.
(c) if the order passed in the previous proceeding/s requires any modification or
variation, it would be required to be done in the same proceeding.

(iii) The Affidavit of Disclosure of Assets and Liabilities annexed of this judgment, as
may be applicable, shall be filed by both parties in all maintenance proceedings,
including pending proceedings before the concerned Family Court/District
Court/Magistrates Court, as the case may be, throughout the country.

(iv) For determining the quantum of maintenance payable to an applicant, the Court
shall take into account the criteria enumerated in Part B - III of the judgment.

(v) The maintenance in all cases will be awarded from the date of filing the
application for maintenance.

(vi) For enforcement/execution of orders of maintenance, it was directed that an

order or decree of maintenance may be enforced under Section 28A of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1956 (sic1955), Section 20(6) of the D.V. Act and Section 128 of Code
of Criminal Procedure, as may be applicable. The maintenance order may be
enforced as a civil court money decree per the Code of Civil Procedure provisions,
particularly Sections 51, 55, 58, 60 read with Order 21.

The court held that maintenance granted under the DV act is in addition to the
maintenance granted under maintenance under Crpc and HMA act.

Criteria for determining the Quantum of maintenance:-

(i) The objective of granting interim/permanent alimony is to ensure that the

dependant spouse is not reduced to destitution or vagrancy on account of the failure
of the marriage, and not as a punishment to the other spouse. There is no
straitjacket formula for fixing the quantum of maintenance to be awarded. The
factors which would weigh with the Court inter alia are the status of the parties.

(ii) A careful and just balance must be drawn between all relevant factors.The test for
determination of maintenance in matrimonial disputes depends on the financial
status of the Respondent, and the standard of living that the Applicant was
accustomed to in her matrimonial home.

(iii) Section 23 of HAMA provides statutory guidance concerning the criteria for
determining the quantum of maintenance. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 of HAMA
provides the following factors which may be taken into consideration: (i) position and
status of the parties, (ii) reasonable wants of the claimant, (iii) if the
Petitioner/claimant is living separately, the justification for the same, (iv) value of the
claimant's property and any income derived from such property, (v) income from
claimant's own earning or from any other source.
(iv) Section 20(2) of the D.V. Act provides that the monetary relief granted to the
aggrieved woman and/or the children must be adequate, fair, reasonable, and
consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved woman was
accustomed to in her matrimonial home.

(v) The Delhi High Court in Bharat Hedge v. Smt. Saroj Hegde MANU/DE/1518/2007 :
140 (2007) DLT 16 laid down the following factors to be considered for determining
maintenance:

1. Status of the parties.

2. Reasonable wants of the claimant.

3. The independent income and property of the claimant.

4. The number of persons, the non-applicant has to maintain.

5. The amount should aid the Applicant to live in a similar lifestyle as he/she enjoyed
in the matrimonial home.

6. Non-Applicant's liabilities, if any.

7. Provisions for food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attendance and

treatment etc. of the applicant.

8. Payment capacity of the non-applicant.

9. Some guess work is not ruled out while estimating the income of the non-
applicant when all the sources or correct sources are not disclosed.

10. The non-applicant to defray the cost of litigation.

11. The amount awarded Under Section 125 Code of Criminal Procedure is adjustable
against the amount awarded Under Section 24 of the Act.

(vi) Apart from the aforesaid factors enumerated hereinabove, certain additional
factors would also be relevant for determining the quantum of maintenance payable.

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 1687 of 2006

Party Name: Vinita Saxena Vs. Pankaj Pandit
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2006
Fact: The marriage between the appellant-Vinita Saxena and the respondent-Pankaj
Pandit was solemnized on 7.2.1993 as per Hindu rites and customs. No child was born
out of wedlock. According to the appellant, the marriage lasted for five months and was
never consummated because the respondent was incapable of performing his
matrimonial obligations. According to the appellant, from the first day of the marriage,
the respondent's mother treated the appellant with utmost cruelty both mental and
physical and that the reason for cruelty was the respondent's mental disorder. The
respondent's case is a case of Paranoid Schizophrenia. The appellant discovered only
after the marriage that the respondent was under constant treatment and observations
of different doctors even before the marriage for the said ailment. Though the appellant
knew the respondent before her marriage it is only after the marriage, the appellant
realised and discovered the mental disorder of the respondent. The appellant was never
told by the respondent nor his parents that he was suffering from such serious mental
disorder and that he was under the treatment and used to take strong medicines before
the marriage. According to Dr. C.R. Samanta, who was a consultant psychiatrist at
Aashlok Hospital, the respondent was a case of Schizophrenia and depression. On
4.7.1993, the appellant tried to discuss regarding the problems she was facing with the
respondent and her mother-in-law, who objected strongly and accused the appellant of
defaming the respondent. At her instance, the appellant was beaten mercilessly by the
respondent, which made him nervous to the extent that he consumed "Baygon Spray"
to commit suicide. The appellant and her brother immediately took the respondent to
the hospital in order to save the respondent's life. Again, Dr. C.R. Samantha prescribed
certain medicines i.e. (1) Triperidol (2) Pacitane (3) Prodep to the respondent. The
respondent was hospitalised for four days at Aashlok Hospital, Safdarjung Enclave and
was discharged after giving proper treatment on 7.7.1993. According to the appellant,
Triperidol is given in case of acute and chronic psychoses anxiety disorders, mania,
Schizophrenia as per the medical advise. The situation further became worse on
8.7.1993 and 9.7.1993. Again on the instigation of the respondent's mother, the
respondent slapped and abused the appellant mercilessly and she was not even allowed
to have food that day and the next day morning i.e. on 9.7.1993. On 9.7.1993, the
appellant was pushed and kicked out of the matrimonial home by her mother-in-law
and the respondent and thereafter, the appellant was not permitted to return again.
The appellant filed H.M.A. Petition on 30.6.1994 against the respondent for dissolution
of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) and (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 hereinafter
referred to as "the Act" on the grounds of mental and physical cruelty and insanity
before the Court of District Judge at Delhi. The trial Court vide its order dated 15.5.1993,
relying on the facts and averments made by the parties as well as taking the medical
documents placed on record observed that a letter of request should be written to the
Medical Superintendent, L.N.J.P. Hospital to constitute a panel of doctors to examine
the respondent and to report about his mental state. However, this order was
subsequently set aside by the High Court in a Revision Petition filed by the respondent.
After the marriage had broken down the appellant pursued further studies and
completed M.S. (Structural Engineering) from IIT Delhi and in 1996, left for her Ph.D.
programme to U.S.A. Father of the appellant, J.S. Saxena, deposed as PW-II and the
appellant as PW-I and Dr. D.S. Arora, Medical Superintendent, Aashlok Hospital and Dr
Kuldeep Kumar of Safdarjung Hospital recorded their statement as PW-III and PW-IV
respectively supporting the case of the appellant.

Summary Of Outcome: Workable solution certainly not possible. Hence, decree of

divorce in favour of appellant wife and against respondent husband granted. Order of
trial court as affirmed by High Court set aside. The word 'cruelty' has not been defined
and has been used with human conduct or behavior. Mental cruelty can cause even
more serious injury than physical harm and create such apprehension in the mind of the
injured appellant as contemplated in the section. Under Section 13 (1) (iii) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955, mental disorder' as a ground of divorce is only where it is of such a
kind and degree that the appellant cannot reasonably be expected to live with the
respondent. Where the parties are young and the mental disorder is of such a type that
sexual act and procreation of children is not possible, it may furnish a good ground for
nullifying the marriage because to beget children from a Hindu wedlock is one of the
principal aim of Hindu Marriage where sanskar of marriage is advised for progeny and
offspring. Marriage without sex is anathema. Sex is the foundation of marriage.

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 2224 of 1970

Party Name: N.G. Dastane Vs. S. Dastane
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 1975

Fact: The parents of respondent, i.e., Sucheta proposed marriage to the appellant in
April 1956. The respondent was B. Sc. Graduate and had a Master’s degree in social
work. Before finalizing the marriage proposal, the respondent’s father sent the letter to
the appellant to inform him about the incident that the respondent suffered from a
‘severe attack of sunstroke’ which affected her mental condition for some time, and
now she was recovered from that attack and also stated she was cured. No further
inquiries were raised after the confirming incident with the doctor. They married and had
two daughters; the appellant asked for police protection saying that the respondent was
a threat to life. The appellant moved a petition to the court to revoke the marriage under
section 12(1)(c) Of Hindu marriage act,1955 because his consent has been obtained by
fraud. He also requested for divorce under section 13(1) (iii) of the Hindu Marriage
Act,1955 and for judicial separation under the same act.

Summary Of Outcome: Court found that the respondent was guilty of cruelty but
the appellant condoned it and the subsequent conduct of the respondent was not
such as to amount to a revival of the original cause of action - appeal dismissed.
 10
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 383 of 2003
Party Name: B.S. Joshi and Ors. Vs. State Of Haryana and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2003

Fact: Appellant No. 4 is the husband. Respondent No. is his wife. Their marriage had
taken place on 21st July, 1999. They are living separately since 15th July, 2000. Appellant
Nos. 1 to 3 are father, mother and younger brother of appellant No. 4. FIR No. 8 of 2002
was registered under Section 498A/323 and 406 IPC at Police Station, Central Faridabad
at the instance of the wife on 2nd January, 2002. She has filed an affidavit that the FIR
was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied
imputations. According to that affidavit, her disputes with the appellants have been
finally settled and she had Appellants No. 4 have agreed for mutual divorce. The
affidavit further states that on filing of the petition for mutual divorce, statements on
first motion was recorded on 18th July, 2002 and 2nd September, 2002. Also that in
second motion filed by the parties to the marriage, their statements were recorded by
the Court of Additional District Judge, Delhi on 13th September, 2002. Counsel for
respondent No. 2 supporting the appeal also prays for quashing of the FIR. There is
however, serious opposition on behalf of the State.. The High Court has, by the
impugned judgment, dismissed the petition filed by the appellants seeking quashing of
the FIR for given the High Court the offences under Sections 498A and 406 IPC are non-
compoundable. The inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be invoked
to bypass the mandatory provision of Section 320 of the Code.

Summary Of Outcome: The object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section

498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her
husband or her relatives. Section 498A was added to punisha husband and his
relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy
unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counterproductive
and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this
provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power
to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women for
settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of Indian Penal Code. Hence
the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or
F.I.R. or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers
under Section 482 of the Code.
 11

Case Number: Civil Appeal no. 5933of 2000

Party Name: Sharda Vs. Dharmpal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2003

Fact: The parties herein were married on 26.6.1991 according to the Hindu rites. On or
about 3.6.1995, the respondent filed an application for divorce against the appellant
under Section 12(1)(b) and 13(1)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. He filed an
application seeking directions for medical examination of the appellant on 5th May,
1999. The appellant objected tnter alia on the ground that the Court had no jurisdiction
to pass such directions. By an order dated 8.10.1999, the said application was allowed
directing the appellant to submit herself to the medical examination. Aggrieved by the
said order, she filed a Revision Petition before the High Court which was dismissed by
the impugned judgment.

Summary Of Outcome: The Court, after elaborate discussion, concluded :

(1) A matrimonial court can order a person to undergo a medical test.
(2) Passing such an order by the Court would not violate the right to personal liberty
under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
(3) However, the Court should exercise such a power if the applicant has a strong
prima facie case and there is sufficient material before the Court. If, despite the
Court’s order, the respondent refuses to submit himself to a medical examination,
the Court will be entitled to draw an adverse inference against him.In some
instances, a medical examination by experts in the field may not only be found to be
leading to the truth of the matter. Still, it may also lead to the removal of
misunderstandings between the parties. It may bring the parties to terms.In
matrimonial disputes, the Court also has a conciliatory role; even for the said
purpose, it may require expert advice.If for arriving at the satisfaction of the Court
and to protect the right of a party to the lies who may otherwise be found to be
incapable of saving his interest, the Court passes an appropriate order, the question
of such action being violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India would not
arise. The Court, regarding Article 21 of the Constitution of India, must also see to it
that the right of a person to defend himself must be adequately protected.
 12

Case Number: Civil Appeal no. 491 of 2006 and 5099 of 2007
Party Name: Gaurav Nagpal Vs. Sumedha Nagpal
Court: Supreme Court of India
Year: 2008

Fact: The parties got married on 14.10.1996 and the child from their wedlock was born
on 15.11.1997. According to the appellant, the respondent abandoned the child on
8.8.1999 but she filed a Habeas Corpus Petition before the Delhi High Court on
25.8.1999. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction.
Respondent filed a Special Leave Petition against the High Court's order dated 14.1.2000
and a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
`Constitution'). This Court permitted interim custody of the 20-month-old child with the
appellant. The respondent filed a maintenance petition before the Delhi High Court and
a petition for guardianship before a learned Additional District Judge, Jhajjar. The same
was later withdrawn and the petition was filed in the District Court, Gurgaon. Appellant
filed his reply opposing the application on the ground that the respondent had deserted
the child. By order dated 2.5.2002, learned Civil Judge dismissed the application for
interim custody holding that any disturbance by changing the custody of the child would
traumatize him and shall not be conducive to the welfare of the child. It would affect the
mental balance of the child who had developed love and affection for his father and his
family members. The respondent filed a Revision Petition before the High Court. The
High Court granted the visitation rights to the respondent by order 30.9.2002 but
continued the interim custody with the appellant.

Summary Of Outcome: The principles about the custody of a minor child, are well
settled. In determining the question as to who should be given control of a little child,
the paramount consideration is the `welfare of the child' and not the rights of the
parents under a statute for the time being in force. Merely because there is no defect in
his personal care and his attachment to his children which every average parent has,
he would not be granted custody.

13

Case Number: R/Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 26957, 24342 of 2017 and R/Special
Criminal Application No. 7083 of 2017
Party Name: Nimeshbhai Bharatbhai Desai Vs. State Of Gujarat
Court: High Court Of Gujarat At Ahemdabad
Year: 2018
Fact: The first informant married one Nimeshbhai Desai, original accused No. 1 on 20th
May 2014. Soon after the marriage, matrimonial disputes cropped up between the
husband and wife, ultimately leading to the filing of the first information report for the
offenses of sexual abuse.

Summary Of Outcome: The husband cannot be prosecuted for the offense of rape
punishable under section 376 of the IPC at the instance of his wife, as marital rape is
not covered under section 375 of the IPC. The husband cannot be prosecuted for of
offense rape at the instance of his wife in inception-II in section 375 of the IPC, which
provides that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his wife not being
under 18 years of age is not rape. The exemption is given to marital rape, as Justice
Verma noted, "stems from a long outdated notion of marriage which regarded wives
as no more than the property of their husbands.” Marital rape ought to be a crime
and not a concept. Of course, there will be objections, such as a perceived threat to
the integrity of the marriage union and the possibility of misuse of the penal
provisions. It is not true that the private or domestic domain has always been outside
the purview of the law. The law against domestic violence already covers physical
and sexual abuse as grounds for the legal system to intervene. It is difficult to argue
that a complaint of marital rape will ruin a marriage while a complaint of domestic
violence against a spouse will not. It has long been time to jettison the notion of
'implied consent' in marriage. The law must uphold the bodily autonomy of all
women, irrespective of their marital status. A law that does not give married and
unmarried women equal protection creates conditions that lead to marital rape. It
allows men and women to believe that wife rape is acceptable. Making wife rape
illegal or an offense will remove the destructive attitudes that promote marital rape.
Such an action raises a moral boundary informing society that a punishment results if
the limit is transgressed. The Husbands may then begin to recognize that marital
rape is wrong. Recognition and criminal punishment should deter husbands from
raping their wives. Women should not have to tolerate rape and violence in
marriage. The statutory abolition of the marital rape exemption is the first necessary
step in teaching societies that dehumanized treatment of women will not be
tolerated and that marital rape is not a husband's privilege but rather a violent act
and an injustice that must be criminalized.

14
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 1330 of 2009
Party Name: Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Manju Sharma
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2009

Fact: The marriage occurred between the appellant and the respondent on 26.02.1993
and a female child was born on 6.12.1993. In the petition filed by the appellant, it was
alleged that soon after the marriage the respondent was behaving in a cruel manner
derogatory to the appellant and the family members; that the respondent avoided
staying in the matrimonial home and never remained there for more than 25 days
together; and that after leaving the matrimonial home on 19.5.1993 while she was
pregnant with the child, the respondent never returned to live with the appellant. It was
also alleged that the father of the respondent is a retired Sub-Inspector of the Delhi
Police and the brother is a Constable and both used to extend threats to the appellant
and his family members that they would be implicated in false cases. Respondent in her
written statement stated that on 14.09.1994, the appellant and his family members
gave her a severe beating which led to her being medically examined by the doctors at
Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital. A copy of the extract of the MLC register on that date was
enclosed in the written statement. It was also stated that the appellant and his mother
had taken the jewelry of the respondent and given it to the appellant’s brother’s wife.
On asking, the respondent was again assaulted and sought to be burnt alive by the
appellant’s family members. The trial Court, after examining the evidence, concluded
that no case of cruelty had been made out as alleged by the appellant. The Trial Court
held that considering that the respondent had been turned out of the matrimonial
house and had been given beatings for which she was medically examined, the
respondent was treated cruelly by the appellant. The High Court dismissed the appeal.
Hence, this appeal

Summary Of Outcome: The court in some cases has dissolved a marriage on the
ground of irretrievable breakdown. those cases have not considered the legal
position we have mentioned above, and hence they are not precedents. A mere
direction of the Court without considering the legal position is not a precedent The
legislature provides no grounds for irretrievable marriage breakdown for granting a
divorce decree. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that
would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature. Suppose we grant
a divorce based on an irretrievable breakdown. In that case, by the judicial verdict,
we shall be adding a clause to Section 13 of the Act that irretrievable marriage
breakdown is also a ground for divorce.

15
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2310 of 2014
Party Name: Sunita Kachwaha Vs. Anil Kachwaha
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2014
Fact: This appeal is preferred against the Order dated 26.06.2008 passed by the High
Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Revision No. 2303/2007, in and by
which, the High Court has set aside the order of maintenance of Rs. 3,000/- awarded to
the wife while affirming the order of maintenance awarded to the two daughters.
Marriage of the first Appellant was solemnized with Respondent on 5.02.1996 as per
Hindu rites and the spouses are blessed with two daughters. The first daughter Ankita is
aged 12 years and second daughter Akshita is 8 years old as on the date of filing of SLP.
Case of the Appellant-wife is that when she was living in the matrimonial house, the
Respondent and her in-laws were harassing her on the ground that she has not brought
sufficient dowry. The Appellant-wife is alleged to have been subjected to physical and
mental cruelty, demanding car and dowry. As the torture became intolerable, the
Appellant-wife had contacted her brothers in the year 2006, and her brothers came to
Kota to take the Appellants back on 24.04.2006. The matter was reported to the SHO
Police Station, Mahaveer Nagar, Kota about the cruel treatment meted out to the
Appellant-wife by the Respondent and in-laws. Because of the harassment, it is stated
that the Appellant-wife could not continue to reside in the matrimonial house, and the
Appellant-wife along with her children went to her parents house at Jabalpur. The
Appellants claimed maintenance by filing petition Under Section 125 Code of Criminal
Procedure before the Second Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Jabalpur. Keeping
in view the need of the Appellants, the Family Court by its Order dated 29.10.2007
directed the Respondent to pay Rs. 3,000/- per month and Rs. 2,500/- per month to the
Appellant-wife and to each of the daughters respectively.

Summary Of Outcome: Inability to maintain herself is the pre-condition for grant

of maintenance to the wife. The wife must positively aver and prove that she is
unable to maintain herself, in addition to the fact that her husband has sufficient
means to maintain her and that he has neglected to maintain her . The learned
Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the Appellant-wife is well qualified,
having post graduate degree in Geography and working as a teacher in Jabalpur and
Health Department. Therefore, she has an income of her own and needs no financial
support from the Respondent. Because the Appellant-wife is a qualified
postgraduate, more is required to hold that she is in a position to maintain herself. In
her employment as a teacher in Jabalpur, nothing was placed on record before the
Family Court or the High Court to prove her employment and earnings. In any event,
merely because the wife was earning something, it would not be a ground to reject
her claim for maintenance.
 16
Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 511-5512 of 2015
Party Name: Vinod Kumar Subbiah Vs. Saraswathi Palaniappan
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2015

Fact: The Appellant and the Respondent were married on 28.6.2004 and moved to the
U.S. on 9.7.2004. They visited Chennai in October 2005 and June 2006. During the latter
visit, the Respondent was three months pregnant and left for her parental home in
Madurai on 10.6.2006 where she gave birth to a male child on 5.12.2006. The Appellant
subsequently filed for divorce Under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act on
30.4.2007. The case put forward by the Appellant is that the Respondent was verbally
abusive; she would insult his family; she would threaten to lodge false police complaints;
and she would threaten to commit suicide placing the blame on the Appellant and his
family. After she left for her parental home in June 2006, the Appellant attempted to
bring her back to her matrimonial home but she refused. The Appellant claims he has
been put through intolerable mental agony and can no longer continue to marry the
Respondent. The Respondent denied these allegations and claimed that she and the
Appellant lived happily in the U.S. and only went to her parental home in June 2006 for
her child to be born there. She has pleaded that she returned to Chennai with her child
from March to April 2007, that the divorce petition was completely unexpected and was
the result of a misunderstanding between her family and that of the Appellant. She
subsequently filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights Under Section 9 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, praying that the Appellant be directed to take her back to her
conjugal home, which she pleaded is in the U.S. She alleged that her husband is living a
wayward life, that her father-in-law misbehaved with her, and that her parents-in-law
were negligent with her infant child and asked her to leave the house when she
questioned them about this. She also filed a maintenance petition seeking Rs. 2 lakhs
per month as maintenance. Single Judge of High Court set aside judgment of Trial Court
and dismissed divorce petition filed by Appellant-husband - Hence, present appeal

Summary Of Outcome: The Trial Court examined the evidence at great length and
concluded that the Respondent’s actions amounted to cruelty. If a spouse abuses the
other as being born from a prostitute, this cannot be termed "wear and tear" of
family life. Summoning the police on false or flimsy grounds cannot be similarly
viewed. Making it impossible for any close relatives to visit or reside in the
matrimonial home would also indubitably result in cruelty to the other spouse. After
a cursory discussion of the evidence that the Trial Court had discussed threadbare,
the High Court was not justified to set aside the conclusions arrived at without giving
substantiated reasons.
 17
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 5837 of 2006
Party Name: S.R. Batra and Ors. Vs. Taruna Batra
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2006

Fact: After the marriage respondent Taruna Batra started living with her husband Amit
Batra in the house of the appellant No. 2 in the second floor. It is not disputed that the
said house which is at B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi belongs to the appellant No. 2
and not to her son Amit Batra. Amit Batra filed a divorce petition against his wife Taruna
Batra, and it is alleged that as a counter blast to the divorce petition Smt. Taruna Batra
filed an F.I.R. under Sections 406/498A/506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and got her
father-in-law, mother-in-law, her husband and married sister-in-law arrested by the
police they were granted bail only after three days. It is admitted that Smt. Taruna Batra
had shifted to her parent's residence because of the dispute with her husband. She later
alleged that when she tried to enter the house of the appellant No. 2 at property No. B-
135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi she found the main entrance locked and hence she filed
Suit No. 87/2003 for a mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. The
appellants’ case was that before the trial Judge could pass any order on the suit filed by
their daughter-in-law, Smt. Taruna Batra and her parents forcibly broke open the
house's locks at Ashok Vihar belonging to appellant No. 2, the mother-in-law of Smt.
Taruna Batra. The appellants alleged that they have been terrorized by their daughter-
in-law and had to stay in their office for some time. The appellants state that their son
Amit Batra, husband of the respondent, had shifted to his flat at Mohan Nagar,
Ghaziabad before the above litigation between the parties had started. The learned trial
Judge decided both the applications for temporary injunction filed in suit No. 87/2003
by the parties by his order on 4.3.2003. He held that the petitioner had the second floor
of the property and he granted a temporary injunction restraining the appellants from
interfering with the possession of Smt. Taruna Batra, respondent herein. Against the
aforesaid order the appellants filed an appeal before the Senior Civil Judge, Delhi who by
his order dated 17.9.2004 held that Smt. Taruna Batra was not residing in the second
floor of the premises in question. He also held that her husband Amit Batra was not
living in the suit property and the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place
where only wife was residing. He also held that Smt. Taruna Batra had no right to the
properties other than that of her husband. Hence, he allowed the appeal and dismissed
the temporary injunction application. Aggrieved by it Taruna Batra filed a petition.
Hence, this appeal.

Summary Of Outcome: The claim for alternative accommodation can only be made
against the husband and not against the husband's in-laws or other relatives. As
regards Section 17(1) of the Act, in our opinion, the wife is only entitled to claim a
right to residence in a shared household, and a 'shared household' would only mean
the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband or the place which belongs
to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The property in question in the
present case neither belongs to Amit Batra nor was it taken on rent by him, nor is it a
joint family property of which the husband, Amit Batra is a member; is the exclusive
property of appellant No. 2, mother of Amit Batra. Hence it cannot be called a
'shared household.’

18
Case Number: Criminal Appeal Nos. 564-565 of 2015
Party Name: Shamima Farooqui Vs. Shahid Khan
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2015

Fact: The Appellant filed an application Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Code of Criminal Procedure) contending, inter alia, that she married Shahid
Khan, the Respondent herein, on 26.4.1992 and during her stay at the matrimonial
home she was prohibited from talking to others, and the husband not only demanded a
car from the family but also started harassing her. A time came when he sent her to the
parental home where she was compelled to stay for almost three months. The
indifferent husband did not come to take her back to the matrimonial home, but she
returned with the fond and firm hope that the bond of wedlock would be sustained and
cemented with love and peace but as the misfortune would have it, the demand for the
vehicle continued and the harassment was used as a weapon for fulfilment of the
demand. In due course she came to learn that the husband had illicit relationship with
another woman and he wanted to marry her. Usual to sense of human curiosity and
wife's right when she asked him she was assaulted. The situation gradually worsened
and it became unbearable for her to stay at the matrimonial home. At that juncture, she
sought help of her parents who came and took her to the parental home at Lucknow
where she availed treatment. Being deserted and ill-treated and, in a way, suffering
from fear psychosis she took shelter in the house of her parents and when all her hopes
got shattered for reunion, she filed an application for grant of maintenance at the rate
of Rs. 4000/- per month on the foundation that husband was working on the post of
Nayak in the Army and getting a salary of Rs. 10,000/- approximately apart from other
perks. High Court modified awarded maintenance by holding that Family Court had not
ascribed any reason for grant of maintenance - Hence, present appeal

Summary Of Outcome: Held, Section 125 of the Code had been rightly held to be
applicable by Family Judge - Though the application for grant of maintenance was
filed, it was only decided for a decade - There was no order for the assistance of
interim maintenance. High Court had shown immense sympathy to the husband by
reducing ing amount after his retirement – The wife was entitled to lead a life
similarly as she would have lived in the house of her husband – The obligation of the
husband was on a higher pedestal when the question of maintenance of the wife and
children arose - Solely because the husband had retired, there was no justification
for reducing maintenance by its half - Impugned order set aside and order of Family
Court restored, Appeal allowed.

19
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 3253 of 2008
Party Name: Narendra Vs. K. Meena
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2016

Fact: The Appellant husband had married the Respondent wife. The Appellants filed
divorce petition on the ground of cruelty. The case of the Appellant was that the
Respondent did not live happily with the Appellant. The Respondent wife had
become cruel because of her highly suspicious nature. The Respondent wanted the
Appellant to leave his parents and other family members. The Family Court granted a
decree of divorce to the Appellant. The Respondent filed appeal, which was allowed
by the High Court, whereby the divorce decree was set aside. Hence, the present
appeal.

Summary Of Outcome: The unsubstantiated allegations leveled by the Respondent’s

wife and the threats and attempt to commit suicide by her amounted to mental
cruelty. Therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree of divorce on
the ground stated in Section 13(1)(a) of the Act. Taking an overall view of the entire
evidence and the judgment delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe there was
no need to take a different picture than the one taken by the trial Court. The
behavior of the Respondent’s wife appears to be terrifying and horrible. One would
find it difficult to live with such a person with tranquility and peace of mind. Such
torture would adversely affect the life of the husband.

20
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2015
Party Name: Krishna Bhatacharjee Vs. Sarathi Choudhary and Ors.
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2015
Fact: The marriage between the Appellant and the Respondent No. 1 was solemnised
on 27.11.2005 and they lived as husband and wife. As the allegations proceeded,
there was the demand for dowry by the husband including his relatives and,
demands not being satisfied. The Appellant was driven out from the matrimonial
home. However, due to the intervention of the elderly people of the locality, there
was some conciliation as a consequence of which both the husband and the wife
stayed in a rented house for two months. With the efflux of time, the husband filed a
petition seeking judicial separation before the Family Court and eventually the said
prayer was granted by the learned Judge, Family Court.
After the judicial separation, the Appellant filed an application Under Section 12 of
the 2005 Act before the Child Development Protection Officer (CDPO), O/O the
District Inspector, Social Welfare & Social Education, seeking necessary help as per
the provisions contained in the 2005 Act. She sought seizure of Stridhan articles from
the possession of the husband. The application which was made before the CDPO
was forwarded by the said authority to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The
learned Magistrate taking into consideration the admitted fact that Respondent and
the Appellant had entered into wedlock treated her as an "aggrieved person", but
opined that no "domestic relationship" as defined Under Section 2(f) of the 2005 Act
existed between the parties and, therefore, wife was not entitled to file the
application Under Section 12 of the 2005 Act. The learned Magistrate came to hold
that though the parties had not been divorced but the decree of judicial separation
would be an impediment for entertaining the application and being of this view, he
opined that no domestic relationship subsisted under the 2005 Act and hence, no
relief could be granted.
The aggrieved wife preferred criminal appeal which has been decided by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge holding, inter alia, that the object of the 2005 Act is
primarily to give immediate relief to the victims; that as per the decision of this Court
in Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab that Section 468 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure applies to the proceedings under the 2005 Act and, therefore, her
application was barred by time. Being of this view, the appellate court dismissed the
appeal.
On a revision being preferred, the High Court, after referring to Inderjit Singh Grewal
v. State of Punjab, has stated that the wife had filed a criminal case Under Section
498(A) Indian Penal Code in 2006 and the husband had obtained a decree of judicial
separation on 2008. Hence, the proceedings under 2005 Act was barred by
limitation. That apart, it has also in a way expressed the view that the proceedings
under 2005 Act was not maintainable. The present appeal has been filed against the
said order.
Summary Of Outcome: The core issue that is addressed is whether the Appellant has
ceased to be an "aggrieved person" because of the decree of judicial separation.
Once the decree of divorce is passed, the status of the parties becomes different, but
that is not so when there is a decree for judicial separation. Given judicial
pronouncements, it is pretty clear that there is a distinction between a decree for
divorce and a decree of judicial separation; in the former, there is a severance of
status, and the parties do not remain as husband and wife, whereas in the later, the
relationship between husband and wife continues. The legal relationship continues
as it has not been snapped. Thus understood, the finding recorded by the courts
below, which have been concurred by the High Court that the parties having been
judicial separated, the Appellant’s wife has ceased to be an "aggrieved person" is
wholly unsustainable.

21
Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 2309 of 2009
Party Name: Shabana Bano VS. Imran Khan
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2009
Fact: Appellant Shabana Bano married the respondent Imran Khan according to
Muslim rites at Gwalior on 26.11.2001. According to the appellant, at the time of
marriage, necessary household goods to be used by the couple were given. However,
despite this, the respondent-husband and his family treated the appellant cruelly and
continued to demand more dowry. After some time, the appellant became pregnant
and was taken to her parent’s house by the respondent. The respondent threatened
the appellant that in case his demand of dowry is not met by the appellant's parents.
She would not be taken back to her matrimonial home even after delivery. Appellant
delivered a child in her parental home. Since even after delivery, respondent did not
think it proper to discharge his responsibility by taking her back, she was constrained
to file a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short,
'Cr.P.C.') against the respondent in the Court of Family Judge, Gwalior. The appellant
avered that respondent has been earning a sum of Rs. 12,000/- per month by doing
some private work and she had no money to maintain herself and her new-born
child. Thus, she claimed a sum of Rs. 3000/- per month from the respondent towards
maintenance. On notice being issued to the respondent, he denied all the contents
of the petition filed by the appellant under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. except
admitting his marriage with the appellant. The respondent raised preliminary
objections that appellant has already been divorced on 20.8.2004 in accordance with
Muslim Law. Thus, under the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as `Muslim Act'), appellant is not entitled
to any maintenance after the divorce and after the expiry of the iddat period. It was
also contended by him that appellant herself is earning Rs. 6,000/- per month by
giving private tuitions and is not dependent on the income of the respondent, thus,
she is not entitled to any maintenance. It was also contended by respondent that
appellant had gone to her parental home on her own free-will and accord, after
taking all the jewellery and a sum of Rs. 1000/- and despite notice being sent, she has
yet to return to her matrimonial home. Thus, for all these reasons, she is not entitled
to receive any amount of maintenance. Therefore, the claim of the appellant was
allowed to the extent of Rs. 2,000/- per month towards care from the date of
institution of the petition till the date of divorce, i.e., 20.8.2004 and further from the
said date till the expiry of iddat period but the amount of maintenance thereafter
was denied. The High Court Quashed the criminal revision filed by the appellant.

Summary Of Outcome: The appellant's petition under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
would be maintainable before the Family Court as long as appellant does not
remarry. The amount of maintenance awarded under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
cannot be restricted for the iddat period only. Learned Single Judge appeared to be
little confused about different provisions of the Muslim Act, Family Act, and Cr.P.C.
and thus was wholly unjustified in rejecting the appellant's Revision. A cumulative
reading of the relevant portions of judgments of this Court in Danial Latifi (supra) and
Iqbal Bano (supra) would make it crystal clear that even a divorced Muslim woman
would be entitled to claim maintenance from her divorced husband as long as she
does not remarry. This being a beneficial piece of legislation, the benefit must accrue
to divorced Muslim women.

22
Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 6332-6333 of 2009
Party Name: Darshan Gupta Vs. Radhika
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2009
Fact: The marriage between the appellant-husband and the respondent- wife was
solemnised as per the Hindu rites and cutoms. They were happy until the wife
conceived two years after the marriage. The conception was aborted, after which the
wife started suffering from hypertension, resulting in fits, weakness, and extreme
morning sickness. The couple was advised to avoid conception for two years o avert
serious medical complications. The appellant proceeded with the cohabitation, and
the child was delivered, after which her medical condition deteriorated. The husband
filed a petition for divorce whereas the wife filed a petition for conjugal rights. Family
Court allowed the plea of the wife. The High Court reversed the result, which advised
the party to remain together for six months. After the husband's inappropriate
behavior, the wife filed an appeal in the Supreme Court, and the husband filed a
request on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown as the respondent was not willing
to agree to divorce.
 Summary Of Outcome: Wife (respondent) merely suffers from mild to moderate
cognitive deficiencies. Expert opinion unanimous that same would not come in her
way to discharge matrimonial obligations. Wife (respondent) right from beginning,
fervently expressed desire to restore her relationship with her husband and to live
everyday life in marital relationship with him. No evidence on record of case to
establish that wife's (respondent) mental condition would have any effect on her
matrimonial obligations. Appellant (husband) failed to establish that wife's behaviour
was aggressive, erratic or abnormal; or that he was subjected to cruelty on account
of such behaviour--Party seeking divorce has to be innocent of blame. Appellant
cannot be permitted to use his fault to his advantage. Divorce on facts alleged--Not
acceptable. Grounds/facts on which a claim for divorce can be maintained under
Section 13(1) not available to the appellant in facts and circumstances of case--
Prayer made for divorce by appellant fails—the Impugned judgment of High Court--
Affirmed. Constitution of India--Article 142--Hindu Marriage Act, 1955--Sections
13(1)(a) and (iii)--Irretrievable breakdown of marriage--Wife (respondent) does not
consent to severance of matrimonial tie. A decree of divorce on the ground of
irretrievable breakdown of a marriage cannot be granted for the simple reason that
breakdown is only from the side of the husband (appellant)--Plea advanced at the
hands of the husband (appellant) to invoke jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution to annul a marriage between parties, as a matter of doing complete
justice between parties--Not acceptable.

23

Case Number: Civil Appeal Nos. 2446 of 2005

Party Name: Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs. Bandaru Pavani
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2008
Fact: The appellant, who is a Roman Catholic Christian allegedly married the
respondent, who is a Hindu, on 24.10.1996, in a temple only by exchange of `Thali'
and in the absence of any representative from either side. Subsequently, the
marriage was registered on 2.11.1996 under Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act,
1955, hereinafter referred to as the "1955 Act". Soon thereafter, on 13.3.1997, the
respondent-wife filed a petition before the Family Court at Visakhapatnam, being
O.P. No. 84 of 1997, under Section 12(1)(c) of 1955 Act, for a decree of nullity of the
marriage entered into between the parties on 24.10.1996 on the grounds mentioned
in the said petition. The primary basis for declaring the marriage nullity was mainly
misrepresentation by the appellant regarding his social status and that he was a
Hindu by religion. However, the appellant and his family members professed the
Christian faith after the marriage. The Family Court dismissed the said petition
against which the respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court, which
allowed the appeal by its judgment and order dated 12.9.2002 upon holding that the
marriage between a Hindu and a Christian under the 1955 Act is void ab initio and
that the marriage was, therefore, a nullity. A few months thereafter on 23.1.2003 the
respondent married one Dr. Praveen. Thereafter, on 23.4.2003 the appellant filed a
Special Leave Petition out of which the present appeal arises.
Summary Of Outcome: Section 5 of the Act there after also makes it clear that a
marriage may be solemnized between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in
the said Section are fulfilled. In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her
application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant
that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination,
the marriage solemnized by Hindu customs was a nullity, and its registration under
Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High
Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein, and the
judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.

24

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981

Party Name: Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano Begum and ors.
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 1985
Fact: This appeal, arising out of an application filed by a divorced Muslim woman for
maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC, raises a straightforward issue which is of
common interest not only to Muslim women, not only to women generally but, to all
those who, aspiring to create an equal society of men and women, lure themselves
into the belief that mankind has achieved a remarkable decree of progress in that
direction. The appellant, who is an advocate by profession, was married to the
respondent in 1932. Three sons and two daughters wire born of that marriage. In
1975 the appellant drove the respondent out of the matrimonial home, la April 1978,
the respondent filed a petition against the appellant under Section 125 of the Code
in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Indore asking for
maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month. On November 6, 1978 the appellant
divorced the respondent by an irrevocable talaq. His defence to the respondent's
petition for maintenance was that she had ceased to be his wife by reason of the
divorce granted by him, to provide that he was therefore under no obligation
maintenance for her, that he had already paid maintenance to her at the rate of Rs.
200 per month for about two years and that, he had deposited a sum of Rs. 3000 in
the court by way of dower during the period the of iddat. In August, 1979 the
learned Magistrate directed appellant to pay a princely sum of Rs. 25 per month to
the respondent by way of maintenance. It may be mentioned that the respondent
had alleged that the appellant earns a professional income of about Rs. 60,000 per
year. In July, 1980 in a revisional application filed by the respondent, the High court
of Madhya Pradesh enhanced the amount of maintenance to Rs. 179.20 per month.
The husband is before us by special leave.
Summary Of Outcome: Since the petition was filed under Crpc rather than Muslim
Marriage Act, the supreme court decided in favour of Ms. Shah Bano. The appellant
would require to pay the costs of the appeal to respondent 1, which we quantify at
rupees ten thousand. It is needless to add that it would be open to the respondent to
make an application under Section 127(1) of the Code for increasing the allowance of
maintenance granted to her on proof of a change in the circumstances as envisaged
by that section.

25
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 8(n) of 1971
Party Name: Lakshmi Sanyal Vs. Sachit Kumar Dhar
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 1972
Fact: The facts may first be stated. The appellant and the respondent are close
relations; their mothers being real sisters. It appears that before January 30, 1960
they had sexual relations, resulting in the appellant becoming enceinte (pregnant).
The respondent, originally a Hindu, converted to Christianity and professed the
Roman Catholic faith. The appellant, who was also a Hindu, converted to that faith
and was baptized on January 29, 1960. On January 30, 1960, Father Antoine
solemnized the parties' marriage at the Church of St. Ignatius, Calcutta. On May 10,
1960, the first child, a daughter, was born to the appellant. She gave birth to a
second child, also a daughter, in October 1961. It would appear that the appellant
left the home of the respondent in the year 1965 and the action out of which the
appeal has arisen was filed in July 1966 on the original side of the High Court. It was
dismissed by Mr. Justice Ghose and the request under the Letters Patent was also
rejected by the Division Bench. In the petition several allegations were made about
the respondent’s conduct. It was alleged, inter alia, that it was under duress,
intimidation and undue influence that the sexual relationship started between the
appellant and the respondent, ultimately resulting in the appellant conceiving a child.
The conversion to Christianity and the performance of the marriage ceremony were
all attributed to fraud, coercion and undue influence practised by the respondent. It
was claimed that the appellant was a minor when the marriage was solemnized and
the consent of her father or her guardian was not taken nor did she give her support
freely to the wedding. Further, the marriage was void because the parties were
within the prohibited degree of consanguinity. The respondent denied all these
allegations. He gave his version of how the intimate relationship between the parties
developed and how the marriage was ultimately solemnized.

Summary Of Outcome: Supreme Court observed that the marriage of parties is

governed by Cannon law and not by the Hindu Marriage Act - as per Cannon law
marriage between persons so related is valid – the age of the majority

26

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 11158 of 2017

Party Name: Amaardeep Singh VS. Harveen Kaur
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2017
Fact: The parties were living separately. Disputes between the parties gave rise to
civil and criminal proceedings. Settlement was arrived to resolve all the disputes and
seek divorce by mutual consent. Custody of the children was to be with the
Appellant. They have sought waiver of the period of six months for the second
motion on the ground that they have been living separately for the last more than
eight years and there was no possibility of their re union. Any delay would affect the
chances of their resettlement. The parties have moved present Court on the ground
that only present Court could relax the six months period as per decisions of present
Court.

Summary Of Outcome: The object of the provision is to enable the parties to

dissolve a marriage by consent if the marriage has irretrievably broken down and to
enable them to rehabilitate them as per available options. The thought inspired the
amendment that forcibly perpetuating status of matrimony between unwilling
partners did not serve any purpose. The object of the cooling of the period was to
safeguard against a hurried decision if there was otherwise possibility of differences
being reconciled. The object was not to perpetuate a purposeless marriage or
prolong the parties’ agony when there was no chance of reconciliation. Though every
effort has to be made to save a marriage, if there are no chances of reunion and
there are chances of fresh rehabilitation, the Court should not be powerless in
enabling the parties to have a better option. In determining the question whether
provision is mandatory or directory, language alone is not always decisive. The Court
has to have the regard for the context, the subject matter, and the object of the
provision. The Court dealing with an issue is satisfied that a case is made out to waive
the statutory period Under Section 13B(2), it can do so after considering the
following:
i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13B(2), in addition to the
statutory period of one year Under Section 13B(1) of separation of parties, is already
over before the first motion itself;
ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation, including efforts in terms of Order XXXIII Rule
3 Code of Civil Procedure/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family Courts Act
to reunite the parties, have failed, and there is no likelihood of success in that
direction by any further efforts;
iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences, including alimony, custody of
the child, or any other pending issues between the parties;
iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving reasons for
the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied, the release of the waiting
period for the second motion will be at the discretion of the concerned Court.

27
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7650 of 2021
Party Name: Amit Kumar Vs. Suman Beniwal
Court: Supreme Court Of India
Year: 2021
Fact: Parties hereto had been living separately for almost 14 months and about soon
after three days of marriage. The petition was preferred seeking the relief of divorce
by way of mutual consent. The first motion was granted. The application moved for a
waiver for six months statutory period. However, it was rejected. In a challenge
against it, High Court refused to grant the relief. Hence, the present appeal.

Summary Of Outcome: The factors mentioned in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur

(supra), in Paragraph 19, are illustrative and not exhaustive. These are factors that
the Court is obliged to take note of. The Family Court, as well as the High Court, have
misconstrued the judgment of this Court in Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra)
and proceeded on the basis that this Court has held that the conditions specified in
paragraph 19 of the said judgment, quoted hereinabove, are mandatory and that the
statutory waiting period of six months Under Section 13B(2) can only be waived if all
the conditions above are fulfilled, including, in particular, the state of separation of
at least one and half year before making the motion for a decree of divorce. It is well
settled that a judgment is a precedent for the issue of law that is raised and decided.
A review is not to be read in the manner of a statute and construed with pedantic
rigidity. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur (supra), this Court held that the statutory
waiting period of at least six months mentioned in Section 13B(2) of the Hindu
Marriage Act was not mandatory but directory and that it would be open to the
Court to exercise its discretion to waive the requirement of Section 13B(2), having
regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, if there were no possibility of
reconciliation between the spouses, and the waiting period would serve no purpose
except to prolong their agony. In the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court
deems it appropriate to exercise its power Under Article 142 of the Constitution of
India to grant the Appellant and the Respondent a decree of divorce by mutual
consent Under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, waiving the statutory
waiting period of six months Under Section 13(B)(2) of the said Act.