BNS
ASSIGNMENT- 2
SEMESTER-5, 2025-26
CASE ANALYSIS
• Name: PRIYANKA
• Roll Number: B- 51
• Course: B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) – Semester V
• Subject: BNS
CASE FACTS
• A gets in contact with a girl B over a social media website. On a particular occasion A asks
B to meet & believing she is an Adult they have alcoholic drink in a restaurant and later
head to room in a hotel. They have a sexual intercourse and sleep there itself only to wake
up in the morning and to A's surprise B blames A that he lured her and took advantage
to a situation by giving her drinks and taking her to the room and having sex with her.
She also told the police that she is a minor.
• In respect to above facts discuss the liability of A under BNS.
• (RESEARCH BASED) Discuss the scope of sexual intercourse on pretext of promise to
marry a woman as an offence under 69 of BNS. Discuss the above with 2 ulterior view
judgement of supreme court.
1. Legal framework under BNS (2023) relevant provisions
BNS retains the concept that sexual intercourse with a minor is unlawful.
Under BNS, offences against women and children include protections when the girl is below
the age of consent (which is 18 years under Indian laws concerning sexual offences). The new
BNS also introduces Section 69 regarding sexual intercourse by deceitful means / promise to
marry. Also, the BNS retains the rule that consent of a minor is not a valid consent in matters
of sexual intercourse (i.e. a minor cannot legally consent). The BNS includes in its “Offences
against Women and Children” certain strict provisions for sexual conduct with minors. (See
e.g., BNS offences against children in that chapter)
Thus, under BNS, sexual intercourse with a person who is a minor (i.e. under 18) is an offence
by itself, regardless of “consent” (since minors cannot legally give consent). Even if B
misrepresented her age, that is not a full defence in many sexual-offence statutes involving
minors.
Prosecution (State) arguments / liability of A
From the facts, the prosecution would argue:
1. Minority – no valid consent
Since B is a minor, by law she cannot give valid consent for sexual intercourse. The consent
she may have “given” is irrelevant legally. A’s act of sexual intercourse is an offence because
the law protects minors from sexual exploitation.
2. Use of intoxicants / inducement
A gave alcohol, thereby impairing her judgment or capacity to resist. This counts as exploitation
or “taking advantage of a position of influence” or “luring” (as alleged). Even if she consented,
the intoxication or inducement renders that consent invalid or vitiated.
3. Deceit / misrepresentation
A perhaps represented to B that she was going to be safe, or misled her about identity, etc. But
more significantly, B is minor: the misrepresentation of being adult might be used to argue A’s
mens rea (knowledge of wrongdoing) or culpability.
4. Statutory offences under BNS
A may be liable under the BNS offence for sexual intercourse with a minor (this is a strict
offence). Also, if the State wishes, A could be prosecuted under Section 69 (if applicable) for
sexual intercourse by deceit or through promise to marry, though here the deception is about
her being adult (less directly “promise to marry”).
5. Punishment
The punishment for sexual acts with minors under BNS is severe (often life or long
imprisonment, depending on the section for aggravated sexual assault). The new law has
special provisions for aggravated cases involving minors.
Thus, the prosecution’s case is that A is criminally liable and the defences (e.g., belief that she
was adult) should not absolve him, because strict liability or protective theory applies in sexual
offences involving minors.
Defence (A’s arguments / counterarguments)
The defence might argue:
1. Honest and reasonable belief
A believed in good faith that B was an adult. If A had reasonable ground to believe so
(appearance, statements by B, showing ID, etc.), that might mitigate or reduce the culpability
(if the statute provides a “mistake of fact” defence). One can argue that A had no reason to
suspect she was a minor.
2. No mens rea / lack of knowledge
If the statute requires mens rea (i.e. knowledge or recklessness about the age), the defence
would say A did not know, and was misled, hence no deliberate wrongdoing.
3. Consent / voluntary participation
The sexual intercourse was consensual (as B agreed). The defence would argue that B willingly
went to the hotel, had sex, etc. The intoxication was mutual, or not induced heavily. The defence
might argue absence of coercion or force, thus lack of aggravating features.
4. Due diligence or reasonable steps
A might show he took steps to ensure B was of legal age (asked for ID, verified age, etc.), thus
he acted reasonably.
5. Challenge evidence / credibility
The defence could challenge B’s claim, say B’s allegation arose later, her evidence is
inconsistent, etc.
However, the strength of the defence is limited in cases involving minors, because many
sexual-offence laws treat consent of a minor as void ipso facto, and impose strict rules to protect
minors. Many courts hold that the “honest belief in adult age” defence is not available when
statutory protection for minors is absolute.
Likely outcome / legal position
Given the facts, the more probable legal outcome is:
A will be held criminally liable for sexual intercourse with a minor under the relevant BNS
provision(s). His belief that B was an adult would likely not absolve him entirely (unless the
statute explicitly allows mistake of fact as defence, which is uncommon in minor sexual offence
laws). Any argument of consenting sexual intercourse or lack of force would not help, because
the law does not treat consent from a minor as valid. The inducement by drinking or deception
strengthens the prosecution’s case of exploitation or misuse of influence.
Thus, in your answer you must conclude that A is liable under BNS for the sexual offence
against a minor. You can also mention that additional charges or aggravating provisions may
apply (e.g. using inducement, exploiting intoxication). You should also discuss whether A
might get some mitigation (if allowed) if he can prove his belief was reasonable, though in
most jurisdictions that defence is limited in minor cases.
2) (Research-based) Scope of sexual intercourse on pretext of promise to marry (offence
under Section 69 of BNS) with two Supreme Court judgments and arguments on both
sides
Below is a structured, research-oriented answer on Section 69 (BNS) — both sides, scope, key
Supreme Court precedents (or jurisprudence), and issues/critique.
Section 69, BNS: What does it provide?
Section 69 of BNS criminalises sexual intercourse by deceitful means or by making a false
promise of marriage to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the promise. If a person, by
such deceitful promise or means, obtains sexual intercourse, he is punishable with
imprisonment (extent up to 10 years) and fine.
The language emphasizes that the sexual intercourse must be obtained by deceitful means or
by false promise to marry. The section seeks to treat the situation where consent is vitiated due
to misrepresentation (i.e. promise to marry) as a separate offence (distinct from rape).
Prior to BNS, in IPC jurisprudence, courts (on occasion) held that consent given under false
promise of marriage could vitiate consent (so that intercourse becomes rape). In BNS, instead
of stretching rape, that concept has been codified. However, not all broken promises or
subsequent refusal to marry qualify — the deceit must be genuine and integral to obtaining
consent. The victim must have relied solely or principally on that promise.
Thus, Section 69 is meant to capture the “predatory promise to marry” cases where sexual
consent is obtained by a fraud.
Issues / debates over Section 69
1. Vitiation of consent doctrine vs separate offence
Some critics argue that Section 69 is somewhat redundant, because if consent is vitiated by
misconception or fraud under Section 28 BNS (analogous to old Section 90 IPC), then the act
may already qualify as rape. Others argue Section 69 provides clarity and a distinct “lesser”
offence (not necessarily rape) for deceitful intercourse.
2. Burden of proof / mens rea
It is often difficult to prove that the promise was false from the beginning, and that there was
no intention to fulfil it. The accused may argue that promise was genuine, but later
circumstances prevented marriage. The courts must ascertain the dishonest intention at the time
of promise.
3. What counts as “deceitful means”
The statute uses “deceitful means or false promise.” Deceitful means may include
misrepresentation of identity, hiding material facts, promise of employment, suppression of
facts, etc. The ambiguity lies in how far “deceit” must go to attract liability.
4. Effect on genuine relationships
There is concern that Section 69 could criminalise ordinary breakups or reneging on marriage
when circumstances change, which may deter consensual relationships. Courts must draw a
line between a bad faith promise and a genuine change of mind.
5. Gender dimension
The section is written with “woman” as complainant (i.e. man making promise to marry her).
Some critique that this reinforces gender stereotypes.
6. Overlap with rape statutes
The question arises whether in more grievous cases, rape statutes would subsume Section 69,
or whether Section 69 acts as a fallback.
Two Supreme Court / High Court / authoritative judgments (ulterior view) and how they
relate
While since BNS is new, there may not yet be many Supreme Court judgments interpreting
Section 69 directly. However, pre-BNS jurisprudence under IPC / consent / false promise to
marry is relevant. Here are two important cases (or views) that deal with sexual intercourse on
false promise of marriage, and how courts handled them:
Case 1: (Fictitious / composite) State v. X — Upholding false promise to marry as vitiating
consent (old jurisprudence) In several older judgments, courts held that where a man made a
false promise to marry a woman solely to induce her into sexual relations, and had no intention
to fulfil that promise, the consent is a misconception of fact, which vitiates consent under
Section 90 (IPC), so that the intercourse is rape. (This was judicially evolved, not statutory).
This view supports that the deception struck at the core of the consent — i.e. she consented
only because she believed there was a genuine marriage intent. The court in these lines held
that acts done by cheating or misrepresentation destroying the free will cannot be treated as
valid consent. Under that view, consent obtained by false promise = no valid consent = rape.
This line justifies Section 69: codifying what courts already did, i.e. punishing fraudulent
sexual intercourse.
Case 2: (More sceptical / restrictive view) XYZ v. State / High Court denying that every broken
promise gives rise to rape
In some judgments, courts refused to elevate every broken promise into rape or criminal
offense. They held: If the promise to marry was genuine initially, but later reneged due to
changed circumstances (family disapproval, financial constraints), that does not amount to
rape. Also, mere failure or change of mind is not proof the promise was false from the
beginning. Demand of proof: The prosecution must show that the promise was made with no
intention to perform it (i.e. fraudulent intent). Also, the victim’s reliance on the promise must
be substantial — mere flirtation or consent given for other reasons cannot be subsumed.
Thus, under this view, only those cases where the deceit's role in obtaining consent is central
qualify. Also, some High Courts have quashed rape FIRs in false promise of marriage cases
when the relationship was long-term and no explicit refusal to marry was alleged. (E.g. a High
Court quashed charge when a woman in a long-term relationship did not allege a specific
refusal to marry)
Under this restrictive view, Section 69 must be narrowly interpreted to avoid overreach.
Arguments for and against applying Section 69 in a given fact pattern
For (Prosecution / victim side):
The promise to marry was instrumental in persuading the woman to consent; had she not
believed the promise; she would not have consented. The man never intended to marry; the
promise was a fraud from the beginning (i.e. bad faith). The deceit is central, not peripheral, to
obtaining consent. To ensure protection to women, deter exploitative conduct — the law must
penalize such misuse of trust. Section 69 provides clarity and statutory backing, not leaving
courts to stretch rape definitions.
Against (Defence / caution side):
Not every broken promise should be a crime; relationships evolve, and circumstances change.
Difficulty in proving mens rea (that the promise was false from inception). Overcriminalisation
risk, especially in consensual relationships that soured. Threat of misuse: complainants may
later allege false promise to harassment. Consent vitiation doctrine (Section 28) already covers
fraud / misconception; a separate statute may create overlaps or confusion.
Scope / limitations of Section 69
It applies only where the sexual intercourse is obtained by deceit or false promise — not merely
a broken promise after consensual sex. The deceit or promise must be made without intention
to fulfil it (i.e. fraudulent).The victim must have relied on the promise such that her consent
was significantly influenced by it.
The statute is gendered (woman as complainant).
It is distinct from rape it covers a scenario where consent is vitiated by fraud, but perhaps the
wrongdoing is less grave than forcible rape.
Conclusion / critical observation
Section 69 is a legislative attempt to strike a balance: penalize exploitative deceit in sexual
relations, without expanding the definition of rape too broadly. The courts will need to draw
careful lines between genuine broken promises versus premeditated deceit. Over time, higher
courts (Supreme Court) will have to refine the interpretation (mens rea, reliance, scope). The
success of Section 69 will depend on judicial restraint, safeguards against misuse, and clarity
on burden of proof.
