67

NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL.

(REDACTED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE)

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
COMPROMISE Or 7az FALL 1992 ZLECT7ICAL ENCINEZAING FZNAL
;Er. 311] EXAM:HAT:ON AT TEE UNIT= STATES XAVAL ACAZEMZ
:ASE SL-7.'3E7 : 330457

20 .:AIVIARY 1994

/7,71414
VADM 3 ? .) 3 OM ETT , OSN
tiAVAL ECTOR

The informadon contained herein relates to the internal practice* of the

Department of the Navy and is an Lucerne' communication enthin the Nary
Department THIS REPORT IS NOT RELEASABLE without the specific
approval of the Secretary of the Navy. Its contents may not be disclosed outside
onginal distribution. nor nay it be reproduced In whole twin part All requerm
for this report extracts therefrom or correspondence related thereto 'hail be
referred to the'Nsval Inipector Genersi
 68

OFFICE OF THE NAVAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Report of Investigation
Case number: 930857

20 January 1994
Subj: COMPROMISE OF THE FALL 1992 ELECTRICAL ENGINEER/NG FINAL
(EE 311] EXAMINATION AT THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

INTIODUCTION
1. 3y letter dated 4 June 1993, the Acting Secretary of the
Navy, ADM Frank B. Kelso, USN, directed the Naval Inspector
General (NAVINSGEN) to conduct an investigation into the
application of the honor system and the integrity of the
examination process at the U.S. Naval Academy with respect to
allegations of honor violations arising from the Fall Semester
1992 examination in the course Electrical Engineering (EE 311)."
2. Prior to ADM Kelso's direction, the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service (NCIS) had investigated criminal aspects of
the allegations, and the Naval Academy had taken disciplinary and
administrative actions based on information developed by NCIS.
ADM Kelso's request originated after new allegations, made after
completion of the NCIS investigation, were presented and
complaints were received that the administrative disposition of
individual cases may have been flawed. The Secretary of the
Navy, John H. Dalton, reaffirmed ADM Kelso's direction to
NAVINSGEN after he assumed office.
3. This report describes the significant decisions made and
actions taken following the first reports of the compromise. The
conclusions and recommendations NAVINSGEN are also provided.
A glossary which defines key terms associated with the Honor
Concept is also provided. Individual cases of midshipman
misconduct developed during the NAVINSGEN investigation will be
provided to the convening authority for disposition.
4. In addition to the approximately 800 midshipmen who were
interviewed, the following provided information for this report
by way of interviews and sworn statements, which are attached as
enclosures (1) through (17):

RAM( Thomas C.Lynch. Superintendent:

CAPT John B. Padgett, Cosaendant of Midshipmen:
CAPT Nicholas P. DeCarlo, SJA to the Superintendent:

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Or. Robert Shapiro. Academic Dean:

CAPT Philip F. Grasser, Director, Division of Engineering
and Weapons;
Prof. Richard Martin, Chairman, EE Department;
CDR David Wilson. EA to the Superintendent;
LCDR Timothy F. Nagle, SJA to the Commandant;
LCDR Larry Scalzitti, EE Department;
LT Thomas D. Cann, Ethics Advisor to the Commandant;
EMS Cory Culver, Honor Committee Chairman, Class of 1993;
ENS J. L. Chadwick, Deputy Vice Honor Chairman for
Investigations, Class of 1993;
ENS Joseph Foraker, Vice Honor Chairman, Class of 1993::
ENS Kelly Hoeft, Honor Committee Member, Class of 1993;
ENS Brendan Dibella, Brigade Honor Secretary, Class of 1993:
ENS John Miles, Brigade Honor Coordinator, Class of 1993:
and
ENS Christopher Harding, Honor Faculty Liaison,
Class of 1993.
RACMGRO0WD

5. The mission of the United States Naval Academy (Academy) is:

To develop midshipmen morally, mentally, and physically and
to imbue them with the highest ideals of duty, honor and
loyalty in order to provide graduates who are dedicated to a
career of naval service and have potential for future
development in mind and character to assume the highest
responsibilities of command, citizenship, and government.
(OPNAV Notice 5450, 1 December 1987).

5. The midshipmen and cadets of the service academies are taught

to adhere to a coda of conduct for professional military leaders
that predates the founding of our nation and finds expression in
the writings of ten such as John Paul Jones and General Von
Steuben. The Honor Concept of the Brigade of Midshipmen is
elegant in its simplicity, relentless in its demands:
Midshipmen are persons of integrity: They do not lie, cheat,
or steal. (USNAINST 1610.3E0101).

7. Honor Codes notwithstanding, the service academies have not

been Immune to cheating. In 1976, the EE Department at West
Point gave 823 second classmen (juniors) a take home examination.
the answers to which, upon analysis by the instructors, indicated
widespread unauthorized collaboration. Eventually, about two
hundred cadets were referred to administrative proceedings. In
1989, a special commission studying the Honor System at West
Point made the following observations:

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When serious breakdowns in the Honor Code and System

have occurred at West Point and in the related Code and
System at the Air Force Academy, they correlated with
internal group loyalties contradictory to the spirit of the
Corps of Cadets itself. Such groups were prep-school
friends, company enclaves, and, most seriously,
intercollegiate athletic teams. Indeed, the wore: scandals
and the most virulent threats to the Honor Code stemmed from
deception connected with football. Groups of athletes
cheated together in academic examinations, and were found
out and dismissed. Coaches and supervisors misrepresented
the necessary academic standards in a misplaced notion of
the need to "vin." That was a contagion of dishonesty that
threatened the Academy'itself. Today, officials at West
Point are aware of the problem and are taking continual
measures to contain the threat of its recurrence. However,
given the temptations involved, constant vigilance is
essential in respect to honesty in intercollegiate athletics
and for full integration of athletes into the Corps of
Cadets.

8. The Special Commission pointed out another problem in the

daily application of the Honor Code at West Point:
There has been a recurring tendancy toward
trivilization of the meaning of honor, such as when the
Honor System was used to enforce prohibitions against
keeping liquor in hair tonic bottles, bed stuffing (using
blankets to simulate a sleeping cadet), and various college
pranks. The serious issue is that such Misuse of the System
has been a repeated source of antagonism, misunderstanding,
grievous injustice to cadets, and harm to the repute and
regard for the Honor. Code itself.
7X2ST RXPoRTS or Tel Coe(VROXISI

9. The EE 311 course at the Academy is a core (mandatory)

requirement for all non-engineering majors. Many midshipmen told
'HAVINSGEN they believe the course is irrelevant: its mandatory
nature constitutes form of harassment. (Many cadets made
similar comments about the LE course involved in the 1976
cheating incident at West Point.)
10. The LE 311 examination was administered at 0745, on Monday,
14 December 1992, to 663 midshipmen. Within hours of its
completion, midshipman (MIDI() A sant an E-Mail ge
to a faculty member stating that the exam had been compromised.
Similar messages were transmitted by other midshipmen later that
day. Some of the reports indicted the football team had
obtained an advance copy of the exam.

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11. On the morning of 15 December 1992, Dr. Robert Shapiro, the

Academic Dean, informed the Superintendent of reports the exam
had been compromised. The information the Dean had at that time
was scanty, and the Superintendent directed him to check with the
Electrical Engineering (Er) Department to determine if the test
results showed any evidence of cheating, such as inexplicable
spikes in individual grades or an overall higher than expected
course average. The Dean also told the Superintendent that the
original test, sent to the copying canter by the course
coordinator, had been lost sometime between the 3rd and 9th of
December, and thus potentially compromised because it had not
been rewritten after the loss vas discovered.

.2. The Superintendent then met with the Commandant of

Midshipmen and directed him to talk to the midshipmen whose names
had surfaced in connection with the reported compromise. The
Superintendent and CAPT Nicholas DoCario, Staff Judge Advocate to
the Superintendent, also discussed the matter. The
Superintendent and his staff were in agreement that they needed
additional information before making any firm decisions.

13. On 16 December 1992, the Dean briefed the Superintendent on

the ET Department's information, consisting of a half page of
data (enclosure (18)) prepared by L.= Lawrence Scalmitti, an Er
Department Instructor. They found no patterns or inexplicable
spikes in grades. The information developed by the EE Department
did not include a review of the actual answers contained on the
examination papers themselves. (Evan though the exam answers
were eventually read and graded, it appears no one at the Academy
ever compared the answers of different midshipmen for evidence of
collaboration.)

14. Also on 16 December 1992, the Commandant reported to the

Superintendent that his discussions with the midshipmen
associated with the report of a compromise led him to believe the
report was not credible. He told the Superintendent that all
reports of the alleged compromise originated with one midshipman
2/C, who could only report overhearing a group of unidentified
midshipmen talking about the football team having a copy of the
ET 311 examination.
15. Based on this early information, the Superintendent and his
staff agreed that if there was a compromise it was not
widesp,ead. Accordingly, the Superintendent decided there was no
justification for ordering everyone to retake the test.

16. However, during that day and the next, additional reports of
a compromise surfaced frog o-her midshipmen. In light of the
continuing reports of a cospromise and the fact that the first
copy of the examination sent to the copying center had reportedly

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been lost, the Superintendent decided that further investigation

was necessary.

17. The investigative options considered were: (1) requesting an

NCIS investigation: (2) appointing an officer to conduct a JAGMAN
investigation: or (3) conducting an investigation by midshipmen
pursuant to the Honor Concept. Because he was concerned there
could be criminal conduct, specifically, theft of the test and/or
breaking and entering, the Superintendent decided to ask NCIS to
conduct the investigation.

:Et NCIS IrnimaaTios

18. The Superintendent mat with NCIS agents on 16 December 1992.
He told them what he knew about the alleged compromise and
expressed his concern that there might be criminal conduct (theft
or breaking and entering) hlyond the actual cheating.
19. The Superintendent gave NCIS the limited analysis of the test
results which had been performed by the SE Department, and
designated CAPT DeCarlo as their point of contact during the
investigation. According to the NC:5 agents who attended the
meeting, the Superintendent made no attempt to limit the scope of
the investigation or to direct their activities. However, it was
clear to all at the meeting that NCIS would conduct the
investigation using procedures applicable to cases where criminal
conduct is suspected.
20. Consequently, during the course of the investigation, NCIS
properly provided most of the midshipmen with rights warnings
pursuant to Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). The warning most frequently informed the midshipman that
he/she was suspected of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, Larceny,
Receiving Stolen Property, Concealing Stolen Property, etc.,
although variations were provided in specific circumstances.
21. Immediately after meeting with the Superintendent, NCIS
began its investigation by interviewing MIDN A , who had
initially reported the compromise by I -Mail. MIDN A said
his roommates were in p ion of ...ae test on the evening of 13
December 1992.
22. The roommates, when interviewed, both identified MIDN
13 as the individual who gave than problems to
work prior to the examination and which they recognized when they
took =a examination the following day. In later interviews,
MIDN C mixed MIDI( as his source of the
examination.

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23. In a statement to NCIS, M/DN C identified 23 midshipmen

he said had the exam. MIDN C admitted he had sold the exam
to four of these midshipmen, and said he knew who they gave it
to. ?ION C gave the agents a sworn statement detailing his
knowledge.

24. NCIS obtained all 663 SE-311 examinations as evidence.

Although consideration VAS given to requesting that =hist, Naval
Education and Training (CNET) analyze the test resu.ts, that
avenue of pursuit was dropped based on their belief that cx-Er was
able to analyze only standardized tests.

25. The NCIS investigation attempted to identify the source of

the compromised examination but was not able to do so. An early
theory held that the first copy of the examination had been
stolen from the Academy mail system between 3 and 9 December
while enroute from the El. Department to the Office Services
Branch Copy Center for printing. This theory was discredited by
the investigation. The NC:S investigation did develop a theory
regarding a particular individual being the source, but that
theory also could not be proven.

25. The NC:S investigation was substantially completed in mid-

:anuary 1993, and the sc:s agents briefed the Superintendent on
their progress during a meeting on 18 January 1993. CAPT DeCarlo
and CDR Wilson were also present. During the meeting, one of the
agents mentioned that they had interviewed the football team. At
that point. the Superintendent, who earlier had been told by the
Athletic Director that football players were complaining they had
been unfairly targeted, became angry. He said that it appeared
to be a "witch hunt" and that the agents' actions were giving
credence to the rumors that the entire football team had the
test. The agents explained that the investigation had led to the
football team, and that it was necessary to interview its members
to be thorougn. The Superintendent accepted their explanation
and the agents continued their investigation.

27. After the NCIS briefing, CAPT DeCarlo recommended the

Superintendent consider referring one or two of the midshipmen
identified by NCIS to a court-martial, although he counseled that
the evidence might be insufficient for conviction. After
thinking about the matter, the Superintendent decided it would
not be appropriate to court-martial someone who only could be
accused of cheating. Having made this decision, the
Superintendent could have initiated a non-criminal investigation
for the purpose of discovering the full extent of the cheating.
However, other than to make additional pleas for midshipmen
having knowledge of the compromise to come forward, the Academy
took no action to identify additional cheaters after the NCIS
criminal investigation was completed.

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28. :n all, NCIS identified 39 midshipmen it believed possessed

some or all of the EE 311 examination before it was given. The
agents explained that many midshipmen had invoked their Article
31(b) rights upon being warned, and had refused to cooperate with
the agents.

XCIDEXT ACTIONS
(Post NCIS Investigation)
29. On 4 February 1993, an NCIS agent briefed the results of the
Investigation to CXPT DeCarlo: LCDR Timothy Nagle, Staff :udge
Advocate to the Commandant: LT Thomas Cann, Ethics Advisor to the
Commandant: and KIDS Cory Culver, the Honor Committee Chairman.
It was the first time any of them, other than CAPT DeCarlo, had
officially received information on the investigation. The
Commandant's staff had, however, been told unofficially to expect
a large number of Honor cases and so had already started planning
for the Honor Boards.
30. After the NCIS agent left the meeting, CAPT DeCarlo, LCDR
Nagle, LT Cann and HIDN Culver discussed how they were going to
proceed with the cases and what modifications to the Honor Board
process would be necessary in order for the Boards to :unction
properly with the number of cages involved.
31. Specific areas discussed for modification were: holding
results until the completion of all Boards; redacting the NCIS
report: selection of midshipmen for various duties related to
Honor Boards: and, generally, the due process protection of the
accused. The Superintendent later approved a recommendation that
the results of each Board be kept secret until all Boards were
completed. This vas done to prevent early Board results from
unduly influencing the outcome of later Boards and to prevent the
Brigade from keeping score as the results became known.
32. CAP? DeCarlo told the Superintendent of the plan to redact
the NCIS report of the criminal investigation for use as the
basis of midshipmen Investigating Officer (ID) investigations and
evidence before Honor Boards.

31. The Commandant approved a modification request to permit the

use of midshipmen 2/C Honor Representatives as Honor Advisors in
order to free up midshipmen 1/C Honor Representatives for
assignment as I0s.
34. Because of a concern over the 21-day rule (the Honor Concept
statute of limitation), CAPT DeCarlo decided that the last day a
midshipman could be accused of an honor violation identified in
the NCIS report was 8 February 1993 (21 days after the

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Superintendent was briefed by NCIS and thus made aware of a

violation).
35. CAPT DeCarlo and LCDR Nagle directed LT Cann to get a copy
of the NCIS report, go through it, and identify midshipmen to be
accused. He obtained a copy from an NCIS agent the next day and
spent the weekend (6 and 7 February) reading it and making a list
of midshipmen he would accuse of committing an honor violation.

36. LT Cann determined there was sufficient evidence to -.mouse

28 of the 39 midshipmen identified in the NCIS report. On Monday
morning, 8 February 1993, LT Cann talked with CAPT DeCarlo by
phone and informed him he had a list of midshipmen to be accused.
CAP0eCarlo had also generated a list and they discussed some of
the names. CAPT DeCarlo did not attempt to substitute or change
any of the names on LT Cann's list. LT Cann then drafted accuser
letters and gave them to MIDN Culver to serve the named
midshipmen.

37. At the 4 February 1993 meeting, LT Cann was told by CAPT

DeCarlo and LCDR Nagle to redact the NCIS report, and he did so
throughout the week of 8 February 1993. As he finished redacting
a portion of the report relating to a particular midshipman, he
would give it to MIDN John Chadwick, Honor Committee Vice
Chairman for :nvestigations, who passed It on to the 1:0
previously selected by the Honor Committee Chairman to
investigate that case.

38. When he reviewed the 28 cases investigated by the I0s, MIDN

Culver dismissed four of them, which was within his authority,
and directed that the remaining 24 cases go before Honor Boards.
On 1 March 1993, the Superintendent encouraged his staff to
complete the Boards quickly, hopefully before Spring Break.

39. The first Board met on 3 March 1993, but than Spring Break
interfered and caused a two-week delay before the second Board
started. The final Board was held on 26 March 1993.
Ultimately, the Honor Boards found 11 violations out of those 24
cases.'

40. The 11 cases were forwarded to the Commandant of Midshipmen

for his review. The Commandant dismissed tour cases, and
forwarded the seven cases in which he found a violation of the
Honor Concept to the Superintendent. In all seven cases, he
recommended the accused be separated from the Academy.

41. The Superintendent dismissed one case and forwarded the

remaining six cases to the Secretary of the Navy, recommending in
each case that the midshipman be separated from the Academy.

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TEX rAinz INSPXCTOR OW/RAI IMBTICATION

42. Following the receipt of new allegations and complaints
regarding disposition of the 24 Honor Board cases, NAVINSGEN was
tasked on 7 June 1993 to conduct an additional inquiry.
43. The NAVINSGEN investigation began with a team of four: two
lawyers and an investigator from NAVINSGEN; and the special agent
who conducted the HCIS investigation. The team first reviewed
all NCIS documents, verbatim transcripts of the Honor Boards,
well as, the Commandant's and Superintendent's hearings. The
team received briefings from the Academy staff and then conducted
a limited number of interviews.
44. Initially, the NAVINSGEN investigation focused on the new
information provided by a midshipman in early May 1993. After
pursuing those leads, NAVINSGEN determined that resolution of the
disparities in individual cases and evidence would require an
investigation into the scope of the compromise. In order to
efficiently conduct the investigation, the team was expanded to
nine members: two additional NCIS.agents, one Marine Corps
officer, and two activated reserve officers from the NAVINSGEN
reserve unit. On 20 June 1993 the team arrived at the Academy
and began the.on-site investigation that lasted unt41 7 January
1994.

45. From the outset, the NAVINSGEN investigation assumed that

the Superintendent's January 1993 decision not to court-martial
identified cheaters would be adhered to in the majority of cases
subsequently developed, although the possibility of referring
especially egregious conduct to courts martial was not ruled out.
Consequently, criminal investigative techniques were not used to
interview midshipmen, .g., they were not advised of their rights
under Article 31(b), UCMJ (military right against self-
incrimination). Unlike criminal proceedings, the absence of
warnings in an administrative investigation normally has no
drawbacks such as suppression of admissions. The decision was
approved by the Acting Secretary of the Navy and later, Secretary
Dalton, with the concurrence of the Judge Advocate General and
General Counsel of the Navy.
46. NAVINSGEN conducted over S00 interviews, under oath, at the
Academy between June 1993 and January 1994. Those interviewed
ranged from the Superintendent to junior civilian employees.
Among the midshipmen it included everyone who took the
examination as well as roommates, sponsor mates, teammates and
company sates of suspects.
47. All interviews of sidshipmen suspects were conducted by at
least two NAV1tcGtN Investigators. Interviews ranged in time

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from 20 minutes to many hours, spread over several days. During

the interviews the investigators took notes and then prepared
typed statements. Statements were given to the persons
interviewed, who were told to read them carefully and to make
corrections, as they would become their sworn statements.

41. In all, 133 cases were developed that warrant further

review. These include the six cases already forwarded to the
Secretary of the Navy, seven cases of midshipmen who have already
been separated from the Academy for other honor/conduct
violations or for academic failure, and one case against a recent
graduate, now on active duty. Eighty-one of the 133 cases have
substantiated admissions.
49. In addition to following leads developed through interviews,
NAVINSGEN obtained all 663 examinatione and analyzed them. This
analysis proved to be the most important investigative tool for
Identifying cheaters.

50. The investigators also obtained the complete engineering

exam data that Lc DR 5ca'- -4 had developed bit which never left
the El. Department. This data identified 27 midshipmen wno
received unusually high grades. Of those 37, the NAVINSGEN
investigation developed cases against 26. An analysis of the 133
suspects identified by NAVINSGEN indicated that 46 of them
Improved their final exam score by over 20 points from their 12-
week exam. NAVINSGEN also requested the E-!fail system be checked
for messages that may have been automatically saved, and several
incriminating messages were found.

51. The XAVINSGEN investigation was unable to determine the

actual source of the compromise. All evidence developed leading
back to the source stopped at MIDN and MIDN
neither of whom provided any information to the investigators.
Identification of the "I /0 source requires the
cooperation of one of those midshipmen. The NAV1NSGEN
Investigation found no evidence that the examination lost in the
mail system was the source of the compromise. The issue of the
integrity of the process used at the Academy for printing large
numbers of examinations will be examined during a NAVINSCEX
inspection of the Academy to be conducted later.

XASISISOIX :Saul*

52. During this investigation, NAV1NSGEN developed six issues

which merit discussion in this report. They are:

A. Er. Department input after allegations of a

compromise:

R.
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B. NCIS investigation:
C. Decision to use Honor Boards and their conduct:
D. Perception of a Conflict of interest:
E. Handling of new allegations; and
F. Honor Concept Climate at The Naval Academy
A. XS DIPASTUNT /5:78T AYTZA ALIJOATIONs Or A COMEPRoXlei
53. As soon as reports reached the Er. Department that the Er 311
exam was compromised, several of the instructors in that
department, led by :.,CDR Scalzitti, began collecting data on the
tests. The first thing they looked at were grades, comparing the
midshipmen's 6-week, 12-week and final grades. Because this was
only one day after the examination, not all the tests were graded
so they were unable to obtain input on the final grades from 13
of the 28 class sections.
54. When the Dean asked the EE Department to check the tests for
unusual spikes in grades between the midshipmen's 12-week exam
grade and final exam grade, he received the data LCDR Scalzitti
had prepared (enclosure IS). On 16 December 1992, the Dean
briefed the Superintendent on :,CDR Scalzitti's half page of data.

55. The cover letter with the EE Department's input, signed by

LCDR Scalzitti, did not indicate that the information was
incomplete, and when that data was briefw: to the Superintendent
he was not told it was incomplete. The input identified 13
midshipmen with unusually high scores. However, 13 out of the
663 who took the examination was not considered beyond a normal
range of unexpected individual improvement. Based on this
information, the Superintendent decided, and the Dean agreed,
that there was no indication that the compromise was widespread.
56. LCDR Scalzitti completed the data compilation (enclosure 19)
the following week by insisting the other instructor: grade the
tests and give him their input. LCDR Scalzitti, working with
another EL Department instructor, then prepared his complete
report on the grade comparisons. It showed 31 midshipmen with
higher than expected grades. The updated data did not leave the
EE Department until it wee given to the NAVINSGEN investigators.
The Superintendent, his staff, the Dean, and NCIS never saw the
updated input until the NAVINSGEN investigators showed it to
them. Consequently, it is now apparent that the Superintendent
and NCIS formed opinions and sada decisions about the comproL:se
based on incomplete information.

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V. scr.s rxvssTxweriow

57. The NCIS was requested to conduct an investigation into the

compromise on the initial theory that a criminal offense, such as
larceny or breaking and entering may have occurred. It quickly
became evident, however, that the origin of the compromised
examination was not clear and that a felony offense had not been
established. Nonetheless, in order to satisfy statutory
requirements in criminal investigations, almost all midshipmen
interviewed (interrogated) were advised of their rights against
self incrimination as set forth in Article 31(b), UCMJ. This
procedure had the cumulative effect of insulating the midshipmen
from their military duty to respond to questions about the
compromise.

53. In addition; NCIS, as the principal Navy organization

chartered, trained and manned to conduct criminal investigations,
conducted the investigation consistent with that charter. That
is, the investigation focused on criminal activity. Conduct in
violation of the Honor Concept, such as cheating, is not normally
within the NC:5 charter and therefore the NCIS agents did not
pursue that issue to completion during their investigation.
Senior Academy officials apparently never considered whether an
NC:5 criminal investigation remained appropriate after the
Superintendent's decision not to court-martial those accused only
of =eating. Although the principal NC:5 Special Agent
frequently briefed CAPT DeCarlo on the progress of the
investigation, CAPT DeCarlo did not reconsider the decision to
request NCIS to conduct a cri.lihal investigation, and did not
consider alternative forms of irvestigation order to determine
the actual extent of the cheating. Two such alternatives could
have been : (1) requesting that NCIS asmist the Academy by
conducting an investigation using less stringent administrative
procedures; or (2) convening an alternative inquiry, such as an
investigation under the provisions of the Manual of the Judge
Advocate General. Ultimately, MAVINSGEN was requested to conduct
an administrative investigation.
C. 733 10MOR BOARDS

(1) DECIMIOX TO USX 'MOOR BOARDS

59. At the Superintendent's l January 1992 briefing from NCIS,

the issue of conspiracy was discussed as a passible criminal
charge against sone midshipmen. The agents provided information
which implicated MIDI e and MION C in the theft of tha
exam and the issue of court-sartialling them was discussed. The
Superintendent decided against it for several reasons, the most
significant of which was that CAPT DeCarlo advised his the cases

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were not that strong and that they would probably lose at trial.
50. The Superintendent was satisfied that the number of
potential cases was not so great as to preclude the use of Honor
Boards as the means of resolution. From that date on. no other
resolution method was considered. The discussions held by the
Superintendent, Commandant and CAPT. DeCarlo in reaching their
conclusion to use Honor Boards focused on whether the Brigade
could mechanically ran so many Boards. They did not'address
whether Honor Boards could effectively decide cases in which 30
or so midshipmen could be engaged in a double-ended "conspiracy,"
..s., engaged in the sane common violation being heard by the
Boards and involved in a common effort to "boat* the Boards.
Hors specifically, none of the three officials considered whether
an Honor Board could properly resolve a case in which the
witnesses may conspire to lie in order to protect each other.
The Commandant stated that he has given a great deal of thought
spout this sumject in the past six months, but had no such
concerns wnen the Honor Boards were chosen as the means of
resolving the EE 311 cases.

rit must be remembered that Honor Boards are non-adversarial.

Unlike criminal trials where justice is found through the clash
of competing interests, the Honor Boards presume that midshipmen
appearing before them are telling the truth.)
(2) CONDUCT OF ':EM BOARDS

:he NAVINSGEN investigation revealed two primary flaws In the

manner in which the Honor Boards were conducmed:
a. XIDSEIYMAN C TISTIXONI:
51. &ION C provided a four-page sworn statement to
NC:S naming 23 midshipmen as having been involved in the
cheating. He vas to be the government's chief witness before the
Boards. His statement to NCIS had provided the basis for much of
the Boards' investigations and, based on his statement, senior
Academy official' felt confident at the outset of the Honor
Boards that cases against the accused were strong. However, on
17 March 1993, at the second Honor Board hearing, MIDN C
disavowed his sworn statement to NCI'S, stating that he was
coerced into giving the statement and that he did not read it
before signing. MIDN C would ultimately testify at 16
Boards (including his own) and disclaimed his sworn statement at
each one of them.
62. It van obvious to the Honor Committee members, each of whom
attended numerous) Honor Boards as non-voting members, that MIDN
C was lying to the Boards. The =embers repeatedly raised

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this issue with LC= Nagle and LT Cann. LCDR Nagle, LT Cann and
MIDN Culver, Honor Committee Chairman, met with the Commandant
early in the board process to discuss the situation. CAPT
DeCarlo vas also informed of the situation, but the
Superintendent was not. According to LCDR Nagle, neither he nor
the Commandant were overly concerned with MIDN C 's false
testimony because it did not appear to be causing an inordinate
number of dismisses 4. Collectively, they decided to assume that
Honor Board zemberr were intelligent and would conclude for
themselves that MI'M C 's testimony was perjured. MIDN
Culver did, however, instruct Honor Board Presiding Officials to
remind Board members that MICH C 's statement was sworn and
signed, and therefore carried greater weight than his testimony.
:.CDR Nagle also stressed to LT Cann and the Honor Committee that
an NC:5 agent would testify at each hearing as to the
circumstances under which MIDN C 's statement was made.

6). Despite MIDN C 's false testimony before the Boards, no

specific action was taken to rebut it. Curing one Board, the
Presiding Official asked LT Cann if redacted portions of H/DN
C 's sworn statement could be provided to the Board to show
that he had, in fact, read the statement, since the pages bore
corrections made in his handwriting and his initials. LT Cann
denied the request. Additionally, witnesses who were available
to impeach MIDI C 's testimony about the compromise were not
called. Nor was action taken to confront MIDI C with his
__use testimony and to hold hi= accountable. Ultimately, Honor
Boards dismissed nine cases against midshipmen named in M/ON
C 's sworn statement to NC:S.
b. LIMITS ow I7f7oRmTTIoalt

64. Under Honor Board procedures, It is a common practice to

redact (delete or edit) information that is not relevant to the
case being heard. On 4 February 199), LT Cann was instructed by
:,CDR Nagle to redact the NCIS report, the single most important
part of which was MIDN C 'a sworn statement, so that only
portions relevant to the individual accused midshipman were
provided to the Investigating Officers. Neither CAPT DeCarlo nor
LCDR Nagle, both of whom are Judge Advocates provided any
guidance to LT Cann, a naval aviator. CAPT DeCarlo believed that
LCDR Nagle was reviewing LT Cann's work. LCDR Nagle stated he
was comfortable with LT Cann proceeding'on his own, believing IT
Cann understood relevancy and would contact him if he had
difficulty. The Commandant acknowledged that he knew LT Cann was
redacting the NCIS report but believed him to be up to the task.
The Superintendent believed that CAPT DeCarlo and LCDR Nagle were
directing the redaction effort.

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65. LT Cann redacted the NCIS report throughout the week of 8

February 1993. As he finished redacting a portion relevant to a
particular midshipman, he provided it to the brigade Honor
Committee Vice Chairman for Investigations. who then passed it to
the IO assigned to investigate that particular case. The NC:5
report redacted by LT Cann was not substantially reviewed by any
Academy official, although LCDR Nagle believes he may have
reviewed a portion of it. This lack of oversight was brought to
the attention of CAPT DeCarlo when a defense attorney of an
accused midshipman complained that LT Cann had refused to provide
hi= with an unredacted copy of his client's own statement.
Although this deficiency was corrected, no effort was made to
review LT Cann's other redactions.
66. Honor Board procedures require that all relevant information
be considered when processing the case of an accused. However,
when the IOs received a redacted portion of the NCIS report, they
realized it was but one portion of a larger, interrelated event.
Many of the :Os received multiple pages of material containing
only a few sentences among large blocks of whited-out print.
They knew they were viewing only parts of the whole picture.
57. The IOs also learned that LCDR Nagle and LT Cann had a
matrix, prepared by CAPT DeCarlo, shoving the intev.connections
of midshipmen and tests. When the IOs asked for a copy of the
matrix. LT Cann denied their request.
ba. The IOs asked LT Cann for permission to confer among
themselves to understand the totality of the compromise. Their
request was denied on the grounds that the Superintendent and his
staff did not want to construct individual cases based on
evidence concerning other midshipmen. Consequently, many IOs
experienced difficulty in preparing their cases.

O. PIRCEPTIOX or T. COUPLICT OF IrfieSST

59. Once all of the Honor boards were completed, the Commandant
briefed the Superintendent on the results.. The Superintendent
knew the names of the 11 midshipmen who had been found in
violation. They did not discuss the specifics of any cases. The
Superintendent advised the Commandant to treat each case on its
own merits and to be fair and impartial in his determinations.

70. The Superintendent and CAPT DeCarlo discussed one case which
presented a potential conflict of interest problem. This was the
case of MIDN E who is the son of a friend of the
Superintendent's. and the Superintendent have known
each other since they were teammates on the Academy football team
in 1963. also later served a tour under the wr

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Superintendent, and they have remained friends over the years.

Their sons are also friends. CAPT DeCarlo is the sponsor of MIDN
His parents, who are strong Academy fans and attend
many sports events, stay .n CAPT DeCarlo's quarters when they
visit their son.
71. The Superintendent and CAPT DeCarlo knew that MIDN E
was one of those found in violation by the Honor Boards, and
discussed what to do if the ComMandant forwarded the case to the
Superintendent. They decided that the case should be sent to the
4 vice Chief of Naval operations, the Superintendent's immediate
superior, for action. They did not discuss whether the
Commandant, as the Superintendent's subordinate, could render an
impartial and independent judgment about the son of someone he
knew to be a friend of the Superintendent.
72. When the Commandant reviewed MIDN E 's case, he
overturned the Honor Board's finding of violation. When
interviewed, the Commandant said he knew about the friendship
between the Superintendent and MIDN E 'a father, but that
it did not impede his ability to make an impartial decision. The
Commandant stated he has met at social events,
usually after sporting activities, but that their conversations
have never mine beyond small talk. He said he overturned the
Board's finding because the NCIS agent who testified in the case
was asked h.s opinion of MIDN E 's guilt or innocence, to
wr.ich tne aqt.nt replied that he thought the midshipman was
guilty. The Commandant believed permitting the agent to give an
opinion on the ultimate question of quilt unduly influenced the
Board.

73. Although we found no conflict of interest in the

Superintendent and Commandant's handling of this case, we found
that there was a definite perception of a conflict or lack of
Impartiality among the midshipmen and that the Academy officials
were not sufficiently sensitive to this perception. This became
particularly evident during the meeting on 22 April 1993 when the
superintendent met with the Brigade of Midshipmen to announce the
final results of the EE 311 Honor cases. MIDN C stood up and
asked the Superintendent to comment on MIDN E 's presence
in the Superintendent's quarters the night before his case was
heard by the Commandant. The staff and the Admiral himself
remember the exchange as a clarification of the basic facts
stated by MIDN C . The Admiral did see MIDN E in his
quarters, but told the Brigade that MIDN E was visiting
his son and that he simply said hello to him and asked him if he
had been to his Commandant's hearing. The Superintendent told
the Brigade that nothing substantive was discussed.

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74. The midshipmen interviewed remember the Superintendent's

answer differently. They recall him first denying seeing MIDN
E in his quarters and only acknowledging it after MIDN
C kept pushing the issue. Various midshipmen remember
snickering and the repeated chanting of MIDN E 's nickname
by members of the Brigade after the Superintendent's response.
75. The perception-of a conflict of interest was raised again by
four of the midshipmen recommended for separation. Writing in
their "Show Cause" letters to the Secretary of the Navy, each
midshipman raised conflict of interest issues in the MIDN
E case, which they argued cast a shadow on the fairness of
the other cases. Specifically, they assert that the Commandant,
rather than the Superintendent, was either a roommate or company
mate of at the Academy.
76. The Superintendent responded to the Show Cause letters in
separate correspondence to the Secretary of the Navy. The
responses, drafted for the Superintendent by CAPT DeCarlo, refute
the assertion of a conflict of interest by stating the Commandant
and were in different classes and were not in the
same company. However, the Superintendent's letters fail to
address the more generalized, and important, allegation of a
personal relationship between MIDN E 's family and high
ranking officials at the Academy.
77. Before signing the letters to the Secretary of the Navy, the
Superintendent asked CAPT DeCarlo about the fact that it did not
mention his own relationship with MIDN. E 's father. CAPT
DeCarlo advised the Superintendent that the 'midahipmen's
assertions anout the Commandant were incorrect and irrelevant to
their particular Show Cause cases. He explained that there was
no need for the Superintendent to provide details of his own
relationship to MIDN g 's father because the case in which
that would be an issue never reached the Superintendent. The
Superintendent then signed the letters.
X. IANDLING hie ALLEGATZONe
71. At his meeting with the Brigade of Midshipmen on 22 April
1993, RADM Lynch stated that the investigation remained open and
he encouraged anyone with information regarding the EE 311
compromise to moue forward. The Superintendent repeated this
request in a newspaper interview shortly thereafter. Picking up
on this message, the Commandant told the Brigade midshipmen
leaders that the investigation remained open and encouraged them
to come forward with any new information on the EE 311 cheating.
79. At the end of April, MIDN F told MIDN Culver that
he had more Information on the EE 311 compromise. He implicated

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several people, including some who had appeared before Honor

3oards but had not been found in violation. MIDN Culver met with
:he Commandant, LCDR Nagle and LT Cann and told them what MIDN
F had told him. He also told them he wanted to address the
entire Brig.de immediit'17, and begin a new investigation.
30. The Commandant told MIDN Culver that they would not
investigate until MIDN F provided a written statement. MIDN
Tulver asked for and received from MIEN F a letter setting
forth the new information. The ?SION F :attar, dated 3 May
1993, states in pertinent part:

On the night before the EE311 final, I walked into 2/C

C's room at approximately 2100. 2/C ki was seated at
desk copying something onto a piece of paper. I
walked over and began to talk to H . Near the
beginning of the conversation, H showed me the
paper he was copying. At the top it read something to the
effect of "EE311 Final Exam Fall 1992." Li began
to tell me that this was the exam he was expecting to take
the following day. He told me a scenario of how G.
had obtained the exam. He stated that a member of the
football team had received it from a professor in another
academic department. This professor was an officer who was
the older brother of tne football player who originally
gained access to the exam and proceeded to give it to other
manners of the football team. Being a football player,
G- got it from a teammate. 1 asked if he actually
believed that this was the exam, and not just another old
exam that was passed down. He proceeded to tell me that he
believed this was the final he would be taking the next day.
He proved his point by showing me the data at the top, "Fall
1992." ...

81. MIDN Culver gave the letter to the Commandant at another

meeting with him, LCDR Nagle, and LT Cann on 3 May 1993. The
Commandant read the letter and noted that it was not signed.
LCDR Nagle recalls the Commandant said he wouldn't do anything
about the allegations until the letter was signed. The
Commandant told the NAVINSGEN investigators he simply said to get
the letter signed. LT Cann recalls that he, LT Cann, told MIDN
Culver to get the letter signed. MIDN Culver recalls that when
he pressed on initiating the investigation, he "vas silenced and
told 'that justice had been served and there was not 'enough' to
reopen the investigation."
82. LCDR Nagle said be felt that MIDN Culver had lost all
objectivity and that they all felt that MIDN Culver was too
personally involved and it wee time to pass the duties of Honor
o Committee Chairman to the incoming donor Committee Chairman.

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83. MIDN Culver and the Commandant do agree that before the
meeting ended, the Commandant told someone to look into the
matter (MIDN Culver says LT Cann got the assignment, the
Commandant recalls taskthg both LT Cann and LCDR Nagle).
However, neither LCDR Nagle nor LT Cann thought they bad been
given any direction to look into the letter.
84. Also on 3 May 1993, there was a turnover meeting between the
incoming and outgoing Honor Committees; CAPT DeCarlo, LCDR Nagle
and LT Cr.nn were also present. They discussed lessons learned
from the recently-completed Honor Boards and listened to concerns
about the way those cases were handled by the 1993 Honor
Committee.

35. MIDN Culver thought one purpose of the meeting was to

discuss the MIDN F letter and how it would be handled, so he
raised the issue concerning what was going to be dare with it.
It quickly became obvious that nobody had told CAPT DeCarlo about
the letter. The meeting ended with CAPT DeCarlo having it for
action. CAPT DeCarlo said he was adamant that an investigation
was needed because it appeared to be new evidence and the
Superintendent had made a commitment to investigate any new
information. CAPT DeCarlo left the meeting with a copy of the
letter but assumed that LT Cann would interview MIDN F and
the other midshipmen mentioned in the letter.
86. CAPT vCario briefed the Superintendent on the MIDN F
letter the day he received it (3 May 1993). The Superintendent
asked him what they should do with it CAPT DeCarlo told the
Superintendent that he (the Superintendent) had asked for
midshipmen to come forward with new information and now that one
had done so they were obligated to look into it. He recommended
that they try to establish some veracity in it and if they did,
to then turn it over to ?MIS. Because CAPT DeCarlo was under the
impression that LT Cann was going to interview the midshipmen, he
told the Superintendent that trey were, in fact, looking into the
letter. However, he was wrong. LT Cann did not think he had any
action on it.

87. Sometime thereafter, (LT Cann estimated at least one week

later), CAPT DeCarlo called LT Cann concerning the part of the
letter where MIDN F recounts that MIDN A told him the
source of the test was a member of the faculty who had a brother
on the football team. CAPT DeCarlo told LT Cann that there was
no such person at the Academy. They did not discuss what LT Cann
may have been doing about the letter.

88. The Commandant, who recalled having asked someone to look

into the allegation about the faculty member first, told the
investigators that in his opinion this inaccuracy affected the

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credibility Of the entire letter, as well as its importance and

urgency. The other officers interviewed shared this sentiment.
The most important assertion in the letter, that F had seen a
printed copy of the examination with the words "ES 311 Final Exam
Fall 1992" on the first page, appears to have been ignored in the
initial inquiries.
89. Besides running down the faculty member/brother issue, CAPT
DeCarlo checked MIDH H's record. Finding that he was an
excellent student and on the Superintendent's list, CAPT DeCarlo
determined that he might have been involved as an "answer =an."
CAPT DeCarlo also had discussions with LCDR Nagle and the manor
Committees about the impact of the 21-day rule and whether it
would act as a bar to accusing anyone.
90. Except for CAPT DeCarlo's limited inquiries, no one took
action on the MIDH F -otter before 19 May 1993. On that
data, the Academy received a fax inquiry from the arzle_kz,-1
agn (enclosure (20)). Based on the questions in the inquiry, it
was obvious that some or all of the new information contained in
the MIDN r letter had reached the paper.
91. At that point, CA.P7 DeCarlo realized they had not taken
timely action on the MIDN F letter and needed to make up
ground. He went to the Superintendent to discuss the =atter and
make recommendations. He says that in retrospect, he should have
turned the AIDN F letter over to mc:s as soon as he learned
of it. The Superintendent acknowledged that it was around this
time that CAPT DeCarlo had come to him and admitted that the
ball had been dropped" in running down the MIDN F letter.
92. CAPT .eCarlo then gave LT Cann clear direction to talk to
the midshipmen named in the letter. LT Cann was able to talk to
MIDN F , MIDH i and MIDH but was
unable to talk to MIDN or his roommate, MIDH K
, both of whoa had begun their stir:mar cruise.
93. LT Cann estimated that he talked to the midshipmen within a
day or two of when he was told to do so by CAPT DeCarlo. Based
on the data the summer cruise began, he believes he reported his
findings shortly after 24 May 1993. The reason he was not sure
of the date is the memorandum he prepared (enclosure (21))
outlining his findings was undated. :n this memorandum, LT Cann
concludes that he will talk to MOH H and MIEN y upon
their return to the Academy, but that the matter did not seem
worth pursuing.
94. On 26 May 1993, the Baltimore Sun ran an article critical of
the Academy (enclosure (22)), suggesting that now information had
surfaced on the cheating but that no action Will being taken. The

2t)
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article was followed, two days later, by Senator Richard Shelby's

(0, Ala] letter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting an
inspector general investigation.

95. Because it was necessary to develop reliable information

quickly, it was suggested, and the Superintendent agreed, to
issue grants of immunity and to have NC:5 send them, along with a
series of questions, to the NC:S agents at the commands where
H and MIDH Y, were attached. On 4 Juno 1993, the
Superintendent signed two grants of immunity. Subsequently, NC:S
served one of the two grants, but before the other was served
NAV/NSGEN began its investigation and preempted further action.
Y, TRI RoNOR COMM"? CL21431T7 it USKA

96. Despite the clear words of the Honor Concept that midshipmen
are persons of integrity expected to apply the highest standards
of honor, duty, loyalty and character, this investigation found
that =any midshipmen do not always measure up to these ideals.

91. Throughout the numerous interviews NAVINSGEN conducted with

midshipmen, the message the investigators received from the
=idsnipmen was that they viewed the Honor Concept as an ideal
that simply could not be applied to many of the problems that
arise in the daily life of a midshipman at the Academy. Their
conduct during the investigation reinforced their views.
98. For example, only a handful of midshipmen admitted their
involvement in the EE 311 exam compromise when first asked the
question. In most cases, they repeatedly lied until
confronted with Irrefutable proof of their involvement. It
quickly became apparent that the midshipmen had to see the
strength of the case the investigators had against them before
they would tell the truth. In many cases, midshipmen admitted
their participation only after the investigators provided a
detailed analysis of their examination answers that shoved a
correlation with the answers of others who had already confessed.
A common reaction was something to the effect of: "okay, now that
: know you got 94, I'll tell the truth.'

99. Many midshipmen tried to rationalize their actions by

denying that they really knew they had the actual exam. In doing
so, they exposed their shallow commitment to the Sonar Concept.
ve found that only a handful of midshipmen knew the exam had been
compromised and anticipated receiving a copy before the evening
of 13 December 1902. For scat, the exam appeared spontaneously
after 2100 on the 13th, and circulated among roommates, small
groups of friends, and teammates who couldn't believe their good
fortune. Some midshipmen reported speculating that it couldn't
really be the exam, but the clear import of their message was

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that they certainly hoped it was. Most important, in the ten or

so hours the exam circulated within Bancroft Hall before it was
administered at 0745 on the 14th, not one midshipman stepped
forward to expose the compromise to Academy Officials.

100. The extent of the compromise also demonstrated to the

investigators the scope of the midshipmen's failure to embrace
the Honor Concept. The compromised examination travelled
throughout the Brigade, ultimately involving Midshipmen from 29
of 305 companies. However, it did not come with answers, so
groups of midshipmen, normally groups with a preexisting
connection, e.g., team mates, roommates and close friends, would
gather to work out the solutions. All types of midshipmen were
involved, not just football players: midshipmen on the
Superintendent's list, as well as midshipmen who were flunking;
. of the football, soccer, wrestling, lacrosse, water-
polo, heavyweight crew, baseball, tennis and basketball teams;
Honor Representatives as well as the Brigade Honor Committee
(class of 1994); members of the glee
club; eight three stripers (midshipman lieutenants!, three
midshipmen with medical school aspirations: 57 midshipmen who
graduated from the Naval Academy Preparatory School.

101. Although we found ""'e evidence of conspiracy to obtain

the exam, we found much to demonstrate that midshipmen conspired
to conceal their involvement to NCIS, the Honor Boards, and to
tne NAVINSGEN investigators. Indeed, the second part of M/OH
F 's letter focuses on his observations of midshipmen working
over a computer to coordinate and perfect the testimony they
would give to the Honor Boards in order to protect each other.
Midshipmen interviewed by NAVINSOZN lied to protect their
friends, even after admitting their own quilt.

102. The actions of one group of midshipmen merit particular

mention. Although many midshipmen lied, most did make some
response to the Investigators' questions. But 14 midshipmen
Implicated in the cheating, 11 of whom were athletes, presented a
united wall of silence by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Despite
that amendment's criminal nexus and nonavailability in an
administrative investigation, after methods of compelling these
midshipmen to cooperate were studied, the legal recommendation
was to request written grants of immunity from the convening
authority. The Superintendent concurred in the request, and 14
grants of immunity were issued and served on the midshipmen.
Nevertheless, only two came anywhere close to telling the truth
In their subsequent interviews. Eight lied and swore to those
lies. Five refused to be interviewed, even in the face of the
Superintendent's grant of immunity and orders compelling their
cooperation. One midshipman expressed his conviction that the
Navy would take no additional action against him for refusing to

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cooperate even after the grant of immunity. He told the

investigators the Navy was bluffing (in taking additional action
against him for his failure to cooperate after receiving the
grant) and that he was "calling their bluff."

103. The majority of midshipmen interviewed did not feel that

truth was found, or even seriously sought, during the Honor
Boards' attempts to implement the Honor Concept at the Academy.
Many examples were given, the most common of which involved the
perceived special breaks given to MIDN E due to his family
connections with the Superintendent.
104. The majority of midshipmen we interviewed also believed the
system punishes anyone who tells the truth. The example given
most often is the outcome of the EE 311 cases. They point out
that only midshipmen who admitted they cheated were ultimately
found in violation and recommended for separation by the
Superintendent.' Whether this was a conscious, subconscious or
coincidental outcome is impossible to say, but the factual result
.s consistent with the perception that telling the truth does not
pay. A related perception expressed by some was that cheating on
tne EE 311 exam was justified because it was unfair of the
Academy to require midshipmen to take the course.

105. Members of the Honor Committee felt that the lack of timely
response by the Superintendent and Commandant on the information
received from ?ETON F evinced their lack of real commitment to
the Hanot Concept. The Committee members believed that the only
reason the Academy took any action on the f letter was
because word of it reached the newspaper'.

106. The class of 1993 Honor Committee was universally critical

of the way the EE 311 cases were handled, from the beginning
through the Commandant's and Superintendent's review and their
follow up when additional evidence was received. Committee
members did not understand the reasons for the decisions made,
nor did they believe they were supported in their efforts to
enforce the Honor Concept.

107. Some members of the Honor Committee mentioned an incident

involving the definition of cheating that is instructive. At an
early stage of the Honor Board proceedings, the Honor Committee
members had a discussion with LCDR Nagle and LT Cann during which
they thought all agreed that midshipmen who did not realize they

Each of the six midshipmen who were recommended for

1

separation by the Superintendent admitted they cheated and said so

under oath to HCIS. They later, at their boards, tried to recant
their statements but were unable to do so convincingly.

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91

had been studying the actual exam Sunday night until they took
the test Monday Morning would be guilty of cheating if they did
not report it to an Academy official. Later, after the Boards
were completed, this question came up in CAPT DeCarlo's presence.
He said that because intent was required for cheating, people who
did not know they had the exam on Sunday night could not be
guilty of cheating. The members of the Honor Committee recall
that LCDR Nagle and LT Cann immediately agreed with CAPT
DeCarlo's position, and denied ever taking a contrary position.
:,CDR Nagle and LT Cann told the NAVINSGEN investigators they did
not recall ever giving the midshipmen a different definition.
Apparently overlooked in this debate, which resurfaced during the
NAVINSGEN investigation, is the obligar.ion a midshipman has to
report the compromise after discovering it, regardless of the
label that may be used to describe the midshipman's conduct on
Sunday night.
108. Many midshipmen said the Superintendent was overly
supportive of the football team. There is a widely held
perception witnin the Brigade that football players receive too
many special breaks, e.g., preselection of courses, standing no
weekend duty during season, and eating at team tables, even as
plebes, tnereby avoiding the training which takes place at
company tables during meals. These views were strengthened when.
according to some midshipmen, the Superintendent told the Brigade
on 22 April 1993, in announcing the results of the 24 cases, that
he was glad to report that no football players ware involved. In
tnis regard, the reoarks of the West Point Special Commission
cited at the beginning of this report bear special consideration.
109. Ultimately, responsibility fbr acceptance of the Honor
Concept at the Academy rests with the Superintendent, not merely
in the sense that the Captain is responsible for his ship, but in
the real sense that the midshipmen must believe he has an
unwavering and total commitment to its principles and that he
lives by them every day of his life. And thus, finally, we must
examine the Superintendent's commitment to the Honor Concept.
110. We believe that, unlike many midshipmen, the Superintendent
does believe the Honor Concept can be applied to all facets of
daily life. Of all those interviewed, he had the clearest, most
direct understanding of the application of the Honor Concept to
the compromise of the EZ 311 exam. He said, quite simply, that
If a midshipman had any reason to believe the problems he etudind
were from the exam and used them anyway, the midshipman accepted
the risk that, if the problems turned out to be actual exam
problems, then he had cheated.

111. Yet we believe the Superintendent's personal commitment to

the Honor Concept creates a dilemma for him. On the one hand,

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the Superintendent will not tolerate those who violate the Honor
Concept, and believes there is no room for them .1t the Academy.
The Superintendent is reported to have said on one occasion that
he would dismiss the entire class of 1994 if they were all
cheaters. On the other hand, he has such a high regard for
midshipmen that he considers it virtually inconceivable one of
them would not adhere to the Honor Concept. Therefore, when
faced with deciding whether a sidshipsan has violated the Honor
Concept, he requires nearly irrebuttable evidence before making a
finding of violation.

112. The Superintendent's dilemma is best illustrated when

midshipmen make accusations of honor violations based on trivial
acts or statements that literally fall within the definition of
an honor violation, but which the Honor Boards were never
intended to address. For example, a midshipman one minute late
for muster might spontaneously exclaim 'I wasn't late!" when his
company commander asks "Why are you late for muster?" Such a
statement is, in the literal sense, a lie, for which separation
as an honor violation is the normal punishment. It is also one
that most reasonable people would agree should not be brought
before the Honor Boards for resolution.

113. But when overzealous midshipmen insist on presenting such

accusations, and the evidence is clear, a finding of violation is
warranted. To avoid the absurdity of separating a midshipman for
such a trivial matter, the Boards, the Commandant, or the
Superintendent are likely to find 'no violation." The problem
with this approach is that it corrupts the entire Honor system.
while this may work in Isolated cases, when applied too often,
the whole concept crumbles and the hypocrisy of the system is
exposed. On the surface. the answer would appear to rest with
the concept of progressive punishment. However, for some,
including perhaps the Superintendent, the dilemma would only be
compounded were he to find the midshipman did lie, but allow him
to remain in the Brigade with some form of punishment short of
separation. To do so would be to admit that some midshipmen are
liars and cheaters, a proposition which can not be reconciled
with an Honor Concept applied absolutely.

114. Moreover, the Superintendent's understandable pride in the

football team has unfortunately led to the appearance that he
gives football players preferential treatment that is
inconsistent with the Honor Concept. Should any cases involving
football players come before him, this perception will make it
virtually impossible for his to treat those cases fairly. Unless
4a finds violation in every one, his review of the football
players' cases will cause the midshipmen to believe he has again
afforded them preferential treatment. The following examples,

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consistent with the perception of the midshipmen mentioned

earlier, are noted:

a. During the NCIS brief on 18 January, the Superintendent

became angry when he was told that NCIS interviewed the football
team. He said that it appeared to be a "witch hunt" and that
their actions were giving credence to the rumors that the entire
football team had the test. He made no similarly emotional
remarks about finding all the cheaters. (The Superintendent did
not try to direct the NCIS investigation and NCIS in fact did
conduct an independent investigation.]
b. 09 3 August 1993, the Superintendent was briefed by
three NAVINSGEN investigators on the findings of the
investigation to date and the direction it was headed. The
Superintendent asked if the investigation would be over by 15
August 1993, the Brigade's return date. He was told the
investigation would likely not be over until the late Fall. He
said he had hoped to tell the Brigade upon their return the
results of the NAVINSGEN investigation, out if that was
impossible, then the investigators should take their time and do
a thorough job because the Xrmy-Navy game was 5 December 1993.
The Head Coach made the same remarks when interviewed.
.15. Taken individually, these considerations may not constitute
a definitive assessment of the Superintendent's priorities
regarding the Honor Concept. Taken collectively, they create the
perception of a lack of appropriate commitment.
CONCLU8ION8, RECOHKENDATION8 AND OPINIONS
CONCLOsION8

1. The EE Department': failure to provide the Superintendent a

complete and accurate examination grade analysis caused senior
Academy officials and s.e NCIS to believe mistakenly that the
extent of the compromise was very limited.
2. NCIS responded to the request of the Superintendent and
conducted an appropriate criminal investigation. However, when
it became apparent that cri.,inal activity would not be pursued
for prosecution, Academy officials did not take action to
initiate an investigation that would be more likely to reveal the
full extent of the cheating.

3. The Honor Board system in its current form was designed to

handle individual cases. The structure and procedures are not in
place to handle a large volume of interrelated cases.

26

77-598 94 - 4
 94

4. Evidence gathered by NCIS was excessively redacted and Boards

were not given access to the examinations of the accused. As a
result, the Honor Boards did not have complete information upon
which to make their decisions.
5. Academy officials responsible for the direct oversight of the
Honor Board proceedings failed to effectively counter MIDN
Walker's disavowal, of his sworn statement to NCIS.
G. There was no actual conflict of interest in the Commandant's
handling of MIDN Ingraham's case. However, there was a definite
perception of a conflict or lack of impartiality among the
midshipmen, and the Academy officials were not sensitive to this
perception, nor is it evident they took any action to counter it.
7. Academy officials failed to act in a timely manner when they
received MIDN Smith's letter.
8. For a variety of reasons detailed in this report, a climate
was created and/or allowed to exist at the Academy that resulted
in a failure of leadership, staff, and midshipmen to understand,
embrace, and/or support the Honor Concept.
9. Decisions made by Academy officials to unduly restrict
information available to midshipmen
Boards constituted 7ismanagement and investigators and Honor
hindered the Boards' ability
to effectively consider the Honor Cases brought as a result of
the NCIS investigation.
10. The cases developed by the NAVINSGEN
not be referred to the Academy for action. investigation should
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. That the cases developed by the NAVINSGEN investigation be
referred to a forum other than the Academy Honor Boards for
resolution.
2. That, in the event recommendation number one is not adopted,
the Secretary of the Navy direct that the Superintendent, United
States Naval Academy, take such action as necessary to
that: ensure

a. Honor Boards are given sufficient evidence to reasonably

evaluate each case (i.e., no excessive redacting of previous
sworn statements):
b. Honor Boards receive proper instruction as to the
evidentiary standard to be applied (decisions on violations
are

27 ti

93 BEST COPY AVAILABLE

 95

to be made based on a preponderance of the evidence; a certainty

that is beyond reasonable doubt is not required);
potential Honor Board members are questioned to ensure
r.
that. (1) they do not have so much knowledge of the events
surrounding the exam's compromise that they can not maks a fair
decision; and (2)'they are not inclined to convict the accused
for the purpose of vindicating the reputation of the Class of
1994.

d. Honor Board members are made to understand that not all

midshipmen who present evidence to them will tell the truth, the
precepts of the Honor Concept notwithstanding.
e. Honor Board members are made to understand that their
only function, as the Boards are currently constituted, is to
determine whether it is more likely than not that a midshipman
committed an honor violation, without regard to the penalty to be
imposed.

3. That, if the cases are referred to the Academy for

disposition, the SuperLIcendent and Commandant should recuse
themselves from the review process in: (1) any case involving
midshipmen they have already rendered a decision on; and (2) any
other case that could reasonably create the appearance of a
conflict of interest or lack of impartiality.
4. That the United States Naval Academy Board of Visitors
recommendations which are supported by the findings of this
investigation be implemented: specifically, recommendations that
relate to:

a. need for revised procedures, clear definition of terms,

and written guidance;

b. midshipmen attitudes;
c. character development and training;
procedural aspects of the Honor Concept, particularly
d.
those governing honor sanctions; and
e. the review process.
Additionally, further review is necessary to define how the
system should function in the future.

9'd
 96

OPINIONS
1. Service on Honor Boards prepares future Naval officers to
make the hard decisions required in disciplining subordinates.
Effective decision-making requires an understanding of the
concept of progressive discipline. As presently constituted,
Honor Boards do not provide adequate training in this area.
Moreover, the perception that separation is the only penalty for
an Honor violation encourages midshipmen Honor Board members to
distort the Board decision making process in order to obtain a
"just" result in those cases where the violation does not appear
to warrant separation. With proper training, permitting
midshipmen to make' recommendations on disciplinary action will
prepare them to be better officers at the same time it promotes
the integrity of Board decisions.
2. The application of the Honor Concept through Honor Boards at
the Academy must struggle with the tact that the Academy
emphasizes the value of loyalty to one's classmates. Many
midshipmen function by the cardinal rule "don't bilge a
classmate." To counter this inclination, Academy officials must
provide a more vigorous and evident endorsement of honor
proceedings than was forthcoming in this instance.
3. Without further change to the Honor Board process, midshipmen
who eventually experience remorse and admit to Honor violations
are likely to be found in violation and recommended for
separation, whereas those who continue to lie may receive no
punishment at all.
4. it would be counterproductive for the Navy to separate
everyone who committed an honor violation in connection with the
compromise of the exam, without regard to the facts and
circumstances surrounding the violation. Our investigation
clearly revealed that there were varying degrees of culpability,
ranging from midshipmen who sold the test to others, to those who
were given answers by "friends" at the very last minute. Some of
the midshipmen who committed honor violations have admitted their
mistakes and learned from them. The Navy should consider whether
this experience has the potential to make those midshipmen better
Naval officers. For example, in our opinion, those who
ultimately admitted their involvement to the investigators,
despite near certain knowledge that they would be separated for
doing so, merit favorable consideration.
5. While RADM Lynch's interest in the football team Cm
understandable in light of his history as Captain of the 1963
football team, the perception that any small, special interest
group is treated preferentially is detrimental to the functioring

29
 4

97

of the Brigade of Midshipmen and to the sanctity of the position

of Superintendent, United States Naval Academy.

6. The Naval Academy is not just another command 'ffithin the

Department of the Navy. it is the symbol of the highest ideals
of the Navy, its commands, and its people. The Navy's response
to the problems at the Academy we have discussed in this report
must demonstrate to the American people that the Navy is firmly
committed to the nicest sense of personal honor and integrity.

30
 98

GLOSSARY
ACV:MATZOS: A charge alleging that a midshipman has violated the
Honor Concept.
BILG/SG A CLASSMATE: To tell or squeal on a classmate.
HONOR ADVISOR: A midshipman 1/C Honor Representative appointed
by the Honor Committee Chairman to assist midshipmen accused
prepare for their Honor Board. Honor Boards are nonadversarial:
accordingly, the advisor is not a defense counsel. His purpose
is to advise the accused on the Honor Board process.
HONOR SOAR°. An administrative board, established in accordance
with the ;;SNA Honor Concept, to resolve accusations of honor
violations against midsnipmen. The board consists of seven voting
t ethers, five of whom are class honor representatives. Six of
tne Board members are midshipmen ./C and the seventh is a
midshipman 2/C unless the accused is a midshipman I/C. There are
also two non-voting members on the board, the presiding official
and the recorder. The two non-voting members are midshipmen
on the Honor Committee. The hearings are not conducted under 1/C
oath and no midshipman accused can be forced to testify against
himself. A violation is found on a simple ma7ority vote. ':ores
are ty secret ballot. The results are Immediately announced.
Punishment is not recommended: the case is simply forwarded to
the Commandant. The Commandant conducts his on hearing, and if
he finds a violation, he awards punishment unless It is
separation. If the recommended punishment is separation, the
case is forwarded to the Superintendent. The Superintendent
conducts his on hearing, and if he finds a violation and concurs
in the separation recommendation, the case is forwarded to the
Secretary of the Navy.
SOSOR COXXITTME CIAIRSAY: Midshipman 1/C who Chairs the Honor
Committee. Holds the rank of Midshipman Commander.
Responsible
for reviewing accusations of honor violations and has authority
to refer accusations to an Honor Board or to dismiss the
accusation.

30SOR COMXITTLE STA77: Seven midshipmen 1/C who enforce the

Honor Concept and run the Honor Boards.
=ma COSCIPT. A USNA regulation. It sets forth the rules by
which all midshipmen must act. its fundamental tenant is A
midshipman will not lie, cheat or steal. Also provides the due
process protections and details of Honor Boards.
sosoR REPRESENTATIVE: A midshipman who serves on the Honor
Committee. The Honor Committee has 72 members, one 1/C and one
2/C midshipman irom each company.

Appendix
 99

AIDSEIMAY IYVVaTIGATIMO OTIPIC27t (I0): A midshipman 1/C Honor

Representative appointed by the Honor Committae Chairman to
investigate accusations of possible honor violations. The IO
reports to the Honor Committee Chairman, and it the Chairman
refers the accusation to an Honor Board the 1'0 acts as the
presenter of evidence before the board (also in a non adversarial
capacity).
21 DAY 1011: Under the Honor Concept, midshipmen, faculty and
staff members are eligible to make accusations against a
midshipman suspected of committing an honor violation. The Honor
Concept reguires,that the accusation be made within 21 days of
the data the accuser becomes aware of the violation. If an
accusation is made, the Honor Committee Chairman will appoint an
IO to conduct an investigation and report back to him his
findings. The Chairman may then dismiss the charges or forward
them to an Honor Board.

Appendix
 100
Senator SHELBY. We are joined by the chairman of the full com-
mittee, Senator Nunn. Senator Nunn, do you have any opening
statement, or remarks that you want to make?
Chairman NuNN. No,Mr. Chairman, is am just pleased that you
are having these hearings, too. I think that the whole question of
honor and conduct in our military services begins at the very early
stages of careers, and I think the way the pattern is set, and the
example is set, and the discipline is set, and the seriousness of pur-
pose by all leaders is set, make an enormous difference, not just
to the immediate but to the long-term honor and integrity of the
military services.
And, without honor and integrity, we would have an eroding
military. It is built on honor and integrity and respect in command,
and I think this is enormously important. I remember, when I
chaired the Manpower Subcommittee, one of the first hearings that
we really put together was around 1974, 1975, and I know Ambas-
sador Armitage remembers that.
And I have always felt that the Honor Code and the respect for
the Honor Code and the way it is carried out at the military acad-
emies really, in a way, distinguishes those institutions from others.
There are honor codes in other institutions around the country. but
I think it is enormously important, as to how it is implemented.
So, I am interested in the hearings, and I will follow it as much
as I can and be here as much as I can. We have the Perry nomina-
tion, and we are going to try to vote at 11 o'clock; so we may have
to run over and do that, and I hope it will not take too long. Then
we have a vote. But I will be here as much as I can, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your leadership, and we appreciate the witnesses here.
Senator SHELBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ambassador, I would like to begin to thanking you for join-
ing us this morning. I would also like to thank you for your excel-
lent record as the Chairman of the Naval Academy's Board of Visi-
tors Honor Review Committee. Through your work, and that of the
other distinguished Americans who serve with you on the commit-
tee, you have made an important contribution to the Academy and
to this Nation.
I have a few questions that I would like to get into, one by one.
The committee's report, on page 1, refers to, quote, "a drift off
course from the importance of honor as an aspect of character."
Would you describe, Mr. Ambassador, for the subcommittee, what
you personally believe to be the underlying cause or causes of that
drift off course? Was the committee able to isolate any systemic
causes or reasons for this drift?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, I believe the drift off course is a
function of several factors. The first is the lack of sustained empha-
sis on character development after plebe summer. We heard time
and again from Midshipmen, that they came in with relatively
idealistic expectations; and over the course of their matriculation
at the U.S. Naval Academy, became increasingly cynical.
I believe, as I have stated, this is not a particular problem that
resides just with the present administration.
Senator SHELBY. What is the cynicism grounded on?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. It is grounded on several things. First of
all, they find that their seniors at the Naval Academy, whether

104
 101
first-, second-, or third-class, may talk the talk, but they do not
walk the walk when it comes to making honor the foremost aspect
of their personal lives. They view this also in society, I might say;
I would be remiss, not to point that out.
They have similar experiences in the fleet, which, on the one
hand, are quite interesting and beneficial professionally, in terms
of professional expertise. In terms of what they see regarding per-
sonal honor, however, I think it is somewhat disappointing; at
least, as it has been reported to us by various Midshipmen.
All of these things, I think, are exacerbated by what we saw as
a Naval Academy community which was pulled in a lot of different
directions: Athletics, academics, military science, all pulling in dif-
ferent directions; and the normal pressures that any young man or
woman, 18 to 22 years old, feels in the societal process and in the
socialization process. All these things are additive. Finally, there
are the pressures of the day for a Midshipman.
It occurred to us that, over time, by the time they are in their
second year or third year, many Midshipmen have come to view the
honor process as just another obstacle; not unlike the mile and a
half run, or some other physical standard, or some other examina-
tion that they have to pass in order to graduate. It becomes an ob-
stacle to graduation, rather than something they internalize and
weave into their daily lives.
Senator SHELBY. How long do you think this erosion of the Honor
Code, or the idea of it, has been going on?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I think I would say from the late sixties.
I believe that those, in 1951, Admiral Lawrence, and otheis who
were responsible for the Naval Academy Honor Code, probably kept
it pretty alive. But from the late sixties on, I believe it has been
slowly eroding.
And, as I said, the fact that Navy leadership, successive Sec-
retaries and CNOs, have not focused on the Naval Academy as a
place, a crucible of character development, but rather as an experi-
mental laboratory for leadership theories, has exacerbated the situ-
ation.
Senator SHELBY. But historically, much of the honor of the Navy
has come out of the Academy as far as the concept of the Code,
hasn't it?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, indeed, the concept. But I would
very much hesitate to say that the honor emanates from the Naval
Academy. There are extraordinarily honorable people who have
graduated from ROTC. ,
Senator SHELBY. But to some extent, it does indeed come from
there?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, indeed so.
Senator SHELBY. Would you elaborate for the committee regard-
ing the specific problem areas to which the report refers; the ac-
tions taken by the Superintendent and the Commandant to address
the problem areas; and the timing of these actions, with regard to
the compromise of the electrical engineering exam in December
1992?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I believe that is a question more for Ad-
miral Bennett than for me.

105
 102
Senator SHELBY. Very well. Do you want to answer that, Admiral
Bennett?
Admiral BENNETT. When the examination was compromised in
December, shortly thereafter there became known through some
Midshipmenand I think that that is important to recognizethat
the initial report of a possible compromise did come from Mid-
shipmen,. via electronic mail to one of the professors in the Elec-
trical Engineering Department. That started the Naval Academy's
process of investigation of those
Senator SHELBY. This is the sequence of events you are talking
about?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir. Because there was an implication
that conceivably the examination had been stolen, there might
have been breaking and entering or other felonious kinds of activi-
ties involved, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy asked the
Naval Criminal Investigative Service to conduct the initial inves-
tigation.
As is outlined in my report, for a number of reasons, including
some erroneous information that was provided to the Superintend-
ent, the determination was made that it was a relatively isolated
incidence. Consequently, I think we got off to an investigative proc-
ess that really did not get to the bottom of the matter.
As I say again, with 20/20 hindsightand I am sure Admiral
Lynch would be the first to suggest that, if he had it all to do over,
he would do it all over again differently.
Senator SHELBY. Sire, but are you saying that the initial inves-
tigation was too narrow in scope?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir, I think so.
Senator SHELBY. From your point of view today?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir, from my perspective, that is precisely
right.
Senator SHELBY. The committee's report notes that the honor
concept must be the property of the brigade. It must be their
means of developing character within their own ranks, and by their
own efforts. It is my understanding there is nothing new in this.
It has, to my knowledge, been widely accepted that the brigade
should own their own honor concept if it is to succeed.
I do not believe, however, that this notion of ownership by the
brigade is intended to absolve the leadership of the Academy of re-
sponsibility regarding the honor concept. How would you, Mr. Am-
bassador, describe the specific responsibilities of a Superintendent
of the Naval Academy, in regard to the honor concept?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I would say that the Superintendent has
the primary responsibility to make the internalization of the honor
concept and the development of character the primary goals of the
Naval Academy. He is given this duty, in my view, by the Sec-
retary of the Navy.
I would say that there is no higher function that he or she would
perform; and, in the words of General Graves, the Superintendent
of the U.S. Military Academy, when he appeared before our com-
mittee, "You know, my job is character development. Period." And
I could not have put it better. That is the job.
Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, how would you describe the
specific responsibilities of a Commandant of Midshipmen at the

106
 103
Naval Academy, in regard to the honor concept? Would it be simi-
lar?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, no. I think the Commandant has a
different responsibility, as he is responsible for conduct, for punish-
ment, meting out punishments, administrative duties, et cetera, et
cetera. So I think he is sort of the first line of entry, if you will,
between the brigade and the administration, regarding matters of
honor.
Senator SHELBY. My time is up on this round. I now want to rec-
ognize Senator Coats, who has joined us and is the Ranking Repub-
lican of the committee.
Senator COATS. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late. As Sen-
ator Nunn knows, a prayer breakfast is a wonderful event, but it
is a logistical nightmare.
I am glad you convened this hearing. There are a number of
qu stions that need to be asked. I am also aware of the fact that,
in just 3 minutes or so, we are to meet and mark up the nomina-
tion of Dr. Perry.
Senator SHELBY. That is right.
Senator COATS. We also have a vote.
Senator SHELBY. We will recess. Do you want to wait?
Senator COATS. Rather than starting in on my questions, perhaps
we could just help out Senator Nunn, if he has some questions. He
may not be able to get back, so I would be happy to defer to him.
Senator SHELBY. Senator Nunn?
Chairman NuNN. I think, Mr. Chairman, since we start at 11
o'clock in the other building, it probably would be better if I head
on over there and come back.
I do think, as I mentioned, this is an enormously important hear-
ing; not because of this incidentwe are going to have incidents
from time to timebut because of the importance of leaders. We
are elected to be leaders, emphasizing to the people who are going
to be in the military, whether it is ROTC or the Naval Academy,
that you cannot have a strong military, as the Ambassador said,
without character.
EVery day that goes by up here we depend on the word and the
honor of those who testify from the military. We take that, and we
never put anybody under oath. We consider the people who testify
before our committee, particularly those in uniform, to be under
oath, and that conceptthat sense of characteris enormously im-
portant.
If I look back at the problems we have had in the military,
whether it is procurement, whether it is battlefield, or whatever it
is, it is usually because someone has not upheld that. So, I think
the emphasis on it, the fact that you are having this hearing,
shows that we think it is very important.
I know, I remember from years ago, that one of the real dif-
ferences between the academiesand I am really not clear exactly
which one has which Code --but not lying, cheating and stealing is
one concept; and then, I believe it is West Point that goes further
than that. It says, "nor tolerate those who do." I remember how
much difficulty we had, with that last phrase; and I will be inter-
ested in these hearings, to develop this.

107
 104
I know that the Naval Academy, I believe, says that it will not
lie, cheat, or steal, period. And I think the question of "nor tolerate
those who do" has always been difficult, and probably still is. So
I am interested in this, beyond this incident.
And I think, in our society todayI do not want to start preach-
ing herebut I think in our society today, in spite of the fact we
are the strongest Nation in the world, that w,3 are eroding in terms
of values in America. An awful lot of our problems in our broad so-
ciety that we try to struggle with everyday here stem from that.
So the military is unique. The military has got to beit reflects
society, but it has got to be better than society, and that is the
challenge here.
So we will be voting at 11 o'clock on Dr. Perry's nomination, and
I think it will be better if we go on up there.
Senator SHELBY. We will recess now. We will recess for 20 or 30
minutes. We will try to get back in 20, but it might be 30.
[Whereupon, at 10:59 a.m., the hearing was recessed, to recon-
vene at 11:38 a.m.]
Senator SHELBY. The committee will come back to order. Senator
Coa' s?
Senator COATS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I want to
say to Ambassador Armitage and Admiral Bennett that this was
not an easy task that you were assigned. I appreciate your willing-
ness to undertake this difficult assignment and do it well. We
thank you for that.
Admiral Bennett, I have a couple of questions that I would like
to ask you; and then, a couple for Ambassador Armitage.
Admiral, in your report, you cite examples from a 1989 report of
the special commission studying the honor system at West Point,
indicating that internal group loyalties develop which undermine
the Honor Code. Could you elaborate on this, and, particularly in
reference to this occasion, was that element a substantial factor in
this particular instance?
Admiral BENNETT. I do mit think it was an overpowering factor,
but there clear/ v is the dichotomy of the concept of "Don't bilge
your classmate, or "Don't rat on a friend," along with the honor
concept that says you should counsel or make known any informa-
tion you have on a violation of honor.
It is a very complex thing. I mean, it is kind of a pat answer to
say, I think it is just one of many elements that were in play in
this particular instance. We found some of the things that were
mentioned in the Board of Visitors Report to be true.
The perceptionit is not a realitybut the perception that it is
sort of a single sanction system, for instance, that says if you are
guilty of an honor violation, you get thrown out of the Naval Acad-
emy. While that may be an administrative action, it is kind of in
the category of a capital punishment for a Midshipman to face.
And, if there is only that sanction, there is very little motivation
for individuals to be truthful about the fact that they cheated.
If I am going to get thrown out for cheating, I can only get
thrown out once. And so, that motivation to come forward and do
the honorable thing is, frankly, not there.
The system can be multiple. There can be punishments, and
there often are, in the administration of the honor system. I think,
 105
as history would kind of point out, that as Midshipmen get more
senior, Second-Class, First-Class, and there are honor violations,
then the punishment usually is dismissal; and that is a pretty big
thing to take home to a mother and a father, and to deal. with.
Senator COATS. Regarding group loyalty, did you uncover any
specific instances of group loyalty? A prep school class comes to the
Academy. Obviously, they would have spent more time together
even before entering the Academy. Or those that are on athletic
scholarship, or participating in athletics. Would you tend to have
some type of segregrtion in terms of living and eating?
Admiral BENNETT. We did not find that there was any one par-
ticular group that conducted a conspiracy. I think, like most insti-
tutions of higher learning, you have certain study groups. There
are usually people you have common interests with. Certainly, the
people that had been together at prep school had a tendency to con-
tinue to be friends. People that play athletics have a tendency to
associate with other athletes.
But we tried to look at this as individual cases. And there were
Midshipmen who happened to play football, or Midshipmen that
happened to be in the Glee Club, and not aswe did not find that
there were teams dedicated to this principle.
There was evidence that groups of individuals got together,
whether they were Company mates or had some other relationship,
and got their stories straight. I think con..oiracy is too strong a
word. But there was definitely that, "Let's cii 'le the wagons" men-
tality, and "Take care of each other."
Senator COATS. In your report, you stated that, further review of
the honor system is necessary, to find where we go with this in the
future. Do you have in mind a specific process that ought to be fol-
lowed, in terms of outlining where the honor code process should
go?
Admiral BENNETT. Well, I think that we have, in both my report
and in Ambassador Armitage's report, we talk in rather general
terms about the kinds of things we need to do.
I think, in this particular case, the devil is in the details. I think
there needs to be very clearly written standards, and we need addi-
tional, and a continuum of, training throughout the time at the
Naval Academy.
I think we need to really address the kind of evidence that is
necessary to prove an honor violation, and a clear-cut understand-
ing that what we are really after are, in my mind, two things:
First, we want to train people, educate them to become honorable
officers in the military. And second, we want to use discipline for
its intended purpose which, in my mind, is to make better people.
It has long been a function of military discipline not to say, "Off
with their heads," but to make them into productive members of
society. We have many, many cases throughout history, of people
who have made a mistake yet become the most honorable of people,
and some people who seem pristine, perhaps only because they
never faced a temptation.
It is those kinds of processes. Who should do that? It has got to
be done at the military academy. And it has got to be done, in my
mind, with the leadership of the military academy, the Mid-
shipmen themselves, the academic departments, the athletic de-
 106
partmenti, the military or professional development people. It is ei-
ther an all-hands effort, or in my mind, it is destined to fail.
The other principal thing that I think is relevant is that we, the
military people, in general, like to be confronted with a problem,
find an answer to it, execute the answer, and forget about it. This
is one of those evolutions that you can never forget about; that is
either a steady strain, involving all the people associated with Mid-
shipmen at the Naval Academy, or we are going to continue to
have problems.
The devil is kind of in the details, and I think that is where we
are now. I think there is recognition by the leadership of the De-
partment of the Navy that we need to do some refinement of the
system. I do not in any way, shape or form, mean to intimate that
the honor concept is totally broken, or we should throw it away. It
is very important that we refine it and make it relevant to the
world we live in.
Senator COATS. My time has expired. I will try to return to the
hearing with some additional questions.
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I wonder if I might make a comment,
Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Coats?
I find myself on the horns of a dilemma, having spent the last
12 years or so sparring with the legislative branch, trying to keep
the legislative branch out of executive branch business. I find my-
self now in the dilemma of actually suggesting some action by the
legislative branch.
The Secretary of the Navy has looked at the recommendations of
the Honor Review Coiii nittee, and has already ordered that some
be implemented; and he is due, in the near future, to judge the
other recommendations and, hopefully, order many of those to be
implemented.
It seems to me a perfectly reasonable thing to suggest that this
subcommittee come up with either report language, or something
more direct, that requires the Navy to report on not only what they
have implemented, but the effectiveness of what has been imple-
mented, in a reasonable timeframe, as a way of assuring that peo-
ple, although people may be transferred from positions of respon-
sibility in the Navy hierarchy act upon this.
Ser..tor SHELBY. The recommendations of the committee, Mr.
Ambassador, included recommendations concerning the tour of
duty of the Superintendent, and the quality of officers assigned to
the Naval Academy.
In the case of the Superintendent, the report recommends pro-
motion to Vice Admiral after 2 years, if the officer's performance
so merits. If the magnitude of the responsibility of the position of
Superintendent is such that it should be designated as a, quote,
"position of importance and responsibility," unquote, and filled at
the 3-star level, should not the Secretary of Defense recommend to
the President that he appoint as Superintendent an individual who
is capable of serving in the position as a 3-star from day one, and
not someone who requires what amounts to a 2-year probationary
period?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I guess the short answer would be yes.
But the longer answer is, I think you want people at the Naval
Academy, or the Midshipmen, to be exposed to different ideas and

11
 107
different views. We did not want to have a situation where a Su-
perintendent necessarily ended his career at the Naval Academy,
DOPMA being taken into consideration, of course.
And, we wanted to have the ability to have a Superintendent
who was judged worthy, and still young enough to go out and serve
yet again in the fleet. That is why we made our recommendation.
The important part of that recommendation is the length of time.
We did find, and it has been a view of the Board of Visitors rein-
forced by the Honor Review Committee, that Superintendents gen-
erally are not at the Naval Academy long enough to really own
what is going on there. That is the problem we were trying to get
at.
Senator SHELBY. Okay. In case of officers assigned to the Naval
Academy, the report, I understand, recommends that they be auto-
matically rated m the top 1 percent of their peer group, without
ranking. Why is this necessary?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, if you were what is referred to as
a "head-and-shoulders" officer, Mr. Chairman, it would be some-
thing you would have to think about, if you knew you were going
to have to go down and be rated with all the "head-and-shoulders"
officers. You could well turn out to be 36th out of 36, the last of
the litter, and actually be an excellent, excellent officer.
We have noticed, and I think many Naval Academy graduates
have noticed, a dichotomy between the way the Marine Corps and
the Navy assigns officers to the U.S. Naval Academy. This has ex-
isted, I am willing to say, since I was there; wherein Marine Corps
officers are generally "head-and-shoulders" officers, and generally
judged by the Midshipmen to be absolutely superior. And yet, naval
officers are a very mixed group.
We are trying to assure that the naval officers who are assigned
there are the same caliber as the Marine officers.
Senator SHELBY. Are you saying that service at the Academy is
seen by some as having a negative effect on one's career?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Well, let us be clear that service at the
Academy is not exactly sea duty; and if it is not judged to be ex-
traordinarily important by the Secretary and the CNO, it is going
to be less valued.
Senator SHELBY. Admiral Bennett, your report indicates that in
mid-December of 1992, during the days immediately following the
first indications of a compromise, attempts to determine the scope
of the possible compromise were limited to a review of exam grades
for any unexplicable spikes in grades. /
The report further indicates that, even though exam answers
were eventually read and graded, it appears that no one, no one
at the Academy ever compared the answers of different Mid-
shipmen for evidence of collaboration. I believe the importance of
comparing answers seems so intuitively obvious, it is hard to imag-
ine why this was not done.
Why, in your personal opinion, was this step not taken? To your
knowledge, was it ever discussed as an option?
Admiral BENNETT. First of all, I think there was initially a direc-
tion: Compare those exams, to see if there are any unexplained
spikes, or grades significantly higher. The report that came back
was that there werewith the initial, incomplete dataonly 13

1i
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grades that were higher. And out of 663 people taking the exam-
ination, the EE Department said that is well within normal vari-
ance.
Yes, in my mind, comparing the grades was an obvious step.
However, if you got some erroneous information and thought you
had a very limited event, that might not be quite as obvious a step.
It was a very useful investigative tool to my investigation, but I
had the advantage of knowing a bit more information.
Senator SHELBY. Hindsight, as you said.
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. Your report also indicates that on December 16,
1992, the Commandant, after speaking with the Midshipmen asso-
ciated with the report of compromise, advised the Superintendent
that he thought the report of compromise was not credible, because
it originated with one individual who could only report overhearing
a group of Midshipmen talking about the football team having the
exam.
Your report also indicates that on December 16, 1992, the same
day, the NCIS agents interviewed Midshipman A, who sent the ini-
tial report of compromise to a faculty member. Midshipman A told
NCIS that his roommates were in possession of the exam the night
before it was to be given.
Now, sir, can you resolve the apparent inconsistency between the
Commandant's basing his assessment of the credibility of the re-
port of compromise on hearsay about the football team, and Mid-
shipman A's reporting to NCIS that his roommates actually had
the exam?
Admiral BENNETT. I think, if you will recall, the initial reports
of the compromise were electronically mailed to one of the faculty
members, and were not nearly as discreet as the information pro-
vided to the NCIS investigator. I have no way of knowing, but I
suggest there are all kinds of allegations of wrongdoing in the nor-
mal course of business; I would be guessing if I tried to figure out
what the Commandant was thinking at that particular time.
Senator SHELBY. I am continuing to refer to your report, though.
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. Your report also indicates that the Superintend-
ent could have initiated a noncriminal investigation to discover the
full extent of the cheating. However, it appears that the Academy
took no action to identify additional cheaters after the NCIS inves-
tigation was completed.
Sir, did your investigation reveal any information that might
help us understand why this aspect of the problem, the full extent
of the cheating, was not ful:" pursued?
Admiral BENNETT. Again, I think, and also mentioned in the re-
port, that it seemed like a natural stopping point.
Senator SHELBY. Why?
Admiral BENNETT. Well, NCIS had been asked to look at crimi-
nal activity.
Senator SHELBY. Okay.
Admiral BENNETT. They had reported back that they could not
determine the actual course of the exam, but they were quite sure
that it had not been stolen and that there was no breaking and en-
tering. And while they had turned up some evidence of criminal ac-
 109
tivity, it was the legal opinion of the staffs Judge Advocate to the
Superintendent that it was not a strong case and would probably
not stand up, if it was handled as a judicial matter.
NCIS gave them 39 names at that time. I think that seemed to
the Superintendent that is quite a large number. We have, obvi-
ously, gotten
Senator SHELBY. Now we know that those 39 names were not all-
inclusive, were they?
Admiral BENNETT. All-inclusive, sir?
Senator SHELBY. In other words, there were others besides the
39?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes.
Senator SHELBY. You did not know that, did you?
Admiral BENNETT. It was not pursued.
Senator SHELBY. It was not pursued. Was it a botched investiga-
tion?
Admiral BENNETT. I would not call it a botched investigation, but
I do notI think, because of the nature of
Senator SHELBY. You would not call it a thorough investigation
either, would you?
Admiral BENNETT. No, sir.
Senator SHELBY. Okay, thank you. Senator Coats?
Senator COATS. This question is directed to either one or both of
you. Senator Nunn alluded to a decline in our cultural standards
in the last 2 or 3 decades. I believe there has been a standard that
is more relative than absolute, that pervades our society, and par-
ticularly pervades our campuses and universities.
It seems to me there is a significant gap widening, between the
standards that we are attempting to establish at the academies,
and what society and the peers of Midshipmen, cadets and others
are living under. These individuals go home during breaks and go
home for Christmas. They meet up with their high school friends
who are now in colleges and universities, many of them distin-
guished colleges and universities.
I would guess, if the question of the Honor Code
it would be viewed by their peers as somewhat of ancomes up, that
anachronism.
My question is: How have attitudes changed? In your investiga-
tion, did you discover a prevalent attitude that the Code is
touch with reality, out of touch with society? Therefore is itout of
pos-
sible, and I am not excusing it here; just playing devil's advocate
that potentially lead to some actions and behaviors that you would
not have identified 20 years ago or 30 years ago? It is a broad ques-
tion, and a philosophical one.
Ambassador --"MITAGE. I will take a cut at it, Senator
think the members of the Honor Review, Committee decry,Coats. as you
I
do, moral relativism. And all of us realize that what assaults our
senses, and has assaulted our senses, masquerading as daytime
television and other things, has chipped away at the fabric of soci-
ety.
But I have got to tell you, as we looked around at the honor
codes at other universitiesWashington and Lee, and the Univer-
sity of Virginia, and William and Mary, and places of this nature
we found a very strong attachment to the honor code. And it is, in-
deed, not an anachronism.

11
 110
I -.-ould say that, based on discussions with Midshipmen and the
comments I made earlier, they come to the Naval Academy as pret-
ty good material. They are pretty good putty. But they become cyn-
ical during that time, and they decry that cynicism that creeps in.
So I think that we cannot blame this problem on society. Indeed,
I personally would find it dangerous to do so. My parents would
tell me stories of the flappers in the twenties, and that was going
to be the end of Western Civilization; and yet we survived. And we
have had renaissances of culture and morality. And I think that
will happen to as a whole.
But I prefer to focus only on what exists within the walls of the
Naval Academy, because I think, to talk too much about moral rel-
ativism in our report, is to give people who are inclined to be lazy
leaders an easy way out. They can just decry the lower standards
as an excuse not to take action. And I do not buy it, personally.
Senator COATS. Well, I am very pleased to hear that answer. I
agree with you, 100 percent.
But my question is, in your investigation, did you discover, an at-
titude that would lead you to believe that those individuals are
bringing from society less of a commitment to absolute values than,
perhaps, existed in five past?
Ambassador ARMITA 'iE. No. We found, I am sorry to say, quite
the contrary.
They come in with quite good values, and they leave the Naval
Academy with the values chipped away. Hence, the cynicism. This
is the problem I am talking about. This was the problem that we
tried to elucidate in our report.
Senator COATS. And the reasons for that are?
Ambassador A ......DMITAGE. I think they see a "Do as I say, and not
as I do" attitude among senior upperclassmen at the Naval Acad-
emy, to some. extent. They certainly see lessened standards in the
fleet, once they go out on summer cruise; and I think these are ad-
ditive.
I think there are varying degrees of appreciation among Mid-
shipmen for the officers with whom they come into contact at the
Naval Academy, ranging from extraordinarily good to extraor-
dinarily bad; this is another area that we tried to address in our
report, by trying to assure that only first-class men and women are
assigned to the Naval Academy.
Senator COATS. Is there anything you want to add to that, Admi-
ral Bennett?
Admiral BENNETT. I am not sure I agree with all of that; but I
did not find a pervasive attitude even among those people that we
ultimately developed cases on, that they did not know the dif-
ference between right and wrong.
I think, perhaps, at times, their definitions of some words may
have some different meanings for them, as a direct result of the so-
cieties they come f-om. And that is one of the reasons that I think
that both '',he Ambassador and I feel it is very important, that we
make sure we tell them what it is we want them to do.
If, indeed, there is that degradation of ethical standards and con-
duct within society, it seems to me all the more reason that we
have to work very hard to ensure that that is not allowed to exist
within the military.

114
 111

And, as I mentioned before, I do not consider the concept out-

dated, or the system totally broken. But I think there are some
things that we need to do, to make it a dynamic system that is re-
flective of the world we live in, and not the world we want it to
be.
Senator COATS. Senator Nunn talked about the question of the
non-toleration clause. I do not know if he is going to be able to
come back, or not. I think, Ambassador Armitage, your report rec-
ommended against adding the non-toleration clause.
Admiral Bennett, I do not recall whether you touched on that
subject or not. I do not believe you did.
Admiral BENNETT. I did not. I have personal views, but they are
not, necessarily, directly related to this.
I think the principal issue is that the Naval Academy has felt for
a long time that a Midshipman is required to examine his own eth-
ical standards, and is not simply required to pass it on to higher
authority to deal with.
As a commanding officer of ships, I have had a lot of young sail-
ors that had captain's mast because division officers, frankly, did
not deal with it, did not do their job. It was easy; they could pass
it on to me. I usually told them that I would be glad to do it one
time; the second time, I would get half their pay.
And I think that there is a positive aspect. I spent some time
talking to Honor Committee members during this investigation, on
this very subject, and they felt very strongly that the counseling as-
pect of a toleration concept, if you will, requires that Midshipman
to examine tl-e difference between trivial things that he can deal
with and counsel, or more important things that need to be made
a matter of record.
I think that is the basic difference, and I guess we can get an
opinion on both sides of the issue. My personal feeling is that there
is more to be gained by not adopting a non-toleration policy.
Ambassador ARMITAGE. I must say, the Honor Review Committee
had really split views about this going in, Senator. We had, per-
haps, our most energetic debate among ourselves on the question
of toleration. Senator McCain had very strong views on this ques-
tion.
In our investigations, in our deliberations, and in our discussions
with the Naval Academy, we found no one, whether they were criti-
cal of the present situation or not, who wanted to change from the
toleration clause;
Number two, all of us on the Honor Review Committee finally
came to the view that a toleration clause, as exists at the Naval
Academy, is much more like the real world.
Number three, we were affected somewhat in our view by some
information which we received from the GAO; they will follow us
up here. They can speak with numbers and graphs, et cetera, to
this question.
But I think it is fair to say that, as a general matter, we found
that the number of honor casesif you put aside this big problem
right now at the Naval Academyat West Point, and the Air Force
Academy, and the Naval Academy, the numbers are about the
same for the student population, whether there is toleration or
non-toleration.
1t5
 112
In private questionnaires provided to cadets and Midshipmen,
you will find that toleration at the Naval Academy might actually
be lower, in terms of what the GAO found, than at the other serv-
ice academies. But they can address it very well, from a factual
standpoint.
Senator COATS. Thank you. Once again, my time has expired. I
appreciate your answers.
Senator SHELBY. Mr. Ambassador, let me pick up on something
Senator Coats asked you, and see if I understood your answer. Cor-
rect me, if I misinterpret.
Did you basically say that a lot of the cadets that go to the Naval
Academy, or most of them, are more honorable when they get
there, are more ethical, than when they get out because of the cyni-
cism and so forth that they pick up there?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, well, let me change
Senator SHELBY. Do you want to clarify that?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, I would like to clarify it. I think I
would like to change it to say they are much more idealistic when
they arrive at the Naval Academy than they are when they grad-
uate. I wil! stand, then, on that.
Senator OHELBY. Insofar as their idea and concept of the Honor
Code?
Ambassador ARMITAGE. Yes, indeed.
Senator SHELBY. That is a sad commentary, is it not? Thank you.
Your report describes various actions on the part of the Academy
leadership, Admiral, that could be construed as limiting the activi-
ties of the Brigade Honor Committee.
The report includes a recommendation that, in the event cases
are referred to the Brigade donor Boards, that the honor boards
be given sufficient evidence to reazene:oly evaluate each case. The
presence of such a recemmeneation leads to the conclusion that the
Brigade Honor Boards were not given sufficient information to
evaluate this case.
Do you believe, Admiral, that is a correct conclusion? Were the
honor boards given sufficient information to evaluate each ease? If
not, in your opinion, why, and by whom, was the information re-
stricted from the boards? I think this is central here.
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir. The answer to the first part is no,
I do not think they were given all the information they should have
been given.
Senator SHELBY. Why not?
Admiral BENIN/Err. I think there were two reasons. I think, cor-
rectly, the Academy was very interested in providing due process
and protection for individual cases. I also was critical, for instance,
that the honor boards, as currently set up, are not well designed
to deal with interrelated cases.
The decision was made by the leadership, and I have no argu-
ment with it, that they did not want to provide information to a
single honor board, that would implicate other Midshipmen, since
they were to treat each individual case as an individual thing.
As a result, the investigations had to be redacted, to eliminate
referral to other Midshipmen. I think that the procedure for redac-
tion was badly handled, frankly, and badly overseen.
 113
Senator SHELBY. Sir, let me ask you this: When there is evidence
of widespread violation of the Honor CodeI realize that each indi-
vidual is responsible for their own conduct, and so forthbut
would it not lead a reasonable person to believe that you have got
to investigate it as a whole? And then, break it down into individ-
ual cases?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. And that was not done much?
Admiral BENNETT. Well, it was investigated kind of as a whole.
You know, we have already gotten to the point that it was not as
thorough, perhaps, as it should have been.
Senator SHELBY. But you said it was not a botched investigation?
I believe that was my word. It was not botched, but was it a poor
investigation?
Admiral BENNETT. No. I think the information available, taken
collectively, provided enough information for honor boards to func-
tion. I am not suggesting that every case that goes to an honor
board should be found guilty.
Senator SHELBY. Sure, I agree with that.
Admiral BENNETT. I think that there was adequate information
there, however, to address it. When it was improperly, in my view,
redacted, then the honor boardsby their own testimonydid not
feel they had adequate informati( n.
Senator SHELBY. Sir, let me go farther. Why, and by whom, was
the information restricted from the boards?
Admiral BENNETT. This was one of the issues. I was quite critical
of the administrative procedures regarding redaction; the Honor
Officer, a Lieutenant aviator was given that task. Normally, he
would be overseen by the judge advocate generals. In this particu-
lar case, he
Senator SHELBY. Did he fail, in that task?
Admiral BENNETT. They did. He, I think, was doing the best job
he could. I was critical because there were indicationsfor in-
stance, he redacted the entire record of one of the individuals that
was before the honor board. When that was pointed out, it might
have been a clue that maybe someone had better look at the rest
of the redaction.
Senator SHELBY. Was that showing preferential treatment?
Admiral BENNETT. No, sir. I have no indication that there was
an attempt to show preferential treatmentjust simple errors in
the administrative process.
Senator SHELBY. Why was there not proper oversight given to
the Lieutenant's task?
Admiral BENNETT. I do not know.
Senator SHELBY. And whose responsibility was it, to give that
oversight?
Admiral BENNETT. Well, I think ultimately the Commandant.
Senator SHELBY. You think or you know?
Admiral BENNETT. The Commandant is responsible for the con-
duct of the honor boards.
Senator SHELBY. Sure.
Admiral BENNETT. The staff judge advocates are responsible for
providing appropriate oversight. They did not do that.

1i7
 114
Senator SHELBY. They failed. In this regard, your report address-
es the use, to which you have already referred, of the redacted doc-
uments, restrictions on the Brigade investigating officers' confer-
ring among themselves to understand the totality of the com-
promise, and the manner in which allegations, which arose after
completion of the NCIS investigation, were handled.
Do you have any reason to believe that the leadership of the
Academy, or any other official, attempted in any way to limit im-
properly the scope of the various investigations?
Admiral BENNETr. No, sir; I do not.
Senator SHELBY. Have you looked beyond this? Have you inves-
tigated every aspect of that?
Admiral BENNETT. I think so. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. Do you believe, sir, that there was, among the
leadership of the Academy, a conspiracy to cover up all or part of
the problem, for any reason?
Admiral BENNETT. Sir, we found no evidence to indicate that, in
any way.
Senator SHELBY. Do you believe that the actions taken by the
leadership of the Academy were guided by any motives, other than
a desire to get to the bottom of the truth of a very complex emo-
tional and politically charged issue?
Admiral BENNETT. I think they v. ere anxious to get to the end.
Senator SHELBY. To the end, but maybe not to the bottom?
Admiral BENNETT. And I was critical of
Senator SHELBY. Do you agree with that?
Admiral BENNETT. Yes, sir.
Senator SHELBY. Go ahead. You were going to say something.
Admiral BENNETT. I think, as I mentioned, our approach was
and I have the advantage of not having been there for the initial
part of the examination; I have no emotional attachment; I did not
know any of the Midshipmen personallybut our direction was: As
long as we have a clue, we will run that down. What we want to
do is find the whole truth.
I think there was a very natural desire to get this done, and be-
hind them. As a result, I do not think it was as thorough as it
should have been.
Senator SHELBY. But you do not want to use the strong words,
"botched the investigation," do you, although that is what it looks
like?
Admiral BENNETT. As I say, I think the original investigation
Senator SHELBY. Admiral, what is your terminology, to describe
the investigation?
Admiral BENNETT. Incomplete.
Senator SHELBY. Incomplete. Thank you. Senator Coats?
Senator CoATE. I have no more questions.
Senator SHELBY. We appreciate the first panel. We appreciate
your candor and your waiting for us, and we will move along.
Thank you.
The subcommittee is pleased to welcome here for the second
panel Mr: Mark E. Gebicke, Director of Military Operations and
Capability Issues of the General Accounting Office; and Mr. Wil-
liam Beusse, Assistant Director, Military Operations and Capabili-
ties Issues, General Accounting Office.
 115
Your reports will be made a part of the record in their totality..
Following an incident in 1989 in which a female Midshipman
was handcuffed to a urinal at the Naval Academy, the Chairman
of the Armed Services Committee and the former Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel asked the GAO to un-
dertake a review of sexual harassment at the three service acad-
emies. This review is part of a broader view of student issues at
the service academies, and the GAO has previously issued reports
on academics, gender, and racial disparities, and hazing and treat-
ment of Fourth Class cadets and Midshipmen. The subcommittee
appreciates the GAO's efforts in this matter.
[The information referred to follows:]