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Colombia s Narcotics Nightmare How the Drug Trade
Destroyed Peace James D. Henderson Digital Instant
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Author(s): James D. Henderson
ISBN(s): 9780786479177, 0786479175
Edition: Illustrated
File Details: PDF, 8.67 MB
Year: 2015
Language: english
Colombia’s Narcotics
Nightmare
Colombia (Santino Ambrogio/Thinkstock)
Colombia’s Narcotics
Nightmare
How the Drug Trade
Destroyed Peace
James D. Henderson
The person who has helped me most with this book is my wife Linda Roddy
Henderson, whose counsel and proofreading of the manuscript were of great
value. I thank Bonnie Senser, Administrative Specialist of the Department of
Politics and Geography of Coastal Carolina University, for her patient and ever
cheerful help in the multiple tasks of manuscript preparation. I thank too my
colleagues in the department of Politics and Geography, Ken Rogers, Richard
Collin, and Pam Martin, for their support and encouragement over my six years’
work on this book. Thanks too are owed Coastal Carolina University which
awarded me sabbatical leave, an additional semester of leave from duties, and
additional financial support to complete this study. Stu Lippe, Senior Advisor,
Western Hemisphere Affairs/Office of Andean Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
was generous with his help and advice, especially that concerning Plan Colombia.
I thank many friends and colleagues in Colombia, especially Gustavo Duncan
for his critical reading of the manuscript. I also thank Alfredo Rangel, Diana
Patricia Restrepo, Father Antonio José Sarmiento, Carlos Muñoz, and Eduardo
Rueda. Special recognition is owed Jorge A. Restrepo, Director of the Conflict
Analysis Research Center, cerac (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Con-
flicto), and Andres Corredor of cerac. To all of you, and to many other col-
leagues in the United States and Colombia, I offer my sincere thanks for your
help and advice over the past six years.
vi
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments vi
Introduction: The Left and Right of Violence and Illegal Drugs in Colombia 1
Song of Love (Between My Country and Me) by Luz Marina Posada 10
vii
viii Table of Contents
Conclusion
Victim of Globalization 185
Illegal Drugs and Colombia’s New Violence 186
Post-Conflict Colombia 187
Glossary 193
Chapter Notes 197
Bibliography 216
Index 223
Introduction:
The Left and Right of Violence
and Illegal Drugs in Colombia
This book is a history of Colombia’s illegal drug industry, and its focus is the impact of the
international drug trade on the country and its people. Colombia is portrayed here as a victim
of the global trade in illegal drugs. Prior to the 1960s the country had no history of large-scale
drug export, becoming a major player in the trade only when smugglers from the United States
arrived there during the decade paying top dollar for Colombian-produced marijuana. Marijuana,
and then cocaine, brought the country a tsunami of illegal dollars that fed every variety of crime.
Levels of crime and violence rose steadily and by the end of the twentieth century Colombians
wondered whether national institutions could withstand the multi-faceted disorder financed by
massive and seemingly endless flows of illegal drug money. By the time Colombians at last began
effectively addressing the crisis in 2002, more than 300,000 lay dead. They were victims of vio-
lence finding its source in the Pandora’s box of evils that drug money unleashed.1
Colombia’s rise as supplier of cocaine to the United States and the wider world was in
keeping with the historic commercial role prescribed for it under international capitalist theory.
For half a millennium, through its long colonial period and later as an independent republic,
the Andean country had obligingly supplied minerals, medicines, and foodstuffs desired by
the rich and powerful nations of the world. In earliest times it was gold, emeralds, and quinine.
Later it was coffee. Most recently it has been recreational drugs and cut flowers, coal, nickel,
and petroleum. Seen from this perspective Colombia has ever been a good and compliant
member of the international trading system. Only in the case of illegal drugs did the business
acumen of Colombians lead them astray.
Present-day Colombia’s bad reputation is a far cry from that of earlier times. At the end
of World War II its people were known throughout Latin America for their sobriety and indus-
try, their staunch Roman Catholicism and their Spanish, bell-like in clarity and said to be the
1
2 Introduction
best in the world. They had played a significant role in the recent war, helping guard approaches
to the Panama Canal and supplying strategic raw materials and manufactured goods to the
Allied powers. And in a region known for military coups and a proclivity for strongman rule,
Colombia’s democratic tradition shone as a splendid anomaly. An exceedingly beautiful country
crowded with verdant mountains and abundant tropical flora and fauna, it had long since gained
fame for the excellence of its mild, shade-grown coffee. As the halfway-point of the mid–twen-
tieth century approached Colombia was developing significant industrialization in and around
its principal cities, especially its second largest city, Medellín, thanks to its booming textile-
manufacturing sector. At that moment Colombia was continuing its pell-mell rush into mod-
ernization. Already a nation of cities, it would become more urban than rural by the 1960s.
Nor was there anything in Colombia’s earlier history that marked it as a place destined
to become the Western World’s illegal drug emporium. Its historical process had been much
like that of the rest of Spanish America. For three hundred years its people were loyal subjects
of the Spanish crown. Throwing off Spanish rule early in the 1800s, they proclaimed them-
selves an independent republic in 1819. Turbulent decades followed during which details of
national life were worked out, frequently through brief civil wars centering largely if not exclu-
sively on determining the Church’s place in politics and society. By the twentieth century that
process was largely complete. Colombians were generally in agreement that their nation was
a constitutional liberal democracy where church and state were separate. Its political system
was a presidential one whose chief executive was elected at four-year intervals with no right
of immediate re-election. It possessed a two-house popularly elected congress, and a Supreme
Court charged with interpreting the constitution and seeing that it was upheld.
Colombia’s relationship with the United States was harmonious. Save for early twentieth-
century anger over U.S. connivance in the separation of Panama, Colombians were well-
disposed toward the North American power. The countries’ close economic link was confirmed
when, following World War I, the U.S. supplanted Europe as chief purchaser of Colombian
coffee and as its principal supplier of manufactured goods. During the 1920s the U.S. paid
Colombia a large and sorely needed cash indemnity for its involvement in the Panamanian
secession. When World War II broke out Colombia was a strong supporter of both the United
States and the Allied Powers, hence assuring its place as a member in good standing of the
inter–American system. It went on to become a signatory of the Bretton Woods accord of
1944, and a charter member of the United Nations one year later. One of its former national
presidents served as the first Secretary General of the Organization of American States in
1948. Suffice it to say that when Alberto Lleras Camargo was named chief presiding officer of
the newly created inter–American body, Colombia’s prestige was unrivalled in the hemisphere.
a hundred years, and nourished by the irresponsible leadership of party elites, the Violencia
brought a spell of authoritarian rule during the 1950s.3
Chastened by their failings, Liberal and Conservative party leaders returned the country
to democratic rule in 1958. They did so by implementing a sixteen-year power-sharing pact
called the National Front. Political passions cooled and the Violencia ended by 1965. Levels of
violence fell, reaching the average of Latin America as a whole over the ten years that followed.
Modernization continued at a rapid pace and economic growth was, as ever, continuous.
When Fidel Castro’s success in Cuba stirred fears of communist revolution in Latin Amer-
ica, the United States launched a much-heralded aid program known as the Alliance for
Progress. Friend and ally Colombia became the showcase for Alliance programs, a fact under-
lined by the 1961 state visit of U.S. president John F. Kennedy and his wife. By the mid–1960s
Colombia stood as the world’s second-most-popular destination for idealistic young Americans
enlisted as volunteers in Kennedy’s Peace Corps.
But early in the 1970s the benign image of post–Violencia Colombia quickly disappeared
and was replaced by an entirely negative one. Early in the decade U.S. drug smugglers discovered
the country to be a seemingly inexhaustible source of high-quality marijuana. And by the early
1980s Colombia had become a prodigious supplier of vastly more profitable cocaine. Soon Colom-
bians were being portrayed in U.S. film and television programs as the most cold-blooded and vio-
lent of all drug smugglers, killers who enjoyed using chain saws to execute those who crossed them.
Meanwhile, the trade in illegal drugs eroded and corrupted Colombia’s national institu-
tions, and financed every form of illegal activity. Cocaine production increased in step with
the weakening of national institutions. By the mid–1990s it was apparent to all that illegal
drug dollars were massively present in politics. Between 1994 and 1998 the United States pun-
ished Colombia for allowing drug money to corrupt its politicians, a policy that only strength-
ened criminal and anti–State actors. Violence levels surged. Colombia became infamous as
both the world’s most violent nation as the global leader in kidnappings. By 2000 the country’s
communist guerrillas were defeating units of the national army in the field and attacking towns
on the outskirts of the national capital. At that time the guerrillas were major drug dealers in
their own right, using their earnings to buy weaponry rivaling and surpassing that of the
national army and police. In the countryside, citizens caught in the crossfire died in growing
numbers. Human rights violations increased exponentially during the 1990s as paramilitary
militias battled the guerrillas for preeminence in drug-producing regions. The world grew
alarmed. Was Colombia becoming a failed state run by drug traffickers? Would it become a
haven for terrorists and criminal elements? Would its lawlessness spread to neighboring Ecuador
and Peru, and perhaps into Central America as well? The U.S. government warned its citizens
not to visit the violent and dangerous nation.
Democratic Security
“For the first time in years Colombians can drive between most of the country’s
cities without risk of kidnapping or hold-up.”
—The Economist, March 24, 2007
Colombians answered questions about their country’s future in a prosaic way: through
an election. In mid–2002 they installed a new president, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, who promised
4 Introduction
to make them safe again by vigorously attacking the forces of disorder. His task was made
easier by outgoing president Andrés Pastrana, who had begun modernizing the armed forces
and had invited the United States to join in a wide-ranging program aimed at combating the
drug trade and strengthening national institutions, especially the military. Called Plan Colom-
bia, it channeled $5.4 billion in aid to Colombia between 2001 and 2007, most of it paying
for coca and opium poppy fumigation and for military training, equipment, and technology.
Álvaro Uribe took full advantage of Plan Colombia. Acting as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces he pursued what he named his “Democratic Security” policy, the chief component
of which was an offensive against the country’s largest guerrilla group and destruction of the
coca plantations and cocaine laboratories that were its principal source of revenue. Plan Colombia
aid became fully available just as Alvaro Uribe entered office and he used it to good advantage.
Thanks to his vigorous action against the guerrillas, the drug mafia, paramilitary forces, and com-
mon criminals, violence levels fell sharply throughout Uribe’s first term in office. Grateful Colom-
bians overwhelmingly elected him to a second term in 2006, having amended their national
constitution to do so.
Human rights abuses also decreased significantly during Uribe’s first term. This was owed
to the fact that he and his government convinced some 30,000 paramilitary troops to demo-
bilize and their leaders to submit to detention. Meanwhile massive extradition of drug traffick-
ers to stand trial in the United States drove the illegal drug industry underground, thereby
lessening its damage to society.
The Uribe presidency did not end Colombia’s problems. But it did turn the tide against
the country’s violence and lawlessness. For the first time in thirty years Colombia and its people
were not on the defensive before violent and criminal elements enjoying virtually unchecked
use of illegal drug monies. Colombians could at last focus on the task of strengthening national
institutions, rather than attempting to defend them. And they could do so with the satisfaction
that they had done these things not only by their own volition but by democratic means.
This book is also about international relations, especially about binational relations
between Colombia and the United States. As such it sends contradictory messages about the
two countries’ effort to stem the illegal drug trade. It finds the Colombo-U.S. anti-drug effort
to have been successful in helping Colombia halt its spiral of drug-related violence. On the
other it finds that the billions of dollars invested in the U.S. anti-drug campaign have failed
to reduce either the quantity or quality of psychoactive drugs reaching U.S. consumers. Illegal
drugs are presently cheaper, more readily available, and of greater purity in the United States
today than at any other time in history.5 Meanwhile intensified enforcement of U.S. drug laws
merely serves to increase the competence of dealers in illegal drugs and to drive less efficient
merchandisers from the field.6 The only meaningful domestic result of U.S. anti-drug efforts
has been to bring unpopular ethnic minorities—particularly young men of color—to heel
through their massive incarceration on drug-related charges, while enhancing the political
The Left and Right of Violence and Illegal Drugs in Colombia 5
careers of anti-drug crusaders and making incarceration a new and non-exportable national
industry.
So the recent history of the War on Drugs is an ambiguous one. In an era of global market
integration U.S. attempts to harshly proscribe a popular albeit illegal consumer good have been
largely self-defeating. The prohibition of a range of popular psychoactive consumer goods
has placed the United States in an unwinnable war against market forces. At the same time
the Colombian case shows that the illegal drug trade cannot be allowed to run unchecked,
precisely because it is a business in the hands of criminals.
Another persistent theme in this volume is that of state-strengthening, and the role for-
eign aid can play in the process. Below it is shown both that Colombia’s painful experience
with illegal drugs eventually led to the strengthening of national institutions, and that U.S.
foreign aid provided through Plan Colombia has played a meaningful role in the process. It
also makes clear that when there is poor understanding of one country by another, as in the
case of the United States and Colombia over most of the period analyzed here, the weaker of
the two will suffer. Until the formulation of Plan Colombia in the late 1990s, U.S. policy
makers had a poor understanding of the harm that drug-related violence and criminality had
done to its Andean ally. Nor did they acknowledge the extent that their own failure to control
illegal drug consumption at home contributed to Colombia’s problems. Hence officials in the
United States made demands of Colombia that the country could not satisfy and that in fact
hastened the country’s descent into violence.
The history told in the pages below is not bereft of positive elements. Slowly over twenty-
five arduous years the United States came to perceive the baleful effect of the illegal drug trade
on Colombia, and both countries came to understand that they must act jointly and vigorously
to attack the socially destructive commerce. In the process Colombia and its people came to
look at themselves more analytically than before, going on to undertake long-needed structural
reforms. And U.S. policy makers recognized that their country had a moral obligation to help
resolve the ghastly constellation of Colombian problems that were in large part made in the
U.S.A.
* * *
This study of Colombia’s rise as an illegal drug exporter begins with consideration of the
decade of relative peace that the country enjoyed following the end of the Violencia in 1965.
Figuring prominently in its first chapter is a discussion of the country’s “iron triangle of vio-
lence,” a term employed here to explain the set of conditions making Colombia especially sus-
ceptible to law-breaking and violence. Chapter 1 ends by describing the rise of the “drug
culture” in the United States during the 1960s and early 1970s, and initial U.S. and Colombian
responses to illegal drug consumption and production.
Chapter 2 describes how Colombia became the chief supplier of illegal drugs to the
United States during the 1970s and early 1980s. It goes on to describe the shocking violence
attending the drug trade both in Colombia and the U.S., and how that infant industry stim-
ulated every sort of criminality and anti–State activity.
The book’s third chapter recounts the bloody decade-long attempt of Colombia’s Medel-
lín and Cali cartels to bend the State to their will. The battle was joined in the mid–1980s,
continued through the early 1990s, and was attended by appalling violence, and injury to
national institutions. Yet through it all Colombians made strides in political reform, a long-
6 Introduction
standing demand of many citizens. The chapter ends at the moment of optimism attending
the rewriting of the national constitution, the demobilization of several guerrilla groups, and
the destruction of the Medellín and Cali cartels.
Chapter 4 traces the expansion of Colombia’s communist farc and ELN guerrillas, a
process aided and accelerated by the national government’s preoccupation with defeating the
drug cartels. It describes the guerrilla’s growing involvement with illegal drugs and details their
complex interaction with the drug traffickers themselves. The chapter ends by telling the history
of the guerrilla offensive against the Colombian state that began in 1994 and ended in 2002.
The fifth chapter treats the origin and rise of Colombia’s paramilitary groups. Attention
is paid to their relationship with the illegal drug mafia and to the way guerrilla expansion
during the 1980s and ’90s hastened their growth. It examines the paramilitary antiguerrilla
offensive begun in 1994, which reached its most intense phase during the first two years of
the twenty-first century. The chapter ends by recounting of the paramilitary demobilization
begun during 2003–4.
Chapter 6 details Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security initiative through which the Colom-
bian State struck effectively against the farc and ELN guerrillas, and against those connected
with the illegal drug industry. Important to that discussion is assessment of the role of U.S.
aid administered through Plan Colombia. The chapter ends with discussion of the anti-
violence and anti-illegal drug measures taken during by Alvaro Uribe during his second term
(2006–2010). It also contains a brief conclusion.
Modern historical writing was born in Colombia during the 1950s and 1960s, when the
first of the country’s brightest scholars began returning from European and North American
universities, advanced academic degrees in hand. Many of them were of middle-class origin
and represented the first graduates of the country’s rapidly-expanding system of public uni-
versities. They brought contemporary and cutting-edge theory to the craft of historical and
social science writing, driving the non-professionally-trained from the field, sometimes with
considerable brutality.8 Up to that time historical writing had been the purview of lawyers,
retired politicians, journalists, and other non-academically-trained scholars.
By the 1970s and 1980s a substantial and highly influential body of work had emerged
from this impressive new scholarly writing that would orient the thinking of Colombians well
into the twenty-first century. While drawing on all social science disciplines the new scholarship
came to be known collectively as the New History of Colombia.9 It is important to touch on
the New History because of the way it has presented Colombia’s recent past, and especially
the country’s violence, to the country and the world.
The New History was born at a time of turmoil in Colombia. The Violencia was ending
and the same Liberal and Conservative party leaders in power when it started had re-assumed
national leadership under the sixteen-year power-sharing National Front agreement. It was an
arrangement in effect freezing Colombia’s outmoded political system in place at a moment
The Left and Right of Violence and Illegal Drugs in Colombia 7
when the country desperately needed a more open and representative democratic structure.
Defects of the National Front became all the more apparent within months of its inception
in August 1958, just months before Fidel Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba. Castro moved
quickly to implement wide-ranging programs highlighted by land reform and moves to restrict
foreign, particularly U.S., economic interests. The Cuban Revolution and its attending reforms
were alluring to many young Colombians, including most members of the new generation of
academically trained scholars. Not all writers of the New History were Marxists, but a signifi-
cant number of them were. And virtually all of them shared Castro’s nationalism and anti-
imperialism. They were especially critical of the United States, a country they saw as in league
with Colombia’s ruling class. Both were perceived as bent on exploiting Colombia and its
people for their own narrow economic interests.
Generational conflict further intensified the critique of those standing at the center of
the country’s new scholarly discourse. Colombia was a place where change came at a snail’s
pace and where the older generation yielded power to the younger with excruciating slowness.
The National Front power-sharing regime was a perfect target of the left-leaning scholars of
the New History. They portrayed it as a metaphor of their country’s political backwardness
and its domination by corrupt elites who blocked progress at home in order to promote their
own interests and those of the imperialist masters they served. It’s no wonder that the vision
of Colombia emerging from their scholarship was an exceptionally critical one. The country
depicted in much early New History scholarship was a place shot through with inequality and
where an oppressed proletariat stood poised to take power, violently if necessary.
When Colombia entered its new time of violence in the 1970s most members of the
scholarly community viewed the upset as flowing from internal, rather than from external
causes. For many of them that violence was seen as representing the first stages of a long-
anticipated proletariat revolution. As the violence intensified during the 1980s, a group of aca-
demics emerged who were dedicated to its analysis. Known as the “violentologists” (violentól-
ogos), they counted the brightest lights of New History scholars among their number. When
in 1987 they were asked by the government to analyze the country’s worsening violence they
found it rooted in Colombia’s notorious social inequality. Make the country a more just and
democratic place, they concluded, and violence will lose its motive force. The illegal drug trade
and its attending violence received only passing reference in their report.10
A positive consequence of the violentologists’ critique of national institutions was that
it kept the idea of political reform constantly in the minds of the Colombian public and the
nation’s leaders. The reform movement gained momentum after 1974 when the National Front
officially ended, and culminated in 1991 with the rewriting of the national constitution. Yet
there were negative consequences of the New History’s unremitting critique of national flaws.
As violence intensified during the 1980s and ’90s some writers began asserting that the blood-
shed was rooted in flaws in the national character and in the nature of Colombian society
itself. On one hand this led to ambivalence regarding the flourishing communist guerrilla. If
Colombia was irredeemably corrupt and unjust, then the guerrilla presence was justified and
their depredations a necessary price paid to achieving a positive revolutionary end. Hence the
guerrillas would logically and necessarily remain in the field until their egalitarian vision was
realized. Essayists also mused that Colombian society was so flawed as to have damaged the
character of Colombians themselves. Their self-deprecating arguments gained momentum as
levels of violence and disorder rose throughout the 1990s. Such assessments became the norm
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