Rule 60.

Relief from a Judgment or

Order
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(a) CORRECTIONS BASED ON CLERICAL MISTAKES; OVERSIGHTS AND OMISSIONS. The
court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or
omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the
record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice.
But after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate court and while it is
pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court's
leave.
(b) GROUNDS FOR RELIEF FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT, ORDER, OR PROCEEDING. On
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not
have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
(c) TIMING AND EFFECT OF THE MOTION.
(1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable
time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry
of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.
(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment's finality
or suspend its operation.
(d) OTHER POWERS TO GRANT RELIEF. This rule does not limit a court's power to:
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment,
order, or proceeding;
 (2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. §1655 to a defendant who was not
personally notified of the action; or
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
(e) BILLS AND WRITS ABOLISHED. The following are abolished: bills of review, bills
in the nature of bills of review, and writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, and
audita querela.
NOTES
(As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. Mar. 19, 1948; Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 20,
1949; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987; Apr. 30, 2007, eff. Dec. 1, 2007.)
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1937
Note to Subdivision (a). See [former] Equity Rule 72 (Correction of Clerical
Mistakes in Orders and Decrees); Mich.Court Rules Ann. (Searl, 1933) Rule
48, §3; 2 Wash.Rev.Stat.Ann. (Remington, 1932) §464(3); Wyo.Rev.Stat.Ann.
(Courtright, 1931) §89–2301(3). For an example of a very liberal provision for
the correction of clerical errors and for amendment after judgment, see
Va.Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) §§6329, 6333.
Note to Subdivision (b). Application to the court under this subdivision does
not extend the time for taking an appeal, as distinguished from the motion
for new trial. This section is based upon Calif.Code Civ.Proc. (Deering, 1937)
§473. See also N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) §108; 2 Minn.Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9283.
For the independent action to relieve against mistake, etc., see
Dobie, Federal Procedure, pages 760–765, compare 639; and
Simkins, Federal Practice, ch. CXXI (pp. 820–830) and ch. CXXII (pp. 831–
834), compare §214.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1946 AMENDMENT
Subdivision (a). The amendment incorporates the view expressed
in Perlman v. 322 West Seventy-Second Street Co., Inc. (C.C.A.2d, 1942) 127
F.(2d) 716; 3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3276, and further permits
correction after docketing, with leave of the appellate court. Some courts
have thought that upon the taking of an appeal the district court lost its
power to act. See Schram v. Safety Investment Co. (E.D.Mich. 1942) 45
F.Supp. 636; also Miller v. United States (C.C.A.7th, 1940) 114 F.(2d) 267.
Subdivision (b). When promulgated, the rules contained a number of
provisions, including those found in Rule 60(b), describing the practice by a
motion to obtain relief from judgments, and these rules, coupled with the
reservation in Rule 60(b) of the right to entertain a new action to relieve a
party from a judgment, were generally supposed to cover the field. Since the
rules have been in force, decisions have been rendered that the use of bills
of review, coram nobis, or audita querela, to obtain relief from final
judgments is still proper, and that various remedies of this kind still exist
although they are not mentioned in the rules and the practice is not
prescribed in the rules. It is obvious that the rules should be complete in this
respect and define the practice with respect to any existing rights or
remedies to obtain relief from final judgments. For extended discussion of
the old common law writs and equitable remedies, the interpretation of Rule
60, and proposals for change, see Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from
Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623. See also 3 Moore's Federal
Practice (1938) 3254 et seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other
Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942, 945; Wallace
v. United States (C.C.A.2d, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 240, cert. den. (1944) 323 U.S.
712.
The reconstruction of Rule 60(b) has for one of its purposes a clarification
of this situation. Two types of procedure to obtain relief from judgments are
specified in the rules as it is proposed to amend them. One procedure is by
motion in the court and in the action in which the judgment was rendered.
The other procedure is by a new or independent action to obtain relief from a
judgment, which action may or may not be begun in the court which
rendered the judgment. Various rules, such as the one dealing with a motion
for new trial and for amendment of judgments, Rule 59, one for amended
findings, Rule 52, and one for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Rule
50(b), and including the provisions of Rule 60(b) as amended, prescribe the
various types of cases in which the practice by motion is permitted. In each
case there is a limit upon the time within which resort to a motion is
permitted, and this time limit may not be enlarged under Rule 6(b). If the
right to make a motion is lost by the expiration of the time limits fixed in
these rules, the only other procedural remedy is by a new or independent
action to set aside a judgment upon those principles which have heretofore
been applied in such an action. Where the independent action is resorted to,
the limitations of time are those of laches or statutes of limitations. The
Committee has endeavored to ascertain all the remedies and types of relief
heretofore available by coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, bill of
review, or bill in the nature of a bill of review. See Moore and Rogers, Federal
Relief from Civil Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 659–682. It endeavored
then to amend the rules to permit, either by motion or by independent
action, the granting of various kinds of relief from judgments which were
permitted in the federal courts prior to the adoption of these rules, and the
amendment concludes with a provision abolishing the use of bills of review
and the other common law writs referred to, and requiring the practice to be
by motion or by independent action.
To illustrate the operation of the amendment, it will be noted that under
Rule 59(b) as it now stands, without amendment, a motion for new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence is permitted within ten days after
the entry of the judgment, or after that time upon leave of the court. It is
proposed to amend Rule 59(b) by providing that under that rule a motion for
new trial shall be served not later than ten days after the entry of the
judgment, whatever the ground be for the motion, whether error by the court
or newly discovered evidence. On the other hand, one of the purposes of the
bill of review in equity was to afford relief on the ground of newly discovered
evidence long after the entry of the judgment. Therefore, to permit relief by
a motion similar to that heretofore obtained on bill of review, Rule 60(b) as
amended permits an application for relief to be made by motion, on the
ground of newly discovered evidence, within one year after judgment. Such a
motion under Rule 60(b) does not affect the finality of the judgment, but a
motion under Rule 59, made within 10 days, does affect finality and the
running of the time for appeal.
If these various amendments, including principally those to Rule 60(b),
accomplish the purpose for which they are intended, the federal rules will
deal with the practice in every sort of case in which relief from final
judgments is asked, and prescribe the practice. With reference to the
question whether, as the rules now exist, relief by coram nobis, bills of
review, and so forth, is permissible, the generally accepted view is that the
remedies are still available, although the precise relief obtained in a
particular case by use of these ancillary remedies is shrouded in ancient lore
and mystery. See Wallace v. United States (C.C.A.2d, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 240,
cert. den. (1944) 323 U.S. 712; Fraser v. Doing (App.D.C. 1942) 130 F.(2d)
617; Jones v. Watts (C.C.A.5th, 1944) 142 F.(2d) 575; Preveden v.
Hahn (S.D.N.Y. 1941) 36 F.Supp. 952; Cavallo v. Agwilines, Inc. (S.D.N.Y.
1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 2, 2 F.R.D. 526; McGinn v. United
States (D.Mass. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 3, 2 F.R.D. 562; City of
Shattuck, Oklahoma ex rel. Versluis v. Oliver (W.D.Okla. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules
Serv. 60b.31, Case 3; Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil
Judgments (1946) 55 Yale L.J. 623, 631–653; 3 Moore's Federal
Practice (1938) 3254 et seq.; Commentary, Effect of Rule 60b on Other
Methods of Relief From Judgment, op. cit. supra. Cf. Norris v.
Camp (C.C.A.10th, 1944) 144 F.(2d) 1; Reed v. South Atlantic Steamship Co.
of Delaware (D.Del. 1942) 6 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.31, Case 1; Laughlin v.
Berens (D.D.C. 1945) 8 Fed.Rules Serv. 60b.51, Case 1, 73 W.L.R. 209.
The transposition of the words “the court” and the addition of the word
“and” at the beginning of the first sentence are merely verbal changes. The
addition of the qualifying word “final” emphasizes the character of the
judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and
hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the
rule, but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court
rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.
The qualifying pronoun “his” has been eliminated on the basis that it is too
restrictive, and that the subdivision should include the mistake or neglect of
others which may be just as material and call just as much for supervisory
jurisdiction as where the judgment is taken against the party
through his mistake, inadvertence, etc.
 Fraud, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party are express grounds for relief by motion
under amended subdivision (b). There is no sound reason for their exclusion.
The incorporation of fraud and the like within the scope of the rule also
removes confusion as to the proper procedure. It has been held that relief
from a judgment obtained by extrinsic fraud could be secured by motion
within a “reasonable time,” which might be after the time stated in the rule
had run. Fiske v. Buder (C.C.A.8th, 1942) 125 F.(2d) 841; see also
inferentially Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co. (C.C.A.9th, 1942) 125 F.(2d)
213. On the other hand, it has been suggested that in view of the fact that
fraud was omitted from original Rule 60(b) as a ground for relief, an
independent action was the only proper remedy. Commentary, Effect of Rule
60b on Other Methods of Relief From Judgment (1941) 4 Fed.Rules Serv. 942,
945. The amendment settles this problem by making fraud an express
ground for relief by motion; and under the saving clause, fraud may be urged
as a basis for relief by independent action insofar as established doctrine
permits. See Moore and Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments (1946)
55 Yale L.J. 623, 653–659; 3 Moore's Federal Practice (1938) 3267 et seq.
And the rule expressly does not limit the power of the court, when fraud has
been perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an
illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford Empire Co.
(1944) 322 U.S. 238.
The time limit for relief by motion in the court and in the action in which
the judgment was rendered has been enlarged from six months to one year.
It should be noted that Rule 60(b) does not assume to define the
substantive law as to the grounds for vacating judgments, but merely
prescribes the practice in proceedings to obtain relief.
It should also be noted that under §200(4) of the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. [App.] §501 et seq. [§520(4)]), a judgment
rendered in any action or proceeding governed by the section may be
vacated under certain specified circumstances upon proper application to
the court.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1948 AMENDMENT
The amendment substitutes the present statutory reference.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES—1987 AMENDMENT
The amendment is technical. No substantive change is intended.
COMMITTEE NOTES ON RULES—2007 AMENDMENT
The language of Rule 60 has been amended as part of the general
restyling of the Civil Rules to make them more easily understood and to
make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes
are intended to be stylistic only.
 The final sentence of former Rule 60(b) said that the procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment was by motion as prescribed in the Civil
Rules or by an independent action. That provision is deleted as unnecessary.
Relief continues to be available only as provided in the Civil Rules or by
independent action.
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