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SF 14 25

Safety Flash
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
47 views5 pages

SF 14 25

Safety Flash
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Safety Flash

14/25 – August 2025

IMCA Safety Flashes summarise key safety matters and incidents, allowing lessons to be more easily learnt for the benefit of all.
The effectiveness of the IMCA Safety Flash system depends on members sharing information and so avoiding repeat incidents.
Please consider adding [email protected] to your internal distribution list for safety alerts or manually submitting
information on incidents you consider may be relevant. All information is anonymised or sanitised, as appropriate.

1 Brazil: diver permanently disabled after decompression illness


A regional court in São Paulo, Brazil, has upheld the joint conviction of a diving company and an electrical energy
company for a work accident suffered by a diver who lost strength in his upper limbs and the ability to move,
requiring permanent use of a wheelchair.

The judgement – in Brazilian Portuguese – can be found here.

What happened

The diver was performing underwater inspection and maintenance work at a depth of 26m. On the day of the
incident, the water temperature was low, and the diver was carrying tools necessary for the activity. Upon emerging
from the final dive, the diver experienced symptoms of decompression sickness, with severe tingling in the
abdomen. Upon reaching the surface, the diver reported feeling unwell and was taken to the hyperbaric chamber
for emergency treatment. While being taken to the hyperbaric chamber the diver lost his vision and movement.
Then it was discovered that the hyperbaric chamber was not working properly.

The diver was then taken for treatment, with oxygen from an improvised chamber, to another diving company, four
hours drive away. Upon arrival, there was no doctor present, and the diver has to wait for about an hour for the
hyperbaric chamber to be set up.

After ten hours of further hyperbaric treatment, the diver fully recovered his vision, but remained unable to move
his legs and arms. Upon returning to his home, he was hospitalized for about 30 days, after which he was released
for home physical therapy treatment. The court report noted that as a result of the accident, he developed severe
anxiety and depression due to his physical and physiological limitations.

What went wrong


• The company failed to comply with any diving or safety regulations;
• The company hyperbaric chamber wasn’t working properly - the external pressure gauge was inoperative;
• There was no proper risk assessment or planning for an emergency scenario of this sort;
• There was no appropriate means of transporting the diver to a new emergency location – a truck had to be
used;
• There was no proper emergency communication:
̶ There was no doctor present at the second site;
̶ The hyperbaric chamber at the second site was not ready for emergency use – the court noted that there
was a “a complete lack of communication between the company and the plaintiff's shelter.”

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IMCA makes every effort to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in the documents it publishes, but IMCA shall not be liable for any guidance and/or
recommendation and/or statement herein contained. The information contained in this document does not fulfil or replace any individual’s or Member's legal, regulatory
or other duties or obligations in respect of their operations. Individuals and Members remain solely responsible for the safe, lawful and proper conduct of their operations.
© 2022 Page 1 of 5
Lessons to learn

This is the third incident of this type in recent years that IMCA is aware of. To capture the lessons learned from
these incidents, earlier in 2025, IMCA released diving recommended practice IMCA D085 Guidance on deck
decompression chamber (DDC) operations for the therapeutic treatment of divers. This document provides
comprehensive guidance on the operation of Deck Decompression Chambers (DDCs) for the therapeutic treatment
of divers, emphasising the importance of competence, emergency planning, and adherence to safety standards.

See IMCA D 085 Guidance on deck decompression chamber (DDC) operations for the therapeutic treatment of divers

2 Diver reports unwell post-dive: non-decompression illness


What happened

A diver experienced a dizzy spell about one hour after completing a diving operation. The incident occurred after
the 50 year old diver undertook a dive to 87 feet with a bottom time of 31 minutes. The diver was decompressed
on a USN rev 7. 90/33 'freetime dive’ and reported well upon surfacing. About one hour later, on deck, the diver
called out for attention reporting extreme nausea and dizziness.

What was the response

The diver was immediately recompressed in the chamber on a USN treatment table 6 as per company procedure
with a Diver Medic Technician (DMT) with him in attendance. The DMT performed a full physiological and
neurological examination and blood sugar levels were taken as a precautionary measure. The diver’s blood sugar
levels were observed to be dangerously high.

A hyperbaric physician was contacted and following their advice, decompression illness was ruled out and
hyperglycaemia was suspected, as the examination pointed towards a diabetic response. Treatment table was
switched to a Table 5 to reduce chamber time so that the diver could have his blood sugar levels brought under
control at the earliest opportunity.

After 90 minutes the diver and DMT were able to leave the chamber. The diver was evacuated ashore for further
medical attention.

What was the problem?

It was later reported that the diver had an unreported diabetic condition for which he was not taking any traditional
therapy for but was seeking alternative natural methods.

What were the recommendations?


• Healthy eating ‘campaign offshore’ & Welfare Improvement
̶ Crew should engage with vessel medics for nutritional advice;
̶ Crew should be motivated to declare medical issues before coming offshore;
̶ Crew need to be confident that their jobs are not at risk because of declaring their medical conditions.
• Improve crew education on common non-communicable diseases like Diabetes and Hypertension so that they
can easily spot when they have symptoms;
• Encourage use of gym when offshore – physical and mental fitness needs to be encouraged and looked after;
• Look closely at ensuring how divers maintain their fitness and Body Mass Index (BMI) to an acceptable level.
Members may wish to refer to:
• IMCA D 061 Guidance on health, fitness and medical issues in diving operations
• IMCA HSS 033 Guidance on occupational health
• Diver fainted

IMCA Safety Flash 14/25 Page 2 of 5


3 Shore-side crane boom collides with vessel mast
What happened
Applicable
During shipyard lifting operations, the boom of a dock crane made contact with the vessel Life Saving
mast. As a result of the collision, a wind sensor and GPS sensor were dislodged and fell to Rule(s) Safe
deck. Additionally, a fixing clamp was later found on the main deck, approximately 30m Mechanical
Lifting
away.

Boom adjacent to mast after the incident Damage on the mast

This was a high potential incident; both the wind sensor and the fixing clamp could have struck a person, potentially
causing serious injury or even fatality.

What went wrong


• The yard crane operator was simultaneously driving the dock crane, slewing, and booming out, without
maintaining visual control during the operation. This was in contravention of the yard’s own lifting procedures;
• The dockyard crane operated independently, without waiting for signals from the banksman on the vessel;
• The banksman was not positioned to effectively observe potential obstacles
• The dockyard crane operator lacked clear visibility and could not see any potential clashes.
Actions and topics for discussion
• Ensure that all stakeholders – vessel crew, third party crew, dockyard crew, management - understand just how
critical is the role of the banksman in lifting operations;
• It is vital to have clear communication between the banksman and crane operator;
• Ensure the dockyard management have received all the right information they need before the vessel goes into
dock and before operations begin. This should include:
̶ Vessel “General Arrangement” drawings, including details of potential obstacles;
̶ Vessel dimensions.
Members should refer to:
• IMCA HSS 032 Guidance on safety in shipyards
• NTSB: Vessel crane contact with shore-side crane
• Near miss: load lifted without notice putting crew in the line of fire

IMCA Safety Flash 14/25 Page 3 of 5


4 Injury sustained while operating steel lifting magnet
What happened Applicable
Life Saving
While preparing to transfer steel plates using a steel lifting magnet, a crew person was Rule(s)
injured. The crew person attempted to adjust a magnet by releasing a locking lever that Line of Fire
was located low and far from their reach. As they adjusted the lever, it recoiled suddenly
because of the spring-loaded tension, hitting them in the face. They sustained a cut to the left cheek requiring
fifteen stitches. It could have been worse: it might have been damaged or broken teeth or facial bones in this
incident.

Recoiling lever of the lifting magnet Steel plates being moved Faded Caution sticker

Our member noted that a similar incident had occurred a year before, involving a different crew member, who
suffered a minor cut on the chin when the handle of the same lifting magnet hit them.

Investigation revealed
• The lifting magnet was chosen for the task due to its perceived efficiency;
• The design of the operating lever meant that tension allowed it to spring back sharply;
• The lifting magnet normally underwent annual inspection but was not subject to regular maintenance, relying
solely on user reports for faults;
• A similar incident happened a year ago;
• The original warning stickers, placed when the previous incident happened, had faded and became illegible.
Actions and discussion points
• Implement a regular inspection regime for lifting magnets that includes periodic inspections, fault reporting
and replacement of faded warning stickers;
• Evaluate equipment efficiency before use: Is this the best tool for the job on this occasion?
Members may wish to refer to:
• Stored energy – dislodged pin causes injury
• Release of stored energy from coiled superloops

5 Head Injury in Engine Room


What happened
Applicable
A Chief Engineer sustained a head laceration injury after accidentally striking Life Saving
his head on the sharp edge of a lighting protection grille rod installed at a Rule(s)
Bypassing
height of 168 cm in the engine room. Safety Line of Fire
Controls

IMCA Safety Flash 14/25 Page 4 of 5


Location of lighting and lighting protection grille rod hazards

Why did it happen


• The head-room was low, and the lighting protection grille was lower still at 168 cm above deck, posing a physical
hazard at head level;
• The “protective” grille was itself harmful, with sharp, unprotected rod ends which created a risk of laceration
or impact injury;
• No adequate PPE (safety helmet) was worn at the time of the impact, increasing injury severity;
• This obvious hazard was overlooked during installation and routine checks following installation.
Learning
• Consider a hazard hunt to identify all snagging points (risk to head/body).
̶ Could there be some you hadn’t thought of, or that were missed the first time around?
̶ Reassess familiar spaces, not just obvious major equipment areas. What about the mess, the corridor in
the accommodation etc etc.
• Can the hazard be engineered or designed out – that’s ideal but not always practical;
• Can some form of protective pad be applied?
• Can sharp edges or low-hanging objects be appropriately marked?
• Does everyone know about the hazard? Is it worth a reminder at the tool box talk? “Watch out when you go
past here, there’s a low bit where you have to duck to get through”
• Think through hazard awareness and reiterate PPE use (such as helmets in machinery spaces).
Members may wish to refer to:
• Two injuries [the first being the same injury as in this incident]
• LTI: Head injury
• Personal injury following PPE violation and slip and fall on deck
• High potential LTI: Rigger ear injury

IMCA Safety Flash 14/25 Page 5 of 5

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