Sector Note Industrial Goods and Services │ India │ September 17, 2025

India
Aerospace & Defence
Overweight (no change)
Analyzing next 15 years of defence demand
Highlighted Companies
Hindustan Aeronautics ■ TPCR-2025 lists 457 items (vs. 221 in TPCR 2018), shifts >50% to electronics,
ADD, TP Rs6325, Rs4840 close EW & space; prioritizes sub-systems vs. platforms and boosts indigenization.
The company’s order book is up at ~Rs2.4tr; ■ Sudarshan Chakra project, to be completed by 2035, needs an investment of
Rs1tr order pipeline supports revenue visibility; at least 4tr across air defence systems, radars, HAPS, DEW and space.
diversified backlog assures growth. The
Rs150bn capex over a period of five years ■ HAL(ADD),BEL(ADD),BDL(NR), Astra Microwave(NR) & Data Patterns(NR) to
boosts capacity; EPS estimated at 16% YoY in be main beneficiaries of TPCR electronics push & Sudarshan Chakra project.
FY26F and 18% YoY in FY27F; fleet upgrades
(Jaguar/Mirage out, AMCA/Su-57 in) to aid the
company’s OEM & MRO divisions.
The future of Indian defence is digital, networked, and electronic
TPCR-2025 maps 457 programs and makes clear its priority, 224 (49%) are in cyber
Bharat Electronics
ADD, TP Rs459, Rs403 close systems/electronics/electronic warfare, nearly half of all entries, signaling a decisive shift
TPCR 2025 electronics push and a to networked, software-defined and electronic capabilities. TPCR quantifies the pivot, more
multimillion-dollar project pipeline ensures than 60,000 software-defined radios, 7,000–8,000 S-band satellite terminals, dedicated
revenue visibility. Operation Sindoor’s integrated EW suites and AI as a service set-up for ~4,000 users, alongside specialized
success + Atmanirbharta (DAC 2020) projects (smart adaptive jamming, electronic-denial bubbles, time-spoofers). TPCR shows
makes the company a key government- India is buying hardware, software and networks. Survivability, command-and-control and
trusted indigenization & defence
lethality will be won in the electronics and cyber domains, and indigenization of these
electronics partner.
digital-electronic building blocks is imperative for defence industry investment.

Summary Valuation Metrics There is a deliberate focus on industrial deepening

P/E (x) Mar26-F Mar27-F Mar28-F TPCR-2025 skews decisively to subsystems, 86.9% of the 457 programs (~397) target
Hindustan Aeronautics 36.2 30.7 26.7
Bharat Electronics 47.3 38.8 33.6 subsystem-level work, versus 13.1% (~60) for large platforms. Design democratizes
opportunity, opening roles for specialized component manufacturers, micro, small and
P/BV (x) Mar26-F Mar27-F Mar28-F
medium enterprises and technology start-ups and creates a tiered, competitive supplier
Hindustan Aeronautics 7.9 6.7 5.8
Bharat Electronics 12.2 10.0 8.3 base instead of concentrating value in a few large integrators. The result is a classic
industrial policy move to deepen and derisk the domestic supply chain and compel prime
Dividend Yield Mar26-F Mar27-F Mar28-F
contractors to act as system architects who manage a complex domestic ecosystem rather
Hindustan Aeronautics 0.9% 1.1% 1.2%
Bharat Electronics 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% than merely assembling imported kits.

India needs heavy investments in air and space defence systems

India urgently needs prioritized investment in air and space defence systems to close
operational seams, as a few long-range batteries cannot substitute for a geographically
distributed architecture across a two-front geometry, and we expect overlapping area-
defence, AWACS plus HAPS/long-endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to be the
near-term fix for radar-horizon blind spots. We expect a rapid rollout of AESA upgrades on
mission-critical radars, coupled with hardened, distributed sensor-fusion and C2 nodes,
and so automation drives prioritization under saturation or EW. Critically, we recommend
an accelerated plan to field the SBS 3 radars to improve satellite detection. We also
analyzed that cheap swarms (dozens–hundreds of small UAS/loitering munitions) demand
directed-energy weapons and integration now to change the kill-economics, and that surge
production plus realistic intercepts-per-day consumption models and pre-positioned stocks
are essential to avoid rapid depletion in a sustained combat.

Sudarshan Chakra is an ambitious project costing Rs4tr

We analyzed that Sudarshan Chakra is an ambitious, Rs4tr integrated air and space
defence program. It allocates roughly Rs1.8tr to layered area-defence (QRSAM, KUSHA,
Akash Prime) for geographically distributed interception; Rs1.4tr to ground and over-the-
horizon sensing (Voronezh OTH, Surya VHF, Super Swordfish) to eliminate maritime and
Research Analyst(s) low-altitude blind spots; space sensors and HAPS (hosted IR payloads + high-altitude
pseudo-satellites) to regain boost-phase warning; directed-energy (DEW) R&D and trials
to defeat dozens–hundreds swarms cost-effectively; AESA upgrades, and hardened
distributed sensor-fusion/C2. Delivered at this scale and pace, Sudarshan Chakra would
provide overlapping sensors (airborne, maritime, space), resilient automated C2 and
economical swarm defeat.
Shubham DALIA
T (91) 02241611544
E [email protected]

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 Industrial Goods and Services │ India
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TPCR-2025 improves on TPCR-2018 with

increased focus on indigenization
TPCR-2025 offers a clear map of the size, nature, and direction of the impending
capital expenditure cycle, revealing a multi-decade opportunity for private
players/DPSUs/MSMEs. It is important to note that the document is a sub-set of
the overall requirement of defence services as it details the technologies and
capabilities that could be made public for use by industry.
Figure 1: 100% increase in total TPCR programs

TPCR 2025 457

TPCR 2018 221

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 2: Electronic systems are in focus

TPCR 2025 TPCR 2018

93
Weapons, Munitions & Propulsion
57

33
Space Systems
4

61
Materials, Structures & Manufacturing
78

224
Cyber Systems/Electronics/EW
82

0 50 100 150 200 250

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

There is a deliberate focus on industrial deepening. 86.9% of the projects are at

the subsystem level, compared to just 13.1% for large platforms. This
structure democratizes the opportunity, moving it beyond a handful of large-scale
platform integrators. It opens the field to a tiered ecosystem of specialized
component manufacturers, MSMEs, and technology start-ups, fostering a broad,
competitive base of suppliers. This is a classic industrial policy strategy to build a
resilient and deep supply chain, forcing large integrators to act as true system
architects who must manage a complex domestic network rather than simply
assembling imported kits.

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Figure 3: Subsystems are taking a major chunk Figure 4: ~12% of items are being developed/ready for ToT

Platform Subsystem Yes No

13.1% 11.8%

86.9% 88.2%

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Cyber systems/electronics/EW constitute a staggering 49.0% of all projects,

followed by weapons, munitions & propulsion at 20.4%. The future of Indian
defence is digital, networked, and electronic. The strategic value is shifting away
from traditional heavy engineering towards high-Intellectual Property (IP), high-
margin electronics, software, and systems integration.
Figure 5: Space-based systems are emerging as a technology where India is planning
to invest
Category Analysis

20.4%
Cyber Systems/Electronics/EW

Materials, Structures &

Manufacturing
Others
7.2% 49.0%
Services, Sustainment & Test
2.2%
Space Systems

7.9%
Weapons, Munitions &
Propulsion

13.3%
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

The digital battlefield of electronics, EW, and cyber systems

(49.0% of projects)
The digital battlefield is no longer a futuristic concept - it is the central organizing
principle of India's military modernization, commanding nearly half of all planned
projects. The demand is driven by the imperative of network-centric warfare, as
explicitly detailed in the requirements for flagship platforms. The Future Ready
Combat Vehicle (FRCV) and the Light Tank, for instance, are mandated to be
fully cyber-hardened systems with integrated Battlefield Management Systems
(BMS), secure data links, and the capability to operate in an intense Electronic
Warfare (EW) environment.
The scale of this digital transformation is immense. The Indian Army alone
requires over 60,000 Software-Defined Radios (SDRs), between 7,000 and
8,000 S-Band Satellite Terminals, and between 55,000 and 60,000 Thermal
Imaging Sights. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is planning a new IAF Strategic
Communication Network, which requires Next-Generation Radar Warning
Receivers (RWRs) for over 300 transport and fighter aircraft, and it is procuring

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a host of advanced jammers and sensors. This represents a multi-year

procurement cycle for a vast array of electronic systems.
The roadmap also emphasizes a significant leap in technological sophistication.
There is a clear push towards next-generation systems such as Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, which require advanced Gallium
Nitride (GaN) based Trans-Receiver modules, Cognitive Radio, Quantum
Communication systems, AI-based Emitter Identification, and Zero Trust
Network Architecture. This is a strategic intent to move up the technology value
chain, from licensed production to indigenous design and development of cutting-
edge systems. This massive demand for advanced electronics, particularly
semiconductors like GaN modules, exposes one of India's key strategic
vulnerabilities but also creates a powerful catalyst. The non-negotiable
requirements of the TPCR will, we believe, act as a foundational driver for the
government's domestic semiconductor manufacturing and packaging (ATMP)
initiatives, providing the long-term offtake assurance needed to attract private
investment into a domestic fab.
Cybersecurity has also been elevated to a strategic imperative. The inclusion of
numerous projects for indigenous tools, from web-based vulnerability
assessment and indigenous code analysis to deep fake detection and the
creation of cyber ranges for training, marks the recognition of the cyber domain
as a critical warfighting front.

Lethality and propulsion (20.4% of projects)

The second-largest category of expenditure is dedicated to the modernization of
India's kinetic capabilities, with a clear shift towards precision, extended range,
and smarter munitions.
The primary focus is on defeating modern armoured threats, evidenced by the
large-scale requirement for 20,000 to 50,000 units of 4th/5th Generation Anti-
Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) for the Indian Army, alongside advanced
125mm tank ammunition. In the artillery domain, the demand for 600,000
Enhanced Range Artillery Projectiles and thousands of Course Correctible
Fuzes (CCF) for existing 155mm guns signifies a major leap in capability. This
initiative aims to transform a vast inventory of conventional shells into precision-
guided weapons, a cost-effective force multiplier. Similarly, the Indian Navy’s
requirement of advanced Lightweight Torpedoes, Extended Range Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) Rockets, and various types of Guided Ammunition
for its naval guns reflect the imperative to counter both surface and sub-surface
threats in the maritime domain.
Beyond munitions, the roadmap outlines ambitious, long-term projects in critical
propulsion technologies, aiming for technological parity with global powers. These
include the development of Scramjet Propulsion for Hypersonic Missiles,
Nuclear Propulsion for future aircraft carriers and surface combatants, and Air
Independent Propulsion (AIP) systems for conventional submarines.

Platforms and integration (7.9% of projects)

While platforms represent a smaller portion of the total project count, they are the
high-value, high-visibility anchors of the defence ecosystem. These large-scale
programmes are critical not only for their direct contract value but also for their
role in driving development and business across the entire domestic supply chain.
On land, the key programmes are the Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV),
with a projected requirement of 1,700-1,800 units to replace the T-72 fleet,
and the Light Tank project, with a requirement of 300-400 units for versatile
deployment. It is crucial to note that these are not mere manufacturing contracts;
they are complex design and development challenges with a heavy emphasis on
modern electronic architecture, network-centric capabilities, and the integration of
unmanned systems.

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In the naval domain, the flagship programmes include the next indigenous Aircraft
Carrier, Next Generation Destroyers (NGD), Next Generation Corvettes
(NGC), and specialized vessels like Mine Counter Measure Vessels (MCMV).
These platforms are characterized by increasing complexity, advanced stealth
features, and a significant and growing proportion of their value being derived from
their onboard electronic suites and weapon systems.
The role of the platform manufacturers themselves is evolving. They are
increasingly required to act as prime integrators and system architects,
responsible for managing a vast and complex network of Tier-1 and Tier-2
domestic suppliers to deliver a fully functional, indigenized system. A complex
platform like an NGD or FRCV consists of thousands of subsystems, and the
indigenization mandate forces the prime contractor to cultivate a domestic supply
chain. This creates a powerful pull effect on the entire MSME ecosystem, where
a single high-value contract for a prime integrator generates a cascading wave of
business for hundreds of smaller firms.

The new frontiers of unmanned, space, and directed energy

weapons
TPCR-2025 dedicates significant attention to forward-looking, high-growth
segments that will define the future of warfare. These areas, while nascent in
terms of current revenue, represent immense long-term growth potential for
companies that can establish an early technology lead.
The roadmap for Unmanned Systems is comprehensive, spanning every domain
of warfare. It includes requirements for strategic assets like Medium and High-
Altitude Long Endurance (MALE/HALE) RPAS, High-Altitude Pseudo-
Satellites (HAPS) for persistent surveillance, and ultimately, Stealth Unmanned
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) capable of supersonic speeds and Manned-
Unmanned Teaming (MUM-T). The emphasis is clearly on autonomy, stealth, and
SATCOM-based, beyond-line-of-sight operational capabilities.
Space-based assets emerge as a major new focus area, reflecting the domain's
growing importance for military operations. The TPCR details requirements for a
wide range of satellites, including Multiband RF Sensors for electronic
intelligence, High Throughput Communication Satellites in Low Earth Orbit
(LEO) to provide low-latency connectivity, and L/P band Synthetic Aperture
Radar (SAR) satellites for all-weather surveillance. The vision extends to
ambitious concepts like On-Orbit Servicing, Maintenance, and Refuelling
(OOMR) and the use of on-board AI for real-time data processing, signifying a
desire to build a resilient and technologically advanced space architecture.
The push into Directed Energy Weapons (DEW), while in its early stages, is
strategically significant. Tactical High Energy Lasers and High-Power
Electromagnetic Weapon Systems are designed to counter the threats ranging
from drones to electronic systems. We view this as a long-term R&D focus with
the potential for disruptive impact on the battlefield. The government appears to
be using these "new frontier" domains, particularly drones and space, to
deliberately seed a new ecosystem of defence start-ups, bypassing the legacy
structures of Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Domains like
Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAVs) and small satellites are software-
intensive and rely on rapid, agile innovation cycles, characteristics better suited to
start-ups than to large, hierarchical PSUs.

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Introduction to air defence analysis

Abstract
We examine the technical architecture, operational coverage, and industrial
implications of India’s present and planned air-defence posture, including
integrated surface-to-air/ballistic-missile layers, space-domain sensors and
interceptors, and the ground-based long-range radar backbone that supports
persistent domain awareness.
Our scope covers (a) technical capability mapping (systems, ranges, sensor
fusion and coverage gaps), & (b) ongoing and expected procurements and R&D
programs.

Critical strategic assumption

India needs ~Rs4tr of additional Our analysis explicitly assumes that India faces a sustained two-front threat from
investment for its ambitious the People’s Republic of China on the northern and eastern approaches and from
Sudarshan Chakra project. Pakistan on the western front. Preparing for a credible two-front defence posture
materially changes force-structure requirements and unit-cost aggregation. As a
guiding aphorism we emphasize that “the best way to avoid a war is to prepare
for it.”
We therefore include comparative technical assessments of China’s and
Pakistan’s relevant aerospace and missile capabilities, sensors, fighters, ballistic
and cruise missile inventories, and integrated air-defence systems to ensure our
gap analysis and procurement projections are stress-tested against realistic threat
envelopes.
Also, our primary focus in this analysis is defensive and not offensive
investments/upgrades in the armed forces’ capabilities.

Key findings
Consolidating ongoing contracts, announced programmes and our capability-gap
analysis under the two-front assumption, we estimate India will need at least Rs4tr
of additional investment for air and space domain modernization through 2035.
India needs system procurement, new ground-radar deployment, space-sensor
assets and associated sustainment. This estimate is explicitly linked to the
strategic ambition described by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his 15th
Aug 2025 Independence Day address under the ‘Sudarshan Chakra’
umbrella, which we treat as a guiding political commitment and parametric driver
for procurement timelines.
Figure 6: Key expected investments
System Expected Investment (tr)
Air Defense 1.82
Space Defense 0.2
Ground Radars 1.4
Others 0.5
Total Investment 3.9
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

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Understanding the threats

Pakistani air threats
We assess that Pakistan’s air threat to India stems from its mix of 3rd/4th-
generation fighters, modern drones, and a growing missile arsenal. The Pakistan
Air Force (PAF) fields roughly 418 combat jets, chiefly F-16s, indigenously co-
developed JF-17s, and newly acquired Chinese J-10C fighters. Most older types
(Mirages and F-7s) are being retired in favour of these.
Pakistan received the first batch of J-10CE fighters in 2022. These Mach-1.8,
AESA-radar jets carry long-range PL-15 air-to-air missiles and precision air-to-
surface munitions. The JF-17 Thunder (Mach-1.6), built jointly by Pakistan and
China, is the PAF’s workhorse (Block-3 standard, AESA radar) and carries
Chinese AAMs (PL-10, PL-12/15) and air-launched cruise missiles. Legacy F-16s
(Mach ~2.0) remain in service with Pakistan (~70–80 active, after retirements).
In past skirmishes (e.g. Feb 2019’s aerial clash), Pakistani JF-17s were deployed
against India. Conversely, Pakistan has publicly denied any current deal for
Chinese 5th-generation stealth fighters. However, Turkish UCAVs and 5th-gen
projects remain wildcards, given Islamabad’s Turkey ties.
Figure 7: Pakistan’s fighter jet details (pre-Operation Sindoor)
Top speed Representative range /
Platform Active Ordered Origin / Producer Stealth / RCS Typical armament examples
(typ.) radius
China (Shenyang / Short-range AAMs (PL-
Non-stealth (classic small fighter Combat radius ~300–600
F-7 (J-7 family) 72 Chengdu derivative of Mach 2.0 5/Python equivalents),
RCS) km (variant dependent)
MiG-21) unguided bombs
Non-stealth (low observable in later Ferry ~4,200 km; combat AIM-120 AMRAAM, AIM-
F-16A/C 44 USA (Lockheed Martin) Mach 2.0
blocks only via RCS reduction kits) radius ~550 km 9/Python, LGBs, A2G stores
Reduced RCS (not full stealth); Combat radius ~900– PL-10, PL-12 / PL-15 AAMs;
J-10C 20 5 China (Chengdu) Mach 1.8
AESA-radar on later examples 1,200 km (est.) ALCMs (KD-88 / equivalents)
Pakistan/China co- Small RCS on Block-3 (reduced Combat radius ~800–900 PL-10, PL-12/15 AAMs, Ra’ad
JF-17 (Block-3) 123 35 Mach 1.6
production (PAC/CAC) signature; not true stealth) km (variant dependent) ALCM, ASMs, guided bombs
France (Dassault;
Mirage III / IIIEP Combat radius ~500–800 R-550 / Matra AAMs,
69 licence builds / Mach 2.2 Non-stealth
/ OF / RP km (variant dependent) dumb/laser-guided bombs
upgrades)
Mirage 5 / 5EF / Similar to Mirage III Air-to-surface ordnance,
90 France (Dassault) Mach 2.0–2.1 Non-stealth
F / PA variants AAMs (older types)
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, FLIGHT GLOBAL

Pakistan’s missile threat likewise spans subsonic cruise missiles and ballistic
missiles. For example, the CSIS Missile Threat database lists Pakistan’s Babur
cruise missile (Hatf-7) as a subsonic weapon (Mach ~0.6) with a 350–700km
range , and its air-launched Ra’ad (Hatf-8) as a terrain-following cruise with ~600
km range. Short-range missiles like the Hatf-9 “NASR” (70km, tactical nuke) and
Hatf-2 “Abdali” (180km) provide battlefield deterrence. Longer-range ballistic
missiles include the Shaheen-1 SRBM (750–900km) and Shaheen-2 MRBM
(1,500–2,000km), both Mach~5 re-entry systems capable of carrying nuclear or
conventional warheads. The Shaheen-3 (range ~2,750km) and Ababeel (MIRV-
capable, 2,200km) are under development.
Figure 8: Pakistan’s missile details
Missile Name Class Range (km) Typical speed (typ.) Warhead / Payload Guidance
180–200 Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic
Abdali (Hatf-2) SRBM ~500 kg (conventional/nuclear) Inertial; road-mobile TEL
km (>Mach 5)
350–700 ~300–450 kg (conventional or INS + TERCOM/DSMAC; satellite updates
Babur (Hatf-7) Cruise missile Subsonic cruise ~ Mach 0.6–0.85
km nuclear) on later variants
Anti-ship cruise missile Subsonic ~ Mach 0.7–0.9 (variant INS/active radar terminal seeker (ship-
Exocet 40–180 km ~150–300 kg (HE/penetrating)
(ASCM) dependent) targeting)
Hatf-5 1,250– Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic ~700–1,000 kg
MRBM Inertial (liquid-fuel design; older)
“Ghauri” 1,500 km (>Mach 5) (conventional/nuclear)
Ghaznavi Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic
SRBM 290 km ~500–700 kg Inertial; reported post-separation corrections
(Hatf-3) (>Mach 5)
Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic Small conventional/nuclear
Hatf-1 SRBM 70–100 km Inertial
(>Mach 5) payloads (legacy)
SRBM / Tactical Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic
Nasr (Hatf-9) 70 km Low-yield tactical nuclear (sub-kt) Inertial; mobile TEL
ballistic (>Mach 5)
Shaheen-1 SRBM / short-MRBM 750–900 Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic Up to ~1,000 kg
INS + post-separation attitude correction
(Hatf-4) (solid) km (>Mach 5) (nuclear/conventional)
Shaheen-2 1,500– Ballistic, terminal: hypersonic Solid-fuel; inertial with reported guidance
MRBM ~1,000 kg (nuclear/conventional)
(Hatf-6) 2,000 km (>Mach 5) upgrades
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, CSIS

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Potential future Pakistani threats

Looking ahead to 2035, Pakistan’s threat profile may expand via Chinese and
Turkish partnerships. In aircraft, Pakistan is reportedly not finalizing any Chinese
5th-gen deal, but we see a high probability of the country acquiring some stealth
platforms via China/Turkey by 2035 (e.g. a two-seat FC-31/J-35 or Turkey’s TF-
X). Pakistani officials have begun F-16 Block 70 modernization talks with the US,
which could add more capable F-16s. Meanwhile, Turkey’s new supersonic UCAV
Kızılelma (Mach ~0.9, low RCS) may be exported; mass production of Kızılelma
began in 2024. On the missile side, we anticipate Pakistani jets fielding
supersonic missiles like China’s CM-400AKG (a Mach ~4 AShM, range ~200
km).
Pakistan has also tested Fatah-II guided rockets (~400km range) and continues
to develop longer-range MRBMs (Shaheen-3, Ababeel MIRV).
Figure 9: Potential future threats
Platform/Missile Category Speed Range (km)
Chengdu FC-31/J-35 Fighter (5th gen) Mach ~2+ ~1,500 (est.)
Turkey TF-X (Kaan) Fighter (5th gen) Mach ~2 ~1,300 (est.)
Bayraktar Kızılelma (Turk) UCAV Mach 0.9 930
F-16 Block 70 Fighter Mach 2.0 ~4,300
CM-400AKG (China) Missile (AShM) Mach 4+ ~180–250
Fatah-II (Pakistani) Rocket/MRL Mach ~3–4 ~400
Shaheen-3 (Hatf-10) Ballistic MRBM Mach ~5 2,750
Ababeel (MIRV) Ballistic MRBM Mach ~5 2,200
DF-ZF HGV (Chinese) Hypersonic Mach 5–10 ~~1,800 (DF-17 MRBM)
Kh-32/YJ-12A (China) Missile Mach ~3 (YJ-12) ~500 (YJ-12A)
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 10: Pakistan’s missile arsenal and range

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, CSIS

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Chinese air threats

Chinese Western Command bases in Tibet and Xinjiang now host advanced
fighters (5th-gen J-20, J-10C, J-11, Su-30, Su-35), large-scale armed UAVs (e.g.
Wing Loong series), and growing ballistic/cruise missile units (DF-21, DF-17, DF-
26, CJ-10, etc.). By 2035, these will be supplemented by next-generation systems:
stealthy UCAVs (GJ-11 ‘Sharp Sword’), hypersonic glide vehicles (DF-ZF), new
long-range drones (WZ-8), and 6th-generation fighters (J-XX/J-36 prototypes).
Figure 11: China’s fighter jet details
Active Origin Top speed Representative combat
Platform Stealth / RCS (qual.) Typical armament examples
inventory (manufacturer) (Mach) radius / range (km)
CJ-10/CJ-20 LACM, YJ-63 ALCM,
H-6 (bomber) 150 Xian / AVIC 0.86 Large RCS ≈1,500 (combat radius)
gravity/precision bombs
J-7 (light fighter) 417 Chengdu / AVIC 2.05 High RCS (legacy) ≈800 PL-2 / PL-5 IR AAMs
J-8 (interceptor) 143 Shenyang / AVIC 2.2 Moderate RCS ≈900 PL-8, PL-12 AAMs
J-10 (multirole) 268 Chengdu / AVIC 2.2 Moderate RCS ≈800 (combat) PL-15 BVR, PL-10 SR AAM, guided bombs
J-11 / J-16 / Su- PL-15, PL-10; YJ-12 AShM; Kh-31/Kh-59
365 Shenyang/Sukhoi 2 Moderate-to-large RCS 1,000+ (varies by type)
27/30/33/35 family anti-rad/stand-off msl
J-20 (5th-gen stealth PL-15 long-range AAM; PL-10 short-range;
19 Chengdu / AVIC 2 Low RCS (stealth) ≈1,000+
fighter) standoff A/G munitions
JH-7 (fighter-bomber) 103 Xian / AVIC 1.75 Large RCS 700–1,000 YJ-81/83 AShM, precision glide bombs
Nanchang / Unguided bombs, rockets, light precision
Q-5 (ground-attack) 118 1.2 Large RCS ≈600
Hongdu munitions
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, FLIGHT GLOBAL

China’s Rocket Force fields dense short- and medium-range ballistic missile
batteries near the Tibet/Xinjiang borders. Older solid-fuelled SRBMs (DF-11:
~300 km, DF-15: ~600km) provide theatre strike. Newer SRBMs (DF-16: ~800km)
and MRBMs (DF-17 with hypersonic glide warhead, ~1,800–2,500km) extend this
out to Pakistan and parts of India.
Even longer-range missiles are deployed, conventional DF-21C MRBMs
(≳2,000km) and DF-26 IRBMs (~4,000km) are based in western China. For
precision strikes, the PLAAF and Rocket Force use long-range land-attack cruise
missiles. The DH-10/CJ-10 LACM (range >1,500km) and its air-launched variant
CJ-20 carry ~500 kg warheads with inertial terrain guidance.
Shorter-range air-launched cruise missiles (e.g. YJ-63, ≈200km range) allow H-6
bombers to hit tactical targets with high accuracy.
Figure 12: China’s missile details
Missile Name Class Range (km) Speed (typical) Warhead / Payload Guidance
INS; later GPS/Beidou updates (CEP ~150
DF-11 (CSS-7) SRBM 280–300 Reentry ~Mach 4–6 ~500 kg; HE, submunitions, or nuclear
m)
DF-12 / M20 SRBM 280 ~Mach 4–5 480 kg; HE, cluster, penetrator INS + GPS (30–50 m CEP)
INS; DF-15B adds terminal radar (CEP ~30
DF-15 (CSS-6) SRBM 600 ~Mach 5 500–750 kg; HE, nuclear
m)
DF-16 (CSS-11) SRBM 800–1,000 ~Mach 5 500–1,000 kg; HE, penetrator INS + possible Beidou GPS
Hypersonic Glide Boosted by DF-16; inertial + possible
DF-17 1,800–2,500 Glide Mach 5–10+ 300–500 kg; conventional/nuclear
Vehicle (HGV) terminal seeker
DF-21 (CSS-5 Mod) MRBM ~2,150 Mach 10+ (reentry) ~600 kg; HE or nuclear (250–500 kt) INS + GPS; some variants radar terminal
DF-26 (CSS-18) IRBM ~4,000 Mach 10+ 1,200–1,800 kg; conventional or nuclear INS + Beidou GPS
1,050–1,750 kg; nuclear MIRV (150–300 kt
DF-31 (CSS-10) ICBM 7,000–11,700 Mach 20+ INS + astro-inertial; Beidou
each)
~2,200 kg; single nuclear warhead (3 Mt
DF-4 IRBM / Early ICBM 4,500–5,500 Mach 15–20 INS + astro guidance
class)
DF-41 ICBM 12,000–15,000 Mach 20+ 2,500 kg; up to 10 MIRVs (150–300 kt each) INS + astro; possible Beidou GPS
~3,000 kg; single large-yield nuclear
DF-5 ICBM ~13,000 Mach 20+ INS + astro guidance
warhead (3–5 Mt)
Subsonic (~Mach 0.7–
HN-2 Cruise Missile 1,400–1,800 ~400–500 kg; HE/nuclear possible INS + GPS + DSMAC/TERCOM
0.8)
HN-3 Cruise Missile ~3,000 Subsonic (~Mach 0.75) ~500 kg; HE or nuclear INS + GPS + terrain matching
HN-1 Cruise Missile 50–650 Subsonic (~Mach 0.7) ~400 kg; HE INS + GPS
SLBM (sub- 1,050–2,000 kg; nuclear warheads (MIRV-
JL-2 8,000–9,000 Mach 15–20 INS + astro; Beidou GPS
launched) capable)
Subsonic cruise;
Cruise Missile
YJ-18 220–540 terminal Mach 2.5–3 300–500 kg; HE or nuclear INS + GPS + terminal active radar
(land/air launched)
sprint
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, CSIS

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Figure 13: China’s missile arsenal and range - 1

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, CSIS

Figure 14: China’s missile arsenal and range - 2

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, CSIS

China is already flight-testing next-generation systems that could pose serious

threats by the early 2030s. Notably, an upgraded Shenyang J-35A (derived from
the FC-31/J-31 design) was unveiled in 2024 and is entering PLA service by
~2026–27, providing a second stealth fighter type beyond the J-20. Even more
advanced are the unnamed 6th-generation fighters (J-XX, J-36) whose
prototypes flew in late 2024 - these are described as tailless, triple-engine
stealth jets capable of Mach 2+ speeds and integrated UAV swarm control.
On the strike side, China’s DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (launched on DF-17)
is nearly operational, delivering manoeuvrable Mach 5–10 glide warheads, The
WZ-8 reconnaissance drone (Mach 3 at ~30 km) is already in limited service,
and Lijian (GJ-11) UCAVs (stealthy combat drones) are slated by mid-2020s for
precision strikes alongside J-20.

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Figure 15: Potential future threats

Projected IOC
Program / System Class Key Capabilities Expected Armament
(est.)
Shenyang J-31 / J-35A 5th-gen stealth Twin-engine low-observable design; smaller than J-20; modern PL-15 AAM; PL-10 AAM; precision A/G
~2026–2030
(FC-31) fighter sensors and avionics missiles (export variant likely)
Chengdu J-20B/C 5th-gen stealth 2025–2030 Improved engines (supercruise); larger internal bays; two-seat PL-10, PL-15 AAMs; anti-radiation, anti-ship
(upgraded J-20) fighter (expected) version (for EW/UCAV control) missiles
J-XX / J-36 (unnamed 6th-gen fighter Tailless stealth design; hypersonic dash (beyond Mach 2–3); Advanced AAMs; future DEWs (lasers,
2030s (est.)
6th-gen fighters) concepts AI-enabled sensor fusion; loyal-drone wingmen railguns); standoff weapons
~2025
Hypersonic Glide Mach 5–10+ reentry glide; maneuverable trajectory; high ~500–800 kg warhead
DF-ZF HGV (CSS-XX) (operational
Vehicle survival (conventional/nuclear)
trials)
Near-space
~2021–2025 Rocket-boosted to ~30 km altitude; Mach 3 cruise; 30,000– No missiles (recon platform with EO/SAR
WZ-8 “Gao Feng” reconnaissance
(operational) 50,000 m ceiling sensors)
drone
Hongdu GJ-11 “Sharp ~2025 (IOC Tailless stealth UAV; networked “loyal wingman” with J-20; Internal payload bays for guided
Stealth UCAV
Sword” (Lijian) likely) precision targeting bombs/missiles (future ship/ground strike)
Hypersonic LACMs Supersonic cruise Subsonic/supersonic (Mach ~3) cruise missile; strike fixed ~300–500 kg warhead; INS/TERCOM
~2025
(DF-100/CJ-100) missile bases guidance (high speed complicates defense)
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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India’s current air defence capabilities

Introduction
We believe that India today fields a layered, mixed analogue–digital air-defence
architecture, short-range & point-defence (SPYDER, Akash variants), medium-
range area defence (Barak-8, Akash Mk-II/Prime), and long-range strategic
coverage (S-400 regiments plus BMD radars and interceptors). This mix provides
good coverage against aircraft, subsonic cruise missiles and many tactical ballistic
missiles inside defended envelopes; it is less robust against boost-phase
detection/track, very short-warning hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), and
persistent boost-phase tracking without space-based IR sensors (SBIRS-style),
though planned sensor and satellite programs (Swordfish/Super-Swordfish, 52
defence satellites, Voronezh/Container negotiations) aim to reduce some of those
gaps over the 2025-2035 window.
Figure 16: What India’s current systems can reliably protect against
System Threats it can credibly defeat mitigate Limitations
High-altitude/long-range fighter penetration, some AWACS/ISR,
Excellent stand-off denial; single S-400 regiment cannot cover all
S-400 (long-range SAM) many cruise missiles, near-terminal ballistic targets within coverage
approaches, needs networked deployment for multi-front coverage.
(long-range intercepts up to a few hundred km).
Area defence of cities/airbases against aircraft, anti-radiation Complementary to S-400 for mid-tier engagements; naval and land
Barak-8 (LR-SAM)
missiles, and cruise missiles out to medium ranges. variants provide flexible coverage.
Point/area defence vs fighters, UCAVs, many cruise missiles in the
Economical mid-layer; density necessary to protect dispersed
Akash / Akash Prime / Akash-Mk II 25–45 km band; effective at high altitude (Akash Prime has high-
airbases and logistics nodes.
altitude tests).
Rapid-reaction, point defence vs fighters, attack helicopters, UAVs Mobile, low-latency layer for forward elements and high-value point
SPYDER (SR / MR)
and stand-in munitions at short ranges. targets.
Designed for traditional ballistic arcs; successful tests but coverage
Intercept of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in exo- and
PAD / AAD / AD-1 (BMD) is geographically limited and finite interceptor inventory constrains
endo-atmospheric flight phases within tested envelopes (Phase-I/II).
saturation resistance.
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Operational gaps in India’s air defence

The first and most visible seam is one of coverage and distribution. India has
acquired high-end, long-range area-defence systems that materially improve
localized denial, but these systems remain few and are geographically
concentrated. A very capable long-range battery provides formidable protection
where it is placed; it does not, however, substitute for a geographically distributed
architecture that can cover multiple axes simultaneously. In a two-front geometry
an adversary will aim to find the seams between a handful of high-value nodes,
attacking along secondary axes or timing salvos to overload a single sector.
Closely related is the problem of radar horizon and low-altitude blind spots. Fixed
ground radars are limited by curvature of the earth and by terrain clutter; sea-
skimming cruise missiles and terrain-hugging cruise weapons can remain
undetected until minutes, or even seconds before impact. The traditional
remedy has been airborne early-warning aircraft that see below the radar horizon;
AWACS increase detection ranges for low-altitude threats, but they are expensive
platforms, limited in number, and are themselves vulnerable to suppression or
saturation.
We therefore expect a dual approach, increasing AWACS availability in the near
term while accelerating the operational deployment of high-altitude, long-
endurance stratospheric systems that act as quasi-satellites. High-Altitude
Pseudo-Satellites (HAPS) and long-endurance UAVs sit in a useful middle layer,
flowing far longer on station than AWACS and providing a persistent look-down
capability that substantially narrows the radar blind spot. For India’s two-front
planning, the centrepiece should be redundancy, multiple, overlapping airborne
vantage points so that low-flying salvos cannot exploit a transient sensor gap.
Sensor quality and fusion are the next and inseparable concern. Many existing
ground radars remain older PESA designs; AESA arrays deliver higher fidelity,
better multi-target tracking, improved resistance to electronic attack, and greater
flexibility in beam management. Yet, the mere replacement of PESA with AESA
is not sufficient if aircraft, shipborne and ground radars are upgraded piecemeal
without parallel investments in robust, hardened sensor-fusion nodes. We expect
a phased prioritization, AESA installs for a sub-set of mission-critical platforms and

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fixed radar nodes, while simultaneously building distributed fusion centres that
tolerate degraded links and can operate autonomously if higher-level command is
disrupted. Without fusion that combines radar returns, electro-optical/infrared
cues, signals intelligence and airborne feeds into a coherent air picture, India’s
defenders will be forced into time-consuming human adjudication in conditions
where automation and fast prioritization are decisive.
An existential gap for ballistic and emerging hypersonic threats is early launch
detection. The most advantageous window to attribute and cue against a
ballistic launch is the boost phase, but boost-phase detection requires
overhead infrared sensors or other space-based capabilities that India does not
yet operate at scale. Without a dedicated space-based IR early-warning
constellation or a complement of hosted infrared payloads on GEO/HEO
platforms, detection tends to occur in midcourse or terminal phases, which
compresses decision time and complicates discrimination among decoys, multiple
warheads and countermeasures. We expect that the practical near-term path will
rely on mixing hosted payloads with improved ground and ship sensors, but our
recommendation is an accelerated plan to field dedicated space IR nodes by
2030–2035 that materially expands reaction time and simplifies the engagement
problem for missile-defence assets.
Maritime approaches and the very-long-range problem raise a separate but
complementary issue. Over-the-horizon radars (OTHR), which exploit
ionospheric propagation or surface-wave techniques, detect low-flying
aircraft and sea-skimming missiles at ranges beyond line-of-sight. India’s
long coastline and critical sea-lanes create many vectors where littoral threats can
approach undetected if OTHR coverage is thin. We expect that the right
architecture combines OTHR nodes, maritime-patrol aircraft and HAPS-class
persistent ISR so that sea-skimming salvos cannot exploit a single sensor domain.
Practically, this requires geographically dispersed OTHR nodes fused with
airborne and spaceborne feeds to create a maritime air picture that is not fragile
to single-point failures.
A qualitatively new category of threat is the cheap, large-scale swarm of
small UAS or loitering munitions. Swarms change the economics of
engagement - an adversary can expend dozens or hundreds of low-cost elements
to exhaust a defender’s inventory of interceptors, especially if those interceptors
are single-shot missiles with high unit costs. Directed-energy weapons (DEW),
including high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems, change
that economics. We expect DEW prototypes and field trials to accelerate globally
and to become a necessary element of base and harbour defence in the coming
decade. The crucial expectation for India is that fielding an operational laser or
HPM system offers the ability to defeat multiple small targets at a marginal cost
far lower than kinetic interceptors; our recommendation is to expedite trials over
critical bases and ports, to accelerate integration with detection and fire-control
chains, and to implement doctrinal changes that put DEW into the defensive
baseline for high-probability swarm-targeted nodes.
Sustained combat also exposes supply and throughput vulnerabilities. In a two-
front, protracted exchange, interceptor inventories can get depleted rapidly. The
defensibility of a region is therefore not only a function of peak capability but of
sustainable throughput, intercepts per day that the force can sustain while
resupply and production keep pace. We expect India to need realistic consumption
models that map expected attack profiles to day-by-day interceptor usage,
together with surge-production plans that can be activated in crisis. Near-term
stockpiling and pre-positioning are necessary, but longer-term production-line
scalability and supply-chain resilience must be a part of the planning baseline
through 2035.
Mixed salvoes combining ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and swarms impose a
cognitive and computational burden on defenders who must prioritise and allocate
scarce interceptors. The C2 architecture that performs well under benign
conditions may be brittle under electronic warfare or cyber-attack. Our expectation
is that automated, resilient command-and-control with graceful degradation is an
operational imperative, while distributed C2 nodes with the ability to exercise local

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autonomy, hardened datalinks and anti-spoofing measures will reduce the risk
that a contested electromagnetic environment produces indecision.
Figure 17: India’s air defence gaps and planned / expected / recommended development posture towards 2035
Strategic consequence in a two-front India’s planned / expected / recommended development posture
Gap Threat vectors
war toward FY2035
India is investing in an indigenous long-range programme under
Coverage seams and penetration risk Project Kusha (an Indian S-400 class LRSAM). We expect Delhi to
on secondary axes; ability of an Saturation strikes, flank pursue Project Kusha aggressively and model procurement of
Concentrated long-range
adversary to time or route salvos to penetrations, simultaneous multiple Kusha regiments — our working planning figure for force-
SAMs / limited distribution
exploit non-overlapping engagement two-front raids sizing is ~8 Kusha regiments by FY2035 (procurement + phased
arcs induction), alongside continued Russian S-400 deliveries and mobile
regimental deployments.
India is expanding airborne persistent sensors — increasing AWACS
Late detection of terrain-hugging Sea-skimming cruise capacity (Netra/Netra-MkII / “Awacs India” approvals) and
Radar horizon / low- threats, severely compressed missiles, terrain-hugging accelerating HAPS/HALE acquisitions and tests. We expect a mixed
altitude blind spots engagement windows for base defence cruise missiles, low-flying AWACS + HAPS posture (more AWACS sorties in the short term,
and littoral assets strike aircraft operational HAPS deployments in the mid term) to reduce radar-
horizon seams.
India will lean on a mixed approach: deploy QRSAM and Akash
Prime for medium-tier mobile coverage while accelerating
Reduced multi-target track capacity,
Multi-target saturation, EW AESA/VHF radar deployments — systems named in the roadmap
PESA legacy & limited poorer ECCM performance and
contest, stealth/low-RCS include Surya (VHF) and upgraded Swordfish / Super-Swordfish
AESA penetration diminished ability to sustain tracking in
probe attacks long-range trackers; legacy radars will be progressively upgraded
contested EW environments
with AESA (and VHF/AESA) technologies to improve ECCM and
multi-target fidelity.
India is rolling out SBS-III / Space-Based Surveillance constellations
Compressed BMD reaction time, harder for surveillance; however, SBS-III is primarily an imaging/surveillance
Ballistic missile salvos,
Lack of space-based IR discrimination of warheads/decoys, programme — India needs and is expected to pursue a dedicated IR
hypersonic boost-phase
boost-phase detection reduced time to cue interceptors in a early-warning path (SBIRS-like / hosted IR payloads → GEO/HEO IR
launches
ballistic/hypersonic salvo nodes) to provide boost-phase warning and to be operationalised by
2030–2035.
India is moving to expand very-long-range coverage —
Low-flying ISR/attack procurement/negotiations for Russian Voronezh / Container-S type
Late maritime warning, vulnerability to
Limited OTHR coverage for aircraft, sea-skimming over-the-horizon radars have been reported, and DRDO’s Super
littoral salvos and low-flying maritime
maritime approaches missiles, small unmanned Swordfish / Swordfish upgrades will also contribute to long-range
threats
surface/air threats tracking and littoral surveillance; these acquisitions plus HAPS/MPA
fusion are expected to form the maritime OTHR backbone by 2035.
India has already demonstrated and is accelerating DEW
Loitering munitions, development (Mk-II(A) laser tests, ongoing HPM/laser programmes).
Attrition of expensive interceptors,
Swarm drones and cheap coordinated small-UAV We expect trials to transition to operational DEW integration
crippling of logistics/hubs and port
saturation attacks swarms, expendable (lasers/HPM) for high-throughput base and port defence,
facilities if left unchecked
kamikaze drones complementing radar/EO C-UAS sensors by 2030 and expanding to
wider coverage toward 2035.
India is upgrading long-range trackers (Super Swordfish / LRTR
Extremely short reaction times, limited Hypersonic glide vehicles, family) and investing in sensors to improve tracking of very-fast
Hypersonic / very high-
midcourse discrimination, need for rapid boost-phase ballistic threats; these upgrades, combined with space/HAPS sensing and
speed threats
novel intercept approaches missiles future fast-response interceptors, are required to address hypersonic
challenges by 2035.
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Current systems and coverage

S-400 Triumf
The Russian-made S-400 Triumf long-range SAM system is now the backbone of
India’s air defence. It can track up to 300 targets and simultaneously engage 36.
Under the 2018 contract (US$5.43bn), India ordered five regiments; as of 2025
three have been delivered. The first two regiments were deployed to Adampur and
Halwara (Punjab) by 2021, and a third regiment to the Siliguri ‘Chicken’s Neck’
(West Bengal) by mid-2024. These cover India’s western front (Pakistan) and the
northeastern flank (China). The remaining two regiments are expected by 2026F
(likely to be based in Rajasthan and Arunachal/Sikkim) to guard the western
desert and eastern borders.
Figure 18: Current deployment of S-400

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 19: S-400 missile details

Parameter 9M96E (short) 9M96E2 (medium) 48N6 (long) 40N6 (very-long)
Maximum range ~40 km ~120 km ~200–250 km ~380–400 km
Maximum altitude ~20 km ~30 km ~27 km ~30 km
~420 kg (in canister / launch ~1,893 kg (launch weight);
Missile / launch (weight) ~333 kg (in canister / launch weight) ~1,800–1,835 kg (launch weight)
weight) container ~2,600 kg
Warhead weight ~24 kg (blast/fragmentation) ~24 kg (blast/fragmentation) ~143–180 kg ~150 kg
Inertial + active radar seeker (active Inertial + active radar seeker Inertial + semi-active / track-via-
Guidance Semi-active / active radar homing
homing) (active homing) missile (radar guidance)
Maximum speed ~Mach 2.5–3.0 ~Mach 2.9–3.5 ~Mach 4–6 ~Mach 4–9+
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Missile types
9M96E (short-range interceptor)
The 9M96E is the S-400’s short-range, high-manoeuvrability interceptor designed
to fill the inner layer of the system’s defensive bubble: it defends against aircraft,
cruise missiles and precision guided threats at short ranges while enabling the
larger missiles to focus on high-value or longer-range targets. Around 40km
range, intercept altitudes up to ~20km, a launch (in-canister) mass of the order
of ~330–350kg, and a ~24kg fragmentation warhead; it employs inertial mid-
course guidance with an active radar seeker for terminal homing. These missiles
are small enough to be quad-packed in one TEL canister (a single S-400 TEL
with four containers can thus carry many 9M96 rounds), giving commanders high
salvo density against saturation attacks and excellent capability against
manoeuvring, low-observable threats.
9M96E2 (extended/medium-range 9M96 family)
The 9M96E2 is essentially the middle child of the 9M96 family: larger and longer
reaching than the baseline 9M96E but still far smaller than the classic 48N6 family.
Around 120km range with intercept altitudes up to ~30km, a mass in the ~420
kg range and the same compact ~24kg warhead and active-seeker terminal
guidance. Its purpose is to bridge the gap between short-range, high-density
interceptors and the heavy long-range missiles, allowing an S-400 battery to
engage a wider ladder of targets economically and to handle medium-range cruise
and stand-off threats without expending the larger long-range missiles. The
9M96E2 therefore adds tactical flexibility, commanders can use it for medium-to-
long escort engagements while retaining large missiles for strategic or very long-
range threats.
48N6 family (long-range workhorse)
The 48N6 family (48N6E / 48N6E2 / 48N6DM etc.) are the S-400’s long-range
interceptors and the evolutionary heirs of the S-300 line. Engagement ranges
are typically between ~150km and ~250km, with a launch weight of around
~1,800–1,840kg and warheads commonly in the ~145–180kg range; guidance is
inertial with semi-active or track-via-missile radar homing in the terminal phase.
The 48N6 missiles are large, single-piece rounds carried one per TEL canister
(four containers per TEL), and they are optimized to engage high-value aerial
targets (AWACS, tanker aircraft), stand-off weapons and even some classes of
ballistic threats at their flight envelope limits. Because of their mix of reach and
destructive power, the 48N6s form the S-400’s principal workhorse for area denial
against conventional air operations.
40N6 (very-long-range, strategic interceptor)
The 40N6 is the S-400’s strategic, very-long-range interceptor intended to push
the system’s engagement bubble out into hundreds of kilometres, around ~380–
400km, and to engage high-altitude or stand-off platforms well before they reach
critical assets. Launch weight figures put the 40N6 around ~1,893kg (container
mass higher), with a large fragmentation warhead in the ~150kg neighbourhood
and interception altitudes to roughly ~30km; guidance is using mid-course
updates from the system combined with an active/semi-active terminal seeker.
Because of its size, loadout and mission, the 40N6 is not used for salvo-heavy
inner-defence work but rather to extend the engagement envelope countering
high-value adversary platforms and contributing to strategic area denial.
Figure 20: System-level details
System Level Details
Parameter Value
Regiments ordered 5
Active regiments 3
Batteries per regiment 4 (2 battalions×2)
Launchers per battery 8
Canisters per launcher 4
Ready missiles per battery 32 (8×4)
Ready missiles per regiment 128
Total ready missiles (3 reg) 384
Reserve missiles (assumed 2×) 768
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Figure 21: Expected deployment of pending regiments, S400s

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 22: S-400’s working

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, AFP, DAWN

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BARAK-8 MRSAM
India’s BARAK-8 (MRSAM/LRSAM) is a jointly developed Indo-Israeli
medium/long-range surface-to-air missile system. It provides 360° all-weather air-
defence against aircraft, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), anti-ship
and cruise missiles, and ballistic missile threats.
The missile was co-developed by India’s Defence Research and Development
Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) beginning in 2006,
with production by Bharat Dynamics (BDL) in India and Rafael/IAI in Israel.
India has fielded BARAK-8 in naval (LR-SAM) and land (MR-SAM) variants: the
Indian Navy’s Project 15A/15B destroyers and the INS Vikrant carry the long-
range version, while the Indian Air Force and Army have inducted the land-based
MRSAM to protect key bases and border regions.
Figure 23: Current (expected) deployment of BARAK-8

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Missile types
BARAK-8 (MR-SAM/LR-SAM)
The BARAK-8 is a two-stage, solid-fuelled medium/long-range SAM designed for
both shipborne and land-based defence. Its development began with a 2006 Indo-
Israeli agreement (about US$330m) to co-create a next-generation SAM. The
naval version (also called LR-SAM) was first tested in 2015 and entered service
around 2016, replacing the older BARAK-1 on Indian warships. The land variant
(MR-SAM), jointly produced by DRDO and IAI with support from Indian industry,
was test-fired in 2016 and inducted by the IAF/Army from 2021.
BARAK-8’s operational role is to provide point and area air defence of critical
assets. It defends airbases, cities, and naval task forces by intercepting hostile
aircraft, UAVs, anti-ship and cruise missiles, and even short-range ballistic
missiles. The missile’s design features, including an active radar-homing seeker
with thrust-vector control, a two-way datalink for mid-course guidance, and vertical
launch capability for 360° coverage, give it high agility (≈30g) and quick reaction
against saturated attacks. In tests, BARAK-8 interceptors have successfully

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engaged multiple high-speed targets in succession, demonstrating multi-target

engagement under demanding scenarios.
BARAK-8ER (Extended Range)
The BARAK-8ER is an extended-range variant under development to supplement
the standard BARAK-8. In this design, a larger booster stage increases the
missile’s engagement envelope to about 150km (compared to 70–100km for the
base missile). The ER missile is lengthened (launch length ~6m vs. 4.5m normally)
and may incorporate a dual-pulse motor for added speed/endurance in mid-
course. The mid- and terminal-phase guidance remains an active radar seeker
with two-way datalink, as in the original variant.
BARAK-8ER’s operational role will be to engage distant or high-altitude threats
beyond the base missile’s reach. It is intended to knock down incoming targets
well beyond the visual range, for example, supersonic cruise missiles or longer-
range aircraft approaching from afar, thus adding another layer beneath very-long-
range systems like the S-400. The ER variant will automatically engage multiple
beyond visual range threats, reflecting an emphasis on saturation and massed
attack scenarios.
As of 2025, Barak-8ER remains in testing/development; once fielded, it should
enable India to counter aerial threats up to ~150km. This extended reach would
significantly enhance airspace denial, covering gaps between BARAK-8’s ~100km
range and the ~400km range of high-end S-400 batteries.
Figure 24: BARAK missile details
Parameter Barak-8 (MR/LR-SAM) Barak-8ER (Extended Range)
Maximum Range 100 km 150 km
Max. Altitude 16 km (operational) 30 km (estimated)
Speed ~Mach 2 (≈2,400 km/h) ~Mach 2+ (estimated)
Missile Weight 275 kg (body only, incl. 60 kg warhead) ≈300 kg (incl. booster, est.)
Warhead 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation 60 kg high-explosive fragmentation
Inertial navigation + 2-way data link (mid-course);
Guidance Same guidance (INS + datalink; ARH)
active radar homing (terminal)
Launch Platform Vertical launch (ship VLS or mobile land launcher) Same as Barak-8
Missiles per
8 (standard vertical launcher cell count) 8 (same launcher capacity)
Launcher
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Akash missile
The Akash family of missiles was developed by DRDO under the Integrated
Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) and inducted into service in
2015. It is an indigenously designed medium-range SAM with a solid-fuel booster
and ramjet sustainer.
The missile flies at about Mach 2.5, reaches altitudes near 18–20km, and carries
a ~60kg high-explosive pre-fragmented warhead. Launch units can use either
tracked (T-72 or BMP-2 chassis) or wheeled heavy trucks. Guidance is via radar
command in mid-course and terminal active homing; the Mk-1S variant adds an
indigenous seeker for higher kill probability.
An Akash battery consists of a 3D phased-array Rajendra radar and four
launchers (3 missiles each) interlinked, giving each battery 12 ready missiles with
up to four simultaneous intercepts (two missiles per target) and a single-shot kill
probability around 88%.
Akash’s role is area air defence of critical assets. It is a multi-target, all-weather
SAM intended to neutralize fighter jets, helicopters, drones and cruise missiles.
Two batteries (eight launchers) form an IAF squadron, and up to four batteries
form an army regiment, coordinated by command centres. The Rajendra radar
can automatically track dozens of threats (up to 64) and cue the launchers for
quick engagement. Because the system is fully mobile (road/rail/air deployable)
and uses indigenously produced components, Akash units can be rapidly
redeployed to meet evolving threats. Akash batteries are deployed around key air
bases, borders, and sensitive regions to provide a medium-range air-defence
umbrella. With local production saving import costs, Akash bolsters India’s self-
reliant layered defence against aerial threats.

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Figure 25: Current (expected) deployment of Akash

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 26: Akash missile details

Specification Value
Range (engagement) 30km
Max altitude 20km
Missile weight 720kg
Warhead 60kg
Mid-course: command guidance / datalink. Terminal: indigenous active RF seeker
Guidance
(hybrid)
Launch platform Tracked (T-72, BMP-2 chassis) or wheeled (Tata LPTA 8×8 truck)
Missiles per launcher 3
Simultaneous
Engage ~4 targets with 8 missiles simultaneously; track up to 64 targets
engagements
Surveillance radar range 180Km
Fire-control radar range 80Km
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

SPYDER (surface-to-air PYthon and Derby)

India acquired 18 SPYDER-SR batteries (six launchers each) under a 2008
contract. SPYDER units are deployed to protect key air bases and border sectors.
For example, SPYDER-SR launchers have been fielded at northern airbases like
Pathankot (Punjab) and Hashimara (West Bengal) as a part of a multi-tier air
defence layer. In addition, SPYDER is being positioned along India’s western
frontiers facing Pakistan.

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Figure 27: Current (expected) deployment of SPYDER

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

SPYDER-SR
SPYDER-SR (Short Range) was jointly developed by Rafael and IAI in the early
2000s as a quick-reaction, low-altitude air defence missile system. It completed
flight tests in 2005 and was aimed at countering threats like fighters, helicopters,
UAVs and cruise missiles. India procured SPYDER-SR starting in 2008.
In operation, SPYDER-SR provides point and area defence of air bases and
high-value targets. Its battery C2 and radar (EL/M-2106 ATAR) can detect low-
flying threats and cue Python-5 IR missiles or Derby radar missiles to intercept.
Key design features include slant-launch cans for 360° coverage (no vehicle turn
needed), ‘lock-on-after-launch’ capability, and an all-weather C2. Using the same
Python/Derby missiles as fighter jets maximizes commonality. India deployed
SPYDER-SR to fill a gap below higher-tier systems - it can engage targets from
20m up to ~9km altitude and ~15km out, ideal for defending against low-level
incursions or cruise missiles. Its mobility and quick reaction time let it cover
advancing or dispersed forces.

SPYDER-MR
SPYDER-MR (Medium Range) is a longer-leg variant with booster-equipped
missiles. Introduced later than SR, the MR extends SPYDER’s engagement
envelope – roughly 35–50km range and up to ~20km altitude. This is achieved by
adding a booster to the same Python-5 and Derby air-to-air missiles.
Operationally, SPYDER-MR provides area defence coverage beyond SR’s reach.
Though India has so far fielded only SR units, the IAF has planned MR batteries
to shield large airfields and border areas from stand-off threats. The MR’s EL/M-
2084 MMR radar enables wide-area surveillance and multiple target engagement,
making it suitable for protecting critical assets. Like SR, SPYDER-MR is mounted
on Tata truck launchers (eight-missile cells).

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Figure 28: SPYDER missile details

Parameter SPYDER-SR (short-range) SPYDER-MR (medium-range)
Python-5 (infrared-guided) and Derby Python-5 (with booster) and I-Derby ER (active-
Missiles Used
(radar-guided) radar)
Maximum Range ~15 km ~35 km (up to ~50 km in practice)
Maximum
~9 km ~16 km (up to ~20 km)
Altitude
Maximum Speed Mach ~4 (for both Python-5 and Derby) Mach ~4 (same missiles with boosters)
Same missiles (≈105 kg and 118 kg respectively)
Missile Weight Python-5: 105 kg; Derby: 118 kg
with booster
Warhead Weight Python-5: 11 kg; Derby: 23 kg Same warheads (11 kg and 23 kg)
Python-5: dual-band IR/EO seeker; Derby: Same guidance (IR for Python-5, active radar for
Guidance
active radar Derby)
Tata Motors 4×4 truck (same family as SR
Launch Platform Tata Motors 4×4 high-mobility truck
launchers)
Missiles per
4 (on a swiveling inclined launcher) 8 (on an 8-cell launcher vehicle)
Launcher
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Ballistic missile defence AAD/PAD

India’s two-tier BMD Phase-I uses the Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) interceptor to
engage incoming missiles exo-atmospherically (above ~50km) and the
Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor for endo-atmospheric (low-altitude)
engagements. Targets are detected by long-range radars and satellites; the
Mission Control Centre (MCC) classifies threats and assigns them to launch
batteries. Launch Control Centres (LCCs) at each battery compute firing solutions
and prepare the missile for launch. Multiple PAD or AAD missiles can be fired per
target to improve kill probability. After launch, the interceptor receives mid-course
updates via data link and then uses its onboard radar seeker for the final intercept.
Each PAD/AAD interceptor is built by Bharat Dynamics (BDL) as per DRDO
design. The PAD’s two-stage design gives long reach (able to engage
MRBMs/IRBMs), while the AAD is a single-stage solid rocket optimized for high
agility at lower altitude. Both use inertial navigation with frequent updates from
ground radars (e.g. Swordfish LRTR) and carry active radar seekers for terminal
homing.
Figure 29: Current (expected) deployment of AAD/PAD

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Radar and fire-control configuration

Target detection and tracking rely on dedicated BMD radars. The Swordfish
LRTR (Long Range Tracking Radar) is an L-band AESA radar that currently
detects and tracks ballistic missiles out to ~600–800km (future upgrades target
≈1,500km). It can spot very small objects at these ranges. A complementary 3D
Multi-Function Control Radar (MFCR), developed with French support, provides
fire-control for the endo-atmospheric AAD intercepts. The MFCR is an active
phased array that can track multiple targets and guide AAD missiles, and it also
has a role against aircraft up to ~30km altitude.
All sensor data (from Swordfish, MFCR, coastal surveillance radars and even
satellites) is fed into the MCC. The MCC (a software-intensive command node)
fuses the data, classifies targets, computes engagement solutions, and assigns
threats to specific launch batteries. Each launch battery’s LCC then receives the
target cue and computes the precise intercept timing, preparing its missiles for
launch. After launch, the MCC/LCC network maintains datalinks to update the
interceptor, which activates its onboard radar seeker for the final homing and
impact.

Deployment and unit organization

Phase-I BMD has been deployed around India’s strategic centres. Delhi (NCR)
and Mumbai were the initial coverage areas. We expect expansion to southern
hubs, notably Bengaluru (Karnataka), Chennai (Tamil Nadu) and Hyderabad
(Telangana) by setting up BMD sites that can reach these cities with their long-
range radars and interceptors. (We assume five BMD regiments are covering
Delhi, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana, and Tamil Nadu.)
In the field, a PAD/AAD regiment or battery comprises multiple mobile launchers
and support vehicles. Each AAD launcher (AAD Mobile Launcher System) is an
all-terrain 12×12 truck carrying six canistered AAD missiles and its own Launch
Control System.
PAD launchers similarly are heavy TEL trucks (8×8 chassis) with canisterized
PAD interceptors. A typical battery will include several such launchers (each with
4–6 missiles), plus a Missile Control Centre and associated
generators/communications. A Swordfish radar unit and an MFCR fire-control
radar are co-located or networked with the battery. All elements are joined by a
secure datalink network and a central Mission Control Centre on a nearby
command post.
Figure 30: PAD/AAD missile details
AAD (Advanced Air Defence,
Parameter PAD (Prithvi Air Defence)
“Ashwin”)
Layer
Exo-atmospheric (50–80 km) Endo-atmospheric (≤30–40 km)
(interception)
Target class Shorter-range ballistic (~150–200 km
MRBMs/IRBMs (~300–2000 km range)
(range) range)
Max interception
≈80 km ≈30–40 km
altitude
Speed ~Mach 5 (hypersonic) ~Mach 4–4.5
Propulsion Two-stage: solid first stage + liquid second stage Single-stage solid rocket
INS with LRTR mid-course updates; terminal INS + ground updates; terminal active
Guidance
active radar homing radar seeker
Warhead 40 kg pre-fragmentation warhead, proximity-fuzed 80 kg (kinetic “hit-to-kill” vehicle)
Mobile launcher on 12×12 truck with 6
Launcher Mobile TEL on 8×8 truck (BEML-Tatra)
canisters
Deployed
~75 (Phase-I stockpile) ~75 (Phase-I stockpile)
interceptors
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Planned/recommended air defence systems

QRSAM
QRSAM is an indigenously developed, highly mobile short-range surface-to-air
missile system built by DRDO/BEL/BDL to protect moving mechanised forces and
forward formations against aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and precision munitions.
Recent Defence Acquisition Council/Ministry of Defence approvals have
authorised a procurement package at Rs360bn (coverage: 3 Army regiments + 3
IAF squadrons i.e., six units total). QRSAM is a canisterized, truck-mounted
launcher with six missiles per launcher, active RF seeker, two-way datalink and
dual radars for 360° coverage.
Figure 31: QRSAM system specifications
Parameter QRSAM
Role / layer Short-range, mobile point/area air defence
Range ~25–30 km (engagement)
Altitude (engage) Up to ≈6–10 km
Missile length / weight ≈4.36 m; ≈270 kg
Warhead Pre-fragmented / HMX-TNT style warhead
Propulsion / stages Single-stage solid rocket motor
Guidance Mid-course INS + two-way datalink; terminal active radar seeker (Ku/X-band monopulse seeker). Optical/laser proximity fuze for endgame.
Launcher Mobile TEL (8×8 truck) with 6 canisterised missiles per launcher; designed for Search-on-Move / Track-on-Move / Fire-on-Move.
Radar / sensors Battery Surveillance Radar (360° active array) + Battery Multi-Function Radar (tracking/fire-control); fully automated C2 & datalinked architecture.
Mobility & survivability Designed for on-the-move operation with all-terrain trucks; ECCM features to resist jamming.
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 32: Phase-1 expected deployment of six regiments (Rs360bn)

Service City (State/UT)
1 Army Ambala (Haryana)
2 Army Jaisalmer (Rajasthan)
3 Army Leh (Ladakh, UT)
4 IAF Ambala (Haryana) — IAF Station Ambala
5 IAF Jodhpur (Rajasthan) — IAF Station Jodhpur
6 IAF Tezpur (Assam) — IAF Station Tezpur
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 33: Phase-2 expected deployment of eight regiments (Rs480bn)

City (State) Primary co-located asset / corps
1 Srinagar (J&K) Srinagar AFB / Northern valley logistics
2 Barmer (Rajasthan) Forward desert forces (Barmer/Phalodi axis)
3 Bhuj (Kutch, Gujarat) Kutch mechanised formations / western naval approaches
4 Jalandhar / Amritsar (Punjab) 2nd western Army concentration / Punjab corps nodes
5 Siliguri (West Bengal) Siliguri Corridor / Bagdogra AFB
6 Guwahati / Tezpur (Assam) NE corps staging / Tezpur & Guwahati airbases
7 Bareilly / Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh) Central mobile reserve / lines of communication
8 Udhampur (Jammu & Kashmir) Jammu front / forward logistics toward Ladakh
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

The QRSAM missile is a single-stage solid-propellant interceptor (≈4.36 m / ≈270

kg) with a 25–30km effective range and terminal active RF seeker (Ku/X band)
plus an optical proximity fuze. Each launcher is a truck-mounted TEL carrying six
canisterized missiles and working with Battery Surveillance and Multi-Function
radars to provide 360° detect-track-engage capability. The weapon is optimized
for ‘search-on-move / track-on-move / fire-on-move’ operations, enabling mobile
units to retain layered air defence while on the march.
Figure 34: Financial model (expected investment by 2035F)
Financial Model
Total QRSAM regiment order 84000
Total Regiments 14
Battries per regiment 3
Launchers per battery 4
Canisters per launcher 6
Missles ready for engangement per battery 24
Missles ready for engangement per regiment 72
Total actove deploymenet missiles 1008
Reserve missles (Assumed 2x ) 2016
Per missile cost (Assumed similar to Akash 25mn) 50.4bn
Lifecycle/Maintenance cost (Assumed 20% of the overall cost) 178bn
Total Project Cost 1.07tn
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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KUSHA
Project KUSHA is India’s indigenous, long-range, layered air defence program
developed by DRDO. Approved in 2022 with an outlay of ~Rs217bn, it aims to
field mobile missiles and radars capable of intercepting stealth fighters, cruise
missiles, drones and even ballistic targets well beyond current systems.
KUSHA is intended to complement existing systems (Akash, BARAK‑8, S-400)
and bridge the gap to India’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) missiles.
It features three interceptor variants (M1, M2, M3) with ranges roughly 150km,
250km, and 350 – 400km, respectively (Phase II may extend the range beyond
600km).
KUSHA’s development is largely indigenous, fitting India’s Make-in-India defence
goals. It is envisioned as a mobile, area‑defence shield for vulnerable regions and
strategic and tactical assets across India.
By giving India a domestic long-range SAM, KUSHA aims to reduce the reliance
on imports and address both Pakistani and Chinese threats.

Radar and sensor systems

KUSHA’s long range requires advanced radars. In addition to integrating existing
sensors, DRDO is developing a new S-band long-range radar (Long Range Battle
Management Radar or LRBMR) and high-frequency fire-control radars. The
LRBMR will be a powerful S-band AESA radar with 500+ km detection range.
Early-warning and multi-domain surveillance will be provided by such radars
(scanning ~500–600 km). Fire-control will use high-resolution X-band AESA
radars (for example, shipborne LRSAM fire-control radars scaled up for land use),
tracking targets in the 300–600km engagement zone
Figure 35: Financial model (expected investment by 2035F)
Financial Model
Total Kusha regiment order 8
Total Regiments 8
Battries per regiment 2
Launchers per battery 4
Canisters per launcher 4
Missles ready for engangement per battery 16
Missles ready for engangement per regiment 32
Total actove deploymenet missiles 256
Reserve missles (Assumed 2x ) 512
Per missile cost (Assumed costlier to Akash 25m/Assumed 35m) 17.9bn
Lifecycle/Maintenance cost (Assumed 20% of the overall cost) 3.58bn
Total Project Cost 661.5bn
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Figure 36: Expected KUSHA regiment placement

# State / UT Suggested Location (base / district)
1 Ladakh (UT) Leh sector (near Leh / DBO approach)
2 Jammu & Kashmir (UT) Srinagar / Awantipora axis
3 Punjab / Haryana Ambala / Jalandhar / Patiala belt
4 Rajasthan Barmer / Jaisalmer sector
5 Gujarat Kutch / Bhuj region
6 West Bengal Siliguri / North Bengal (Siliguri Corridor)
7 Maharashtra Mumbai / Pune region (Borivali or Khadakwasla area)
8 Andaman & Nicobar Islands (UT) Port Blair / Car Nicobar
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Figure 37: Expected deployment of KUSHA

SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

Akash Prime
Akash Prime is an advanced, indigenously upgraded medium-range mobile SAM
developed by DRDO. It builds on India’s Akash missile family with enhancements
for high-altitude precision. The system is designed for deployment on both tracked
(Army) and wheeled (Air Force) launchers and integrates with India’s radar
network.
Akash Prime incorporates several upgrades over the legacy Akash Mk-I/1S
systems. Importantly, it adds an indigenous active RF seeker (versus the older
semi-active or Mk-IS seeker). This enables the missile to emit RF beams and
home in autonomously on fast targets during the terminal phase, greatly improving
kill probability under countermeasures. Other enhancements address high-
altitude performance, and the Prime variant is customized for reliable operation
above 4,500m in thin air and cold climates.
Despite these upgrades, the engagement envelope (range ~30km, ceiling ~20
km) and 60kg warhead remain similar to the earlier Akash Mk-I/1S. The radars
(Rajendra and BSR) and launchers are essentially of the same design, and so
Prime retains the multi-target engagement and networked C2 features of its
predecessor. Akash Prime delivers key qualitative improvements (active seeker,
altitudes, ECCM) without changing the basic performance parameters.
Figure 38: Technical Specifications of Akash Prime
Specification Value
Range (engagement) 30km
Max altitude 20km
Missile weight 720kg
Warhead 60kg
Mid-course: command guidance / datalink. Terminal: indigenous active RF seeker
Guidance
(hybrid)
Launch platform Mobile launcher (army: tracked/T-72/BMP derivatives; air force: wheeled 8×8 trucks)
Missiles per launcher 3
Simultaneous
Engage ~4 targets with 8 missiles simultaneously; track up to 64 targets
engagements
Surveillance radar range 80Km
Fire-control radar range 60Km
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

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Akash Prime plays a critical mid-tier role in India’s multi-layered air defence
network. It bridges the gap between short-range point defences (e.g. guns,
MANPADS, CIWS) and long-range strategic systems (e.g. S-400 SAMP/T, fighter
interceptors). Integrated into the Integrated Air Command & Control System
(IACCS), Akash batteries work in concert with other sensors and shooters. For
example, Rajendra radars cue the Akash missiles upon target data from long-
range 3D radars, and all units link to the IACCS ground picture.
Because each Rajendra can guide eight missiles against four targets at once, an
Akash battery can intercept salvoes of enemy jets or UAV swarms in real-time.
This capability was demonstrated in recent trials and exercises. For instance,
Akash Prime batteries scored direct hits on two fast-moving targets at 15,000 feet
(4,500 m) in Ladakh. The system has also been fielded during Operation Sindoor,
where it helped counter Pakistani drones and Chinese-origin aircraft under a multi-
layered response. Akash Prime’s networked radars and multi-engagement
missiles significantly bolster India’s defensive curtain over high-altitude and
frontier airspace.
Figure 39: Financial model of Akash Prime (Rs)
Financial Model
Total Akash regiment order 2
Total Regiments 2
Battries per regiment 4
Launchers per battery 4
Canisters per launcher 3
Missles ready for engangement per battery 12
Missles ready for engangement per regiment 48
Total actove deploymenet missiles 96
Reserve missles (Assumed 2x ) 192
Per missile cost (Assumed similar to Akash 25mn) 4.8bn
Lifecycle/Maintenance cost (Assumed 20% of the overall cost) 0.96bn
Total Project Cost 87.36bn
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH

SBS 3
India’s SBS-3 (Space-Based Surveillance Phase-III) program will field a 52-
satellite constellation by 2029 to give India round-the-clock military surveillance.
In Oct 2023, the Union Cabinet cleared SBS-3 at a budget of Rs269.68bn.
Under this plan, 21 satellites will be built by ISRO (in collaboration with France)
and 31 by Indian private companies. The first launch is expected by Apr 2026F,
with the full constellation deployed by end-2029F.
All satellites will operate in low earth orbit (LEO) (with some in geostationary orbit
for wide-area coverage) and be equipped for optical and radar imaging. They will
carry advanced sensors with AI-enabled inter-satellite networking to rapidly share
data. Collectively, SBS-3 will provide much higher revisit rates and image
resolution than earlier spy sats, enabling persistent monitoring of border areas,
adversary bases, and critical maritime zones.

Existing defence satellites

India’s space-based military surveillance dates to the early 2000s. SBS Phase-I
(2001–2002) launched four satellites (Cartosat-2A, Cartosat-2B, Israel’s EROS-B
and RISAT-2) for all-weather border monitoring. These delivered ~1 m resolution
imagery that proved useful in the 2001–02 India-Pakistan standoff. SBS Phase-II
(approved 2013) added six more satellites (Cartosat-2C/D, Cartosat-3A/B,
Microsat-TD, RISAT-2A) to increase imaging frequency and capability. Alongside
SBS sats, India also operates dedicated defence spacecraft: e.g. GSAT-7 (2013)
for naval communications with a 2,000 nm Indian Ocean footprint, and GSAT-7A
(2018) for air force networked communications. The navy also uses a
hyperspectral observatory HySIS (launched 2018) for oceanic surveillance, and
the DRDO-developed EMISAT (2019) for electronic intelligence. New military
commsats like GSAT-7B (Army) and GSAT-7R (Navy) are in development (GSAT-
7B’s 5‑tonne multi-band satellite was contracted in 2023 for Rs29.63bn). These
existing systems form the backbone of India’s space assets; SBS-3 will add a
much larger imaging and reconnaissance layer atop this.

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SBS-3 constellation details

Phase-III represents a step-change in capability. The 52 satellites will include both
optical and radar sensors, with some geostationary nodes for instant broadband
relay. The constellation will support multiple functions, high-resolution imaging,
electronic/communications intelligence, and maritime reconnaissance. For
example, part of the constellation is explicitly for SATCOM links to long-range
drones (e.g. MQ-9B UAVs) and naval assets. All satellites will feature modern
processors and onboard AI to autonomously detect targets and route
imagery/data to operators.
India will co-develop 21 satellites with French partners under a defence
cooperation pact, while Indian private players will supply the remaining 31. This
public–private model is unprecedented for Indian defence space, marking “nearly
half” of the constellation being built by industry.

Strategic and military relevance

SBS-3 is explicitly aimed at shrinking India’s decision loop and gaining an edge in
modern warfare. India must detect, identify and track potential threats when they
are still in their staging areas, airfields and bases deep within an adversary’s
territory.
By covering much larger areas of China, Pakistan and the Indian Ocean with
superior resolution and much shorter gaps between revisits, the SBS-3
constellation will enable precisely that. It underpins a new military space doctrine
that emphasizes persistent ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) from
space. In a recent conflict ,Operation Sindoor, the armed forces relied heavily on
Cartosat optical and foreign commercial satellites to guide strikes, SBS-3 will
provide a dedicated Indian capability for such missions, improving the observe-
orient-decide-act cycle.

AWACS Systems
Airborne Warning & Control Systems (AWACS) give the IAF a critical over-the-
horizon view that ground radars lack. Flying at high altitude, AWACS radar can
look down to spot low-flying aircraft, missiles or stealthy targets hidden by terrain
or curvature of the Earth. They act as airborne command centres, tracking
hundreds of targets and coordinating fighters and SAMs in real time.
AWACS dramatically expand detection range and situational awareness beyond
what ground stations alone can cover. For example, studies note that at ~30,000 ft
an AWACS can monitor low-level activity up to ~500km, whereas fixed radars can
be blanked by mountains or the horizon. Likewise, modern AWACS with advanced
AESA/GaN radars can detect low-RCS (stealthy) aircraft at much greater
distances than legacy systems.
AWACS have proved force-multipliers: they can simultaneously track ~100 targets
and cue interceptors on half of them, greatly multiplying the effectiveness of the
same number of fighters.

Current IAF AWACS fleet and capabilities

As of 2025, India’s Air Force operates a very limited AWACS fleet, just six aircraft.
3 Israeli Phalcon AWACS: EL/W-2090 AESA radars mounted on Russian Ilyushin
IL-76 A-50EI heavy transports. These provide 360° coverage and roughly 400km
detection range. The three Phalcon jets were delivered between 2009–2011. They
serve as India’s primary AWACS but have aging airframes and heavy
maintenance needs (due to Russian components)
3 DRDO Netra Mk1 AEW&C: Indigenous AESA radars (two dorsal arrays) on
Brazilian Embraer ERJ-145 regional jets. These give ~240° coverage (no nose
array) and roughly 200–450km range (depending on target RCS). Netra Mk1
entered service around 2017–2019. These platforms (an ‘AEW&C’ system) were
built by DRDO/CABS in collaboration with Hindustan Aeronautics (HAL) and
provide tactical early warning. The Netra Mk1 fleet was used effectively in recent

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operations (Balakot 2019 and Operation Sindoor 2025) to fuse data and cue
fighters.

Planned AWACS inductions

Recognizing the shortfall, India has approved two major AEW&C programs to
build up the fleet under its Aatmanirbhar push. These add 12 new AWACS by the
early 2030s (plus proposals for even more):
Netra Mk1A (Embraer ERJ-145) – An upgraded AEW&C based on the existing
Embraer 145. Six more Embraer 145 airframes will be procured and retrofitted
with new GaN-based AESA radar and enhanced mission systems. This Rs90bn
project (DAC-cleared in 2025) will nearly triple the IAF’s ERJ-145 AWACS fleet.
Deliveries are expected within five years, giving 240° coverage with ~450km range
per aircraft.
Netra Mk2 (Airbus A321) – A larger AEW&C on six former Air India A321 airliners.
Approved by CCS in 2025 for ~Rs190bn, the Mk2 will carry a dorsal AESA radar
(GaN-based) plus a nose AESA for ~300°–360° coverage. This upgrade yields
longer endurance, maritime domain tracking, and ballistic missile detection. First
deliveries are planned around 2030–33.
(India had also proposed an AWACS-India (A330) project – 6 AESA-equipped
A330 platforms for full 360° coverage – but that has stalled. Initially 2 were cleared
for Rs51.13bn (2015) and six more estimated at Rs200bn, yet it remains
unfunded)
Figure 40: AWACS planned and their financials
Program / System Base Aircraft Units Cost (₹) Status
Netra Mk1A (DRDO AEW&C) Embraer ERJ-145 6 90bn DAC-cleared 2025
Netra Mk2 (DRDO AEW&C) Airbus A321 6 190bn CCS-approved 2025
AWACS-India (A330 AWACS) Airbus A330 6 200bn 2 cleared (2015), 6 planned; delayed
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Radar systems for BMD and stealth defence

India’s two-front threat demands a multi-layered radar network for ballistic missile
defence, from early warning to mid-course tracking and final discrimination and
stealth detecting VHF radars. Key systems include indigenous and procured
radars covering VHF to microwave bands.

Surya VHF radar (indigenous anti-stealth radar)

Surya is India’s indigenous very-high-frequency (VHF) three-dimensional
surveillance radar designed primarily to defeat low-observable targets and provide
broad early surveillance. Operating at metre wavelengths, Surya exploits long-
wave scattering characteristics that make it resilient against shaping and radar-
absorbent materials used in modern stealth designs; this allows it to detect and
track targets that would be much harder to see for higher-frequency radars. The
system is built on a mobile, truck-mounted active phased-array architecture and
can perform continuous 360° azimuth coverage with persistent staring modes
when required. In the ballistic missile defence (BMD) context Surya’s main value
is spectral diversity and horizon extension: while it is optimized for detecting
stealth fighters and cruise missiles, its VHF band is also capable of sensing large-
signature events such as a missile boost plume or a heavy re-entry body that may
be less visible at X- or Ku-band. This capability provides an additional,
independent cue for launch detection during the boost and early mid-course
phases and thus contributes to a layered, multi-spectral sensing strategy. Being
largely indigenous, Surya also brings operational flexibility — units can be re-
deployed to cover northern or western approaches in a two-front scenario — and
reduces single-vendor dependencies in India’s sensor mix. The program’s fielding
adds a complementary long-wavelength “wall” to India’s radar architecture and
helps close gaps that higher-frequency precision trackers can miss, especially
against stealthy and low-flying threats.

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Figure 41: Unit estimation

Parameter Value
Detection radius (Surya, VHF) 360 km (reported figure for RCS ~2 m²)
Radial diameter per radar (2×R) 720 km
Terrain adjustment factor (accounts for 0.83 (assumption → effective linear coverage = 720 ×
mountains/coverage losses) 0.83 = ~598 km)
0.80 (20% overlap between adjacent radars for seam-free
Planned adjacency overlap / redundancy factor
coverage)
Effective linear coverage per radar (used) ≈480 km (598 × 0.80 ≈ 480)
India–Pakistan linear border 3,320 km (rounded)
India–China LAC 3,488 km (rounded)
Existing Surya units (public / delivered) 6 units (contract for 6; 1st delivered)
Redundancy/depth multiplier for rear-area & maritime 1.50 (to provide depth, rear coverage, redundancy &
coverage coastal approaches)
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Figure 42: Financial estimation

Front / category Computed radars required
Pakistan front (linear spacing) 7
China front (linear spacing) 8
Linear total (both fronts) 15
With redundancy/depth (×1.5) 23
Already-delivered / contracted 6
Additional Surya radars expected to procure 17
Total Cost 7.5bn
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

Voronezh over-the-horizon (OTH) radar

The Voronezh family represents a strategic, over-the-horizon early-warning
capability based on long-wave sky-wave propagation through the ionosphere;
India’s discussions to acquire a Voronezh-class OTH radar therefore reflect a
decision to acquire very long-range launch detection and strategic warning depth.
By bouncing HF/VHF signals off the ionosphere, an OTH radar can detect missile
launches and large aerial activity thousands of kilometres beyond the line of sight
of ground radars, giving national command authorities minutes of additional
warning for distant launches. For BMD this means cueing of tracking radars and
interceptors well before the incoming threat reaches Indian airspace: Voronezh
can detect boost-phase signatures from strategic and theatre ballistic missiles far
from the coastlines or borders and provide continuous, wide-area surveillance for
mid-course tracking of high-altitude objects. The system’s technical trade-offs —
reliance on ionospheric conditions and lower spatial resolution than line-of-sight
AESA trackers — are balanced by its unrivalled range, which is precisely the
capability India needs to cover distant threat corridors, especially those from deep
inland launch sites. Operationally, having OTH coverage oriented toward both
western and eastern theatres would materially increase the reaction time available
to India’s BMD layers in a two-front conflict, permitting earlier handoff to long-
range trackers and space/air assets and improving interceptor cueing and
allocation decisions during massed or staged launches.
Figure 43: Technical details and cost estimation
Item Data / explanation
System name Voronezh
Strategic early warning: detect and track ballistic missiles, ICBMs/IRBMs, strategic
Primary role
aircraft, and space objects at very long ranges (boost/midcourse detection)
~8,000–10,000 km (vertical up to ~8,000 km; horizon ≈6,000 km for high-altitude
Range / horizon
targets) Capable of tracking hundreds of objects concurrently.
Large phased-array antenna(s), long-range search, object discrimination, space-
Typical functions included
tracking secondary function, fixed hardened site with substantial infrastructure.
Typical deployment Very large, fixed installation (“wall-like” antenna arrays); substantial land, power,
footprint infrastructure and protected compounds required.
Per unit cost 332bn
Total units estimated 2
Total estimated cost 664bn
SOURCE: INCRED RESEARCH, COMPANY REPORTS

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Super Swordfish long-range tracking radar (LRTR-II)

Super Swordfish is India’s high-performance long-range tracking radar developed
for mid-course surveillance and fire-control support within the BMD architecture.
As an L-band active electronically scanned array (AESA), Swordfish emphasizes
long-range detection, robust multitarget tracking, and the ability to support
discrimination and track continuity for multiple high-velocity objects. It functions as
the primary mid-course “workhorse” that transitions detection information from
strategic early-warning sensors into precise, trackable state vectors that fire-
control centres and interceptors can use. The radar’s extended range and AESA
beam agility enable it to follow objects through exo-atmospheric portions of
trajectories, maintain simultaneous tracks on numerous objects and potential
decoys, and provide the coarse-to-fine handoff to higher-frequency, high-
resolution fire-control radars closer to engagement points. In practical terms,
Super Swordfish increases the lead time available to the interceptor decision
cycle, refines predicted intercept windows, and improves the probability of
successful engagements in mid-course intercepts. Its resilience to jamming and
ability to operate continuously against dense target sets make it especially
valuable when facing advanced threats such as multiple independently targetable
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) or when simultaneous launches occur from two
directions in a two-front contingency.

Very long range tracking radar (VLRTR)

The Very Long Range Tracking Radar is intended to push India’s ground-based
tracking envelope still farther, providing deep mid-course and near-space
surveillance well beyond conventional long-range trackers. Designed around high-
power, GaN-based AESA technology, VLRTR aims to sustain high signal-to-noise
tracking on objects at very long ranges and to feed continuous, long-arc tracks for
strategic objects, including ballistic warheads during their mid-course phases and
space objects of interest. Where Super Swordfish provides theatre-level mid-
course tracking, VLRTR is conceived as the strategic tracking bedrock that
reduces dependence on single passes and provides longer dwell times on targets,
improving discrimination between actual warheads and decoys through extended
observation. Its ability to monitor objects at extreme ranges is particularly
important when addressing threats from deep launch sites or when multiple
engagements must be sequenced over long flight times. Integrating VLRTR data
with OTH and space-based sensors strengthens the overall track file, enabling the
mission control architecture to produce more reliable engagement solutions and
to prioritize interceptor allocation under stress.

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 Industrial Goods and Services │ India
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 Industrial Goods and Services │ India
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Recommendation Framework
Stock Ratings Definition:
Add The stock’s total return is expected to exceed 10% over the next 12 months.
Hold The stock’s total return is expected to be between 0% and positive 10% over the next 12 months.
Reduce The stock’s total return is expected to fall below 0% or more over the next 12 months.
The total expected return of a stock is defined as the sum of the: (i) percentage difference between the target price and the current price and (ii) the forward net
dividend yields of the stock. Stock price targets have an investment horizon of 12 months.

Sector Ratings Definition:

Overweight An Overweight rating means stocks in the sector have, on a market cap-weighted basis, a positive absolute recommendation.
Neutral A Neutral rating means stocks in the sector have, on a market cap-weighted basis, a neutral absolute recommendation.
Underweight An Underweight rating means stocks in the sector have, on a market cap-weighted basis, a negative absolute recommendation.

Country Ratings Definition:

Overweight An Overweight rating means investors should be positioned with an above-market weight in this country relative to benchmark.
Neutral A Neutral rating means investors should be positioned with a neutral weight in this country relative to benchmark.
Underweight An Underweight rating means investors should be positioned with a below-market weight in this country relative to benchmark.

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