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Discussions focused on by atty: (ang uban cases walay citation but cases ni gikan huhu)

Residual powers of the government (Marcos v. Manglapus):

●​ It cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and
which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The
powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article
on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. … Among
the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or her) oath of
office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to
bar the return of the Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the
present time and under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
In the absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with grave
abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not enjoin the
implementation of this decision.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency (forgot the case):

●​ The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of
the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus,
the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are
deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove
such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of
government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that
the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive; and that the multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief
Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been
adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be
expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.
Exceptions to the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency:
●​ There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and
if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches
of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that
demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested
power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the
executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
●​ Ex-officio capacity: But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be
extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its
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members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. Under
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance, the
Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members
of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come
from the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board
for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who
was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board. Such Cabinet members sat on the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not
because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was
the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. ... their actions being made
in their ex-officio capacities and not as alter egos of the president.

Political Questions:
●​ political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question
being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with
the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the
courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. When political questions are
involved, the 1987 Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the official whose action is being questioned.

Jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit:

●​ Extends even to private entities such as charitable organizations: “As can be gleaned
from the foregoing, the COA's audit jurisdiction generally covers public entities.
However, its authority to audit extends even to non-governmental entities insofar
as the latter receives financial aid from the government. Thus, it is clear that the
determination of COA's jurisdiction over a specific entity does not merely require
an examination of the nature of the entity. Should the entity be found to be
non-governmental, further determination must be had as to the source of its funds or
the nature of the account sought to be audited by the COA.”
●​ From upclass notes: Even if it were true the foundation is funded by international
organizations or foreign entities, these foreign grants became public funds the moment
they were donated to it thus, auditable by the audit commission. (can’t find the case)
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Abolishment of administrative agencies: (forgot the case)

●​ Since these administrative bodies are created by authority of the Constitution, the
congress cannot abolish these bodies by mere ordinary legislation. Such abolishment
can only be effected through a Constitutional amendment.
●​ Case of ombudsman (i forgot the title)
○​ First: creation by the Constitution (mandate of the Constitution), which means
that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions
and privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution
itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;
○​ Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed
from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions; hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the
political branches of government so as to impair said functions; and
○​ Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those
within the ranks of the office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
○​ Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of
the Ombudsman from political harassment and pressure, so as to free it
from the "insidious tentacles of politics."

Independence of the office of the Ombudsman (extent thereof):

●​ In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these 'independent'
bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of
'independence' would result in the impairment of their core functions... [T]he
independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the
framers to be independent from executive control or supervision or any form of political
influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not scarce on
how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.
●​ However, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis
to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power constitutionally vested unto the
courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and
apply even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman cannot be exempt from judicial
power. Consequently, where there is grave abuse of discretion, the courts/judiciary can
inquire into the validity of such.
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The Commission on Human Rights:

●​ NO AUTHORITY TO PROSECUTE, ISSUE INJUNCTIVE ORDERS ETC.:
○​ The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes
of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission
does not have.
●​ Can cite in contempt but very limited to:
○​ The CHR's contempt power is a tool to ensure that its investigations and inquiries are
conducted effectively and that its mandate is respected. This power however, is
limited only to violations of its procedural rules essential to its investigations.
●​ This is why it is considered a “toothless” tiger. While it may do all investigations it can, it
does not have the power to prosecute nor adjudicate a human rights case. At most, it
can help file a case in the proper courts.

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS: (i forgot to add the titles of the case, rushed na jud)
●​ On the failed creation of the CAR:
○​ The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region. The keywords provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
connote that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
"region" used in it's ordinary sense means two or more provinces. ... Congress never
intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we
would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials, a set of
provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and
legislative powers over exactly the same small-area.
●​ Bansangmoro not a state within a state.
○​ The Bangsamoro, although its territory is defined, is not a separate state. The
autonomy granted to the Bangsamoro government is limited to its internal
governance, preventing it from having sovereignty.... While administrative autonomy
devolved some powers to the region, these are also limited by national policies or
standards, for instance, the Local Government Code. Under Article X, Section 3 of the
Constitution, the structure of local governments and the allocation of powers,
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responsibilities, and resources among the different local government units and local
officials were placed in the hands of Congress. Thus, creating an autonomous region
does not equate to any separation from the Philippine state, nor having sovereignty
from the Republic. It can only be formed within the framework of the Constitution,
respecting the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines.

Creation of Administrative Agencies (Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission)

●​ Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. … In this regard, it must
be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is,
a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection
clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label
the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Doctrine of Necessary Implication and Inferences:

●​ No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. … to fill in the gap
is the doctrine of necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a
statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges
or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. And every
statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power,
right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the lesser.

Tests to validate the delegation of legislative powers:

●​ There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
●​ Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have
to do is enforce it.
●​ Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation
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from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative
authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative.
●​ What if the law is not sufficient?
○​ If the law itself doesn't clearly provide a sufficient standard, courts do not
automatically declare the delegation invalid. Instead, they may look
backward—examining the law's intent, purpose, or even related laws—to
try and identify an implied or underlying standard. … to avoid encroaching
on the powers of the legislature, since allowing agencies to act without clear
legislative guidance could effectively give them law-making power, which would
be unconstitutional.

Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies as opposed to doctrine of primary

jurisdiction: (GMA case tapos gacite case ni Lacap)
●​ Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of
all administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The
administrative officer concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the
matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing to exhaust administrative remedies affects
the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a precedent condition which must
be complied with prior to filing a case in court. However, “failure to observe the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction
of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions. The only
effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a
cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can then take cognizance of
the case and try it.”
●​ Meanwhile, “corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.” Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the
competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived.
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Administrative process: Right to notice of hearing (when it may be dispensed with - Due
process; case is about a banking institution being put under receivership without notice of
hearing):
●​ Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. The doctrine is founded
on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s
assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be
taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies
lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national
economy.

Implied Powers of Administrative Agencies (LLDA Case - Laguna lake preservation):

●​ While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency
has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers.
In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter, as a regulatory and
quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the
authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency

Legislative Veto (not allowed; violates separation of powers):

●​ a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

Administrative Relationship (president’s power of control v. power of supervision):

●​ Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As
such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest
they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or
reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people.
Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision
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only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any
authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law.
●​ Another case: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not
control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that
LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue
advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent
them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals.
He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the
withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be
directed by administrative fiat.

Abolishment of administrative agencies by the president (not direct but through

reorganization):
●​ It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the
President's constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue
of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.