1 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Contents

Foreword5
List of figures 6
List of tables 8
List of abbreviations9
Executive summary11
1 Project background13
1.1 Overview of the pilot 13
1.2 Key objectives 13
1.3 Built on the Singapore safety study 14
1.4 Port Dampier: Selection basis 15
1.5 Ship-to-ship transfers as a proxy for bunkering  16
1.6 Ecosystem support 16
2 Safety studies18
2.1 Introduction 18
2.2 Participants 19
2.3 Response motions and mooring analysis 20
2.3.1 Overview 20
2.3.2 Methodology 20
[Link] Metocean data 20
[Link] Hull profile and loading conditions 22
[Link] Wave radiation and diffraction analysis 22
[Link] Mooring analysis 24
2.3.3 Findings and recommendations 26
[Link] Key findings 26
[Link] Recommendations 26
2.4 Risk assessment 27
2.4.1 Overview 27
2.4.2 Methodology 27
[Link] Hazard identification (HAZID) 30
[Link] Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) 31
2.4.3 Findings and recommendations 33
[Link] HAZID key findings 33
[Link] HAZID recommendations 33
 [Link] HAZOP key findings 34
[Link] HAZOP recommendations: 34
2.5 Plume dispersion study (CFD) 35
2.5.1 Overview 35
2.5.2 Methodology 35
[Link] Release scenarios 36
[Link] Modelling conditions 37
2.5.3 Findings and recommendations 38
[Link] CFD key findings 38
[Link] Key recommendations from CFD analysis 44
2.6 Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 45
2.6.1 Overview 45
2.6.2 Methodology 45
[Link] Incident tiers 45
[Link] Tier-level assessment 46
[Link] Integration with other plans 47
[Link] Initial action 48
2.6.3 Findings and recommendations 49
[Link] Key findings 49
[Link] Recommendations 51
3 Operation execution57
3.1 Location details 57
3.2 Mooring analysis based on weather forecast 57
3.3 Assets deployment 59
3.4 Transfer and shutdown systems 63
3.4.1 Transfer system 63
3.4.2 Nitrogen leak test 64
3.4.3 Ammonia transfer #1 (From the Green Pioneer to the Navigator Global)  65
3.4.4 Ammonia transfer #2 (From the Navigator Global to the Green Pioneer) 66
3.4.5 Hot gassing 67
3.4.6 Nitrogen blow through and purging 68
3.4.7 Emergency shutdown (ESD) and emergency release coupling (ERC)
arrangements 69
3.5 Joint plan of operations (JPO) 71
3.6 Timeline of key events (hrs) 73
4 Optimising ammonia bunkering76
4.1 Overview 76
4.2 Transfer system set up 77
4.3 Ammonia bunker tanker configuration and operations 80
4.3.1 General 80
4.3.2 Propulsion and manoeuvring 81
4.3.3 Fenders 81
4.3.4 Manifold arrangement 81
4.3.5 Transfer system 83
4.3.6 Vapour management 85
4.3.7 Spill containment 85
4.3.8 Quality and quantity measurement 85
4.3.9 Sample collection 85
4.3.10 Bunker Delivery Note (BDN) 87
4.4 Receiving vessel configuration 87
4.4.1 Manifold arrangement 87
4.4.2 Vapour management 88
4.5 ERP resources 88
4.5.1 Personal protective equipment (PPE) 88
4.5.2 Leak detection equipment 89
4.5.3 Emergency shut-off and isolation tools 89
4.5.4 Spill containment and neutralisation 89
4.5.5 Decontamination equipment 89
4.5.6 Firefighting equipment 89
4.5.7 Communication and signage 89
4.5.8 Medical supplies 89
5 GCMD’s considerations for future trials90
Acknowledgements92
About the Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation (GCMD)93
5 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Foreword

While the physical transfer of 4,000 m3 of liquid ammonia between two gas carriers took just
fifteen hours, the full operation spanned five days, and was many months in the making.

Preparations were extensive.

From safety and risk assessments and vessel specifications to CFD simulations based on
metocean data. From sourcing transfer hoses and emergency release couplings compatible
with ammonia to coordinating and consulting with port authorities and safety agencies on an
emergency response plan. From identifying the right assets to assembling the right expertise.

At every step, we were supported by an ecosystem of committed, mission-aligned partners

who recognised the importance of demonstrating safe and effective procedures for ammonia
transfer under lightering and bunkering conditions.

This report captures our journey.

It outlines the technical and operational building blocks of the pilot, the rationale for each
decision, and the learnings drawn from execution at sea.

With the IMO’s recent approval of a global GHG emissions pricing framework, demand for
zero- and near-zero-emissions fuels, including green ammonia, is expected to rise. As the
first ammonia-capable dual-fuel large ocean-going vessels set to enter service in early 2026,
we hope this report serves both as a practical reference and a catalyst for future pilots, some
already building on our work, and for the commercial-scale operations that must follow. To
meet that momentum, we must ensure that safety guidelines, operational protocols, and
standards are in place, so that when fuels are ready and vessels are delivered, bunkering can
begin without delay.

Professor Lynn Loo

Chief Executive Officer
Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation
June 2025
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 6

List of figures

Figure 1: Safety studies overview 18

Figure 2: Representative metocean data from station BN09 21
Figure 3: Metocean data from station WCB over the same period 21
Figure 4: 3D mesh visualisation of the two vessels involved in ammonia transfer 22
Figure 5: Potential collision due to roll motion 23
Figure 6: Roll motions for different loading conditions 23
Figure 7: Mooring arrangement and wave directions 24
Figure 8: Risk assessment methodology 28
Figure 9: HAZID nodes 30
Figure 10: HAZOP nodes 32
Figure 11: 3D model of vessels 36
Figure 12: Release scenarios for plume dispersion modelling 36
Figure 13: Location and size of Western Anchorage WA19 38
Figure 14: Plume distances for release scenarios 39
Figure 15: Plume progressions during a 33 m release on deck (10 m/s wind,
3

1,600 ppm concentration)  41

Figure 16: Plume width (60 m) during a 33 m release on deck (10 m/s wind,
3

1,600 ppm concentration) 42

Figure 17: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,
1,600 ppm concentration) 42
Figure 18: Plume width (100 m) during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,
1,600 ppm concentration) 43
Figure 19: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (10 m/s wind,
220 ppm concentration) 43
Figure 20: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,
220 ppm concentration) 44
Figure 21: Incident tiers outlining the extent of emergency response 45
Figure 22: Tier-level assessment guide 46
Figure 23: Integration of existing operational procedures with pilot-specific ERP 47
Figure 24: Initial actions flowchart  48
Figure 25: Response protocol 49
Figure 26: Joint emergency response structure 50
7 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 27: Response resource overview 52

Figure 28: The different PPEs deployed during this pilot 53
Figure 29: Optical gas imaging (OGI) camera54
Figure 30: Standby vessel Coral Knight55
Figure 31: Equipment at the liquid bulk terminal of Port Dampier 60
Figure 32: ERC testing at the Dampier Cargo Wharf of Port Dampier 60
Figure 33: Deployment of primary fenders 61
Figure 34: Vessels involved in mooring operations 62
Figure 35: Mooring arrangement 62
Figure 36: Transfer system arrangement 63
Figure 37: Nitrogen leak test configuration 64
Figure 38: Nitrogen released to the atmosphere post-leak test 65
Figure 39: Ammonia transfer #1 from the Green Pioneer to the Navigator Global66
Figure 40: Ammonia transfer #2 from the Navigator Global back to the Green Pioneer67
Figure 41: Hot gassing 67
Figure 42: Nitrogen purging 68
Figure 43: Gas measurement through the manifold drain valve 69
Figure 44: ESD and ERC arrangements 70
Figure 45: ERC internal flip-flap valve 71
Figure 46: ERC configuration options in a typical transfer system 78
Figure 47: Receiving vessel manifold connection types 79
Figure 48: Bunker tanker design considerations 80
Figure 49: Provision for nitrogen supply at the manifold 82
Figure 50: Considerations for manifold locations 83
Figure 51: Hose rail height and manifold width 84
Figure 52: Hose support arrangement 84
Figure 53: In-line sampling with horizontally connected collection container 86
Figure 54: Eight key enablers for port readiness for ammonia bunkering 90
Figure 55: Areas to be addressed for future trials 91
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 8

List of tables

Table 1: Contributors to the safety study reports 19

Table 2: Weather recordings at four stations in Port Dampier 20
Table 3: Summary of maximum hawser and fender loads 25
Table 4: Allowable hawser and fender loads 26
Table 5: Guidelines for risk ranking 29
Table 6: HAZID risk count 33
Table 7: HAZOP risk count 34
Table 8: Assumed transfer conditions at manifold 37
Table 9: Assumed release volumes for two minutes 37
Table 10: Plume distances that resulted from a 33 m release on deck 
3
39
Table 11: Plume distances that resulted from a 33 m3 release on water  40
Table 12: Guidelines to nominate on-scene commander (OSC) 50
Table 13: Sample results from mooring analysis using forecasted weather data 58
Table 14: Delegation matrix 59
Table 15: Details of fenders and transfer system components 61
Table 16: Transfer flow rates 65
Table 17: Examples of operation protocols established 72
Table 18: Ammonia properties 76
9 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

List of abbreviations

2D Two-dimensional
3D Three-dimensional
AEGL Acute Exposure Guideline Levels
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable
AMSA Australian Maritime Safety Authority
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APR Air-Purifying Respirators
ASR Ammonia Spill Responder
BDN Bunker Delivery Note
BOSP Beginning of Sea Passage
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics
CRC Casualty Response Coordinator
CRT Casualty Response Team
DCW Dampier Cargo Wharf
DFES Department of Fire and Emergency Services
DoT Department of Transportation
DPA Designated Person Ashore
EEBD Emergency Escape Breathing Device
EHQ Emergency Headquarters
EOSP End of Sea Passage
ERC Emergency Release Coupling
ERP Emergency Response Plan
ESD Emergency Shutdown
GCMD Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation
GPS Global Positioning System
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZMAT Hazardous Materials
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HMPE High Modulus Polyethylene
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
HW Hawser
IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 10

IGF code International Code of Safety for Ship Using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint
Fuels
IGC code International Code of the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Liquefied Gases in Bulk
IMO International Maritime Organization
ISM International Safety Management
JPO Joint Plan of Operations
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LSA Life Saving Appliances
MARPOL The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
MBL Mean Breaking Load
MOL Mitsui O.S.K. Lines
MT Metric Tonne
NIOSH US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
NM Nautical Mile
OGI Optical Gas Imaging
OSC On-Scene Commander
OSR Oil Spill Responder
PHPU Pneumatic Hydraulic Power Unit
POAC Person in Overall Advisory Control
PPA Pilbara Ports Authority
PPE Personal Protective Equipment
PPM Parts Per Million
PV Pressure-vacuum
QCDC Quick Connect-Disconnect Coupling
RAO Response Amplitude Operator
SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SDO Standards Development Organisation
SGMF Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel
SIGTTO Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators
SIMOPS Simultaneous Operations
SMPEP Shipboard Marine Pollution Emergency Plan
SOPEP Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan
STCW Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping
VHF Very High Frequency
VSD Vessel Separation Detection
YCA Yara Clean Ammonia
YPF Yara Pilbara Fertilizers
11 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Executive summary

The Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation (GCMD) has successfully completed a
pioneering pilot transferring liquid ammonia between two gas carriers to trial safety protocols
and operational guidelines for bunkering at the Western Anchorage WA19 near Port Dampier in
Pilbara, Western Australia. The trial involved the ship-to-ship transfer of 2,700 metric tonnes (MT)
of ammonia, equivalent to 4,000 cubic metres (m3), at a rate of 700-800 cubic metres per hour
(m3/hr) between the Green Pioneer and the Navigator Global, reflecting realistic metrics for a
typical bunkering operation. The location was selected for its operational advantages, including
an existing ammonia terminal, longstanding expertise in ammonia handling, a dedicated large
anchorage spanning one nautical mile (NM) and a safe distance of 20 NM from shore.

This pilot marks a significant step forward in demonstrating the feasibility and safety of using
ammonia as an alternative marine fuel, supporting the maritime industry's decarbonisation
efforts. The trial focused on addressing aspects of the technical, logistical, safety, and
regulatory requirements associated with ammonia bunkering within an operating port’s
anchorage. Comprehensive safety studies were structured around four key areas:

Feasibility: Assessments were conducted on site conditions, vessel compatibility, mooring

arrangement, response motions, operational windows, and other constraints to simulate
ammonia bunkering at anchorage.

Risks: The identification and evaluation of potential hazards were carried out through hazard
identification (HAZID) and hazard and operability study (HAZOP) workshops.

Consequence: Modelling credible ammonia release scenarios sheds light on their potential
impact on personnel, port infrastructure, and the surrounding environment.

Response: An evaluation of emergency preparedness and response capabilities was

undertaken with pilot participants. The findings and recommendations were presented to
local agencies, such as Pilbara Port Authority (PPA), Australian Maritime Safety Authority
(AMSA), the Department of Transport (DoT), and the Department of Fire and Emergency
Services (DFES), who provided guidance on operational safety.

The findings across all four study areas confirmed that ship-to-ship ammonia transfer at
anchorage can be both safe and practicable, provided that recommended safeguards and
operational controls are implemented.

Key highlights from the safety studies include:

• Response motions analysis using historical metocean data from August to November
2023 revealed a critical roll motion threshold of four degrees to prevent bridge wing
collisions for this particular pair of handysize and midsize gas carriers, when the wave
limit is set at 0.88 metres (m) and the wave period is between 9 and 11 seconds (s).
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 12

• Mooring analysis indicated a maximum wind speed of 20 knots and a maximum swell
height of 0.3 m for safe operations. Mooring loads were capped at 50% of line mean
breaking load (MBL), around 211–265 kilonewtons (kN) and 3,015 kN for fender systems.

• Risk assessments, including HAZID and HAZOP, revealed no high-level risks. HAZID
identified 15 medium and eight low risks, while HAZOP identified eight medium and
three low risks. By implementing existing safety measures and introducing additional
controls, such as the use of Vessel Separation Detection (VSD) devices, Emergency
Release Couplings (ERC), avoiding simultaneous operations (SIMOPS), scheduling fire
and spill drills closer to the operation date, and stationing a standby incident response
vessel, the probability of medium-level risks was further reduced. A task-based risk
assessment (Task and Safe Job Analysis) conducted during the Joint Plan of Operations
(JPO) confirmed that the risks identified through the HAZID and HAZOP exercises were
not only comprehensive but also appropriately addressed through operational planning.

• Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) plume dispersion modelling simulated a release

of 33 m³ of ammonia, corresponding to four times the volume of the most credible
worst-case scenario, under winds from the bow and transverse directions of the vessels.
The resulting Acute Exposure Guideline Level 3 (AEGL-3), representing an ammonia
concentration of 1,600 parts per million (ppm), showed plume distances ranging from
750 to 1,300 m at variable wind speeds of 1, 5, and 10 metres per second (m/s). These
distances remained within the dedicated anchorage boundaries of 1 NM in diameter.

Furthermore, the modelling found that the progression and dispersion of an AEGL-3
plume would persist for up to 30 minutes (min) under base case conditions (i.e., 10
m/s), and up to 60 min in low-wind scenarios (i.e., 1 m/s). The plume progression and
dispersion profile were also described in terms of height, width and distance over time
under different wind conditions for AEGL-3 exposure limits. These findings shaped the
emergency response plan (ERP) and evacuation protocols for the trial.

• Emergency response measures were guided by onboard operational procedures and

insights from dispersion modelling. The plan included communication protocols with
local authorities, a personal protective equipment (PPE) matrix for each operational
stage, the appointment of a key incident handler, and verification of onboard spill kits
and firefighting systems. To reinforce readiness for a range of contingencies—from
minor leaks to full-scale evacuation—the vessel crew also underwent ammonia-specific
emergency drills in the days leading up to the trial.

The trial demonstrated the feasibility of ammonia transfer and provided valuable learnings to
support the development of future ammonia bunkering frameworks. Key takeaways highlighted
the importance of thorough planning, infrastructure readiness, vessel compatibility, and clear
communication among all stakeholders.

This trial represents a significant step towards establishing ammonia as a viable low-carbon
marine fuel. The real-world data and insights documented in this report serve as a practical
framework to refine best practices for scaling ammonia bunkering globally. It is GCMD’s aim
that these findings will build confidence among stakeholders and regulatory bodies, ultimately
contributing to the broader adoption of ammonia as a marine fuel.
13 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

1 Project background

1.1 Overview of the pilot

Piloting ammonia ship-to-ship transfers to simulate bunkering operations

In a significant step towards decarbonising the maritime industry, a GCMD-led consortium

successfully conducted ship-to-ship transfers of liquid ammonia at the anchorage of Port
Dampier in the Pilbara region of Western Australia on 14 September 2024.

Two transfers took place between the Green Pioneer, owned by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines (MOL)
and chartered by Yara Clean Ammonia (YCA), and the Navigator Global, offhired by Navigator
Gas for the use under this project. 4,000 m3, equivalent to approximately 2,700 MT of liquid
ammonia, was transferred at a rate of 700–800 m3/hr between the vessels, reflecting realistic
metrics for bunkering operations.

This landmark trial, a collaborative effort between GCMD and its partners, sought to
demonstrate the feasibility of future ammonia bunkering operations in the Pilbara region.

The transfers were executed under strict safety protocols, including all requisite approvals
secured from relevant government agencies and port authorities.

1.2 Key objectives

The primary objectives of this pilot were to showcase lightering and simulate bunkering
operations through a series of structured activities:

• Conducting feasibility and safety assessments: By analysing historical metocean data,

vessel response motions were evaluated under varying environmental conditions to
assess the strength of the mooring arrangement and feasibility of side-by-side ammonia
transfer operations. These analyses established key operational thresholds and safety
parameters, ensuring the vessels could safely maintain their positions during operations.

A comprehensive risk assessment was carried out, including HAZID and HAZOP exercises.
These focused on identifying potential hazards during the planning and execution stages,
highlighting deviations that could result in safety concerns. The assessment underscored
the importance of plume dispersion modelling using CFD, based on credible failure
scenarios identified during the risk evaluation, and the development of an ERP for the trial.

These assessments encompassed the review of transfer parameters, including flow rates
and transfer conditions, as well as an evaluation of operational plans, procedures, vessel
compatibility, metocean parameters, and crew competencies.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 14

• Trialling operational procedures: Standard ship-to-ship transfer protocols were

expanded with additional processes designed to replicate bunkering operations. These
included the establishment of nitrogen purging procedures for transfer lines after transfer,
and the adjustment of transfer rates to align with bunkering requirements.

• Establishing safety protocols: Safety measures included monitoring ammonia

concentration levels in the piping prior to hose disconnection, utilising emergency
shutdown devices to halt the transfer, deploying personal ammonia detectors for
watchkeeping crew on deck during transfer operation, and ensuring adequate levels of
PPE appropriate to the task.

• Developing emergency response protocols: An operations-specific ERP taking

ammonia’s physical characteristics and toxicity into consideration was developed in
collaboration with the project partners to address potential ammonia release scenarios.

Ultimately, the overarching goal was to help ready the ecosystem for the future use of ammonia
as a marine fuel, paving the way for eventual bunkering when ammonia-fuelled vessels
become available. By demonstrating that ammonia can be transferred safely and efficiently
under simulated bunkering conditions, and generating real-world data and insights, the pilot
serves to build confidence among stakeholders and regulatory bodies, thereby contributing
to the broader acceptance of ammonia as a marine fuel.

1.3 Built on the Singapore safety study

The successful execution of the ship-to-ship ammonia transfers at the Pilbara region was built
upon the foundation of GCMD’s comprehensive safety study for piloting ammonia bunkering
in Singapore1. Singapore, recognised as the world’s largest bunkering hub with stringent safety
requirements due to its proximity to dense populations and high vessel traffic, was chosen as
the initial case study. The premise was that if safe ammonia bunkering could be demonstrated
in Singapore’s complex operational environment, it could potentially be replicated globally.

This comprehensive safety study identified approximately 400 operational and locational
risks associated with four ammonia bunkering concepts, including truck-to-ship, terminal-to-
ship, and ship-to-ship lightering and bunkering operations. Key hazards, such as ammonia
leaks, toxicity, and potential fire risks, were analysed. The study concluded that these risks
can be effectively mitigated to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)2 levels through the
implementation of robust safety measures.

1
GCMD (2023), Safety and Operational Guidelines for Piloting Ammonia Bunkering in Singapore,
([Link]
2
DNV (2019), DNV-RP-G105 Development and operation of liquefied natural gas bunkering facilities,
([Link]
natural-gas-bunkering-facilities/)
15 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Recommendations from the Singapore safety study formed the basis for many of the protocols
trialled in the Pilbara pilot, including vessel separation monitoring, ERCs, ammonia detection
systems for safe hose disconnection, and the development of a tailored ERP. Post-mitigation,
the Pilbara HAZID study identified 23 residual risks—none ranked high, 15 ranked medium
and eight low. Similarly, the HAZOP identified 11 risks, with eight ranked medium and three
low.

The competency framework for seafarers to manage ammonia as a bunker fuel, developed
as part of the Singapore study, played an important role in shaping the safety protocols for
the Pilbara trial. While leveraging existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) bunkering guidelines2,3,4
the framework was tailored to address ammonia’s toxicity and corrosive nature, as opposed to
LNG’s flammability.

The safety study, in conjunction with the successful execution of ammonia transfers in Pilbara,
offered a valuable “learning by doing” opportunity. This hands-on experience facilitated the
application of lessons learned from the Singapore safety study, enabling GCMD to refine
assumptions and detail the specifics of a future bunkering operation in major ports. Additionally,
it contributed to the enhancement of crew training programs. The trial’s outcomes have also
informed the broader industry, with key learnings shared through Singapore’s Standards
Development Organisation (SDO) Working Group for the Ammonia Bunkering Technical
Reference, alongside partners such as MOL and YCA.

1.4 Port Dampier: Selection basis

The Pilbara region emerged as a strategic location for this ammonia transfer pilot for several
key reasons:

• Viable location for future ammonia bunkering: YCA operates an extensive global
ammonia network, including an 850,000 million tonnes per annum (MTPA) ammonia
production plant, the Yara Pilbara Fertilizers (YPF) in Dampier, with 70% exported. The
proximity of ammonia sources from YPF plant to Port Dampier offers a key advantage for
the trial by allowing for optimised logistical arrangements. With significant renewables
and green fuels development in the region, the Pilbara region is poised to be one of the
leading suppliers of green ammonia in the future, including the Yuri project that YCA is
targeting to produce renewable ammonia by 2026. Coupled with Pilbara’s strategic role
as one of the top ports exporting iron ore, a “green steel corridor”5 between the Pilbara
Ports and North Asia ports with vessels plying between them on dedicated point-to-
point routes can drive innovation and investment in maritime decarbonisation. Pilbara’s
role as a first mover for producing and supplying green ammonia as a marine fuel was

3
Singapore Standards (2022), TR 56-2 :2020+A1:2022 LNG bunkering - Part 2: Requirement for custody transfer
([Link]
4
SGMF (2019), LNG as a marine fuel: Safety and Operational Guidelines- Bunkering,
([Link]
5
MAX Magazine (2024), Pilbara ammonia transfer, ([Link]
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 16

also highlighted in two reports published by the Global Maritime Forum6 and Lloyd’s
Register7.

• Sufficient anchorage within port limits: Port Dampier offers sufficient and suitable
anchorage within its port limits for conducting ship-to-ship transfers. The transfers took
place at an anchorage approximately 20 NM from the shore. This allowed for the ammonia
transfers to take place away from immediate port activities while still benefiting from the
oversight and support of the port authorities. CFD dispersion analysis conducted as
part of the safety assessments showed that even at four times the volume of the most
credible worst-case scenario, the maximum plume length is 0.7 NM, well within the
designated anchorage diameter of 1 NM.

1.5 Ship-to-ship transfers as a proxy for bunkering

In the absence of dedicated ammonia bunkering vessels and commercially available ammonia-
fuelled ships, ship-to-ship transfers at anchorage offer the closest practical simulation of future
bunkering operations and familiarise the authorities and commercial stakeholders with the
range of considerations for commercial ammonia bunkering.

While the procedures for ship-to-ship transfer of ammonia as cargo are defined, they are
seldom practised as most ships trading ammonia load and unload ammonia directly at
shore terminals8. Repurposing the ship-to-ship procedures to simulate bunkering operations
therefore introduces unique operational challenges. Unlike routine cargo loading or unloading,
bunkering occurs more frequently, may involve a larger number of personnel on site, and
typically takes place in closer proximity to port infrastructure and potentially other vessels.
These differences inherently increase the risk profile compared to ship-to-ship transfer of
ammonia as cargo, necessitating more stringent guidelines and comprehensive crew training
to ensure safe and efficient operations.

1.6 Ecosystem support

The successful planning and execution of this ship-to-ship ammonia transfer pilot was
underpinned by extensive collaboration across the ammonia value chain. A tripartite
collaboration between GCMD, PPA, and YCA formed the core of this initiative, leveraging
the unique expertise and resources including knowledge, assets and financial support of each
organisation.

6
Global Maritime Forum (2023), Fuelling the decarbonisation of iron ore shipping between Western Australia
and East Asia with clean ammonia, ([Link]
[Link])
7
Offshore Energy (2023), Lloyd’s Register study reveals ammonia bunkering potential in Pilbara,
([Link]
8
Navigator Gas (2024), Navigator Gas announces successful first ship-to-ship transfer of ammonia,
([Link]
First-Ship-to-Ship-Transfer-of-Ammonia/[Link])
17 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Beyond the core partners, a broader ecosystem of industry leaders and technical experts
played crucial roles in materialising and operationalising the transfers. Key industry partners
included:

• MOL: As the owner of the Green Pioneer, MOL provided the vessel and contributed
guidance towards safety and risk assessments with additional marine staff specialised in
ammonia operation onboard during the trial.

• Navigator Gas: Offhired the Navigator Global for this trial, with marine specialists
providing essential technical and operational support.

• James Fisher Fendercare: Executed the actual transfer operations, providing expertise
and hardware, such as the fenders, hoses, ERC and VSD used in the pilot.

• Rio Tinto: Provided critical towage and tug services for the supply and receiving vessels
during transfer operations.

• bp, BHP, and Eastern Pacific Shipping: As Strategic partners of GCMD, they provided
valuable insights and support towards the overall goals of the trial.

• Gard: As GCMD's Impact partner, Gard supported the pilot with commercial risk mapping
and risk mitigation advice throughout the process.

• DNV: Also a Strategic partner of GCMD, DNV was commissioned to conduct critical
HAZID and HAZOP studies, review transfer parameters, and carry out plume dispersion
assessments.

• OSRL, BlueTack, and Stream Marine Technical: Collaborated to develop the trial-
specific draft ERP in Pilbara, drawing on their expertise in oil and chemical spill response.

• Technology Centre for Offshore and Marine, Singapore (TCOMS): Provided technical
consultancy for vessel motion responses and mooring-related safety assessments.

This extensive collaboration, involving cargo owners, ship operators, technical experts, and
government and port authorities, including PPA, AMSA, DFES, and DoT, was crucial for
navigating the technical, operational, and commercial complexities of this first-of-its-kind
pilot and managing the inherent risks associated with ammonia transfer. The open exchange
of knowledge and support from all partners was essential for the success of this pioneering
effort.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 18

2 Safety studies

2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents key insights from the safety studies conducted prior to pilot execution.
As shown in Figure 1, these include: (1) Response motions and mooring analysis; (2) Risk
assessments – HAZID and HAZOP studies; (3) Plume dispersion study using CFD; and (4) ERP.

Figure 1: Safety studies overview

Historical metocean conditions were reviewed to simulate vessel response motions and
mooring adequacy during side-by-side operations to ensure compatibility among the three
parties involved—the ammonia supplying vessel, the ammonia receiving vessel and the
transfer system equipment provider.

Risk assessments were conducted through two key workshops.

The HAZID workshop aimed to identify the primary risks associated with the different phases
of operations, such as bringing the vessels alongside each other, transferring ammonia, and
unmooring of the vessels once the transfer was finished. By thoroughly analysing each of
these stages, the workshop identified potential hazards that could arise during the operation
and provided recommendations on mitigation measures.

The HAZOP exercise took a more detailed approach by focusing on the technical aspects of
the transfer process itself. This included a virtual walkthrough of the piping system diagrams.
19 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

It aimed to identify potential operational upsets and deviations, and to verify the sufficiency
of existing technical, operational, and organisational barriers.

Following the risk assessment phase, the study developed a set of credible failure scenarios
that could potentially lead to hazardous situations. CFD modelling was employed to simulate
ammonia dispersion associated with previously identified credible risk scenarios, providing
a detailed analysis of how vapour ammonia could spread in the atmosphere under varying
conditions. By factoring in wind patterns, temperature, and environmental influences,
CFD modelling predicted concentration levels and their dispersion behaviour under local
conditions. These findings helped establish robust response strategies in the event of an
ammonia release.

The tailored response strategies were developed across multiple tiers, ranging from immediate
on-site responses to escalated measures that could involve external assistance, depending
on the severity of the release. The effectiveness and adequacy of each tier were assessed to
ensure that ERP can accommodate different levels of risks and consequences.

This comprehensive approach ensures that the ammonia transfer process can be conducted
safely while minimising risks to the environment, personnel, and the vessels involved.

2.2 Participants
DNV prepared HAZID, HAZOP, and CFD, while OSRL developed ERP. Organisations involved
in the development and evaluation of the safety studies are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Contributors to the safety study reports

1 BHP

2 BlueTack

3 bp

4 DNV

5 Eastern Pacific Shipping

6 GCMD

7 Mills Navigation Limited

8 MOL

9 OSRL

10 PPA

11 Stream Marine & Technical

12 YCA
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 20

2.3 Response motions and mooring analysis

2.3.1 Overview

The study aimed to assess the effects of environmental factors on the side-by-side mooring
of the two gas carriers deployed for transfer operations in open waters. Understanding vessel
response motions and the stresses on mooring components, such as hawsers and fenders, will
ensure operational safety. The objectives of the study included:

• Identifying weather conditions from historical metocean data in the region

• Predicting vessel motions under varying sea conditions
• Analysing the forces exerted on hawsers and fenders that maintain mooring integrity
• Determining the allowable weather envelope for safe operations

2.3.2 Methodology

[Link] Metocean data

Historical metocean data were retrieved from PPA’s database, covering the period from August
to October 2023. The collected data included significant wave heights, peak wave periods,
and wind speeds recorded at four stations in Port Dampier.

Table 2: Weather recordings at four stations in Port Dampier

Measuring
Significant wave height Peak wave period Wind speed
station

BN09 Both swell and Peak period stable at ~12 s Maximum: 11.7 m/s
wind sea <1.0 m; for swell, ~3 s for wind sea Average: 4.6 m/s
Daily average <0.5 m

WCB Both swell and Swell: 7 s to 40 s, No records

wind sea <1.5 m; Mean: ~15 s; Wind sea ~5 s
Daily average <1.0 m

Tower No records No records Maximum: 7.2 m/s

Average: 0.96 m/s

Fairway No records No records Maximum: 13 m/s

Average: 4.5 m/s
21 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 2: Representative metocean data from station BN09

Figure 3: Metocean data from station WCB over the same period
(comparison with graph in Figure 2 shows the range of swell patterns)
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 22

[Link] Hull profile and loading conditions

The study involved creating three-dimensional (3D) of the supply and receiving vessels using
two-dimensional (2D) hull expansion plans and structural drawings, incorporating the profile
and length of bilge keels. Each vessel was discretised into triangular panels, and the average
mesh size was about 3 m2.

Green Pioneer

Navigator Global

Figure 4: 3D mesh visualisation of the two vessels involved in ammonia transfer

Given that the study was undertaken several months prior to the actual trial date, real-time
vessel drafts were unknown. Therefore, the expected drafts at various stages of the operation,
such as draft upon arrival, after ammonia transfer and upon departure, were estimated from
the vessel’s trim and stability booklet. The following loading conditions were assumed for the
motion analysis:

• Navigator Global: Arrive in ballast to load and discharge 4,000 m³ of liquid ammonia
into and out of Cargo Tank 1, then depart in ballast condition.
• Green Pioneer: Fully loaded with ammonia in Cargo Tank 1, to discharge, and reload
with 4,000 m³ of ammonia during the round-trip transfer.

[Link] Wave radiation and diffraction analysis

Hydrodynamic calculations, including added mass, wave-radiation damping, and wave

exciting forces, were performed to assess vessel response under wave excitation from different
headings. The Response Amplitude Operator (RAO) was used to link wave characteristics with
vessel movement. A key focus was determining natural roll periods, as resonance (when wave
periods match roll periods) could amplify vessel motion and pose collision risks.

Natural roll periods of the vessels:

• Navigator Global: Without hawsers and fenders - 11.6 s; with hawsers and fenders - 9.1 s.
• Green Pioneer: Without hawsers and fenders - 13.4 s; with hawsers and fenders - 12.5 s.
23 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Navigator Global Green Pioneer

Figure 5: Potential collision due to roll motion

Navigator Global Green Pioneer

Figure 6: Roll motions for different loading conditions

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 24

Roll motion exceeding four degrees was identified as a collision risk for bridge wings. Given
that peak wind sea periods were below 7 s, the swell, which varied in peak periods and
directions, was the primary influencing factor.

Figure 6 exhibits the extreme values of roll motions under the beam sea excitation, and the
black line corresponds to the roll motions at four degrees, serving as the threshold for collision
of the bridge wings. Extreme roll motions remain below four degrees when the significant
wave height is less than 0.88 m.

[Link] Mooring analysis

Time-domain simulations were performed using OrcaFlex software to evaluate the effects of
different sea conditions on the ships and their mooring equipment. The goal was to simulate
the forces on the hawsers and fenders when the ships are subjected to various wave heights
and periods.

The simulations were run for 36 different sea states, considering significant wave heights of
0.5 m, 1.0 m, and 1.5 m, as well as peak periods of 6 s, 7 s, 9 s, and 11 s.

Note:
HW − Hawser

Figure 7: Mooring arrangement and wave directions

25 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Table 3: Summary of maximum hawser and fender loads

Sea state
Maximum hawser Fender force
Wave Wave time Wave tension (% MBL) (% max load)
height (Hs) period (Tp) direction
180° 21 3
6s 135° 27 4
90° 35 6
180° 22 4
7s 135° 36 5
90° 45 9
0.5 m
180° 32 4
9s 135° >50 8
90° >50 13
180° 32 4
11 s 135° >50 14
90° >50 12
180° 30 5
6s 135° 39 5
90° >50 12
180° 32 5
7s 135° >50 9
90° >50 18
1.0 m
180° 49 6
9s 135° >50 21
90° >50 18
180° >50 8
11 s 135° >50 21
90° >50 35
180° 37 6
6s 135° >50 8
90° >50 19
180° 41 7
7s 135° >50 14
90° >50 29
1.5 m
180° >50 8
9s 135° >50 34
90° >50 29
180° >50 12
11 s 135° >50 34
90° >50 52
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 26

Table 4: Allowable hawser and fender loads

Mooring line/ hawser from Line: Ø 24 mm HMPE (50% of MBL 514 kN, i.e. 275 kN)
Navigator Global Tail: Ø 58 mm Nylon tail (50% of MBL 491 kN, i.e. 245.5 kN)

Mooring line/ hawser from Line: Ø 26 mm HMPE (50% of MBL 423 kN, i.e. 211.5 kN)
Green Pioneer Tail: Ø 56 mm Nylon tail (50% of MBL 530 kN, i.e. 265 kN)

Fender Ø 3,300 mm x 6,500 mm (3,015 kN)

Hawser tensions increase with greater wave heights, higher peak periods near the natural roll
periods, and wave directions shifting from head to beam sea. Sea states where hawser tension
remain below 50% of MBL, are shown in Table 3.

2.3.3 Findings and recommendations

[Link] Key findings

• Fender forces: Fender forces remain below the maximum allowable load in all cases.

• Roll motion and bridge wing collision risk:

• Roll motions exceeding four degrees pose a risk of bridge wing collision.
• Significant wave heights above 0.88 m result in roll motions exceeding the four
degrees threshold.
• To keep hawser tensions within safe limits, wave heights must remain below 0.5 m.

• Hawser tension: For peak periods of 9 s and 11 s, hawser tensions generally exceed
50% of MBL, except under specific combinations of wave height and direction.

[Link] Recommendations

• Monitoring of dynamic responses: Continuously track sea conditions to identify peak

wave periods that may coincide with vessel’s natural roll period.

• Operational avoidance strategies: Limit transfer operations when wave periods

approach 9–11 s and/ or wave heights approach 0.88 m, as these align with vessel’s
natural roll period and increase the risk of resonance. These parameters represent an
upper safety limit. More conservative thresholds are recommended in chapter 3.2, based
on the forecasted weather conditions on the date of the trial.
27 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

2.4 Risk assessment

2.4.1 Overview

The primary objectives of the risk assessment were to identify potential Health, Safety,
and Environmental (HSE) hazards for this operation. This included recognising hazardous
conditions inherent to the vessel design or operational nature. Additionally, the assessment
also evaluated the risks after planned mitigating measures and safeguards were in place to
determine whether additional precautionary measures were necessary. Recommendations
were aligned with the latest international safety standards to ensure comprehensive risk
mitigation.

2.4.2 Methodology

Risk assessment was structured and involved analysing likely causes, potential consequences,
and existing safeguards to eliminate hazards at the source or to mitigate them effectively.
Once identified, hazards, including associated causes, consequences, and preventive and
mitigating barriers were documented. Follow-up actions were recorded and assigned to the
responsible parties.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 28

Figure 8: Risk assessment methodology

Step 1 – Identification of nodes: Each key step of the operation (e.g., mooring, hose
connection, leak testing, hose disconnection, etc.) was assigned as a node.

Step 2 – Node briefing: A brief introduction of each node was provided to all participants to
ensure a common understanding of the intended operation.
29 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Step 3 – Identification of hazards and hazardous events: The hazards and hazardous events
for each node were identified based on available documents, drawings, and prior experience.

Step 4 – Identification of causes: For each hazardous event identified, all potential causes
were analysed and discussed. However, the concept of double jeopardy, involving multiple
independent events occurring simultaneously, was not considered during the workshop.

Step 5 – Identification of consequences: The potential consequences of each hazardous

event and its causes were evaluated under the assumption that no preventive or mitigating
measures were in place. The consequences were assessed beyond the node definitions or
scope boundaries to fully understand each event's impact.

Step 6 – Identification of preventive and mitigating measures (safeguards): Existing

safeguards were identified, including measures designed to prevent the occurrence of
hazardous events (preventive measures) and those aimed at controlling their development or
mitigating their consequences (mitigating measures).

Step 7 – Risk ranking: Identified risks were categorised using a risk matrix shown in Table
5. Risk ranking was conducted in alignment with agreed-upon criteria, considering existing
preventive measures. Hazards with inadequate provisions were assigned a higher probability
rating, reflecting an increased likelihood of occurrence.

Table 5: Guidelines for risk ranking

Likelihood of an event

Extremely Very unlikely Possibility Likely Very likely

unlikely of occurring
sometimes

A B C D E
1 Severe M H H H H
consequence

2 Major M M H H H
Severity of

3 Moderate L M M H H
4 Minor L L M M H
5 Minimal L L L M M

H High/ Intolerable/ Not acceptable risk

M Medium risk/ ALARP
L Low/ Tolerable/ Acceptable risk

Step 8 – Identification of recommendations: If the current provision of preventive or

mitigating measures was deemed insufficient to manage risks, or if further assessments were
needed to better understand the hazards or hazardous event, recommendations were raised
during the workshop and assigned to responsible parties.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 30

[Link] HAZID

The HAZID risk assessment focused on general operational risks and included a step-by-step
analysis of critical nodes, shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: HAZID nodes

Node 1 – Approach manoeuvre and anchorage: The approach manoeuvre entailed guiding
the vessel into position while navigating potential obstacles and environmental conditions.
Anchorage stability was assessed to ensure the vessel remained secure throughout the
transfer operation.

Node 2 – Mooring: The mooring process involved securing the approaching vessel to the
anchored vessel, preventing unintended movement during operations. This required careful
coordination and evaluation of mooring lines and environmental forces, including wind and
currents.

Node 3 – Pre-transfer: Pre-transfer checks were performed to verify that all equipment,
systems, and personnel were prepared for the safe transfer of ammonia. Safety procedures
and communication protocols were reviewed and confirmed before transfer was initiated.
31 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Node 4 – Transfer of ammonia: The transfer of ammonia represented the critical phase
during which the molecule was moved from one vessel to another under controlled conditions.
Throughout this process, continuous monitoring of pressure, ammonia flow, and safety systems
was essential.

Node 5 – Post-transfer: Once the transfer was completed, post-transfer procedures were
undertaken to ensure all systems were securely shut down and any residual ammonia was
properly managed.

Node 6 – Unmooring and departure: The unmooring process was executed carefully to
release one of the vessels from its secured position while minimising any risks of sudden
movements or incidents. Departure procedures were implemented to ensure safe vessel
departure from the anchorage without disruptions.

Node 7 – Other hazards: Ensuring that the crew was well-trained for both routine and
emergency operations was a critical aspect of the process. Security protocols were maintained
to address potential threats, manage security breaches, and prevent unauthorised access to
the vessels.

[Link] HAZOP

The HAZOP risk assessment exercise was conducted to perform a detailed analysis of the
vessel systems and transfer system components. The piping and instrumentation diagrams
for the vessels and transfer systems were examined to identify associated risks and existing
mitigation measures, based on the operational steps outlined in Figure 10.

Node 1 – Pressure test: A pressure test was performed to verify that the transfer system was
free from leaks and capable of withstanding the required pressure for safe operations. This
test ensured the integrity of the transfer piping and equipment before the commencement of
ammonia transfer.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 32

Figure 10: HAZOP nodes

Node 2 – Pre-transfer purging: Pre-transfer purging was carried out to clear the transfer lines
of any residual gases or contaminants, ensuring a safe environment free of contamination for
ammonia transfer. This step was essential in preventing unwanted reactions between ammonia
and any remaining substances in the lines and to bring the dew point to acceptable limits.

Node 3 – Transfer: Transfer involved the controlled movement of ammonia between vessels,
with continuous monitoring of flow rates and pressure. Safety measures were in place to
detect and promptly respond to any anomalies that might occur during the process.

Node 4 – Hot gassing: Hot gassing was performed by introducing warm ammonia gas at
40 °C, using cargo compressor, to clear the system of any remaining liquid ammonia. This
step ensured that no residual liquid ammonia remained in the lines before purging operations
were carried out.

Node 5 – Post-transfer purging: Post-transfer purging was executed to flush the transfer
lines with nitrogen gas, removing any residual ammonia vapours after hot gassing. Ammonia
concentrations in the piping were monitored before disconnection of the transfer system.
This procedure prevented any residual ammonia from presenting a safety risk during future
operations or maintenance activities.
33 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

2.4.3 Findings and recommendations

[Link] HAZID key findings

Following the implementation of mitigation measures, 23 risks were identified and ranked, as
outlined in Table 6. The risks included navigational and berthing challenges due to weather
conditions, mooring failures, falling objects during lifting operations, containment breaches
within tank and piping systems, and risks associated with personnel transfers involving crew
and observers.

Table 6: HAZID risk count

Risk ranking Risks identified

High 0
Medium 15
Low 8

[Link] HAZID recommendations

The key recommendations focused on the interface between the two vessels and planning
emergency responses in case of an incident. Emphasis was placed on improving safety
measures, ensuring proper vessel coordination, and preparing for potential failure scenarios.
This included verifying the suitability of ERP and implementing additional protective systems
to mitigate risks.

• Identification of credible failure scenarios: Systematically identify plausible failure

scenarios related to operations.
• Consequence modelling: Perform consequence modelling of identified credible worst-
case scenarios of ammonia release.
• ERP review: Assess and verify the suitability of ERP for the identified scenarios.
• Portable water curtain system: Evaluate using a portable water curtain system
connected to the fire main system for enhanced safety measures.
• Secondary containment: To minimise risk, consider provisions for secondary containment,
such as flange guards, around piping joints.
• Fendering and mooring assessment: Conduct compatibility assessments for fendering
and mooring systems.
• Support vessel operations: Perform a separate risk analysis of support vessel operations,
including fender mooring and personnel transfers.
• JPO: Develop coordinated operational plans to ensure alignment and safety, which is
part of a tabletop exercise to ensure clarity on operating parameters and conditions.
• Role definition: Clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of the Person in Overall
Advisory Control (POAC) and the ship-to-ship superintendent.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 34

• Daylight mooring operations: Limit mooring and unmooring operations to daylight

hours for increased safety.
• Task and safe job analysis: Execute a comprehensive risk analysis of tasks during JPO
discussion.

[Link] HAZOP key findings

A total of 11 risks were identified and ranked, as summarised in Table 7.

Table 7: HAZOP risk count

Risk ranking Risks identified

High 0
Medium 8
Low 3

[Link] HAZOP recommendations:

Since both vessels were engaged in ammonia trading and had established procedures for
safe handling of ammonia, key recommendations from the HAZOP workshop were as follows:

• Adherence to established procedures: To ensure operational integrity, it was strongly

recommended that vessel management strictly adhere to established procedures for
transfer operations and facility maintenance.
• Vapour return line implications: Significant operational and safety challenges were
identified with the vapour return line connection. This connection can result in both
the supplying and receiving ships losing control of their respective tank atmospheres,
as they are directly influenced by changes during the transfer. The receiving vessel’s
reliquefaction plant was therefore assigned to manage any vapours generated during
transfer.
• Maintenance of critical systems: Properly maintaining the reliquefaction plant and
associated pressure-sensing devices on both vessels was critical for safe operations.
• Pressure-vacuum valve management: The cargo tank pressure-vacuum (PV) valves must
be adequately maintained and calibrated to ensure proper operation.
• Post-transfer purging: As post-transfer purging was not part of regular operations, a
detailed checklist outlining the necessary steps for the process prior to hose disconnection
needed to be developed.
35 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

2.5 Plume dispersion study (CFD)

2.5.1 Overview

The study's primary objective was to determine the dispersion pattern of ammonia from
unintended releases and assess the potential impact on surrounding areas. Additionally, the
study aimed to evaluate toxic concentration levels reaching target receptors, ensuring the
implementation of safety measures to mitigate harmful exposure. Toxic gas dispersion was
assessed using AEGL guidelines9, specifically AEGL-2 at 220 ppm (30 min) and AEGL-3 at
1,600 ppm (30 min). AEGL-2 concentrations are defined as those causing irreversible health
effects, while AEGL-3 indicated levels that can result in life-threatening health effects. In the
absence of ammonia-specific guidelines, modelling recommendations from LNG standards2,3,4
were considered. This included the consideration of release scenarios, such as piping failure
(e.g., flange leaks and instrument failure) and hose rupture, with AEGL-3 concentration
applied to establish safety distances and AEGL-2 concentration to establish incident response
procedures.

2.5.2 Methodology

The CFD software FLACS was used to conduct dispersion analyses considering several
accidental release scenarios and weather conditions. The following steps were undertaken:

• 3D models of the Green Pioneer and the Navigator Global were developed to ensure
accurate representation.
• Release scenarios were identified from risk assessment (HAZID and HAZOP) and selected
for CFD modelling.
• Consequence simulations were conducted to analyse dispersion patterns under varying
wind speeds and directions.
• For consequence simulation results, no containment measures applied in the trial (such
as flange guards and drip trays) or the effects of fire water were considered.
• For the identified risk scenarios, 3D dispersion simulations were conducted to establish
toxic contours at specified toxic concentration thresholds.

9
United States Environmental Protection Agency, ([Link]
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 36

Navigator Global
Green Pioneer

Figure 11: 3D model of vessels

These steps facilitated a comprehensive analysis of ammonia plume behaviour and guided
the implementation of appropriate safety measures.

[Link] Release scenarios

Ammonia releases were evaluated in two locations: on deck (and therefore into the atmosphere)
and into water.

Figure 12: Release scenarios for plume dispersion modelling

The analysis was conducted under a range of wind speeds and directions as shown in Figure
12 to assess dispersion patterns across different environmental conditions experienced at
the anchorage of Port Dampier, ensuring a comprehensive understanding of site-specific
ammonia plume behaviour.
37 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

[Link] Modelling conditions

• Wind speeds: 1 m/s, 5 m/s, and 10 m/s, applied in longitudinal and transverse directions
• Ambient temperature: 30 ºC
• Concentration levels: AEGL-2 (220 ppm) and AEGL-3 (1,600 ppm) over 30 min exposure
• Transfer conditions:

Table 8: Assumed transfer conditions at manifold

Medium Operating Operating Flow rate

temperature (ºC) pressure (bar) (m3/hr)
Ammonia -33 5 800

• Release volume: While the emergency shutdown (ESD) response time is 30 s, a

conservative assumption of 2 min was used for the purpose of modelling. The dynamic
inventory was calculated by multiplying the release rate by this duration as shown in
Table 9.

Table 9: Assumed release volumes for two minutes

Assumed release Representative hole Release

scenarios size10 (mm) volume (m3)
Small leak 10 1
Instrument failure 25 2
Piping joint failure 75 14
Full pipe rupture (12 inch) 114 33
Hole in hose 50 12
Full hose rupture (8 inch) 81 32

• Evaporation rate: Evaporation rates over time were generated using SAFETI/ PHAST
software. Due to FLACS' limitations in modelling transient flow, releases were divided into
stages based on pool spreading and evaporation rates. This prevented over-conservatism
when a continuous and steady release is assumed. The predicted evaporation rate varied
with wind speed and was used accordingly in CFD simulations for each scenario. Each
release scenario followed a unique leak rate, depending on release size, release surface,
and wind speed.

10
International Association of Oil and Gas Procedures (IOGP) (2019), Risk assessment data directory - Process release
frequencies, ([Link]
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 38

2.5.3 Findings and recommendations

[Link] CFD key findings

• Plume length: For AEGL-3 (1,600 ppm), the maximum plume length of 1,300 m (0.7 NM)
remained within the anchorage diameter of 1 NM. For release into water with transverse
wind, ammonia remained mainly trapped in the space between the vessels and did not
result in a significant plume.

1,852 m
(1 NM)

Figure 13: Location and size of Western Anchorage WA19

The safety distances for these different scenarios are shown in Figure 14 and tabulated
in Table 10 and Table 11. The maximum plume distance at 220 ppm (AEGL-2) and 1,600
ppm (AEGL-3) was determined to be 1,900 m and 1,300 m, respectively.
39 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 14: Plume distances for release scenarios

Table 10: Plume distances that resulted from a 33 m3 release on deck

Wind Plume Plume distance relative to vessel position

speed concentration
(m/s) (ppm) Aft (m) Port side (m)

220 1,250 700

1 (See note)
1,600 600 600
220 1,500 1,050
5
1,600 650 650
220 1,900 1,650
10
1,600 750 750

Note: Plumes initially travelled 400 m over the sea surface before gaining elevation (over 50 m) with distance.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 40

Table 11: Plume distances that resulted from a 33 m3 release on water

Plume distance relative to vessel position

Wind Plume
(See note 1)
speed concentration
(m/s) (ppm) Aft (m) Port side (m)

220 1,350
1
1,600 750
220 1,600
5 (See note 2)
1,600 1,100
220 1,600
10
1,600 1,300

Note 1: The PHAST/SAFETI model predicts ammonia vaporisation and dilution based on release rate, inventory,
and weather (wind and water) for each case. It estimates evaporation rate, pool diameter, and temperature over
time for CFD input. Across simulations, 48% to 66% of the initial ammonia mass dissolved in water.
Note 2: When ammonia is released onto water within a narrow channel between the two ships, it remains confined
within that space. In this scenario, wind blowing from the forward to aft direction represents the worst case for gas
dispersion, and this scenario was used to establish the safety distances.

• Plume progression and dispersion:

The following key dispersion cases with wind direction from the bow of the
vessel and an ammonia release volume of 33 m3 on deck is shown below:

• Base case: AEGL-3 (1,600 ppm) plume dispersion at 10 m/s wind

speed representing the likely condition during operations at Port
Dampier on the day of trial. The base case yielded the maximum
plume distance.
• Low wind speed: AEGL-3 (1,600 ppm) plume dispersion at 1 m/s
wind speed (10 times lower).
• Low concentration: Plume dispersion for AEGL-2 (220 ppm), seven
times lower concentration than base case at 10 m/s and 1 m/s wind
speeds.

Figures 15, 17 and 19 reveal two distinct phases of plume behaviour in the
simulation:

• Top panel: Plume progression (movement of the plume in the wind

direction to its maximum distance)
• Bottom panel: Plume dispersion (retreat/ dispersal of the plume over
time)
41 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

• Base case (10 m/s wind and 1,600 ppm concentration): As shown in Figure 15, the
plume reached its maximum distance of over 600 m in approximately 3 min (175 s),
and within less than 5 s, the plume started to retreat towards the spill location,
returning within approximately 6 min (360 s).

Figure 15: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (10 m/s wind,
1,600 ppm concentration)

A maximum height of 40 m was observed from the spill source, beyond which it
gradually converged closer to the water surface, maintaining a height range of 5–20
m over the next 500 m (lateral). Beyond this distance, ammonia stayed close to the
water level. The maximum width of the plume occurred during the progression stage
and remained largely within the width of the vessels, with a maximum span of about
60 m, as shown in Figure 16.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 42

Figure 16: Plume width (60 m) during a 33 m3 release on deck (10 m/s wind,
1,600 ppm concentration)

The plume progressed at 5 m/s to its maximum distance; dispersion back towards the
spill location was around 4 m/s. The 1,600 ppm concentration was fully dispersed after
30 min. Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate the plume distribution for a concentration of
1,600 ppm; in reality, plume clouds with lower concentrations surrounded this zone.

• Low wind speed (Ten times slower w.r.t base case): Compared to the base case,
Figure 17 illustrates how the plume showed no signs of convergence towards the
water surface at a lower wind speed of 1 m/s. Within 4 min, it progressively reached a
maximum height of 100 m at a distance of 300 m from the spill location. Beyond this
point, the plume height gradually decreased over time until it reached its maximum
distance. As the dispersion continued over time, the 1,600 ppm concentration plume
was observed to be shrinking, shifting closer to the spill source.

Figure 17: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,

1,600 ppm concentration)
43 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 18: Plume width (100 m) during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,
1,600 ppm concentration)

In Figure 18, the width of the dispersion was larger than in the base case and extended
to a span of 100 m. The 1,600 ppm concentration remained mostly within the areal
boundary limits of the vessels after 20 min and ammonia dispersed completely after
approximately 60 min. Progression and dispersion rates were significantly lower than
the base case, at approximately 1.2 m/s and 1 m/s, respectively.

• Low concentration (Seven times lower w.r.t base case): In Figure 19, similar
dispersion patterns were identified for the 220 ppm concentration, with plume
distances significantly affected by wind speeds. Under low-wind conditions (Figure
20), the airborne nature of the plume resulted in multi-directional dispersion.

Figure 19: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (10 m/s wind,
220 ppm concentration)
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 44

Figure 20: Plume progressions during a 33 m3 release on deck (1 m/s wind,

220 ppm concentration)

[Link] Key recommendations from CFD analysis

• The AEGL-3 plume persists for up to 30 min under base case conditions and up to
60 min in low-wind conditions. Vessel crew should be advised to remain inside the
accommodation block during this period should a release of this type happen, with
ventilation systems set to recirculation mode and maintaining positive pressure in the
accommodation block.

• Safe zones should be designated on deck for higher-severity incidents, and the vessels
should be aligned with prevailing winds wherever operationally feasible, to promote
faster dispersion of AEGL-3 concentration plumes away from the spill site.

• The functionality of emergency showers and eye wash stations should be verified prior
to transfer operations.

• During transfer, other activities on deck should be minimised, with only essential
watchkeeping personnel permitted on deck. Hazardous material (HAZMAT) suits, self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and gas masks should be made available at
designated points along the deck.

• Crew members trained in emergency response should don appropriate PPE—including

HAZMAT suits and SCBA—to carry out mitigative actions, provided it is safe and feasible.

• ERP should be updated to include staged evacuation timelines based on plume exposure
duration. Criteria for safe re-entry to affected areas should be clearly defined.
45 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

2.6 Emergency Response Plan (ERP)

2.6.1 Overview

Emergency response planning for ammonia release incidents is essential due to the hazardous
nature of ammonia. Exposure poses severe health risks, including respiratory damage, skin
burns, and, in extreme cases, fatal consequences. Although ammonia is generally non-
flammable, ignition under certain conditions necessitates specific fire and evacuation protocols.
A structured plan outlining response procedures, chain of command, and communication
pathways is required to ensure a coordinated and efficient response. Regular drills and training
enhance readiness and reduce response times in actual incidents.

2.6.2 Methodology

[Link] Incident tiers

Response actions were defined based on an escalating scale where the mobilisation of
resources—both equipment and personnel—varied according to the scale and characteristics
of the incident.

The response followed a three-tier concept, with levels determined based on:

• The type and nature of the incident

• The potential impact on people, the environment, assets, and reputation
• The amount and source of resources deployed
• The levels of support and higher-level management activation
• Potential stakeholders, media, and public interest in the incident

Tier assignment facilitated the prioritisation and effective allocation of resources, ensuring an
efficient response based on incident severity.

Figure 21: Incident tiers outlining the extent of emergency response

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 46

• Tier 1: Incidents managed solely by the vessel crew without external support

• Tiers 2 & 3: Incidents requiring external assistance. Tier 2 responses involve vessel
management’s salvage service representatives and/ or local authorities. Tier 3 incidents
necessitate additional global salvage company involvement alongside Tier 2 responders.

[Link] Tier-level assessment

A structured tier-level assessment guide was used to determine the appropriate response tier.
Due to the unpredictable nature of incidents, adjustments to the response tier would have to
be made as the situation evolves or when new information becomes available.

Figure 22: Tier-level assessment guide

47 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

[Link] Integration with other plans

ERP was integrated with existing port and vessel management procedures to ensure a unified
response approach, as shown in Figure 23.

Figure 23: Integration of existing operational procedures with pilot-specific ERP

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 48

[Link] Initial action

Upon sighting or detecting an ammonia release, predefined notification and response

protocols should be activated, and key personnel should get involved according to the
command structure shown in Figure 24.

Figure 24: Initial actions flowchart

49 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

2.6.3 Findings and recommendations

[Link] Key findings

• Response management: Shipboard personnel are required to take urgent measures in

accordance with the ship’s SMPEP, ship-to-ship transfer operations plan, and contingency
plans to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Once immediate safety concerns
are addressed, relevant authorities and stakeholders should be notified.

Figure 25: Response protocol

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 50

Table 12: Guidelines to nominate OCS

Questions/ Considerations Navigator Global Green Pioneer

Where has the incident taken place?

What is the (initial) cause for the incident?
Where is the primary risk of further escalation located?
Who is the most suitable/ best positioned to respond
to the incident?
Are there any injuries and/ or medical emergency
requiring immediate attention, and where/ who?

Figure 26: Joint emergency response structure

51 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 25 illustrates the communication flow, response organisation and authorities involved.
In the case of incidents involving both Navigator Global and Green Pioneer, joint emergency
response coordination is essential. The shipmasters are responsible for appointing an OSC
based on the guidelines in Table 12. The respective shore-based incident management
teams will assume initial response primacy until a fully established joint response structure is
implemented, as outlined in Figure 26.

• Credible release scenarios of vapour or liquid ammonia:

• Piping failure: Leaks from piping components (e.g., valves, flanges, etc.) or release
due to failure of instruments
• Hose failure: Breakaway or hose rupture leading to ammonia release (with quantities
limited to the time required to close the emergency shutdown valve)
• Uncontrolled venting: Malfunctions in PV valve, tank overpressure, or overfilling
resulting in unplanned ammonia venting
• Fire/ explosion: Fire in the cargo or fuel system, superstructure, or engine room,
leading to a loss of control over safety systems

[Link] Recommendations

• Response resources

Based on study findings, a tiered response framework was adopted to manage the risks
associated with an ammonia release. Tier 1 response capabilities should be maintained
onboard the vessel, in line with International Maritime Organization (IMO) requirements,
including provisions for shipboard monitoring, ESD systems, fixed firefighting infrastructure,
and appropriate PPE. For more severe scenarios, Tier 2 and Tier 3 responses should
leverage external resources—either regional or international—such as standby vessels with
firefighting capability, towing support, optical gas imaging (OGI) cameras, and certified
incident handlers familiar with local emergency frameworks. The vessel’s DPA should be
empowered to coordinate these external resources, ensuring timely and effective escalation
when onboard capabilities are insufficient. A tabletop exercise should be conducted to
ensure a common understanding of the emergency response protocols.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 52

Figure 27: Response resource overview

53 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

• Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

Figure 28: The different PPEs deployed during this pilot

• General PPE: Safety helmet, coveralls, safety shoes, gloves, and safety goggles

• PPE for watchkeeping and deck operations: General PPE with personal ammonia
detector should be used while on deck, but outside the restricted access area near
the manifold during ammonia transfer. In addition, the following are also made
available on deck: NIOSH-certified Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) or equivalent; tight-fitting air-purifying respirators (APR) with canister-type
gas mask suited for ammonia levels up to 300 ppm, and hood type emergency
escape breathing devices.

• PPE for hose disconnection or tasks involving low-risk of ammonia exposure:

Chemical suit with hood, NIOSH-certified (CBRN) tight-fitting APR with canister-type
gas mask suited for levels up to 300 ppm or equivalent, ammonia-rated gloves and
boots, and personal ammonia detectors.

• Emergency response PPE: A minimum of two SCBAs, including airtight, fully

encapsulated safety suits, should be available on deck for personnel handling
emergency response.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 54

• OGI camera

Figure 29: OGI camera

Courtesy of FLIR

Ammonia vapour is colourless and invisible to the human eye. Visual detection of ammonia
releases is only feasible when it reacts with atmospheric moisture, forming aerosols containing
condensed water vapour and ammonium hydroxide. These visible plumes typically occur
during cryogenic releases. Therefore, remote sensing technologies are required to detect
dispersed ammonia plumes that are no longer associated with visible aerosols. An OGI camera
capable of large-field ammonia detection was brought onboard the Green Pioneer for remote
monitoring of potential release.

• Emergency evacuation

The following considerations were in place for the emergency evacuation.

Green Pioneer Navigator Global

Port side lifeboat Starboard lifeboat

Port side accommodation ladder or pilot ladder Starboard accommodation ladder or pilot ladder

Standby vessel Coral Knight Standby vessel Coral Knight

55 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

• Standby vessel

The Coral Knight was nominated as a standby firefighting tug, equipped with two water
monitors capable of deploying 2,400 m3 /hr with 160 m throw (as per FiFi Class 1 requirement).
This vessel is tasked with (but not limited to) the following response actions:

Figure 30: Standby vessel Coral Knight

Courtesy of Bhagwan Marine

• Emergency towing or mooring/ unmooring services

• Use of water monitors to protect hull, superstructure and/ or other vessels in the
vicinity depending on wind direction or toxic ammonia cloud movement
• Firefighting support
• Emergency medical response and evacuation
• Transport/ transfer of equipment/ personnel

The Coral Knight was positioned in proximity (within 0.5 NM) to enable a response immediately
if needed.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 56

• Incident handler

A Level 3 AMSA-recognised incident handler was on standby ashore to provide guidance to

shipboard and shore-based management teams. The handler was trained to:

• Manage incidents with significant political, economic, environmental, and media

implications
• Establish and oversee personnel safety and welfare measures
• Coordinate multi-agency response efforts
• Interface with affected stakeholders, communities, and external organisations

By implementing these emergency response measures, operational risks associated with an

ammonia release can be mitigated, ensuring an efficient, well-coordinated response strategy.
57 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

3 Operation execution

3.1 Location details

Operations were conducted at Western Anchorage WA19, located approximately 20 NM
from Port Dampier. This anchorage, spanning a diameter of 1 NM, was subject to strict
access restrictions imposed by Vessel Traffic Services under the management of PPA. These
restrictions were enforced to ensure that only vessels directly involved in the operations were
permitted entry. By implementing these measures, operational security was maintained, and
external interference was minimised.

The dimensions of WA19 were sufficient to prevent disruptions caused by the wake of passing
vessels, ensuring stability throughout operations. Additionally, its considerable distance from
the shore and other sensitive areas supplemented safety protocols, effectively mitigating risks
associated with proximity to such receptors.

3.2 Mooring analysis based on weather forecast

The mooring analysis outlined in chapter 2.3 was conducted using historical weather data as
a basis for assessment. Closer to the operations date, regional weather forecast was tracked
closely, given the increased reliability of weather forecasts within a week of the targeted
operations date.

The weather forecast from 11 to 16 September 2024 was monitored daily from 1 to 10
September 2024. To further enhance operational safety, a 2D Optimoor study was conducted,
providing a timely and detailed evaluation of mooring safety in alignment with the predicted
weather conditions.
 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 58

Table 13: Sample results from mooring analysis using forecasted weather data

Wind waves Swell Current Highest line load

Max
Max Guest excursion at
Case anchor
fender manifold
Speed Hs Tp Direction Hs Tp Direction Speed Direction Host Guest chain
load (Fwd/ Aft/ Out)
(from) (from) (from) load

1 S 20% 15% 20 t 15 t 0.30/ 0.00/ 0.00

2 20 knots SW 26% 21% 25 t 21 t 0.30/ 0.00/ 0.00

1.5 m 6s 0.2 m 16 s NW 1 knot SW
3 (1 hr) W 23% 19% 19 t 19 t 0.30/ 0.00/ 0.00

4 NW 14% 12% 22 t 15 t 0.30/ 0.00/ 0.00

<50% 50% <438 t <304 t

Wind Swell 1 Swell 2 Current Highest line

Max
load Max Guest excursion
Case anchor
fender at manifold
Speed Direction Hs Tp Direction Hs Tp Direction Speed Direction Host Guest chain
load (Fwd/ Aft/ Out)
(from) (from) (from) (from) load

5 N 12% 9% 8t 12 t 0.03/ 0.03/ 0.00

E
6 12 knots S 22% 17% 8t 19 t 0.05/ 0.03/ 0.00
0.3 m 6s WNW 0.3 m 16 s WSW 0.6 knot
7 (1 hr) N 20% 15% 10 t 14 t 0.04/ 0.01/ 0.00
S
8 S 32% 22% 10 t 23 t 0.03/ 0.03/ 0.00

<50% 50% <438 t <304 t

Notes:
• Host: Green Pioneer
• Guest: Navigator Global
• Numbers in green refer to allowable limits

The following operating limits were established to ensure safe and effective mooring
conditions:

• Maximum wind speed: 20 knots

• Swell conditions: Height ≤0.3 m, time period 16 s
• Wind-generated waves: ≤1.5 m, time period 6 s
• Current: A northerly flood tide and a southerly ebb tide were observed; however, the
tidal rate was determined to be too low to have any significant impact on mooring
operations
59 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

3.3 Assets deployment

To ensure the safe execution of this pilot, coordinated deployment of vessels and equipment
was undertaken. The delegation matrix for key assets in the trial is outlined in Table 14.

Table 14: Delegation matrix

Ammonia

Green Pioneer

Navigator Global

Fendering and transfer system

Support and standby vessel:

Coral Knight
Crewboat: Stenella, Invincible

Crewboat: Necede

Tugs:
Oita, Pilbara Vulcan, Pilbara Titan
and Pilbara Thor

Pilotage

Cargo survey
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 60

• Transport and equipment logistics: The Green Pioneer arrived at Port Dampier ahead
of schedule, enabling cargo loading operations to commence one day ahead of planned
operations. Once loaded, the vessel departed from the liquid bulk terminal of Port
Dampier and proceeded to the Western Anchorage at WA19.

Figure 31: Equipment at the liquid bulk terminal of Port Dampier

Figure 32: ERC testing at the Dampier Cargo Wharf of Port Dampier

The transfer system components were transported separately from Singapore to Port
Dampier in two consignments. Upon arrival, these components were transferred by land
to the Dampier Cargo Wharf (DCW) at Port Dampier, where they were offloaded, tested,
and subsequently loaded onto the Coral Knight. The details of the fenders and transfer
system components are shown in Table 15.
61 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Table 15: Details of fenders and transfer system components

Assets Description

Fenders Primary fenders: Ø 3,300 mm x 6,500 mm – 4 nos.

Secondary fenders: Ø 1,500 mm x 3,000 mm – 2 nos.

Transfer system components 8-inch ANSI 150 hose – 2 nos.

8-inch ANSI 150 ERC – 2 nos.
Activation devices for ERCs
1. Air dryer
2. Pneumatic Hydraulic Power Unit (PHPU)
3. Vessel Separation Detection (VSD) device
Hose supports
1. ERC side hose saddle (with fall arrestor) – 2 nos.
2. Hose saddle (without fall arrestor) – 2 nos.

• Transit and navigational adjustments: While these preparatory activities were underway,
the project team closely tracked the progress of the Navigator Global as it made its way
to Western Anchorage WA19.

Figure 33: Deployment of primary fenders

Following the completion of its commercial operations in Ulsan, South Korea, the vessel
commenced its southward voyage towards Port Dampier.

• Execution: With both gas carriers securely positioned at WA19, mooring operations
commenced. As part of the mooring procedure, the Green Pioneer was anchored using
its port-side anchor while the Coral Knight secured its stern line to maintain heading.
Meanwhile, the Navigator Global approached at a controlled speed of five knots until it
reached approximately 100 m off the Green Pioneer’s starboard side.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 62

Figure 34: Vessels involved in mooring operations

Figure 35: Mooring arrangement

63 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

The tugs Oita and Pilbara Vulcan, each delivering approximately 65 tonnes of bollard
pull, provided assistance for both berthing and unberthing operations. They manoeuvred
the Navigator Global into position by applying controlled push forces, ensuring a gradual
approach at a speed not exceeding 0.2 m/s. This process continued until the Navigator Global
was securely aligned alongside the Green Pioneer, positioned adjacent to the four primary
fenders.

The Coral Knight played a pivotal role in facilitating coordination between the vessels, ensuring
seamless execution of all operations. The entire sequence—including loading, offloading,
and material transfers—was executed in full compliance with standard maritime protocols.
These measures ensured that all vessel movements were conducted efficiently, safely, and
in accordance with established procedures, marking the successful completion of this critical
phase of the project.

3.4 Transfer and shutdown systems

3.4.1 Transfer system

Figure 36: Transfer system arrangement

The transfer system was configured with an emergency release coupling to ensure the safe
separation of hoses in the event of an incident. Earlier considerations included the option to
deploy a quick connect-disconnect coupling (QCDC) in alignment with existing International
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 64

Code of Safety for Ship Using Gases or Other Low-flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code). However,
the available QCDCs, primarily designed for LNG, contained brass components that are
incompatible with ammonia exposure. While a one-off exemption was obtained from the QCDC
manufacturer, subsequent conversations with SGMF indicated the optional arrangements in
discussion at IMO (See Figure 47). Consequently, a bolted flange assembly was selected for
the receiving vessel’s manifold. This approach aligned with ongoing developments at the
IMO concerning the Interim Ammonia Guidelines and proposed amendments to the IGF
code. These amendments were made on the provision that operational procedures—such as
post-transfer purging—were strictly adhered to ensure dry disconnection of hoses to minimise
exposure and release risks and ensure compliance with emerging regulatory frameworks.

3.4.2 Nitrogen leak test

Figure 37: Nitrogen leak test configuration

65 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 38: Nitrogen released to the atmosphere post-leak test

The liquid and vapour lines between the Green Pioneer's manifold valve and the Navigator
Global's manifold valve underwent a leak test before transfer operations. Nitrogen was
introduced through the Green Pioneer’s manifold vent, with the liquid line pressurised to 7
bar and the vapour line to 2 bar. All pipe connections were carefully inspected for leaks using
a soap solution. Following the completion of the leak test, nitrogen was released through
Navigator Global's manifold drain to ensure system integrity before transfer commenced.

3.4.3 Ammonia transfer #1

(From the Green Pioneer to the Navigator Global)

Liquid ammonia at -33ºC was first pumped from cargo tank no. 1 of the Green Pioneer, using
one pump from the port side and one from the starboard side. Each pump had a maximum
flow rate of 400 m³/hr. The agreed transfer volume was 4,000 m³, with an initial transfer rate
of 100 m³/hr at 2 bar pressure for the first 15 min to cool the transfer lines and monitor for any
abnormal conditions. Subsequently, the flow rate was increased to 700 m³/hr, maintaining a
manifold pressure of approximately 6 bar.

Table 16: Transfer flow rates

Transfer stage Flow rate Max. pressure at manifold Duration

Line cool down 100 m³/hr 2.0 bar ~15 min

Full transfer rate 700 m³/hr 6.0 bar ~ 6 hrs
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 66

Figure 39: Ammonia transfer #1 from the Green Pioneer to the Navigator Global

To regulate tank pressure, the Green Pioneer used its cargo vaporiser to maintain positive tank
pressure and manage any back pressure in the lines. Vapour generated during the transfer
was primarily processed by the reliquefaction plant on the Navigator Global and, in the case
of an emergency, it would be returned to the supply vessel’s cargo tank.

3.4.4 Ammonia transfer #2

(From the Navigator Global to the Green Pioneer)

The second stage of the operation involved transferring liquid ammonia from the Navigator
Global back to the Green Pioneer. Similar to the first transfer, liquid ammonia at -33ºC was
pumped from Navigator Global's cargo tank no. 1 using one pump from the port side and
one from the starboard side. Each pump on the Navigator Global was capable of pumping
at a maximum flow rate of 350 m³/hr, ensuring a controlled and efficient reverse transfer
of ammonia. When this transfer operation was completed, the disconnecting procedures
commenced.
67 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 40: Ammonia transfer #2 from the Navigator Global back to

the Green Pioneer

3.4.5 Hot gassing

Figure 41: Hot gassing

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 68

Warm ammonia at 40ºC was introduced into the liquid line to remove residual liquid ammonia
from the transfer system. Pressure at the Green Pioneer’s manifold was increased to 5 bar
by throttling the manifold valve before gradually reducing to approximately 0.5 bar. This
controlled pressure reduction allowed the liquid ammonia to warm and vaporise, pushing any
trapped liquid back to the Green Pioneer.

To accelerate vaporisation, a fire hose from each vessel supplied a continuous seawater spray
at ambient temperature onto the ‘U’ bend section of the liquid line. This process continued
for approximately two hours until the temperature at the manifolds of the Green Pioneer and
Navigator Global stabilised to ambient conditions. As the vapour return line did not contain
liquid ammonia, hot gassing was not required for this line.

3.4.6 Nitrogen blow through and purging

Figure 42: Nitrogen purging

Nitrogen cylinders were connected to the Navigator Global’s manifold vent after hot gassing.
Pressure at the Green Pioneer manifold was increased to 5 bar by throttling the manifold
valve, with the initial nitrogen blow through directed into the Green Pioneer’s cargo tank.
Subsequently, the lines were purged for approximately 10 min, allowing nitrogen to be
released into the manifold drip tray filled with water on the Green Pioneer’s side.
69 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 43: Gas measurement through the manifold drain valve

As shown in Figure 43, gas measurements were taken before disconnection to confirm
that the inline ammonia concentration was below 300 ppm, ensuring a safe and controlled
disconnection process. The ammonia detector recorded a concentration of 7 ppm.

3.4.7 Emergency shutdown (ESD) and ERC arrangements

Both vessels were equipped with an emergency shutdown panel at the manifold, with remotely
operable pendant exchanged between the vessels, enabling the crew on either vessel to
activate shutdown activities. In the event of vessel separation, the ESD which involves the
stopping of transfer pumps and closing of manifold valves, and ERC actuation which involves
the separation of the transfer system, would occur in two stages: ESD-1 at 5 m drift and ESD-2
at 10 m drift. ESD-1 was linked to the alarm system of PHPU. When triggered, the crew on
continuous watch could manually activate the emergency stop button on the ESD panel or
pendant. This action would stop ammonia transfer by shutting down the transfer pumps and
closing the manifold valves on both vessels.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 70

Figure 44: ESD and ERC arrangements

71 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 45: ERC internal flip-flap valve

Courtesy of Trelleborg

Crew on watch may manually trigger the separation of the transfer system if needed. If the
vessels continued to drift apart before crew could respond, ESD-2 would activate at 10 m,
automatically triggering ERC to separate. This two-stage system provided a critical safety
buffer, allowing the crew to take appropriate action upon activation of ESD-1, while ensuring
automatic fail-safes were in place through ESD-2 in more severe vessel separation scenarios.

3.5 Joint plan of operations (JPO)

A summary of planned operations was documented in the operational record known as the
‘JPO form’. This document was used to brief all personnel involved in the actual operations,
ensuring alignment with the established plan. It also served as a platform for discussion,
allowing personnel to agree upon, amend, or introduce additional protocols deemed
necessary based on prevailing conditions at the operation site.

Table 17 shows examples of operation protocols established.

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 72

Table 17: Examples of operation protocols established

Agreed method of monitoring Global Positioning System (GPS): Speed over ground
vessels’ speed Doppler log: Bottom track speed & approaching and berthing velocity

Agreed communication Primary: Very High Frequency (VHF) channel 72, backup channel 69
Secondary: VHF channel 16, handheld walkie talkie

Agreed operating limits Berthing: Wind ≤20 knots

Stop cargo and monitor: Wind ≥20 knots (sustained for 15 min)
Disconnect and unberth: Wind ≥25 knots

Personnel transfer Personnel transfer to be carried out via Coral Knight and other crew
transfer vessel. No transfer permitted by personnel transfer basket
using ship’s crane.

Man overboard rescue and Following Life Saving Appliances (LSA) onboard Green Pioneer,
recovery arrangements Navigator Global and Coral Knight:
1. Lifebuoy near accommodation ladder
2. Rescue boat

Vessel separation detection Refer to Figure 44. The actuation wire length was modified based on
the arrival drafts of the vessels:
ESD 1: 5.25 m
ESD 2: 11.14 m

Checklists Vessel management’s cargo transfer checklists developed based on

Society of International Gas Tanker and Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)
requirements
Checklist 1: Pre-arrival information
Checklist 2: Before operations commence
Checklist 3: Before berthing and mooring
Checklist 4: Before cargo transfer
Checklist 5: Before unmooring

All checklists were agreed to be discussed via the agreed

communication VHF channel
73 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

3.6 Timeline of key events (hrs)

11 September 2024

01:00 Green Pioneer at Western Anchorage WA19 and port-side anchor

deployed
20:00 Loading of fenders and transfer kits from the Dampier Cargo Wharf at Port
Dampier wharf to the Coral Knight
23:00 Loading completed, the Coral Knight cast off to Western Anchorage
WA19

12 September 2024

17:45 Coral Knight commence fendering and loading of transfer kits on the
Green Pioneer
18:45 Loading completed for the day, the Coral Knight on standby at Western
Anchorage WA19

13 September 2024

07:25 Coral Knight commence fendering and loading of transfer kits on the
Green Pioneer
12:12 Cargo surveyor 1 embarked the Green Pioneer
12:30 Initial tank inspection for ammonia volume commenced on the Green
Pioneer
12:36 The Coral Kight completed fendering and loading of transfer kits on the
Green Pioneer
13:00 Initial tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Green
Pioneer
13:30 End of Sea Passage (EOSP) for the Navigator Global
13:54 POAC embarked the Navigator Global
14:06 Pilot and cargo surveyor 2 embarked the Navigator Global
14:30 Forward tug Pilbara Vulcan and aft tug Oita made fast to the Navigator
Global
15:30 First line secured and mooring commenced between the Navigator Global
and the Green Pioneer
16:18 The Navigator Global and the Green Pioneer are all fast and tugs cast off
16:30 Initial tank inspection for ammomnia volume commenced on the
Navigator Global
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 74

17:20 Initial tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Navigator
Global
22:48 Placement of hose saddles and liquid hose connection commenced
23:48 Placement of hose saddles and liquid hose connection completed

14 September 2024

00:12 Placement of hose saddles and vapour hose connection commenced

00:42 Placement of hose saddles and vapour hose connection completed
00:48 JPO discussion commenced on VHF
01:00 JPO discussion completed
01:20 Liquid and vapour lines prepared for nitrogen pressure test
01:48 Pressure test of liquid line with nitrogen at 7 bar completed
02:12 Pressure test of vapour line with nitrogen at 2 bar completed
02:30 ESD pendants exchanged and ESD activated and tested
03:24 Ammonia transfer #1 commenced (from the Green Pioneer to the
Navigator Global)
08:36 Ammonia transfer #1 completed (from the Green Pioneer to the Navigator
Global)
09:18 Tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Navigator Global
after ammonia transfer #1
09:30 Tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Green Pioneer
after transfer #1
10:06 Ammonia transfer #2 commenced (from the Navigator Global to the
Green Pioneer)
14:54 Ammonia transfer #2 completed (from the Navigator Global to the Green
Pioneer)
15:30 Tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Green Pioneer
after ammonia transfer #2
15:48 Tank inspection for ammonia volume completed on the Navigator Global
after ammonia transfer #2
15:50 Hot gassing of the liquid line commenced from the Navigator Global to
the Green Pioneer
17:18 Hot gassing of liquid line completed
17:24 Nitrogen blow through and purging of the liquid line commenced from
the Navigator Global to the Green Pioneer
17:54 Nitrogen purging of the liquid line completed
75 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

18:00 Gas measurement taken at the manifold of the Green Pioneer. Ammonia
concentration 7 ppm in the liquid line. No ammonia detected in the
vapour line.

18:05 Liquid hose disconnection commenced

18:24 Liquid hose disconnected
18:42 Vapour hose disconnection commenced
18:54 Vapour hose disconnected
20:12 Transfer kits transferred from the Navigator Global to the Green Pioneer
20:30 Documents and checklists signed and exchanged

15 September 2024

09:00 Cargo surveyor 2 disembarked the Navigator Global

09:30 Cargo surveyor 1 disembarked the Green Pioneer

09:48 Pilot embarked the Navigator Global

10:18 Forward tug Pilbara Thor and aft tug Pilbara Titan made fast and
unmooring commenced

10:24 Unmooring completed

10:36 Tugs cast off

11:06 POAC disembarked the Navigator Global

11:12 Pilot disembarked the Navigator Global

12:00 Beginning of Sea Passage (BOSP) for the Navigator Global

12:12 The Coral Knight commenced defendering from the Green Pioneer

14:00 Defendering completed

14:06 The Green Pioneer commenced packing of transfer kits into crates

17:12 The Green Pioneer completed packing of transfer kits

19:42 The Coral Knight commenced collecting transfer kits

21:48 The Coral Knight completed collecting transfer kits

21:54 The Coral Knight casts off to Port Dampier

Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 76

4 Optimising ammonia bunkering

4.1 Overview
This chapter outlines operational recommendations for both the bunker tanker (supply vessel)
and the ammonia-fuelled vessel (receiving vessel), drawing from insights gained during the
trial. In the absence of a dedicated ammonia bunker tanker, two gas carriers were used in
the trial to simulate bunkering operations. For clarity, the supplying gas carrier is referred to
hereafter as the bunker tanker, and the receiving gas carrier as the receiving vessel.

Ammonia’s gravimetric and volumetric energy densities are approximately 2.5 times lower
than those of conventional fuels, so vessels powered by ammonia will require more frequent
bunkering operations or have much larger bunker tanks, which will directly affect cargo carrying
capacity, to make the same journey. This presents a unique set of challenges for ammonia-
fuelled vessels. As a result, it is crucial to consider several key factors during the design and
development of the vessels and their bunkering manifold and associated hardware to ensure
efficiency and safety.

Table 18: Ammonia properties

Fuel property Unit Heavy fuel oil Liquid ammonia

Low heating value MJ/kg 40.2 18.6

(kWh/kg) (11.17) (5.17)

Volumetric energy MJ/m3 39,564-42,036 14,100

density (kWh/m ) 3
(10,990-11,677) (3,917)

Min. auto-ignition
temperature °C 250 650-657

Boiling temperature at
1atm °C N/A -33.4

Condensation pressure
at 25 °C atm N/A 9.90

Hydrogen content % by mass N/A 17.8

77 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

4.2 Transfer system set up

The connection between the manifolds of the bunker tanker and the receiving vessel generally
consists of three main components: the hose, ERC, and QCDC. As shown in Figure 46, ERC
and QCDC may be located on the receiving vessel’s manifold. This ensures that the main parts
of the transfer system remain linked to the bunker tanker in the case of a quick disconnection
or an emergency separation. There are two types of ERCs, a passive ERC that can be triggered
above a preset tension experienced by the bolted connection with the transfer hose, or an
active ERC, where disconnection is triggered by high tension on the actuation wire as shown
in Figure 44. Taking into consideration space limitations on the receiving vessel and also the
need for the crew to be trained to test and operate ERCs, it is recommended that ERC should
be positioned on the bunker tanker manifold. This allows for more flexible arrangements
without compromising safety or operational efficiency.

If a passive ERC, which is triggered by a preset tension on the bolted connection with the
hose, is used, its operability and the risk of unintentional separation due to ice formation
during the transfer should be considered.

An active ERC, which was used in this trial (see Figure 44), typically includes heated hydraulic
systems to prevent ice formation. The active ERC should be placed on the bunker tanker
manifold to avoid the need for rigging the power units, hydraulic systems, pneumatic hose
assemblies, or transferring qualified personnel to the receiving vessel to operate and monitor
the ERC system. The power unit for the active ERC should be equipped with necessary
operational alarms that monitor temperature, air pressure, hydraulic pressure, etc., and to
alert crew of any abnormal operations.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 78

Figure 46: ERC configuration options in a typical transfer system

The ERC should be directly connected to the manifold or the QCDC and should not be
installed between hose sections unless they are properly supported.

Figure 47 illustrates the different types of connections11 that may be used at the manifold
flange of the receiving vessel. The key safety objective of this connection is to provide a dry
disconnection of the hoses after the transfer operation. In Figure 47 (1) and (2), a self-closing
or manually operated valve is used to seal off the hose prior to disconnection. Whereas in
Figure 47 (3) and (4), sealing valves are absent. When using connections shown in Figure 47
(3) or (4), operating procedures that ensure a dry disconnection need to be established.

11
In accordance with IMO Regulation MSC.1/Circ. 1687 Interim Guidelines for the Safety of Ships Using
Ammonia as Fuel, Section 8.4
79 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 47: Receiving vessel manifold connection types

As with the case in this trial, dry disconnection can be achieved by hot gassing, which involves
introducing warm ammonia into the transfer system to vaporise any residual liquid ammonia,
followed by a nitrogen purge to remove the ammonia vapours. Gas measurements should be
taken and must be below 300 ppm before the hose can be disconnected.

The 300 ppm threshold corresponds to an Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)
concentration for ammonia, as defined by the US National Institute for Occupational Safety
and Health (NIOSH)12. This represents an upper safety boundary, while more conservative
thresholds are recommended for early detection and response in several guidelines published
following operational trials. The IMO Interim Guidelines for the Safety of Ships Using Ammonia
as Fuel, issued on 26 February 2025, for example, specify lower ammonia detection thresholds
of 25 ppm for enclosed spaces, 110 ppm for secondary containments, and 220–250 ppm for
alarm and emergency shutdown activation. These thresholds provide a tiered safety system
that would activate emergency response well below the IDLH limit. SGMF's "Ammonia as a
marine fuel - Safety and Operational guidelines - Bunkering", released in September 2024,
recommends hose disconnection only when ammonia concentrations are measured at 25
ppm or below. During GCMD’s trial, ammonia concentration in the liquid line was recorded at
7 ppm after the nitrogen purge.

Hot gassing may not be required for the vapour return line; it may be disconnected after
nitrogen purging and gas measurements, provided the concentrations fall within the safety
limits.

12
CDC (2014), The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) - Ammonia,
([Link]
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 80

4.3 Ammonia bunker tanker configuration and

operations

4.3.1 General

The bunker tanker design must comply with the IMO regulations at the time of its construction,
such as the International Code of the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied
Gases in Bulk (IGC Code), as well as the requirements set by its implementing authority, flag
state, and classification society. Additionally, the tanker must operate under a clearly defined
bunkering procedure, which should be outlined in the International Safety Management (ISM)
manual onboard. This ensures that all operations are carried out according to international
safety standards.

Personnel involved in bunkering operations must be adequately trained and certified

according to the latest Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code.
These certifications should also comply with any additional requirements imposed by the
relevant port authority. Regular training updates and adherence to best practices are crucial
to ensuring safe and efficient operations during ammonia bunkering and related activities.

In the absence of an ammonia bunker tanker, GCMD’s trial involved ammonia transfer
between two gas carriers. Because the supply gas carrier was not outfitted specifically for such
an operation, numerous provisions were needed. The observations and recommendations
outlined here were built upon existing LNG and fuel oil bunkering guidelines. While these
guidelines articulate the overarching safety objectives, the specifics of the arrangements
differ between ship operators, who are responsible for developing vessel-specific solutions
to ensure compliance. These learnings have shaped the considerations outlined in Figure 48.

Figure 48: Bunker tanker design considerations

81 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

4.3.2 Propulsion and manoeuvring

The bunker tanker's propulsion and manoeuvring capabilities must be sufficient to enable it to
approach and berth alongside the receiving vessel independently, without requiring assistance
from tugs or other support vessels. In the absence of this capability in the supply vessel during
our trial, we had to deploy several tugboats to assist in manoeuvring the gas carriers in place for
ammonia transfer. The use of side thrusters enhances the tanker’s manoeuvrability, particularly
in confined or restricted spaces. The ability to navigate and position the vessel precisely is
crucial during bunkering operations, ensuring safety and efficiency. These capabilities obviate
the use of additional tugs during approach and unmooring operations.

4.3.3 Fenders

Rigging and mooring fenders take considerable time; the stowage, inflation/ deflation,
and handling of fenders should be incorporated into the bunker tanker design to optimise
operations. Adequate storage space for fenders, including the necessary number of spares, is
essential to support the bunkering of various ship lengths.

Additionally, providing sufficient air supply for inflation and testing, along with extra bitts for
mooring the fenders, will further optimise operations by reducing the time spent on fender
management.

4.3.4 Manifold arrangement

The bunker tanker’s manifold area is typically located midship, akin to IGC-compliant vessels.
The liquid and vapour return lines must be fitted with appropriate vents and drain lines to
facilitate safe and efficient operations.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 82

Figure 49: Provision for nitrogen supply at the manifold

Additionally, a separate tapping point to introduce nitrogen into the manifold line should be
provided. For frequent bunkering operations, installing a shipboard nitrogen generator with
permanent piping linked to the manifold is advisable.
83 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

Figure 50: Considerations for manifold locations

The manifold location on the receiving vessel is generally towards the aft and just forward
of the accommodation block. This placement minimises interference with cargo spaces.
Depending on the manifold location of the receiving vessel, the lineup of the manifolds on the
two vessels may be suboptimal during parallel body mooring. Flexibility in manifold location
on the bunker tanker (either forward or aft of midship) or the use of innovative transfer systems
may be needed. Special attention should be paid to the arrangement of mooring bitts when
designing the manifold arrangement, especially on the forward side of the bunker tanker.

4.3.5 Transfer system

The deck or hose handling crane must have adequate offboard outreach, and the planned
lifting operations shall be within safe working load limits. Sufficient hose stopper bitts should
be provided in the vicinity of the hose railing to assist in the rigging and securing of hoses.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 84

Figure 51: Hose rail height and manifold width

As shown in Figure 51, the height of the hose railing shall be such that the section of the hose
connecting to ERC or the manifold is within the allowable bending limits of the hose. Also,
with reference to Figure 52, provision to attach a fall arrestor block of adequate size in line with
the liquid and vapour lines should be provided to prevent any sudden fall of the detachable
side of the ERC-hose assembly upon activation. When the distance between the hose railing
and manifold is significant, this section of the hose shall be adequately supported using hose
bun, as shown in Figure 52 (1). The use of a deck crane to support hose arrangement should
be avoided as the crane may be needed for emergency response operations. Alternatively,
support or hose saddles, as shown in Figure 52 (2), may be used. GCMD’s trial deployed hose
saddles on both vessels to support the liquid and vapour lines during transfer.

Figure 52: Hose support arrangement

85 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

An integrated bunker boom may be an alternative to the use of transfer hoses. This helps to
counter the offset in the manifold line-up and greatly improves operational efficiency. Hose
disconnection is also safer, as there should be minimal trapped ammonia in the absence of
a ‘U’ bend. Also, nitrogen purging should be more effective since the hoses are lifted to a
position higher than the receiving vessel’s manifold.

4.3.6 Vapour management

A vapour return line should be deployed to prevent pressure buildup and avoid boil-off gas
release into the atmosphere. Significant operational and safety implications arise when the
vapour return lines are connected, as the bunker tanker can lose control of its tank pressure as
it is now subjected to changes in the receiving vessel’s system. It is, therefore, important that
associated pressure-sensing devices on the bunker tanker are in place and well-maintained. It
is also essential that individual cargo tank PV valves are operational and properly maintained.

4.3.7 Spill containment

An appropriately sized drip tray that spans the piping joints between the manifold-ERC and
the ERC-hose should be in place. As shown in Figure 51, the drip tray should be extended
closer to the hull side to accommodate for the variable sizing of piping components.

4.3.8 Quality and quantity measurement

Raman spectroscopy and mass flow meters can be effective tools for quality control and
transfer volume quantification, respectively:

• Raman spectroscopy: This technique uses a laser to analyse the molecular composition
of a sample by detecting vibrations unique to the molecule. Deviation from the Raman
fingerprint of ammonia indicates the presence of impurities. It can be set up for real-time
detection and can therefore be used to monitor ammonia quality during bunkering.

• Mass flow meters: Mass flow meters can accurately and continuously measure ammonia's
gravimetric or volumetric flow rate in the transfer lines. Coriolis, thermal, and vortex are
some of the available flow meter types for ammonia. Coriolis meters are known for their
high accuracy, often with an accuracy of ±0.1% of the reading, and are used in Singapore
for LNG and conventional fuel oil bunkering. They are capable of measuring the total
quantity of ammonia transferred with higher accuracy, which is critical for bunkering.

4.3.9 Sample collection

In cargo operations, samples are typically collected into sampling containers from the cargo
tank via a closed-loop sampling point in the shipboard piping. Where installed, Raman
spectroscopy also provides real-time monitoring of ammonia quality without the need for
physical sampling. This in-line detection may be safer and could be sufficient. Elaborated
below are recommendations in situations where physical sampling of ammonia is necessary.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 86

Unlike sampling from the tank, ammonia sampling at the transfer interface helps reduce the
number of samples that need to be taken, provides an additional layer of protection and
traceability should issues arise downstream, minimises the number of personnel exposed to
sampling activities, and offers a neutral location for regulators and insurers to resolve disputes.

Figure 53 shows an in-line sampling arrangement using a horizontally connected collection

container.

Figure 53: In-line sampling with a horizontally connected collection container

Courtesy of BIAR sampling systems
87 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

4.3.10 Bunker Delivery Note (BDN)

The MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) requirements
for BDN are outlined in MARPOL Annex VI and focus on ensuring that the fuel supplied to ships
meets quality and environmental standards. The BDN is a mandatory document that bunker
suppliers must provide to a ship whenever it receives bunker. The BDN must be retained on
board the ship for at least three years after the fuel has been delivered.

An electronic Bunker Delivery Note (eBDN) is a digital version of the traditional BDN and
improves efficiency, reduces paperwork, and minimises errors. eBDNs also facilitate quick
access, storage, and sharing, enhancing record-keeping and enabling smoother inspections
by authorities.

The BDN for fuel oil has included the following specific information:

• Name and IMO number of the receiving ship

• Port or location of bunkering
• Date of commencement of delivery
• Name, address, and telephone number of the fuel supplier
• Quantity and type of fuel delivered
• Density at 15 °C
• Sulphur content of the fuel oil
• Flashpoint

Some of this information, such as density at 15 °C and sulphur content, may not be relevant
to ammonia bunkering. As such, these should be replaced with the following non-exhaustive
parameters in BDN for ammonia bunkering.

• Liquid ammonia density (at -33 °C and at atmospheric pressure)

• Moisture content

4.4 Receiving vessel configuration

4.4.1 Manifold arrangement

Since the receiving vessel generally has a higher freeboard than the bunker tanker, it is
recommended to perform the nitrogen purging from the receiving vessel to the bunker tanker
to effectively clear ammonia vapours from the transfer hose. Similar to the bunker tanker
manifold arrangement (see Figure 49), the receiving vessel manifold may be equipped with
tapping points to facilitate the connection of nitrogen cylinders or nitrogen may be supplied
via the receiving vessel’s nitrogen generator, if installed. In the former case, the bunker tanker
will need to be stocked with adequate nitrogen cylinders to be rigged to the receiving vessel
before the transfer operation.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 88

Enclosed and semi-enclosed manifold stations must be equipped with a continuous monitoring
leak detection system. Manifold stations open to weather will need to be monitored during
bunkering by the crew on watch for any abnormal conditions.

Similar to a bunker tanker, the drip trays should sufficiently cover the piping joints between the
manifold, QCDC, and ERC. The width of the drip tray should be sufficient to accommodate
the variable sizes of the piping components. To prevent falls, the height of shipside handrails
adjacent to the drip trays must be increased if the width of the drip tray extends closer to the
shell side.

Davits and lifting points at the bunker stations shall be suitably rated to withstand the loads
from the transfer system, especially the weights of ERC and QCDC.

Provision to attach a fall arrestor block of adequate size in line with the liquid and vapour lines
is required to prevent any sudden separation of the detaching side of the ERC-hose assembly
in case of activation.

4.4.2 Vapour management

The receiving vessel should be equipped with an onboard reliquefaction plant for effective
management of generated vapours. This setup can help handle vapours effectively and
minimise disputes related to bunker quantity.

4.5 ERP resources

SMPEP or Shipboard Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP) equipment maintained onboard
the vessel should have response kits and installations specific to ammonia spill response.
At the initial stages, a tabletop exercise should also be conducted to identify any potential
operational gaps in case an incident occurs.

The following items, including the provision of a safe haven or shelter, should be available and
maintained onboard the vessel for an earlier response.

4.5.1 PPE

• Ammonia-resistant HAZMAT suit with SCBA, including spare air cylinders

• Ammonia-resistant suits
• Gas-tight goggles and face shields
• Ammonia-resistant gloves
• Ammonia-resistant boots
• Gas mask suitable for filtering ammonia
• Personal ammonia gas detector
• Emergency Escape Breathing Device (EEBD)
89 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

4.5.2 Leak detection equipment

• Portable ammonia gas detectors with calibration kits

• Drager tubes or ammonia-specific test strips (if there are limitations to using portable or
personal ammonia detectors, especially when donned in a HAZMAT suit)

4.5.3 Emergency shut-off and isolation tools

• Remote shut-off valves and emergency stop for pumps

• Valve shut-off wrenches or a tool kit for manual closing of actuated-type valves
• Pipe repair kits suitable for temporary containment of ammonia leaks

4.5.4 Spill containment and neutralisation

• Ammonia-neutralising agents: Sodium bicarbonate or other ammonia-neutralising
chemicals
• Spill containment kits with absorbent materials for use on ammonia spills
• Drip trays and plastic sheets for containing leaks
• Sealant putty to temporarily seal small leaks
• Chemical containment drums are used to store spilt ammonia or ammonia water mixtures

4.5.5 Decontamination equipment

• Decontamination showers and portable eyewash stations

• Ammonia-neutralising solution for personnel decontamination

4.5.6 Firefighting equipment

• Dry powder extinguishers (water is not recommended due to reactivity)

• Fire blankets and firefighting foam compatible with ammonia

4.5.7 Communication and signage

• Two-way radios with intrinsically safe design

• Warning signs indicating ammonia hazard zones and evacuation routes
• Emergency response procedure cards for handling ammonia leaks

4.5.8 Medical supplies

• First aid kit specifically including treatments for ammonia exposure

• Oxygen tanks and resuscitators in case of inhalation injuries
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 90

5 GCMD’s considerations for

future trials

Our upcoming studies and trials aim to address the knowledge gaps across eight key
enablers for ammonia bunkering readiness (see Figure 54). The Singapore Phase 1 safety
study (blue), focused on site-specific but vessel-generic assessments, while the Singapore
Phase 2a (orange) undertook vessel-specific safety evaluation. The Port Dampier trial (green)
has contributed valuable insights across several of these enablers. Recognising that no single
pilot can address all gaps, we are adopting a phased approach to build a comprehensive
understanding that is applicable across different ports around the world.

Figure 54: Eight key enablers for port readiness for ammonia bunkering
91 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping

In future trials, we aim to collaborate with industry partners and regulators to develop reliable
procedures for in-line quality and quantity measurements, such as trials with mass flow meters
and in-line sampling systems. We also intend to establish protocols for vapour management,
where the supplying vessel temporarily manages the tank atmosphere of the receiving vessel—a
critical operational aspect. Additionally, we plan to explore transfers involving vessels with
significant differences in freeboard height to enhance versatility. These findings will in turn
inform updates to standards and crew training curriculum to ensure greater operational safety
and efficiency for ammonia bunkering. This is graphically summarised in Figure 55.

1. Establish in-line quantity measurement using a mass flow meter

2. Evaluate in-line intermittent or continuous sampling
3. Demonstrate the effectiveness of dry disconnect coupling for hose disconnection
4. Test transfer and post-transfer procedures with a higher freeboard difference
5. Demonstrate using only the vapour handling system of the supply vessel
6. Establish vapour quantity measurement

Figure 55: Areas to be addressed for future trials

Another key goal is collaborating with vessel designers and shipowners to optimise ammonia
bunker and ammonia-fuelled vessel designs based on trial learnings. Key design enhancements
include higher-capacity service cranes with extended outreach, onboard nitrogen generators
or cylinders for purging operations, and pre-mounted ERCs and QCDCs. Features like bunker
boom for faster connection and disconnection, twin propellers and bow thrusters for better
manoeuvrability, and onboard fender storage to reduce deployment time may need to be
considered in the vessel design.

By incorporating these advancements, we hope to provide insights that can streamline

the bunkering process, improve efficiency, and address operational and safety challenges
posed by ammonia as a marine fuel. These efforts align with our broader vision to facilitate
the widespread adoption of safe ammonia bunkering at ports, ensuring sustainability and
reliability in the maritime industry.
Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 92

Acknowledgements

Australian High Commission, Singapore

Australian Maritime Safety Authority
Bhagwan Marine
BHP
BlueTack
bp
Department of Emergency and Fire Services, Western Australia
Department of Transport, Western Australia
DNV
Eastern Pacific Shipping
Gard
HSA Marine
James Fisher Fendercare
Mitsui O.S.K Lines
Monson Offshore
Navigator Gas
Northern Marine
OSRL
Pilbara Ports Authority
Polar Media
Qube Energy
Rio Tinto
SGMF
Stream Marine & Technical
Technology Centre for Offshore and Marine, Singapore
Trelleborg
Westug
Woodside
Yara Clean Ammonia
93 to Zero Carbon Shipping
Path Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping
93

About the Global Centre for

Maritime Decarbonisation (GCMD)

The Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation (GCMD) was established as a non-profit
organisation on 1 August 2021 with a mission to support the decarbonisation of the maritime
industry by shaping standards, deploying solutions, financing projects, and fostering
collaboration across sectors.

Founded by six industry partners namely BHP, BW Group, Eastern Pacific Shipping, Foundation
Det Norske Veritas, Ocean Network Express and Seatrium, GCMD also receives funding from
the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) for qualifying research and development
programmes and projects. Since its founding, bp, Hanwha Ocean, Hapag-Lloyd, NYK Line and
PSA International have joined as Strategic partners. To-date, over 130 centre- and project-level
partners have joined GCMD, contributing funds, expertise and in-kind support to accelerate
the deployment of scalable low-carbon technologies and lowering adoption barriers.

Since its establishment, GCMD has launched four key initiatives to close technical and
operational gaps in: deploying ammonia as a marine fuel, developing an assurance framework
for drop-in green fuels, unlocking the carbon value chain through onboard carbon capture and
articulating the value chain of captured carbon dioxide as well as closing the data-financing
gap to widen the adoption of energy efficiency technologies.

GCMD is strategically located in Singapore, the world’s largest bunkering hub and busiest
transshipment port. For more information, go to [Link]
 Path to Zero-Carbon Shipping 94

CONTACT US
Email: projects@[Link]
Linkedin: Global Centre for Maritime Decarbonisation (GCMD)
Website: [Link]