Slide 1 Title Page -

Good afternoon everyone. My name is Emma Sadeghi and today I'll be

discussing the application of anti-competition laws in the digital era.

Slide 2 - Content

Slide 3 - Relevance

In 2022 Taylor Swift announced that she would be going on tour. Millions of fans,
myself included, rushed onto the Ticketmaster site in hopes of purchasing tickets
only to be disappointed by server issues and cut throat service charges.
Ticketmasters inability to handle the demand of Swift’s fanbase made new
headlines nationwide. This made me curious as to why Ticketmaster was the
only choice for a ticket provider, leading me to my research question..

Slide 4 - The Research Question

…… How effective have anti-competition policies been at regulating concentrated

industries in the U.S. free market economy?

Slide 5 - Introduction -

For the past few decades, the effectiveness of anti- competition policies in
managing concentrated industries within the United States' free-market economy
has long been a subject of debate.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of this issue, it is essential to examine

the historical evolution of anti-competition policies in the United States. By tracing
their development from its inception to the present day, in order to uncover key
insights into the successes and challenges of regulating concentrated industries.

Slide 6 - Trust Movement -

Starting with the Trust Movement. The late 19th century saw rapid technological
advancements in production, and growth in the transportation networks, which
facilitated the expansion of markets and easier movement of goods. Businesses
recognized the potential for increased efficiencies and profitability through
horizontal and vertical integration of their trade, leading to the formation of trusts.
Horizontal integration is when a business grows by acquiring a similar company
in their industry at the same point in the supply chain. Vertical integration is when
a business expands by acquiring another company that operates before or after
them in the supply chain.

Trusts allowed businesses to control entire industries, streamline operations,

reduce costs, and maximize profits. Prominent trusts, such as Standard Oil ,
Carnegie Steel, and American Tobacco, monopolized 80 to 90% of their
respective sectors. These trusts leveraged their economic power to suppress
competition, limit consumer choice, and exploit workers. These businesses stay
engaged in anti-competitive practices, such as price-fixing, market manipulation,
and exclusionary tactics, to maintain dominance in their industry.

Slide 7 - The Sherman Act

The emergence of such trusts and monopolies prompted legislative responses

aimed at curbing anti-competitive practices and promoting fair competition. In the
United States, the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 was the first federal attempt to
address the problem of trusts and [Link] Act outlaws "every contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade," and any "monopolization,
attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize." The
acts most promonet victory came against the Standard Oil Co. in 1919 as The
Supreme Court found the company guilty of engaging in anti-competitive
practices, including price-fixing, and restraint of trade. Despite such notable
victories, the Sherman Act’s language was broad and ambiguous, making it
largely ineffective in deterring anti-competitive behavior and enforcing it
consistently.

Slide 8- The Clayton Act

The next stage of anti-Competition policy came in 1914 with The Clayton
Antitrust Act and the Federal Trade Commision Act which continue to regulate
U.S. business practices today.
The Clayton Act intended to strengthen the previously mentioned Sherman Act
by prohibiting anti-competitive mergers, predatory and discriminatory pricing, and
other forms of unethical corporate behavior. The act also protects individuals by
allowing lawsuits against companies and upholding the rights of labor to organize
and protest peacefully.

There have been several amendments to the act since its inception, expanding
its provisions to include bans on discriminatory pricing, expanding the scope of
anti-competition regulation to include certain types of horizontal mergers and
acquisitions, requiring companies planning large mergers or acquisitions to
notify the government, and increased criminal penalties for anti-competition
violations.

Slide 9 - the FTC

The FTC Act of 1914 established the Federal Trade Commission, an agency
which has the authority to bring anti-competition charges against violators of the
Sherman and Clayton act.

Both the FTC and The U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, are
responsible for enforcing the federal anti-competition laws. In some respects their
authorities overlap, but in practice the two agencies complement each other.
Over the years, the agencies have developed expertise in particular industries or
markets. For example, the FTC devotes most of its resources to certain
segments of the economy, specifically those where consumer spending is high.

Despite having these policies in place, enforcement of these anti-competition

laws has been on the decline.

Slide 10

Market concentration has been on the rise nationwide, especially in the last few
decades. As this graph shows, Among public companies, the average revenue
share of the five largest firms in each industry has been increasing since the late
1990s, slowly wiping out competing companies. The HHI Index, a leading
measure of market concentration, also reflected these patterns. According to the
HHI, concentration has increased in 70% of industries nationwide since 1998,
and almost 20% of them would currently be considered “highly concentrated”
according to the Department of Justice and FTC’s definition.

Slide 11-
A prominent example of a concentrated market today is Ticketmaster. In 2010 the
ticketing platform merged with Live Nation, a concert venue and events promoter,
allowing them to control over 70% of the live entertainment sector. The
Department of Justice approved the merger on the condition that the company
not retaliate against concert venues for using other ticketing companies, and
despite repeated violations, no substantial enforcement action has been taken.

Similarly, Digital platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Amazon, Apple, and

Microsoft have all been curtanized by regulatory agencies, and private entities,
alleging various violations of anti-competition laws. But successful litigation
outcomes have been hard to achieve.

Slide 12 The Gap Question

Thus, these lawsuits have sparked a broader conversation about the market
power of digital platforms, like Ticketmaster and the need for stronger
anti-competition enforcement of digital commerce. The gap has led me to the
question…..

● Can the gap between anti-contention policy and its judiciary enforcement
be overcome by new laws that regulate competition in the digital
marketplace?

Slide 13 - Methodology

To answer this question I conducted my own research using a quantitative

approach that included a comprehensive review of existing literature and case
studies to understand historical trends, legislative changes, and enforcement
challenges in anti-competition regulation. Legal investigations were conducted to
analyze key anti-competition cases and rulings, examining their impact on market
dynamics and their enforcement practices. Policy evaluations involved assessing
the efficacy of current anti-competition laws and regulatory frameworks in
regulating competition, preventing market abuse, and protecting consumer
welfare. By employing a multidimensional method that integrated historical study,
legal investigation, comparative assessment, and policy evaluation, I was able to
gain a comprehensive understanding of the gap between anti-competition policy
intent and its enforcement and effectiveness in the digital sector.

Slide - Narrowing of Judicial application

It is crucial to recognize the role judicial application of the law has played in shaping
antitrust enforcement.

Today courts evaluate most antitrust claims under a "rule of reason," which requires the
plaintiff to prove that defendants with market power have engaged in anticompetitive
conduct. This is in contrast to antitrust's "per se" rule, in which power generally did not
need to be proven and anticompetitive effects were largely inferred from the conduct
itself. Thus, the interpretation of antitrust laws can vary significantly from one judge to
another. This variance had led to inconsistent enforcement and outcomes across
different cases and jurisdictions, posing challenges to the effective regulation of market
consolidation.

The precedents set by previous court decisions has also played a role in the decline in
the success of anticompetition enforcement. In the context of antitrust law, strict
adherence to precedent is problematic. As courts interpret and apply prior precedents,
they may adopt restricted interpretations of antitrust rules, resulting in a limited range of
enforcement proceedings. If past rulings have been lenient towards consolidation, they
establish a precedent that favors the interests of larger corporations, narrowing the
scope of anti-competition laws, and increasing the burden of proof to prove violations.
Antitrust proceedings are frequently characterized by complex legal and economic
considerations, which can pose challenges for judges tasked with deciding these
issues. The complexities of these cases may limit judges' ability to completely
appreciate the nuances of the issues at hand, forcing them to rely on specialists,
potentially favoring larger firms.

Trying to apply predictability and uniformity enforcement to a evolving flexible market

dynamic has distorted the

Slide 14- Enforcement Decline

Through pattern analysis, I discovered a consistent trend of courts exhibiting caution in
antitrust enforcement. The graph on the left shows DOJ actions taken under the various
sections of the anti- competition police since the 70s. As you can see they are more
likely to bring a case against merger infractions under the section 7 of the Clayton act,
than they are to take action against the first or second acts of the Sherman act, which
directly targets monopolies or restraint of trade. But you can see by the graph on the
right, even merge investigations under the Hart-Scott-Rodino act have been in decline
since the 70s.

Slide - Analysis

In my view, the fear of getting it wrong has distorted anti-competition

enforcement. Anti-competition philosophy today is too cautious, too worried
about adverse effects of over enforcement. Bias against enforcement has caused
many courts to demand a level of proof that is often unattainable.

My analysis also highlights a growing reliance on economic expertise in antitrust

enforcement decisions. Courts frequently defer to economic analysis, potentially
overlooking other factors that influence market competition, such as consumers.
Technocracy assumes that only technical experts can understand the economic
consequences of enforcing anti-competitive laws. For example, the Chicago
School of Economics believes that markets are self-correcting and that
businesses can rarely gain and maintain market power if they are not
competitive. Ticketmaster is a prime example of the fallacy of relying on expert
analysis rather than factual outcomes.

If the courts are unwilling to step back from bias against the risk of
over-enforcement, a new approach is needed to reset the balance

Slide - Conclusion
So to answer my research question, the gap between anti-competition policy and
its judiciary enforcement can be overcome if courts are willing to adopt an
anti-competition enforcement framework that is analytically sound and
fact-based. The standard of proof needs to be consistent with the plain language
of our anti-competition statutes.

A broader focus than just consumer welfare needs to be applied. First, antitrust
policy should be broadened to consider the interests of producers, suppliers, and
workers, not just consumers. Second, antitrust policy should emphasize
competition for its own sake rather than economic outcomes. Third, a lower bar
to challenging business combinations and practices and more active antitrust
enforcement.

Slide - Implications and Future

We need to consider more forward-looking rules that are industry specific to

enhance competition, and not just broad new legislation. We already have
evidence that it can work, an example being The 2004 FCC rule allowed
consumers to “port” their phone numbers to competing carriers, giving
consumers the power of choice, and the benefit of lower rates and better service.
These sorts of tools can help restore markets to a competitive equilibrium.
Congress also needs to fund anti-competition enforcement. We spend 18% less
today on anti-competition enforcement than in 2000, despite increasing
concentration and the growing number of dominant firms in a much larger
economy. We need funding both to bring enforcement actions and to allow for
after-action studies of what happened in markets where the agencies decided not
to bring enforcement actions or where the courts rejected an anti-competition
challenge.

Slide - Works Cited

Slide - End Slide -Questions

We can do more and we can do better. Thank you