India–Russia Relations
Foundations of the Relationship (1947-1971)
India’s foreign policy in the immediate post-independence period was guided by non-alignment, a doctrine
that sought to maintain distance from the two Cold War blocs. However, growing economic needs,
regional insecurity, and Western indifference led India to cultivate a deeper relationship with the Soviet
Union. This was not merely tactical but ideologically compatible, as both nations emphasized state-led
development, anti-colonial solidarity, and strategic autonomy.
● 1955: Khrushchev–Bulganin Visit to India
Marked the beginning of high-level political engagement and robust economic collaboration. The
Soviet Union assisted in building India’s public sector industrial base, including steel plants like
Bhilai and Bokaro, power stations, and technical institutes.
● 1962: Sino-Indian War
Although the Soviet Union attempted to maintain neutrality, it balanced arms sales to both India and
China. However, over time, Soviet support began leaning toward India, especially as China moved
closer to the U.S.
● 1971: Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation
The 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union served
as a strategic deterrent against external intervention, particularly from China and the United States,
during the Indo-Pakistani conflict. It obligated both nations to abstain from aiding adversaries and to
consult each other in the face of threats, effectively guaranteeing Soviet support for India in case of
war. While India's motive included securing diplomatic backing in the UN and military insurance
against a potential China–Pakistan–US axis, the Soviet Union was also influenced by its interest in
expanding influence and arms sales in South Asia. The treaty enabled the USSR to provide decisive
military and diplomatic backing, including vetoes in the UN, naval deployments to counter the US
fleet, and legitimizing India's stance on the refugee crisis. This support gave India the strategic
space to achieve military success in East Pakistan, ensuring its territorial integrity and neutralizing
external threats, thereby highlighting a significant convergence of Indo-Soviet interests.
Through this period, India relied on Soviet backing for technological assistance, military hardware, and
geopolitical leverage in South Asia. The early Cold War laid the groundwork for a durable relationship that
outlasted ideological shifts.
Strategic Alignment (1971–1991)
The two decades following the 1971 treaty marked the zenith of Indo-Soviet strategic alignment,
underpinned by shared ideology, military interdependence, and global geopolitical symmetry. India’s
foreign policy orientation leaned decisively toward Moscow, despite continuing to claim non-aligned
status.
● 1974: India’s Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Though the Soviet Union did not openly endorse India’s nuclear ambitions, it refrained from
criticism and maintained technical cooperation, showing tacit acceptance.Following India’s nuclear
test in 1974, the Soviet Union notably refrained from condemning the move and instead appeared to
justify it, implicitly supporting India's rationale of countering Chinese nuclear coercion. This stance
contrasted sharply with the responses of Western powers, particularly the United States and
Canada, which promptly suspended their shipments of heavy water and nuclear materials to India in
response to the test. Seizing the opportunity to deepen strategic ties and assert its geopolitical
influence in South Asia, the Soviet Union stepped in to supply India with the necessary heavy water
to sustain its nuclear reactor program. This support underscored the USSR’s willingness to
accommodate India’s security concerns and nuclear ambitions within the broader context of their
bilateral relationship, while simultaneously counterbalancing Chinese influence and exploiting the
diplomatic vacuum created by Western sanction
● A relationship unaffected by domestic politics-Though Janata Party President Morarji Desai had
vehemently criticized the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty and pledged to revoke it if his party assumed
power, once in office, the Desai-led government recognized the strategic indispensability of
maintaining strong ties with the Soviet Union. Despite initial ideological resistance and internal
dissent, the Janata administration came to appreciate the depth of India’s dependence on the USSR
in critical areas such as defense supplies, trade, and geopolitical security.
● India’s Response to the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan:1979-Despite global condemnation
of the Soviet intervention, India abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution
demanding an immediate withdrawal, aligning itself—albeit tacitly—with the Soviet position. Indian
policymakers contextualized the Soviet move as a defensive reaction to the instability emanating
from post-revolutionary Iran and the potential threat of an anti-Soviet regime in Kabul, viewing the
intervention as a geopolitical counterbalance to the strengthening Sino-American alliance.
● Non-Alignment and Perceived Partiality-India’s seemingly muted response to the Soviet
occupation sparked concern among several Third World nations about a possible erosion of New
Delhi's commitment to non-alignment. However, Indian foreign policy elites justified their position by
citing the necessity of preserving security ties with the Soviet Union, particularly in a volatile regional
context. The abstention at the UN was not merely a diplomatic maneuver to avoid alienating
Moscow, but also a strategic act of reciprocity for the USSR’s unwavering support during the 1971
Bangladesh War and its ongoing assistance in developing India’s defense and industrial base.
● 1980s: Arms Transfers and Industrial Assistance
India became the largest importer of Soviet arms, including MiG-21 and MiG-27 fighters, T-72
tanks, and submarines. More than 70% of India's defense equipment during this period was of
Soviet origin.
● 1984: Rakesh Sharma’s Space Mission
India’s first astronaut flew aboard the Soviet Soyuz T-11, showcasing symbolic and scientific
cooperation. This moment marked India’s entry into the space age with direct Soviet assistance.
Despite ritual condemnations of the “balance of power,” India used it to retain leverage with the Soviet
Union. It was the Soviet Union that helped India build a heavy industry and arms technology base and
ultimately enabled India to win the Bangladesh war. India, for its part, made the Soviet Union acceptable to
the Third World and muted its criticism of Moscow on major world issues. The relationship therefore served
the interests of both states during the entire Cold War period
Post-Cold war era (1991–1999)
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought dramatic changes to the global order and India’s
foreign policy landscape. Russia, under Boris Yeltsin, transitioned to a market economy and reoriented
toward the West. India, meanwhile, launched its own economic liberalization and began forging new
partnerships. Yet, India and Russia maintained continuity in their strategic relationship.Following the
Cold War, Russia's strategic engagement with South Asia diminished significantly, with the region primarily
viewed as a prospective market for arms and missile technology exports. Although deep geopolitical
interests waned, Russia maintained a functional relationship with India, emphasizing economic and defense
cooperation. President Vladimir Putin has characterized India as a "key strategic partner in the
Asia-Pacific," signaling continued political goodwill. However, the dynamics of the India–Russia relationship
in the post-Cold War period have been and will increasingly be influenced by a new set of strategic,
economic, and regional considerations that differ markedly from the Cold War framework.
● 1993: India–Russia Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
This treaty was critical in reaffirming bilateral commitment during a period of volatility and flux. It
restated cooperation in defense, economics, and science, signaling the importance both countries
placed on the partnership.
● 1998: Strategic Partnership Agreement under PM Vajpayee
Amidst India’s nuclear tests and U.S. sanctions, Russia stood by India and signed a
comprehensive framework for cooperation across military, nuclear, and technological domains.
Strategic Consolidation and Institutionalization (2000–2014)
Under Vladimir Putin, Russia sought to revive its global influence, and India emerged as a key pillar of its
“Eurasian pivot.” Simultaneously, India under Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh began
articulating a vision of multi-alignment. Bilateral relations moved toward institutional stability and
long-term agreements in defense, energy, and nuclear cooperation.
● 2000: Declaration of Strategic Partnership
Initiated under Putin’s first term, this declaration institutionalized annual summits, ministerial
meetings, and track-two diplomacy.
● 2004: India–Russia Intergovernmental Commission
Formalized as a mechanism to address and coordinate various sectors like defense, science,
culture, and trade.
● 2007: Formation of BRICS
Along with Brazil, China, and South Africa, India and Russia became part of a new multilateral
grouping advocating for global financial reform and multipolarity.
● 2008–2010: Expansion in Civil Nuclear Cooperation
Agreements signed for Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu. Russia provided
reactors, fuel, and long-term assistance.
In the post-Cold War era, both India and Russia grappled with redefining their roles amid shifting global
power dynamics and economic realignments. India, ascending in global stature, continued to view Russia
as a counterweight to U.S. dominance, supporting initiatives like the proposed Russia–China–India
strategic triangle, originally suggested by Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov in 1998. However, this
initiative lacked traction, as all three nations still relied on the United States for key strategic and economic
interests.
With the United States experiencing relative decline and China emerging as its primary challenger, both
Russia and India now face the strategic challenge of managing China’s growing assertiveness. This shared
concern over Chinese hegemony has pushed New Delhi and Moscow to deepen their ties, exemplified by
the elevation of their bilateral relationship to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” in 2010.
This period saw deepening cooperation, especially in joint military production (e.g., BrahMos cruise
missile), space technology, and strategic forums. While India diversified its partnerships—particularly
with the U.S.—it continued to see Russia as a trusted legacy partner with minimal political friction.
Complex Interdependence (2014–2022)
This period ushered in greater geopolitical complexity. While Russia drew closer to China due to
Western sanctions (post-Crimea annexation), India deepened its strategic partnership with the U.S.
(e.g., QUAD, LEMOA agreement). Yet, the India–Russia relationship endured due to shared interests in
defense, energy, and multipolar diplomacy.
● 2015: India’s Full Membership in SCO
Strongly backed by Russia, India’s inclusion represented Moscow’s support for New Delhi’s greater
role in Eurasia.
● 2018: S-400 Air Defense System Deal ($5.4 billion)
Despite U.S. objections under CAATSA, India proceeded with this high-profile purchase,
underlining its foreign policy independence.
● 2020: Galwan Clash with China
Russia’s neutral stance during this confrontation tested India’s expectations, especially as Russia
and China deepened their strategic alignment.
India managed a delicate balancing act, affirming ties with the U.S. and Russia without overtly
compromising either. The defense relationship continued to thrive, but economic ties lagged, and India
became increasingly cautious about Russia–China convergence.
Ukraine War and Post-2022 Realignment
The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked a watershed moment for international
diplomacy. India’s response was characterized by strategic neutrality—a policy driven by realpolitik,
energy needs, and geopolitical autonomy. Western pressure mounted, but India retained its bilateral
strategic calculus with Moscow.
● 2022: India Abstains on UN Votes Condemning Russia
India emphasized dialogue and diplomacy, refusing to condemn Moscow directly, and maintained
high-level diplomatic communication with both Russia and the West.
● 2022–2023: India Increases Russian Oil Imports
Taking advantage of discounted crude due to Western sanctions, India ramped up imports and
explored rupee-ruble trade, showcasing energy pragmatism.
● 2023: Delays in Russian Arms Deliveries
India began experiencing logistical issues due to Western export controls on dual-use technology,
prompting reflection on over-dependence.This episode compelled Indian policymakers to
reevaluate the structural dependence on Russia for defense and dual-use imports, opening a
larger conversation about diversification, self-reliance, and the geopolitics of supply chains.
India–Russia ties remained strong, but the war exposed vulnerabilities in defense logistics, payment
systems, and strategic signaling. While India retained Moscow as a vital partner, it intensified efforts to
diversify imports, pursue Make in India, and ensure supply chain resilience.
diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, energy security, and
defense collaboration.
Diplomatic Relations-
While India pursued a policy of non-alignment, its strategic orientation leaned towards the Soviet
bloc, particularly after the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation. This
treaty played a pivotal role during the Bangladesh Liberation War, wherein Soviet support deterred
potential Chinese and American intervention against India.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, India quickly re-engaged with the newly formed
Russian Federation. The strategic partnership was reaffirmed through the signing of the
“Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” in 2000 during President Vladimir Putin’s
visit to India. Since then, annual summits have become a central institutional mechanism, with
both nations alternating as hosts.
In 2010, the relationship was elevated to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership,”
reflecting the depth and exclusivity of the engagement. Despite global geopolitical shifts and
India’s increasing proximity to Western powers like the United States, India has maintained a
strong diplomatic rapport with Russia, emphasizing a multi-aligned foreign policy stance that
prioritizes national interest and strategic autonomy.
ECONOMIC RELATION
One of the most striking developments in recent years has been the significant surge in bilateral
merchandise trade, which reached an unprecedented high of USD 65.70 billion in FY 2023–24, as
reported by India’s Department of Commerce. This marks a major milestone, surpassing the
previously envisioned target of USD 30 billion by 2025—almost doubling it two years ahead of
schedule.
However, this growth has been characterized by asymmetry. India’s exports to Russia stood at
only USD 4.26 billion, while its imports from Russia amounted to USD 61.44 billion, leading to a
massive trade imbalance in Russia’s favor. The asymmetry is largely explained by India’s rising
import dependence on Russian oil and petroleum products, particularly after global supply chains
were disrupted due to geopolitical realignments stemming from the Russia–Ukraine conflict.
On the other hand, China is now Russia’s largest trading partner and the two sides have signed a
thirty-year agreement under which Russia will supply China with 68 billion cubic meters of gas
annually from 2015.28 To address this problem, Russia has not only been trying to woo Indian
investors but has also agreed to use the amount that India owes it as debt from the past to fund
joint ventures in the fields of telecommunications, aluminium, and information technology
Trade in Services and the Investment Landscape
While merchandise trade has grown significantly, bilateral trade in services has remained relatively
stable over the last five years, with the trade balance skewed in Russia’s favor. In 2021, service
trade between the two countries amounted to $1.021 billion.
On the investment front, both countries have demonstrated strong engagement. Major Russian
investments in India are concentrated in oil and gas, petrochemicals, banking, railways, and steel
sectors. These investments are strategically significant, as they not only facilitate infrastructure
development and energy security but also promote technological and institutional collaboration.
DEFENSE
Defense, of course, remains central to Indo-Russian relations. Not only is Russia the biggest
supplier of defense products to India, but the India–Russia defense relationship also encompasses
a wide range of activity that includes joint research, design, development, and co-production.India,
for its part, was one of the few nations ready to finance the production of weapons in Russia at a
time when the Russian arms industry was facing virtual disarray due to the collapse of the Soviet
Union.
Russia is the only country with which India has an institutionalized mechanism at the defense
minister level fostering transfer of high technology and joint production. India is now locally
producing several Russian defense products including the Brahmos supersonic missile, the T-90
tank, and Sukhoi fighter aircrafts.
At the apex of the institutional structure is the India-Russia Intergovernmental Commission on
Military Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-MTC), established in 2000. This body oversees the full
spectrum of defence cooperation, with annual meetings between Defence Ministers and
coordination through two Working Groups and seven Sub-Groups.
Key ongoing defence projects include:
● Indigenous production of T-90 tanks and Su-30MKI aircraft
● Supply and upgrade of MiG-29 aircraft
● Delivery of MiG-29K naval fighters, Mi-17 and Kamov-31 helicopters
● Supply of Smerch multi-barrel rocket launchers
Furthermore, defence ties are reinforced through regular military exchanges and joint exercises.
Under the title “INDRA”, tri-services exercises involving the Army, Navy, and Air Force were held in
2014, with similar activities considered for 2015 and beyond.
Though there is certainly disquiet among the Indian armed forces about Russian behavior on
these issues, it is also clear that Russia is the only state that is willing to share defense technology
of a strategic nature with India including aircraft carriers and nuclear sub marines. It is equally
significant that Russia is probably the only major global power that has not sold defense
technology to Pakistan. Despite repeated delays in Russia’s implementation of major weapon
orders, India continues to rely on Russia for strategic weaponry. Russia will remain India’s major
defense partner in the foreseeable future as the two states move toward joint development and
production of new weapon systems to sustain their historically strong defense ties. This will be key
to sustaining Indo-Russian cooperation given the changing technological needs of the Indian
defense sector.Given the steady deterioration in Sino-Indian ties in recent years, the threat of
China will be one of the most important factors in determining India’s outreach to Russia in the
defense sector.
Energy Security and Economic Relations
Another pillar of India-Russia ties is energy cooperation. Russia, as one of the largest exporters of
hydrocarbons, has emerged as a crucial player in meeting India’s burgeoning energy demands.
India is looking to Russia as a major supplier of the much-needed energy resources in the future,
with India investing in Russia’s Sakhalin-1 hydrocarbon project in one of its highest public sector
investments abroad. Russia is also stressing its role as a key energy supplier. Following the onset
of Western sanctions on Russia due to the Ukraine war, Russia pivoted more decisively toward
Asian markets, offering crude oil to India at discounted rates.
● By 2025, Russia has become one of India’s top oil suppliers, providing nearly 30% of its
crude oil imports. This has significantly enhanced India’s energy security while also offering
Moscow a reliable export market amidst a constrained global environment.
A cornerstone of high-technology collaboration, nuclear energy has long featured prominently in
Indo-Russian ties. In 2025, this relationship continues through:
● Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP): The first two reactors (built with Russian
assistance) are operational; construction of additional units (Units 3–6) is underway with
plans for further expansion.
● Fuel Supply and Technology Transfer: Russia supplies enriched uranium and reactor
technology, and discussions around small modular reactors (SMRs) have gained
momentum.
● Civil Nuclear Collaboration: India and Russia have begun discussing collaboration in third
countries (e.g., Bangladesh’s Rooppur Nuclear Plant) to jointly export nuclear technology
and expertise.
This nuclear collaboration strengthens India’s clean energy agenda while reinforcing strategic trust
with Russia in a sensitive sector.
Conclusion
In sum, the India-Russia relationship embodies the tensions and opportunities inherent in India’s
broader foreign policy framework, which seeks to safeguard sovereignty, maximize strategic
options, and engage with multiple global actors simultaneously. While Russia remains a vital
partner, especially in defense and strategic domains, India’s foreign policy is increasingly defined
by multi-alignment, balancing traditional partnerships with emerging alliances in a fluid
international environment.
Looking forward, the sustainability of this partnership will depend on the ability of both countries to
address emerging asymmetries, expand economic ties, and manage geopolitical divergences
without compromising mutual trust.
Optional
(RUSSIA UKRAINE WAR)
Officially, India maintains a position of strategic autonomy and emphasizes diplomacy and
dialogue. While Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stated that "this is not an era of war" and
expressed sorrow over specific Russian attacks—such as the July 2024 bombing of a Ukrainian
children’s hospital—India has stopped short of condemning Russia outright.
In practice, India has adopted a neutral stance. It has abstained from United Nations General
Assembly resolutions condemning Russia, declined to endorse peace communiqués like the one
produced at the Switzerland summit in June 2024, and avoided mentioning Russia’s aggression in
the G20 declaration under its presidency. Furthermore, India has continued to engage with Russia
economically and technologically, becoming the second-largest supplier of restricted critical
technologies to Russia after China.
India’s position reflects pragmatic concerns: its reliance on Russian military equipment, discounted
crude oil, and historical ties with Moscow. There is also some sympathy within Indian policy circles
for Russia’s framing of the war as a reaction to NATO expansion.
Although India has close ties with both Russia and the West, and is theoretically well-placed to
mediate, it has not made any formal peace proposals. Its diplomacy has leaned more toward
symbolic gestures than substantive action. Modi’s visits to both Russia and Ukraine in the summer
of 2024 highlight India’s effort to balance optics and interests, but the substance of its policy
remains largely self-interested and cautious.
In sum, India neither supports nor opposes the war in direct terms. It advocates peace in rhetoric
while continuing to prioritize its strategic and economic interests in its engagement with Russia.
IMPACT OF CHINA ON INDIA-RUSSIA RELATIONS
China plays a significant, though complex, role in shaping India–Russia relations, acting as both a
strategic motivator and a potential disruptor. At the heart of India’s calculus is a growing concern
that Russia, increasingly isolated from the West following its invasion of Ukraine, may drift closer
to China—potentially at the cost of India's own longstanding ties with Moscow. This fear is one of
the primary reasons India continues to engage with Russia, despite international criticism and
despite India’s rhetorical emphasis on peace in Ukraine.
From India’s perspective, maintaining a strong relationship with Russia serves multiple purposes.
Most critically, it is a way to prevent Moscow from becoming overly dependent on Beijing, and by
extension, from aligning too closely with China’s geopolitical interests. India’s strategy is
essentially to keep Russia as a strategic hedge—ensuring that Moscow retains enough autonomy
to balance its relations between India and China. In this light, New Delhi does not see Russia as a
lost cause, even if some in the West increasingly view Russia as firmly within China’s orbit.
Interestingly, India and China have demonstrated a certain convergence in their positions on the
Ukraine conflict. Both have refrained from condemning Russia outright and have justified their
continued economic engagement—particularly their purchase of discounted Russian oil—as a
contribution to global energy stability. However, this superficial alignment does not equate to
shared strategic interests. India remains wary of China’s broader ambitions and its military
assertiveness, particularly along their contested border.
A critical unknown is how Russia might respond in the event of renewed hostilities between India
and China. Historically, Moscow has adopted a balanced stance in India–China disputes,
occasionally mediating and often providing India with more advanced military technologies than it
has offered to China. This legacy of relative favoritism is an asset in India’s diplomatic toolkit.
However, India is increasingly concerned that Russia’s growing dependence on
China—economically, diplomatically, and perhaps militarily—could tilt its neutrality. Should Russia
be perceived to side with China in a future conflict or crisis involving India, that would constitute a
fundamental rupture in India–Russia ties and likely trigger a major strategic recalibration by New
Delhi.
In summary, China acts as both a driver and a destabilizer in the India–Russia relationship. India’s
continued engagement with Russia is, in part, an effort to counterbalance China's growing
influence over Moscow. At the same time, India’s concerns about a possible future Russia–China
alignment at its expense underscore the fragility and limits of this triangular dynamic. For New
Delhi, the key challenge is preserving a meaningful relationship with Russia while preparing for the
possibility that Moscow's pivot toward Beijing could ultimately undermine India’s strategic interests.
