NOTES ON HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

Prepared by: Atty. Javier Benjamin M. Tongol, RN

I. THE BILL OF RIGHTS

The Bill of Rights, in General

It is a declaration and enumeration of a person's fundamental civil and political rights. It

also imposes safeguards against violations by the government, by individuals, or by
groups of individuals.

The Bill of rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its concern
is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals.
What the Bill of Rights does is to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere
inaccessible to any power holder” [People v. Marti, G.R. No. 81561 (1991)].

In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible
extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."

The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles [Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, Co., G.R. No. L-31195 (1973)].

It is self-executing. XXX It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts

to effectuate constitutional provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty
and the protection of property. [Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579 (2011)]

Application to Private Individuals

The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals. The equal
protection
erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful [Yrasuegui
v. PAL, G.R. No. 168081 (2008)].

Constitutional protection applies to government action and is meant as a restraint against

sovereign authority. The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against private
individuals, and governs relations between individuals and the state [People v.
Marti,supra]

Primacy of human rights (doctrine of hierarchy of rights or doctrine of preferred freedoms)

While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of civil institutions [Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills, Co., supra]

The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty
and property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections" [West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)]

SPECIFIC PURPOSES

1. To preserve democratic ideals

2. To safeguard fundamental rights
3. To promote the happiness of an individual

Due Process of Law

Due process furnishes a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The
standard is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of
justice. It has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. [Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, supra]

Substantive due process inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for
depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. [White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,
G.R. No. 122846 (2009)].

Substantive due process "requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which
the law would be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." It requires the intrinsic validity of
the law in interfering with life, liberty, and property and a guarantee against exercise of
arbitrary power. [Rama v. Moises, G.R. 197146, (2016)].

Requisites of substantive due process

Due process of law simply means that: That there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the Government; That this law
shall be reasonable in its operation; That it shall be enforced according to the regular
methods of procedure prescribed; That it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the
state or to all of a class." [Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra]

Substantive due process requires that the means employed in depriving persons of
property must not be unduly oppressive. [SJS v. Atienza Jr., G.R. No. 156052 (2007)]

Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before
it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. It concerns itself with government action
adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private sphere.
[White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, supra]

Procedural due process is that aspect of due process which serves as a restriction on
actions of judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of the government. It refers to the method
or manner by which a law is enforced. [BERNAS]

General Rule: The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing.
Exceptions: However, notice and hearing are not required in every case, for there are an
admitted number of exceptions in view of the nature of the property involved or the
urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger

Void for Vagueness Doctrine

An act is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its common meaning and differ as to its application. A statute
or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.

A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
prohibited by the statute.

Overbreadth Doctrine
The overbreadth doctrine decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms" [Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, supra]

Equal Protection of Law

All persons or things similarly situated must be similarly treated both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed.

Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others [Ichong v. Hernandez, supra].

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction. What the clause requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification.

By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars [The Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, (1993)]

Requisites for Valid Classification

1. It must rest on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class Presumption of Validity All
classifications made by law are generally presumed to be valid unless shown otherwise
by petitioner [Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 128096 (1999)]

Rational Basis Test

The classification should bear a reasonable relation to the government’s purpose or

legitimate state interest.

Note: This test is important when there is no plausible difference between the
disadvantaged class and those not disadvantaged, and when the government attaches a
morally irrelevant and negative significance to a difference between the advantaged and
the disadvantaged.

Intermediate Scrutiny Test

The Court accepts the articulated purpose of the legislation, but it closely scrutinizes the
relationship between the classification and the purpose based on a spectrum of
standards, by gauging the extent to which constitutionally guaranteed rights depend upon
the affected individual interest.

Government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state
interest and that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest.
Applicable to certain sensitive but not suspect classes; certain important but not
fundamental interest

Strict Scrutiny Test

Search and Seizures

The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right
invocable only by those whose rights have been infringed or threatened to be infringed
[Valmonte v. General De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 (1989)].

What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case
is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances
involved [Id].

Exceptions to the warrant requirement; valid warrantless searches

• Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
• Seizure of evidence in plain view
• Search of a moving vehicle
• Consented warrantless search
• Customs search
• Stop and Frisk
• Exigent and Emergency Circumstances

Exclusionary Rule

All evidence obtained in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding [Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550 (1967)].

The exclusionary rule extends to evidence obtained through uncounseled confession

[People v. Alicando, G.R. No. 117487 (1995)].

The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

The Exclusionary Rule is also extended to exclude evidence which is derived or directly
obtained from that which was illegally seized [BAUTISTA].

Freedom of Speech and Expression

Free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment [Newsounds
Broadcasting v. Dy, G.R. No. 170270 (2009)]

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all
forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well
as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. [Chavez
v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 16338 (2008)]

While the right has a widespread scope, it is not absolute. Examples of unprotected
speech are obscenity, child pornography, and libel

Types of Regulation
Prior restraint and subsequent punishment
Prior Restraint Refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms
of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. [Newsounds
Broadcasting Network v. Dy, supra].

Not all prior restraint is invalid. But all prior restraints are presumed invalid (“any act
that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted
with furrowed brows”).

Every man shall have a right to speak, write, and print his opinions upon any subject
whatsoever, without any prior restraint, so always that he does not injure any other
person in his rights, person, property, or reputation, and so always that he does not
thereby disturb the public peace or attempt to subvert the government [Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)]

Content Based Regulations

A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact
[Chavez v. Gonzales, supra]. Subject to the clear and present danger test: There is to
be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability
[...] unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has
a right to prevent [Reyes v. Bagatsing, G.R. No. L- 65366 (1983)].

Content-Neutral Regulations
Regulations on the incidents of speech — time, place, and manner — under
well-defined standards [Newsounds Broadcasting Network v. Dy, supra].

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only
a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of
this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject
to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach — somewhere
between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content- based restrictions [Chavez v. Gonzales, supra]

Clear And Present Danger Test

There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent

liability [...] unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent [Reyes v. Bagatsing, supra].

The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree [Schenck v. US, supra].

Balancing Of Interests Test

When a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the
regulation results in an indirect, conditional and partial abridgement of speech, the duty
of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests demands greater
protection [American Communications v. Douds, 339 U.S. 282 (1950)].

The test is applied when two legitimate values not involving national security crimes
compete [Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra].

Dangerous Tendency Test

 In each case, courts must ask whether the gravity of the “evil”, discounted by its
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger
[Dennis v. US, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)].

Under this test, the question is whether the words will create a dangerous tendency
that the state has a right to prevent. It looks at the probability that a substantive evil will
result, and it is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated [Cabansag v. Fernandez, supra].

Burden of proof: With the government.

Freedom of Religion

The twin clauses of free exercise and non-establishment express an underlying

relational concept of separation between religion and secular government. [BERNAS].

The constitutional inhibition on legislation on the subject of religion has a double

aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to
such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form
of religion. Thus, the Amendment embraces two concepts – freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
[Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-4 (1940)]

Strict Neutrality or tamer separation

 ● Requires the state to be neutral in its relation with groups of religious believers; the
relationship is not necessarily adversarial
● Allow for interaction between church and state, but is strict with regard to state action
which would threaten the integrity of religious commitment
● The basis of government action has a secular criteria and religion may not be used
as a basis for classification of purposes
● Public policy and the constitution require the government to avoid religion-specific
policy

Benevolent Neutrality and the Doctrine of Accommodation

● It protects religious realities, tradition, and established practice with a flexible
reading of the principle of separation of church and state.
● The Doctrine of Accommodation allows the government to take religion into account
when creating government policies to allow people to exercise their religion without
hindrance. The government may take religion into account to exempt, when possible,
from generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would be infringed, or to create without state involvement, an atmosphere in
which voluntary religious exercise may flourish.
● The breach in the wall between church and state is allowed in order to uphold
religious liberty, which is the integral purpose of the religion clauses. The purpose of
accommodation is to remove the burden on a person’s exercise of his religion.
● Although morality contemplated in laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests [Estrada v. Escritor, supra].

Non-establishment Clause

“From the religious perspective, religion requires voluntarism because compulsory

faith lacks religious efficacy. Compelled religion is a contradiction in terms … Such
voluntarism cannot be achieved unless the political process is insulated from religion
and unless religion is insulated from politics. Non-establishment thus calls for
government neutrality in religious matters to uphold voluntarism and avoid breeding
interfaith dissension” [Estrada v. Escritor, supra].

The clause prohibits excessive government entanglement with, endorsement or

disapproval of religion [Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, supra]

The Free Exercise Clause affords absolute protection to individual religious

convictions. However, the government is able to regulate the times, places, and
manner of its exercise [Cantwell v. Connecticut].

Dual Aspect
a. Freedom to believe – absolute
b. Freedom to act on one’s belief – subject to regulation

Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act
must have appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In
every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a permissible
end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected freedom.

Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight

inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury. Without
doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a
stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any
purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he
purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of
solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or convenience.
In a nutshell, the Constitution guarantees the freedom to believe absolutely, while the
freedom to act based on belief is subject to regulation by the State when necessary
to protect the rights of others and in the interest of public welfare [Valmores v.
Achacoso, G.R. No. 217453 (2017)]

Test to determine the constitutionality of policies challenged under the Establishment

Clause (Lemon Test)
(a) The statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
(b) Its primary or principal effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.
(c) The statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with religion [Estrada v.
Escritor, supra]

Questions on Bill of Rights

1. What provisions in the Bill of Rights are governed by the exclusionary rule on
evidence (so that any evidence obtained in violation of any such provision will be
inadmissible in any proceeding and for whatever purpose)? Enumerate and briefly
describe each.

Ans.: Section 2 – The right against unreasonable searches, seizures and

arrests.

Section 3 – The right to privacy of communication and

correspondence.

Section 12 – The custodial investigation rights.

Section 17 – The right against self-incrimination.

2. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted an Ordinance prohibiting

aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural entities in Davao City.
For that matter, all agricultural entities are mandated to shift to other forms of
spraying (whether manual or truck-mounted boom) within three months from the
effectivity of the ordinance or face sanction. The reason for said enactment were
complaints received by the Davao City government from people residing in villages
adjacent to banana plantations who claimed that due to the pesticide drift caused
by aerial spraying, their health and safety are threatened/endangered. In effect,
the residents invoked their right to health and to have a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature (Sections 15 and 16,
Article II, 1987 Constitution). It was established that banana plantation owners
resort to aerial spraying to combat the “Black Sigatoka” disease and other
menaces that threaten the production and harvest of bananas.

It was also provided in the Ordinance that all agricultural entities in Davao
City must provide for a 30-meter buffer zone from the boundaries of their property
to be devoted to growing diversified trees taller than that which they traditional
plant.

The constitutionality of said Ordinance was challenged by banana

plantation owners and exporters. Resolve.

Held:
 The Court held that although the Ordinance was an exercise by the Davao
City Government of its police power under the general welfare clause (Section 16,
R.A. No. 7160), yet its exercise was invalid for several reasons, to wit:

First, it violated the due process clause. The impossibility of carrying out a
shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months can readily be
appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding
resources required therefor.

The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying
alone will consume considerable time and financial resources given the
topography and geographical features of the plantations. As such, the conversion
could not be completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring
plantation owners and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences
of the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine,
imprisonment and even cancellation of business permits would definitely be
oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.

Second, it violated the equal protection clause.

The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results
from the conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or
truck mounted boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same
inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the
environment. The ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve. In the process, the ordinance suffers from being
“underinclusive” because the classification does not include all individuals tainted
with the same mischief that the law seeks to eliminate. A classification that is
drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears as an
irrrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended
purpose of the law.

Aside from being underinclusive, the ordinance also tends to be

“overinclusive” because its implementation will affect groups that have no relation
to the accomplishment of the legislative purpose. Its implementation will
unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of individuals than those included
in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.

The overinclusiveness of the ordinance may also be traced to its Section 6

by virtue of its requirement for the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone. This
requirement applies regardless of the area of the agricultural landholding,
geographical location, topography, crops grown and other distinguishing
characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to
be avoided. As stated earlier, only banana plantations could rely on aerial
technology because of the financial capital required therefor. Section 6 also
subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in
organic farming, and do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The
classification indisputably becomes arbitrary and whimsical.

A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to

undercut the governmental claim that the classification serves legitimate political
ends. In this light, Section 5 and Section 6 of the ordinance has to be struck down
for carrying an invidious classification, thereby violating the equal protection
clause.

Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are

only ideal venues for the investment of machineries and equipment capable of
 aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected individuals the technology aimed
at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of banana but of
other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper
the operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest
the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their
production and harvest. The effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City in
view of the significant contribution of banana export trading to the country’s
economy.

The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and

unreasonable in light of the existence and availability of more permissible and
practical alternatives that will not overburden plantation owners and those
dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the
ordinance.

Third, it was an ultra vires act on the part of the Davao City Government.
The power to regulate the application and use of chemicals and pesticides is
vested in the Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority (FPA) – a national government
agency. This power is not among those devolved to local governments under the
Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160). (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., GR No. 189185, 16 August 2016,
En Banc [Bersamin, J.])

3. Briefly explain the “void-for-vagueness” doctrine and the “doctrine of overbreadth.”

Ans.: The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that the law should be

declared void for being vague as it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
ordinary intelligence will probably have to guess as to its meaning and differ in its
application. Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: first,
it law violates due process as it fails to afford persons fair notice of the conduct to
avoid and second, it gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and, in effect, it becomes an arbitrary flexing of the government’s
muscle. However, for this doctrine to be invoked, the act must be utterly vague on
its face, i.e., that it cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by statutory
construction.

The doctrine of overbreadth meanwhile states that a governmental purpose

to regulate an activity subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly thereby invading the area of constitutionally
protected freedoms like freedom of expression, freedom of religion and other
fundamental rights.

4. What are “content-based” restrictions on free speech, as distinguished from

“content-neutral” regulations? Is the Public Assembly Act (BP 880) a “content-
based” restriction or “content-neutral?” Explain.

Ans.: Content-based restrictions are restrictions on the speech itself, or the

contents of the speech. They are censorial in character and, therefore, constitute
a prior restraint on freedom of expression. That being the case, they come to the
court with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality. To justify such restriction, it
is not enough that the government is able to point out some compelling interest,
but that the measure is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses, i.e., that the measure
is not overbroad; it does not suffer from the vice of vagueness; it is not
unreasonable. In other words, it is in content-based restrictions that the clear-and-
present-test is applied.
 Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, are restrictions not on the
contents of the speech itself but rather, on the incidents of the speech, i.e., the
manner, the time and the place of the speech. That being the case, to justify such,
a deferential approach is required, i.e., not the clear-and-present-danger test
because, as explained in one case, applying the clear-and-present danger test to
content neutral regulations is just like “using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when
all that is required is just an ordinary hammer.” (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA
447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza])

The Public Assembly Act is held to be a content neutral regulation as it does

not totally prohibit the holding of rallies and public assemblies; it merely regulates
them. In fact, under said law, there are even instances when one may hold a rally
even without permit from the local authorities. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al.,
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

5. The producer and director of the popular local TV drama series “Ang Probinsiyano”
were castigated and threatened by PNP authorities as the show tended to depict
the PNP in a negative light. Subsequently, the director of the TV show, upon
instruction of the TV station management, had to edit certain portions of the story
plot to comply with the demand of PNP authorities. If you are asked to question
this act of PNP authorities, what constitutional issue/s will you raise? Elaborate.

Ans.: What is involved in this case is a content-based restriction on

freedom of expression since the restriction is directed against the content of the
show itself which the PNP authorities wanted to be “edited” to depict the PNP not
in a negative light. This is censorship, a prior restraint on freedom of expression,
and comes to the court with a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality.

Since the PNP authorities failed to show that the drama series presents a
clear and present danger to public safety and public welfare that will warrant its
“edition” to satisfy their demand, their act cannot be sanctioned and must be
restrained.

6. What is a “heckler’s veto?”

Ans.: A heckler’s veto is where the government suppresses a particular

speech, usually unpopular or unorthodox views, or even voice of minority groups,
because the government is afraid that said speech may provoke a violent reaction
on the part of the majority.

A heckler’s veto definitely infringes on freedom of expression, which

includes even “freedom for the thought we hate.”

7. The Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party filed a petition in the COMELEC for it to participate in
Party-List elections. The COMELEC disapproved its application holding that it is
disqualified since its members are “immoral,” citing verses from the Bible and the
Koran. Rule on this decision of the COMELEC, citing legal reason.

Ans.: The act of the COMELEC is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
as it violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion (Section 5, Article
III, 1987 Constitution), and therefore, should be nullified.

The COMELEC, as an agency of the government should not make use of,
or be guided by, religious standards in its decisions and actions. Under the non-
establishment clause, when it comes to religious differences, the State enjoys no
banquet of options; neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance; it should not
establish any religion, and neither should it support one particular religion as
 against another. (Ang LADLAD LGBT Party v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582,
618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc [Del Castillo])

8. In connection with the May 2013 senatorial elections, the Diocese of Bacolod
posted huge tarpaulins in the premises of its Cathedral in Bacolod City categorizing
candidates for Senator into either belonging to “Team Buhay” (those who opposed
the enactment of the Reproductive Health [RH] Law), or “Team Patay” (those who
supported it). In essence, the tarpaulins urged the Catholic faithful to vote only for
candidates belonging to “Team Buhay” in the election.

The COMELEC ordered the Diocese to remove those tarpaulins as they are
considered unlawful campaign propaganda materials prohibited under the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), otherwise those responsible for their posting
may be prosecuted for violation of election laws.

The Diocese argued that those tarpaulins are part of its religious speech
and, therefore, protected by the Constitution pursuant to the Separation of Church
and State Doctrine.

a. Comment on the merit of the argument raised by the Diocese of

Bacolod.

Ans.: The argument does not persuade. It was not a religious speech; it
has nothing to do with the creed, doctrine or beliefs of the church which can be
considered “a purely ecclesiastical affair of the church” that will prohibit the state
from intruding into. It was a political speech by a religious group that may be
subject to the police power of the state. (The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented
by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No.
205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

b. Will you uphold the order of the COMELEC under the circumstances?

Ans.: No. The power of the COMELEC is to regulate the use of political
campaign propaganda to insure equal opportunity among candidates and political
parties during the elections. The tarpaulin cannot be considered a campaign
propaganda material which can be regulated by the COMELEC under the police
power; it was an opinion of a voter on an issue of national significance which is
beyond the power of the COMELEC to regulate as it is protected by the
Constitution under the freedom of expression clause. (The Diocese of Bacolod,
Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC,
GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc [Leonen])

9. Why was former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile allowed to post bail despite that he
was charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense?

Held:

In Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No. 213847,

August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin), the Court held:

“Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court

is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippine’s
responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights x x x.
 “This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights
as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the
grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will
not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

“In our view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his having been charged
in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is
highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time
many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition
of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid
reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.

“The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another

compelling justification for his admission to bail x x x.

“X x x

“Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his
health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling
his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

“Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not

unprecedented. X x x

“It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will

then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and
better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.

“On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish
before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is
to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional
liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue
of bail x x x that the courts can already consider in resolving the application
for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the
scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring
his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.” (Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan [3rd Div.], G.R. No.
213847, August 18, 2015, En Banc [Bersamin])