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Chapter 4: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION:
➢ According to the declaratory theory, the job of the judges is to interpret
an Act of Parliament and declare the law.
➢ However, this is not entirely true. In the case of TONY BLAND when
new facts came to light, the judges created new law when they made it
legal for the hospital to discontinue life support for a patient who was
in a persistent vegetative state.
➢ In the HIGH TREES case Lord Denning created the “equitable
principle of PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL”.
➢ Nonetheless in most cases judges are reluctant to create new law and
they leave it up to the Parliament to do so as in the case of DIANNE
PRETTY where they refused to make mercy killing legal.
➢ According to the principle of the Sovereignty of Parliament, even the
judges cannot question an Act of Parliament (BRITISH RAILWAYS v
PICKIN).
 ➢ Judges interpret Acts with the help of the 3 main rules:
I. LITERAL RULE
II. GOLDEN RULE
III. MISCHIEF RULE

LITERAL RULE:
Where the words used by the Parliament are clear, then the judges must give
effect to the plain and obvious meanings of the words used.
➢ Lord Esher stated in R v JUDGE OF THE CITY OF LONDON
COURT:
“If the words of an act are clear then you must follow them even though they
lead to a manifest absurdity (clear unreasonableness). The court has nothing
to do with the question whether the legislation has committed an absurdity”.
➢ In FISHER v BELL, the shopkeeper escaped liability under THE
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ACT 1959 which made it an offence ‘to sell or
offer to sell an offensive weapon”. He claimed that he had only displayed
 the flick knife in the window and had never offered it for sale. Later the
Parliament had to amend this Act and make it an offence “to possess an
offensive weapon with the intent to sale”.
➢ In the case of LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY CO v
BERRIMAN where a railway worker was killed while doing
maintenance work, oiling points along a railway line. His widow tried to
claim compensation because there had not been a look out man provided
by the railway company in accordance with a regulation under the FATAL
ACCIDENTS ACT. This stated that a look out should be provided for men
working on or near the railway line ‘for the purposes of ‘relaying’ and
‘repairing’ it. The court took the words ‘relaying’ and ‘repairing’ in their
literal meaning and said that oiling points was maintaining the line and
not relaying and repairing so that Mrs Berriman’s claim failed.
➢ In the case of R (BROWN) v BP, the judges stated that since the words
used in the EXTRADICTION ACT 2003 were clear and did not lead to an
absurd result, the literal rule should apply.
➢ In BLACK CLAWSON v PWA, Lord Reid stated “we are not seeking
what the Parliament meant but the true meaning of what it said”.
➢ Advantages: Since Parliament is the democratic law making body, it is
right that the judges should apply the law as it is, using the literal rule to
interpret Acts of Parliament prevents unelected judges from making law.
It makes the law more certain, as the law will be interpreted exactly as it
is written by the Parliament. This makes it easier for the lawyers and
public to know what the law is and how judges will interpret it.
➢ Disadvantages: the literal rule assumes every Act will be perfectly
drafted but in Dangerous Dogs Act Parliament used the word ‘type’ of
dog, whereas it should have used the word ‘breed’ as there is no such
thing as type of dog. Another disadvantage is that when law is drafted,
it is not always possible to cover every situation that Parliament
intended. Words can have more than one meaning and lastly following
the words can lead to unfair decisions.

GOLDEN RULE:
➢ This rule is the modification of the literal rule. The Golden rule starts
by looking at the literal meaning but the court is then allowed to avoid
an interpretation which would lead to an absurd result.
➢ There are 2 ways of using the Golden Rule:
I. NARROW APPROACH:
Is applied where the words have more than one meaning
in which case the better meaning is chosen. In R v
ALLEN the defendant tried to marry again while he was
married. He was charged under Offences Against the
Persons Act, which makes it an offence for ‘whosoever
being married shall marry again without the previous
marriage being ended’. The defendant argued that he
 could not be guilty, as his second marriage was void. The
court, used narrow interpretation and stated that ‘shall
marry’ should be interpreted as going through a
ceremony of marriage, so the defendant was guilty. If any
other meaning were given to these words, the offence
was incapable of being committed.
II. BROADER APPROACH:
Is applied where the words have only one meaning but
the judges do not wish to apply it for policy reasons or
where it amounts to an absurd result. In such a situation
the court will invoke the golden rule to modify the words
of the statute in order to avoid this problem. In RE
SIGSWORTH, a son murdered his mother. The mother
had not made a will, so normally her estate would be
inherited by the next of the kin according to the rules set
out in ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES ACT 1925.
There was no ambiguity in the words of the Act, but the
court was not prepared to let a murderer benefit from his
crime, so it was held that the literal rule should not
apply, and the golden rule should be applied to prevent
absurdity.
➢ Advantages: The rule respects the exact words of Parliament except in
limited situations. It allows the judge to choose more sensible meaning.
It can also provide sensible decisions in cases where the literal rule
would lead to a repugnant situation.
 ➢ Disadvantages: It is very limited in its use, so it is only used on rare
situations, and it is not always possible to predict when courts will use
golden rule over the literal rule. Michael Zander has described it as a
‘feeble parachute’. In other words, it is an escape route but it cannot do
very much.
MISCHIEF RULE:
➢ When judges apply the Mischief rule, they look at the mischief (harm
caused by someone) for which the Act was passed to remedy.
➢ The aim of the judges is to give effect to the true intentions of the
Parliament.
➢ According to the HEYDON’S case, the judge will look at 4 factors before
applying mischief rule:
i. They look at the law before the passing of the new Act.
ii. The defects in the old law
iii. The remedy the new law intends to provide
iv. True reasons for the remedy
➢ Court should look to see what the law was before the Act was passed in
order to discover what gap or ‘mischief’ the Act was intended to cover.
The court should then interpret the Act in such a way that the gap is
covered (SMITH v HUGHES)
➢ In DHS v ROYAL COLLEGE OF NURSING, according to the
ABORTION ACT 1967, only a “medical practitioner” could perform an
abortion. The nurses were performing the procedure under the
supervision of the doctors in clean, hygienic conditions. Had the judges
applied the literal rule in this case, they would have been liable. The
hospital escaped liability because the mischief rule was applied. The
judges looked at the purpose of the Act, which was to prevent backstreet
abortion (illegal abortion). Since this purpose was not defeated, the
hospital was not held liable.
➢ Advantages: judges have greater flexibility in decision making as it
allows judges to look at the gap in the law that the act was designed to
cover, it achieves Parliament’s intentions and is recommended by law
commission.
➢ Disadvantages: there is a risk of judicial law making as judges are
effectively re writing the words of statutes, its use may lead to uncertainty
in the law which will make legal advice difficult.

➢ The PURPOSIVE APPROACH is a modern version of the mischief

rule. This goes beyond the mischief rule in that the court is not just
looking to see what the gap was in the old law but judges are deciding
what they believe Parliament meant to achieve.
➢ The champion of this rule, LORD DENNING, said in the case of
MAGOR AND ST MELLONS v NEWPORT CORPORATION that “We
sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and carry it out, and we
 do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the
enactment……”
➢ However, this approach was criticised. Lord Scarman said that “If
Parliament says one thing but means another, it is not, under the
historic principles of the common law, for the courts to correct it…. We
are to be governed not by Parliament’s intentions but by Parliament’s
enactments’.
➢ This speech shows the problem with the purposive approach. Should the
judges refuse to follow the clear words of Parliament? How do they
know what Parliament’s intentions were?
➢ In the case of R (Quintavalle) v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
HEALTH, the House of Lords decided that organisms created by cell
nuclear replacement (CNR) came within the Defination of embryo in
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act. Section 1(1)a of this Act
states that’ embryo means a live human embryo where fertilisation is
complete’. CNR was not possible in 1990 when the Act was passed, and
the problem is that fertilisation is not used in CNR. It can be seen how
this goes beyond the mischief rule. At the time of the Act, Parliament
was considering the mischief of the risk of the wrong use of embryos
created through fertilisation. The Act was aimed at that. Parliament did
not know of any gap in relation to CNR embryos, as they had not been
invented. As a result, the use of the purposive approach is trying to
make sure the purpose of the Act is given effect, whereas the mischief
rule only looks at what the gap was in the law at the time Parliament
passed the Act.
➢ In another case of JONES v TOWER BOOT CO, a young black worker
was physically and verbally abused in the workplace by his fellow
workers. He sued his employers, arguing that they were vicariously
liable for the actions of the workers. It had to be decided whether the
workers were acting in the ‘course of their employment’ under the Act.
The Court of Appeal ruled that Parliament’s intention when passing the
Act was to eliminate discrimination in the workplace, and this would
not be achieved by giving a narrow interpretation to the words’ course
of employment’. As a result, the employers were liable.
➢ Advantages: Justice is achieved in each case; judges can fill in any gaps
in the law left by Parliament or when dealing with new situations. Judges
can take account of new technology introduced after passing of the Act.
➢ Disadvantages: it is undemocratic, as judges are interpreting laws. It
may be time consuming to work out what Parliament meant. Legal
advice is difficult, as lawyers will not know until the final judgement
whether the judges are prepared to use this approach and it may be
impossible to find Parliament’s intention.

LANGUAGES:
❖ In addition to the four main rules of statutory interpretation, judges have
developed rules of language to help make the meaning of words and
phrases clear. These rules are:
1. The EJUSDEM GENERIS rule: (meaning of the same type)
 This states that where there is a list of words followed by general words,
then the general words are limited to the same kind of items as the
specific words. This rule is easier to understand by looking at the case
of POWELL v KEMPTON PARK RACECOURSE, where the
Defendant was charged with keeping a '‘house, office, room or other
place for betting’. He had been operating betting at what is known as
Tattersall’s Ring (auctioneer of race horses), which is outdoors. The
court decided that the general words ‘other place’ had to refer to indoor
places since all the words in the list were indoor places and so the D
was not guilty. There must be at least two specific words in a list before
the general word for this rule to operate. In HOBBS v CG
ROBERTSON LTD, a workman injured his eye when brickwork he was
removing splintered. He claimed compensation under the Construction
Regulations. These regulations imposed a duty on employers to goggles
for workmen when ‘breaking, cutting, dressing or carving…stone,
concrete, slag or similar material.’ The court held that brick was not ‘a
similar material’. Brick was not Ejusdem generis with stone, concrete
as these are hard material, so that bits would fly off them when struck
with a tool, whereas brick was a soft material. This ruling meant that
the workmen’s claim for compensation failed. In ALLEN v
EMMERSON the court had to interpret the phrase ‘theatres and other
places of amusement’ and decide if it applied to a funfair. As there was
only one specific word, theatres, it was decided that a funfair did come
under the general term ‘other places of amusement’ even though it was
not of the same kind as theatres.
2. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (the mention of one
 thing excludes other):
Where there is a list of words which is not followed by general words,
then the Act applies only to the items in the list. In TEMPEST v
KILNER, the court had to consider whether the statute of frauds 1677
(which required a contract for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise
of more than £10 to be evidenced in writing) applied to a contract for the
sale of stocks and shares. The list ‘goods, wares and merchandise’ was
not followed by any general words, so the court held that only contracts
for those 3 types of things were affected by the statute because stocks and
shares were not mentioned they were not caught by the statute.
3. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS:(a word is known by the company it keeps)
This means that the words must be looked at in context and interpreted
accordingly, it involves looking at other words in the same section or at
other sections in the Act. Words in the same section were important in
INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS v FRERE, where the section
set out rules for ‘interest, annuities or other annual interest’. The first use
of the word ‘interest’ on its own could have meant any interest paid,
whether daily, monthly or annually because of the words ‘other annual
interest’ in the section, the court decided that ‘interest’ only meant annual
interest.
INTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION:
These are not rules as such, but judges can use certain features within the
statute to help make the meaning of some words clearer:
 • Long title may explain briefly Parliament’s intentions.
• Preamble that sets out Parliament’s purpose in enacting that statute
• Headings
• Schedules
• Marginal notes explaining different sections
• Interpretation sections
EXTRINSIC AIDS TO INTERPRETATION:
Extrinsic aids are matters outside the Act which may help a judge explain the
meaning of words in an Act.
They are:
• Previous Acts of Parliament on the same topic
• Earlier case law
• The historical setting
• Dictionaries of the time the Act was passed
The following can now be considered:
HANSARD:
• Hansard is the official report of what was said in Parliament when an
Act was debated:
• Until 1993, there was a firm rule that the courts could not look at what
was said in Parliamentary debates. Lord Denning had tried to attack
this ban in his judgement in the case of DAVIS v JOHNSON, which
involved the interpretation of the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial
Proceedings Act. He said:
‘They should grope about in the dark for the meaning of an Act without
switching on the light.’
• Lord Scarman stated: ‘Such material is an unreliable guide to the
meaning of what is enacted. It promotes confusion, not clarity…’
• However, in the case of PEPPER v HART House of Lords relaxed the
rule and accepted that Hansard could be used in a limited way. In this
case teachers at an independent school were having their children
educated at a reduced rate, which was a taxable benefit based on the
‘cash equivalent’ of the reduction. Under the s. 63 of the Finance Act,
cash equivalent could be interpretrated as either the additional cost of
providing the reduction to the teachers or the average cost of providing
the schooling to the public and the teachers. In this decision, the House
of Lords referred to statements made by the Financial Secretary to the
treasury during a parliamentary stage, which showed that the intention
was to tax employees on the basis of the additional cost to the employer
of providing the concession.
 • Hence, now Hansard may be considered, but only where the words of the
Act are ambiguous or obscure or lead to an absurdity. Even then,
Hansard should only be used if there was a clear statement by the
minister introducing the legislation, which would resolve the ambiguity
or absurdity. The Lord Chancellor opposed the use of Hansard on
practical grounds, pointing out the time and cost it would take to
research Hansard in each case.
Reports of law reform bodies:
Such a report can be looked to discover the gap in the law that legislation based
on the report was designed to deal with.
International Convention:
In the case of FOTHERGILL v MONARCH AIRLINES LTD, the House of
Lords decided that the original convention should be considered, as it was
possible that in translating and adapting the convention to the legislative
process, the true meaning of the original might have been lost. Hence the House
of Lords accepted that English Court should consider any preparatory or
explanatory materials in the international conventions.
The impact of EU law and the Human Rights Act 1998 on statutory
interpretation:
• The European Approach
The purposive approach is preferred by most European countries when
interpretating their own legislation. It is also the approach that has been
 adopted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in interpretating
EU law. This influence of the European preference for the purposive
approach has affected English Judges in the following two ways:
i. They have accepted that the purposive approach is the correct
approach when dealing with EU law.
ii. Using the purposive approach for EU law has made judges more
accustomed to it, and therefore more likely to apply it to the
English law. Even though UK is leaving EU, judges are likely to
continue using the approach, as it has become so well accepted in
English Law.
• The impact of the Human Rights Act 1998
➢ Section 3 of the Human Rights Act says that as far as possible to do so,
legislation must be read and given effect in way which is compatible with
the European Convention on Human Rights. In A & ANOTHER v
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOME DEPARTMENT, the HOL
declared that the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 which
allowed foreign nationals accused of terrorism to be detained without
trial indefinitely was incompatible with the ECHR as it took away the
detained persons right to freedom of expression and the right not to be
discriminated against based on nationality. This forced the government to
change the law and release the detainees subject to strict conditions.

In recent years the judges have combined all the 3 main rules and have
come up with a MODERN UNITARY APPROACH, where they must
respect the literal meaning of the words used in order to interpret them in
the light of the purpose for which the Act was passed. This may include
addition or subtraction of words in order to give sense to them. (INCO
EURO LTD v FCD).
It would be helpful if one specific rule was used, but the judges used the
rule which they prefer. In 1969 the Law Commission recommended that
the mischief rule should be used ‘to promote the legislative purpose’.
However, this proposal has been ignored.

CONCLUSION: -
Hence to conclude, the method used in interpreting a statute is still left on
the individual judge and it is quite possible that one judge will prefer the
literal view, while another could form the opposite conclusion by
applying the mischief rule or the purposive approach.