aninawon | volume 1 • number 1 | january 2019

Contents

Editor’s Introduction v-vi

Reinventing the Lumad: 1-16

Constraints and Prospects of
Being Indigenous
Ulysses S. Cabayao, S.J.

The Mindanao Lumad Social 17-77

Movement
Karl M. Gaspar, C.S.s.R.

Contributors 79
 aninawon | vol. 1 • no. 1 | january 2019

Editor’s Introduction

T
his first issue of Aninawon, the monograph series of the Ateneo
Institute of Anthropology, is honored to have as its inaugural
offerings two essays that address the situation of the ‘Lumad’ or
non-Islamic indigenous peoples of Mindanao. This is fitting indeed, given
the Ateneo de Davao University’s express and continuing commitment to
support indigenous peoples’ rights.

The first article is a recent paper by Fr. Ulysses S. Cabayao, SJ, presented
at the 39th Annual Conference of the Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao/
Anthropological Association of the Philippines, held at Capitol University,
Cagayan de Oro City, last 9-11 November 2017. In his essay, Fr. Cabayao
provocatively argues that the Lumad peoples of Mindanao need to reinvent
their construction and discourse of ethnic identity, if they are to re-present
themselves as distinct from the more politically vocal Moro peoples, yet
similarly entitled to the Philippine state’s recognition and respect for their
rights. This reflection on the Lumad peoples’ current situation vis-à-vis the
Moro peoples is timely, given the ongoing public conversations around
Moro political autonomy in relation to peace in Mindanao, and indigenous
self-determination in relation to federalism.

The second essay is a paper that was originally published as Vol. 1, no.
1, series of 1997 of Mindanao Focus, a publication of the Alternative Forum
for Research in Mindanao (AFRIM). It is presented here (with minor
editorial corrections) with the kind permission of the author, Bro. Karl M.
Gaspar, CSSR. Unfortunately, Aninawon’s copy of the original publication
is so blurred that it was impossible to reproduce its bibliography here as
well. Despite this, the essay’s pioneering attempt to outline the history
of organizing work in Mindanao’s Lumad communities in relation to the
major political developments sweeping across the island—from the colonial
period, through the Marcos regime, and up into the mid-1990s—retains
its integrity, given how the author draws in part from his own experience
and memories of this period. It is by no means a complete account of

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 editor’s introduction

what he calls the Mindanao Lumad social movement, but it is offered here
not only to keep this groundbreaking piece of scholarship the continued
circulation it deserves, but also to provide historical context that enriches
one’s reading of Fr. Cabayao’s contribution.

Together, Bro. Karl’s account of the Lumad peoples’ historical struggle

to find their political voice, and Fr. Cabayao’s argument that for the voice
of the Lumad to be heard now, they need to reinvent their discourse
of identity, provide Anthropologically-informed perspectives on the
continuing struggles of the indigenous peoples of Mindanao. It is hoped
that by thus underlining Anthropology’s contribution to understanding
the historical and contemporary situation of the Lumad—who despite
often being politically under-represented and misunderstood, have a major
stake in the fate of Mindanao—the readers will gain a greater appreciation
of the potential of Anthropology and other social sciences as instruments
of peace and justice.

the acting editor

18 December 2018
Davao City

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 aninawon | vol. 1 • no. 1 | january 2019

Re-Inventing the Lumad:

Constraints and Prospects of Being Indigenous
ulysses s. cabayao, s.j.

Introduction

I
ndigeneity1 is a global discourse characterized by the intersection of
its internationalist concept and its local implementations. Indigenous
peoples experience and negotiate this tension in various specific
historical, social, economic, and political [Link] essay aims to examine
how the Lumad of the Philippines negotiate this global-local dialectic of
indigeneity. My main argument is that the Lumad need to re-imagine
their indigenous identity to remain viable in securing their distinct place in
the future; otherwise, their distinctiveness as an indigenous group can be
elided and rendered invisible. I will begin by delving into an ethnogenesis
of the Lumad. Next, I will establish the initial premise that the global
indigeneity consolidated and constructed the Lumad identity. I will then
propose that the availability and the rigid interpretation of internationalist
indigeneity can constrain and undermine Lumad identity. I will discuss this
issue and its consequences in the context of the Bangsamoro case. Finally,
I will argue that there is a need to expand the notions of indigeneity to
ensure the viability of Lumad identity. Prospects for such expansion can be
drawn from creative retrievals of tribal narratives.

Lumad Ethnogenesis

The indigenous peoples of the southern island of Mindanao are

collectively known as Lumad. At the outset, two things have to be clarified
in describing the Lumad: firstly, that they are not the only indigenous

1
The term indigeneity is often used interchangeably with indigenousness and indigenism.
These three terms are understood to be synonymous in meaning (e.g. in Niezen 2003; 2004;
Waldron 2003; Sissons 2005; Merlan 2009; and many others).

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 cabayao | re-inventing the lumad

peoples in Mindanao; secondly, that they were not historically known as

Lumad and that they did not self-ascribe as such, until recently.

Mindanao is home to 61 percent of the indigenous peoples in the

Philippines (ADB 2002). Aside from the Lumad, the other major
indigenous group in Mindanao is the Islamicized Moros. The actual
population of Lumad cannot be ascertained because there has been
no comprehensive and accurate census of indigenous peoples in the
Philippines since 1916 (Guia-Padilla cited in Gera 2015, p. 8). The
indigenous population is unofficially estimated to be between 10 and
20 percent of the national population (Dekdeken and Cariño 2015).
The number and names of the different indigenous groups in Mindanao
remain an unresolved issue in the Philippines; the current recognized
denominations largely observe the official listing of National Cultural
Minorities drawn up by the Commission on National Integration in
1968 (Rodil 1993; 1994). Of the 27 groups in that official listing, 10
have been classified as Moro, and the other 17 are being referred to as
Lumad. Despite the sketchy categorization and spellings, Lumad currently
refers to 18 ethnolinguistic groups in Mindanao: Ata, Bagobo, Banwaon,
B’laan, Bukidnon, Dibabawon, Higaunon, Kalagan, Mamanwa, Mandaya,
Mangguwangan, Manobo, Mansaka, Subanon, Tagakaolo, T’boli, Tiruray,
Ubo (Rodil 1994, p. 34).

The Lumad have a relatively recent history. There is no mention

of Lumad people as such during the Spanish and American colonial
periods. The Spaniards referred to all the tribal groups who were not
Christianized as infieles (“infidels”, “pagans”). Unlike the Moros, who
were distinctly identified as a composite of tribes (see Blumentritt in
Smithsonian Report for 1899, p. 542), the rest of the Mindanao tribes
were known as discrete, isolated groups. Casiño (2000, p. 290) disputes this
by pointing out commonalities that reveal that “all peoples and cultures
within the Cotabato-Sarangani region were in close contact with each
other throughout their ethnohistories”. Likewise, Paredes (2013, p. 165)
argues that there is evidence of a “pan-ethnic political confederation” that
suggested enough common ground for cooperation and collaboration.
Given that these were recent historical discoveries, the Americans, who
came after the Spaniards, adopted the previous colonial categories of

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classifying these “wild”, “non-Christian” tribes in contrast to the “civilized”

and “Christianized” population. These colonial categories persisted in the
governing policies of the newly-independent, fledgling republic (Rodil
1994). Several decades had to pass before the State began to recognize these
tribes as “national minorities” in the 1973 Constitution, and eventually
as “national cultural minorities” in the 1987 Constitution. After another
decade, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 officially
defined these national cultural minorities as “indigenous peoples (IPs)” or
“indigenous cultural communities (ICCs)”.

The Lumad emerged out of these recent events in the nation’s history.
In June 1986, representatives from 15 out of the 18 ethnolinguistic groups
congregated and adopted the name Lumad to distinguish themselves
from the Moros and the Christian majority (Rodil 1993). This meeting,
Rodil (1994) claims, was unprecedented in that this was the first time
that these groups have assented to a common autonym. The word lumad,
however, had already become the “accepted term among the organized
groups for IPs in Mindanao” since the early 1980s (Alejo 2000, p. 290).
Nevertheless, it remains significant because prior to this mobilization
“all reference to non-Muslim, non-Christian inhabitants of Mindanao
were either idiosyncratic and isolating, or carried subordinate or marginal
connotations” (Casiño 2000, p. 126). Lumad is a Cebuano Visayan word
which means “native, natural-born citizen” or “of native origin, make, or
quality”; as a verb, it can mean to “stay, stick long on” (Wolff 1972, p.
640). Despite the irony of adopting a term from migrant language, it was
considered “most appropriate” since it was the lingua franca understood by
the various groups.

In spite of its etymology, Lumad cannot be presumed as a “native”

identity. There are implications in the English translation of lumad as
“native” that are not so obvious to non-Filipino speakers. To those whose
vernacular is English, “native” resonates with indigeneity. For Filipinos,
however, it immediately conjures the controversial “native”, which is
associated with what Kuper (2003) argues as being “primitive”. In the
Philippines, netibo/netib is used as a pejorative term. During his fieldwork
among the Manobos of Mount Apo, Alejo (2000, p. 66) hesitated to use
netibo because it “connoted primitiveness or backwardness”; though he was

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 cabayao | re-inventing the lumad

surprised to hear that they preferred being called netibo to Lumad. Even
the Lumad are aware of netibo/netib’s derogatory connotation. In my three
years of working among the Ummayamnen of Bukidnon, I often observed
how young Ummayamnen taunt each other as netibo and scolding each
other for behaving like a netib.

Earlier, it was noted that the Lumad as a collective ethnic identity

began to circulate only in the 1980s. Ethnographers of Mindanao IPs
attest to how the different groups tend to be tribal and parochial in their
self-identification (Cole 1913; Garvan 1931; Manuel 1973; Schlegel
1994). While they might have interacted closely before and may have
even collaborated, these early aggregations may not have been stable and
durable enough in crafting a collective consciousness. Self-identifying as
Lumad does not seem to be deeply embedded yet in the consciousness of
ordinary IPs. In the course of her intermittent fieldwork with different IPs
from 1993 until 2010, Quizon (2012, p. 41) “rarely heard the term lumad
in everyday speech”. One reason might have been its recentness; another
likely reason would be its politicized usage as an ideological currency
among organized IPs (Alejo 2000). The word lumad was adopted primarily
for an international audience rather than for their own tribal constituents.

The preceding survey of the ethnogenesis of the Lumad—a nod to what

Clifford (2000, p. 103) emphasized as the necessity of a “historically informed
ethnography” in a “comparative understanding of the politics of identity”—
sets up the background of this essay’s initial premise that the Lumad is a
representation drawn from the internationalist concept of indigeneity and
mobilized according to its specific historical and cultural context.

Indigeneity and the Lumad

The plight of the Lumad have been articulated, consolidated, and

empowered by the global discourse of indigeneity. Being indigenous is
broadly understood according to these criteria: first come, non-dominance,
cultural difference, and self-ascription (Saugestad 2001, p. 43). This broad
consensus, however, does not equate to a universal definition of indigeneity;
rather, this internationalist concept has been negotiated according to
various national and local contexts.
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In the Philippines, the state’s definition of indigeneity in the IPRA

correlates with what is set forth in the UNDRIP and ILO 169. Candelaria
(2012, p.1) concurs that these three instruments “have much in common
and therefore should be considered as complementary and mutually
reinforcing”. Indigeneity, in the Philippine context, is acknowledged
according to three conditions:

First is on account of descent before conquest, which means that

one may want to trace his roots to his elders who were already in
the Philippines before the Spaniards came. Second is on account
of the social, economic, and cultural conditions, i.e., indigenous
peoples are those who practice a way of life characteristically
different from mainstream society. They continue to do so by
living, speaking, dressing, and expressing themselves in such
manner. Third is self-ascription, i.e., one believes by himself or
herself that he or she is an indigenous person and to a certain
extent manifests this belief in his or her relations with other
people (Candelaria 2004, pp. 33-34).

Although there are only three explicitly identified conditions (first-

come, cultural difference, self-ascription) which tie in with Saugestad’s
criteria, the fourth one (non-dominance) is implied in the phrase “different
from mainstream society”.

As a discourse, indigeneity is typically framed as an agonistic dialectic.

There is an implicit violence behind every indigenous construction.
Being indigenous is an identity that emerges in the struggle against
manifold experiences of colonization (Sisson 2005; Merlan 2005; Yeh
2007), oppression (Niezen 2003), and marginalization (Hodgson 2011).
Indigeneity in the Philippines has been shaped and continues to be
influenced by this same discourse. It is not a coincidence that the Lumad
came into existence only in the 1980s in parallel with the global emergence
of indigenous movements (Merlan 2009).

The Lumad also bear the contradictions which have characterized

[Link] contradiction can be seen, for instance, in how globalization
and neoliberalism have exploited and displaced tribal peoples and how, on
the other hand, these same currents have created places and spaces for

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 cabayao | re-inventing the lumad

indigenous movements to emerge (Muehlebach 2001; Niezen 2003; 2004;

Sisson 2005; Hale 2005; Turner 2007; Hathaway 2009; Merlan 2009).

Similarly, the Lumad arose as “a form of self-determination at

the grassroots” in response to the “dispossession and marginalization
of Mindanao highlanders” (Casiño 2000, p. 126). This indigenous
representation was a political mobilization. The word lumad was identified
as the “ideological password” of a “progressive, church-backed tribal
movement” (Alejo 2000, p. 67). “The context of the dictatorial Marcos
regime, in an atmosphere of militarization, human rights violations, poverty,
land grabbing, intrusions by multinational corporations, and government
neglect” mobilized and galvanized the Lumad (Rodil cited in Casiño 2000,
p. 126). To sum up, the available global discourse of indigeneity gave the
Lumad a platform to represent themselves by facilitating the construction
of a consolidated and collective identity that enunciated their shared
experience of marginality and dispossession.

Undermining the Lumad: The Bangsamoro Case

Indigeneity contributed to the emergence and the visibility of the

Lumad. It has provided the Lumad with the necessary instrument to
leverage their indigenous identity in order to attain their goals. Yet it can
also become problematic for the Lumad in two ways. Firstly, the availability
of this discourse to a more demographically dominant indigenous group
can result in what Harrison (1995, p. 258) calls a “proprietary contest”,
where being indigenous is seen as symbolic capital (see Bourdieu 2000,
p. 240-245) to be monopolized or controlled. This can happen when the
dominant indigenous group claims the entitlements of indigeneity within
the same territory. The question of who is indigenous has been turned into
a competition in this context because it legitimizes access to land and its
resources. Secondly, a less dominant group’s static adherence to and narrow
application of indigeneity can lead to the blurring of its distinctiveness
from a competing group, consequently ending up in its invisibility to
legitimating audiences. The case of the Lumad in the proposed Bangsamoro
territory illustrates these two dilemmas.

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For the past four decades, Moro secessionist groups have waged a war
in Mindanao. The reasons for these secessionist movements are complex
and deeply-rooted, and the bloody costs of this protracted armed struggle
have negatively impacted families and the nation. Recently, the cessation
of armed conflict between the State and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), along with the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in March 2014, have revived hopes for peace
and development in Mindanao. An offshoot of this peace agreement is
the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) which seeks to create the
Bangsamoro, a new autonomous political entity to replace what the
Philippine President has called a “failed experiment” (Aquino 2012),
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Lumad,
however, have been largely and glaringly neglected, having no place in the
peace process (see Coronel-Ferrer 1998; Abubakar 2004; Paredes 2015).
The invisibility of the Lumad can be inferred from Article 1, Section 5 of
the Framework Agreement on Bangsamoro (FAB) and Article 2, Section
1 of the original BBL draft, where the Bangsamoro people identify as
“those who at the time of conquest and colonization were considered
natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago and
its adjacent islands including Palawan, and their descendants, whether of
mixed or of full blood…by ascription or self-ascription”. Paredes (2015, p.
177) cautions readers about the simplicity of this definition by pointing
out that the “first seventeen words of the definition of Bangsamoro also
describe the Lumad”. This sweeping assertion of Moro indigeneity (now,
self-identifying as Bangsamoro2) obscures the Lumad’s claim within the
contested legal and topographical territory.

What has happened to the Lumad in the Bangsamoro dilemma can

be described as an elision, in the dual sense of the word: an omission and a
merging. This conflicting and competing claim to indigeneity has resulted
in the “omission” of the Lumad and the “merging” of their indigeneity
with that of the Bangsamoro. To account for this elision, I turn to two
explanations: the mutability of indigeneity and identity, and the status of
the Lumad as a second-order minority.

2
I will use this appellation to distinguish this current mobilization and representation from
the previously held Moro identity.

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Indigeneity and identity are fluid and malleable categories. Merlan

(2005, p. 474) states that “indigeneity (like all identity categories) does
not designate a fixed entity but suggests processes of interaction and
differentiation”. In addition, Hall (1990, p. 226) maintains that cultural
identities are always changing, “unstable points of identification ... not an
essence but a positioning”. This mutability and fluidity allows groups to
appropriate indigeneity in calibrating their identities to adapt to changing
circumstances. This mechanism has facilitated the emergence of the
Lumad, but it has also allowed the Bangsamoro to adopt a claim that
coincides with and effaces the former. The constantly shifting landscape of
indigeneity where the Lumad and the Bangsamoro have staked out their
identities are resulting in this repositioning where the Bangsamoro have
agilely changed gears from a previously belligerent secessionist strategy
(as Moros) to the more acceptable indigenous discourse (as Bangsamoro)
in order to secure and legitimize their claims, leaving the Lumad
immobilized by statically clinging to the internationalist-influenced,
State-sanctioned indigeneity that has previously secured recognition for
them. The changing circumstances, however, press the Lumad for a more
innovative representation. The omission of the Lumad, therefore, could
be attributed to the agility of the Bangsamoro in seizing and exploiting
indigeneity to bolster the legitimacy of their claims, and to the Lumad’s
languid positioning and fossilized appropriation of indigeneity.

This situation is further compounded by the Lumad’s status as a

“second-order minority” in relation to the more dominant minority
group, the Bangsamoro. Barter (2015, p. 128) uses the term “second-
order minority” to refer to “the minorities of secessionist minorities ...
a community which forms a self-identified ethnic or religious minority
within a region dominated by an ethnic group which represents a national,
or first-order, minority”. While the Mindanao situation is already post-
secessionist conflict, it still aptly describes the Lumad in relation to the
Bangsamoro. Furthermore, as evidence of its being a minority within a
minority, Lumad are considered a “residual category”; they are known as
those Mindanao IPs who never converted to Islam and did not become
Moros (Paredes 2015, p. 168). As a second-order minority, the Lumad
can be typologized (see Barter 2015, pp. 128-130) according to settlement
(“concentrated or dispersed”), scale (“national majorities or minorities”),

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and origin (“indigenous or migrant”). Each of these types of second-order

minorities predicts the potential violence that arises from their interaction
with a more dominant minority.

Based on this typology, the Lumad can be categorized as territorially

dispersed, national minorities, and indigenous. These categories locate
the Lumad in a generally non-threatening position. Being territorially
dispersed weakens the Lumad’s capacity to organize and consolidate its
numbers. They are also further weakened and fragmented by having to
advocate on two different geographical and cultural fronts: in the areas
heavily dominated by the minority but dominant Bangsamoro, and in
the areas heavily dominated by majority Christian settlers. Furthermore,
given their small and dispersed numbers, they are likely to be forcibly
displaced by aggressive first-order minorities (Barter 2015, p. 128). As a
national minority, the Lumad share the plight of the Bangsamoro. But
this interaction assumes a different cast as the Lumad find themselves
doubly marginalized by both the national majority and the Bangsamoro
minority. Seen either as a surplus or a residual population, they are “likely
to be ignored or scapegoated” (Barter 2015, p. 128-129). As an indigenous
second-order minority, the Lumad have reason to fight for their land;
they also present an “ideational threat” because their claim parallels that
of the dominant minority, but given their small numbers relative to the
Bangsamoro, the dominant minority are likely to deal with them “by
claiming indigenous minorities as their sub-ethnic cousins, denying their
distinctiveness and working to assimilate them” (Barter 2015, p. 130).

The Lumad’s status as a dispersed national minority echoes their neglect

and invisibility in what has become a dialogue between the State and the
Bangsamoro. In addition, the Lumad, as an indigenous second-order
minority, run the risk of being assimilated into the Bangsamoro identity
through downplaying, merging, and consequently effacing the Lumad’s
indigenous claim vis-à-vis the Bangsamoro’s indigenous identification.
Paredes (2015, p. 178) validates this by stating that “the overall fear of
Lumads [sic] is that the Moros might try to further assimilate them, and
that they could be pressured to convert to Islam or would otherwise lose
their cultural distinctiveness, along with their ancestral lands”.

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 cabayao | re-inventing the lumad

The case of the Lumad in the proposed Bangsamoro territory

highlights the different struggle of indigenous peoples in Third World
or developing nations. It confirms what Sissons points out: “Third World
tribal struggles are usually rooted in the cultural marginalization and
oppression of less powerful indigenous peoples by more powerful ones.
Indigeneity in such contexts is of little or no value as a marker of cultural
or political distinctiveness” (2005, p. 16). Tossing out indigeneity seems
to be out of the question. After all, this discourse and its corresponding
legal instruments in the Philippines have given the Lumad the recognition
and the platform to advocate their cause. Nevertheless, indigeneity can
be exploited by other competing groups to the detriment of others, and a
rigid adherence to a particular definition of indigeneity can constrain and
undermine the effective representation of indigenous identities. So, how
else can the Lumad re-imagine their indigenous identity?

Future Prospects

Re-imagining Lumad identity involves broadening the conventional

discourse of indigeneity. Being indigenous is often represented as an
assertion against marginalization and dispossession. This resonates deeply
with the experience of the Lumad throughout history. But which history or
whose side of history is shaping Lumad indigeneity and identity? Niezen
(2003, p. 10) claims that “indigenous history is ‘invented’”. To update our
representations of Lumad indigeneity, we need to re-examine how the
Lumad have been framed in history and find a way of re-inventing the
Lumad’s history. By inventing, we do not mean creating something ex-
nihilo. Hall (1990, p. 225) observes that identities are not merely conjured
from thin air, they “come from somewhere, have histories. But, like
everything that is historical, they undergo constant transformation”. The
inevitability of being transformed perpetually opens up the prospect of
reconfiguring the Lumad’s indigenous identity.

The Lumad are generally portrayed as helpless victims against the

advance of colonization and globalization (Rodil 1993; 1994). That they
have been victimized and disenfranchised by outside forces cannot be
downplayed nor dismissed (see Rodil 1993; 1994; TRICOM 1998; Alejo
2000; Wenk 2007; Masinaring 2011). These documented incidents have

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alerted others to the Lumad’s plight, but it has also unfortunately and
perhaps unintentionally propagated the myth of the ignorant and passive
native. Edgerton (2008) and Paredes (2013) challenge these stereotypical
characterizations by investigating what was assumed as historical. What
they have uncovered and elaborated on is that the Lumad, contrary to
what has been popularly circulating, have been actively exercising their
agency in confronting the successive and gradual encroachment of other
people into their cultures and lands.

In contrast to the rhetoric that the Lumad remained free during

colonization (Rodil 1994), there was evidence that Lumad communities
have interacted, even initiated contact, with colonial presence; moreover,
they were “active stakeholders in the colonial enterprise”, assimilating
Spanish influences in a way that have shaped Lumad politics, culture,
and history (Paredes 2013, p. 165). The Lumad of Bukidnon, for instance,
have positioned themselves as “people of the middle ground”, negotiating
their position through a “process of adaptation and accommodation”
which allowed them to bridge the “modern and primitive, Western and
non-Western, Christian and non-Christian, forward-thinking versus
backward-looking, and progressive versus traditional” (Edgerton 2008, p.
8). Awareness of the Lumad’s active agency does not seem to be buried and
forgotten in the past. In ethnographic interviews with representatives from
the B’laan, Matigsalug, and Mansaka, the Lumad recount stories of how
their older generation has shared their land with the new migrant settlers
(see LNRC 1994, TRICOM 1998, Wenk 2007, Masinaring 2011). This
narrative is confirmed by other scholars. Casiño (2000), Edgerton (2008),
and Paredes (2013) agree that the success of foreign colonizers and local
migrants in establishing settlements would not have been possible if the
Lumad had not extended friendship and hospitality by offering them land
to settle in. The Lumad’s initiative to share land suggests not an outright and
passive victimization, but an implicit underlying agency. In the words of a
Lumad, “In the past, we thought that land was abundant and free, so, a lot
of us, Mansaka, gave it freely or sold it very cheap to the Bisaya” (Urustum
Matucol interviewed in Masinaring 2011, p. 22). Migrant settlers attest
to this “generous” agency. One of the early settlers in Matigsalug ancestral
land observes: “Their characteristic is different because if they grew fond of
a certain Bisaya, their ‘system’ of selling would just be like sort of giving it

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away because if we really take into account the actual cost or worth of the
land, the payment is not really adequate. They [Matigsalug] also don’t want
to be neighbors with a Bisaya who is mean, or not generous, unlike them
who are very generous” (quoted in Wenk 2007, p. 159).

These historical and ethnographic retrievals are some of the resources

that the Lumad can draw upon to reconfigure their indigenous identity.
Whereas indigeneity is contemporarily framed as a struggle against the
injustice inflicted by non-indigenous others, the Lumad can expand this
further by drawing on a discourse of equitable sharing and peaceable
accommodation (both in the sense of adapting and providing enough
space). Aside from being native or being here first, being indigenous
for the Lumad can further mean the capacity equitably to share land,
coexist peacefully, and provide sufficient space for everyone. This implies
the necessary autonomy to make such decisions, and the necessary land
to carry it out.

This had been the Lumad’s prior stance when they were exploited and
marginalized, they might have been unwittingly complicit in replicating
the injustices of the past. Indigenous identities are not a “return to the
past; rather they are always re-imaginations of the future” (Sissons 2005,
p. 11). Retrieving this past narrative, however, and reintroducing it to
the current Lumad discourse is to take a “discursive approach [that] sees
identification as a construction, a process never completed—always in
‘process’” (Hall 2000, p. 16). This approach is an acknowledgement that
changing circumstances demand imaginative appropriations and pliable
identities. That the Lumad have evolved into becoming a collective
indigenous identity from disparate ethnicities was part of the still ongoing
process of identification. With this recent conjuncture that pits the Lumad
against a competing and potentially hegemonizing polity, their identity
needs to continue evolving by drawing on all available resources that have
enabled them to cope with the shifting political and economic landscape.
Indigenous identities, such as the Lumad, are always “conditional, lodged
in contingency” (Hall 2000, p. 17). Expanding what indigeneity means for
the Lumad means imagining how they actively coped with the traumas to
their culture and threats to their patrimony in order to re-imagine their
place in the future.

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Conclusion

In order to remain viable, Lumad identity must always evolve to cope

with challenges to its indigeneity. Because it is a constructed identity, it
remains constantly open to the possibility of being transformed. Inasmuch
as it owes its existence to the availability of a global discourse of indigeneity,
it has to adapt when international discourses begin to undermine its claims
and elide its distinctive presence. One of its prospects for reconfiguring its
identity can be drawn from ethnic narratives that challenge characterizations
of the Lumad. There are other ways of re-imagining indigeneity and if the
Lumad are to remain visible, they must re-imagine themselves accordingly.
Other prospects that can aid in this re-imagining could be explored by re-
examining available historical and ethnographic sources to re-invent what
it means to be Lumad.

13
 cabayao | re-inventing the lumad

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The Mindanao Lumad Social Movement

karl m. gaspar, cssr

Introduction

A
ll over the world there have been attempts to heighten the world’s
consciousness regarding to plight of indigenous people (IPs).
The struggles of the IPs to promote their rights and defend their
homelands from development aggression have been highlighted in various
ways, from media coverage to international conferences. In the process,
more and more people have come to realize that an international social
movement involving the disenfranchised IPs has evolved through the
years. Indeed, even if the linkages among national movements have been
only recently established, there is no denying that the movement has made
its presence felt within the global framework.

The United Nations International Working Group on Indigenous

Populations (UNIWGIP) is one of those who have tried to project on
an international scale the realties and struggles of IPs, In its 1985 session,
it came up with a draft Declaration of Principles which focused on the
right to self-determination and which has since guided many indigenous
organizations in their continuing struggle.

The declaration asserted that the right to self-determination “is

fundamental to the enjoyment of all human rights. From … (this) right…
flows the right to permanent sovereignty over land, including aboriginal,
ancestral-historical lands, and other natural resources, the right to
maintain and develop governing institutions the right to life, health and
physical integrity, and the rights to culture, way of life and religion. (It
also) includes... (their)… absolute right… to exist as communities, tribes,
nations or other entities according to their own wishes and to define their
own membership.” (IWGIA 1987:92).

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

To further promote awareness and concern for IPs worldwide, the UN

declared 1993 as The Year of Indigenous Peoples.

In the Philippines, a social movement of IPs exists. Self-determination

is also its contemporary rallying cry. The two main issues involved are
the IPs’ control over their ancestral domain and a stop to development
aggression in their homeland. The two regions where this movement
has always been strong since the Marcos dictatorship and where the IP
population has been significant are in the Cordillera and Mindanao. In the
latter, IPs are popularly called lumads.
The social movement is localized and remains quite vibrant in these
regions. Both print and broadcast media continue to report on the IP’s
determined actions to assert their rights in the face of expanding incursions
into their homelands of agri-business corporations, mining companies
and government-initiated infrastructure projects. The indigenous people’s
organizations (IPOs) and their vast network of support groups from
the various sectors of civil society have adopted various approaches
towards waging this struggle. Some continue to fight along with the
armed insurgents; others- out of desperation- have revived their bagani
(warrior) tradition and on various occasions declared the waging of the
pangayaw(tribal war for vengeance); the rest have closed ranks as a broad
alliance to engage the State within the democratic space allowed by the
contemporary political framework.
Up until this writing, government and other sectors of society had been
euphoric over alleged the resolution of the peace problem of Mindanao,
with the government and the the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) agreeing on the setting up of the Southern Philippines Council
for Peace and Development (SPCPD), among others. But recent events
do not appear to bode well for the future. For one, both the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (which MNLF chair Nur Misuari heads
as governor) nor the SPCPD have little to show in terms of concrete
performance. The ARMM continues to be one of the poorest regions in
the country, and the funds-strapped SPCPD is barefly functioning.
It may be too early to judge the peace accord and the SPCPD. After
all, the peace agreement is barely a year old. Additionally, government is
still holding talks with the fundamentalst Moro Independence Liberation
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Front (MILF); too, there are Moro groups like the Abu Sayaf who have
preferred to remain outside the social mainstream, but whom government
must consider if it is to effectively address the peace question in Mindanao.

But all these only further highlight the continuing disfranchisement

of the non-Muslim lumads of Mindanao. The fact is there never was any
instance in the entire peace process—dating back to the Tripoli talks
in 1973—where the lumads of Mindanao (of for that matter the other
indigenous peoples in the country) figured in the core issue of peace and
development. In so far as government is concerned, IPs do not rate high in
its list of priorities. This is supremely ironic considering that like the Moro
people, the lumads, too, are fighting for their right to self-determination.
This partly explains the tenacity of many lumad leaders and their support
groups to continue waging their struggle.

Yet one may ask; how did this struggle emerge and become a social
movement? How strong has this struggle been over the years and how
strong is it today?

This study is an attempt to inquire into these questions. It is primarily

concerned with the communities, groups, organizations, structures,
agencies, institutions, networks and alliances that have constituted the
Mindanao Lumad social movement. (The author coined the term “social
movement” in the absence of a formal name agreed on by the key actors).
This movement has existed since at least thirty years ago. It has involved
the lumad themselves; their communities and their organizations (IPOs)
and over time, outsiders who have been supportive of their cause or else
have established working relationships with them in their struggles. This
study will also look into the workings of the State to the extent that its
policies and programs have affected the lives of the lumads.

The author is indebted to the conceptual framework developed

by Professor Covar (1961, 1974), which was later adopted by Felicidad
Dacayanan (1990). It is that of the whole and the subwhole. In this study,
both the State and Church-civil society (the latter referring to those
groups, institutions and organizations outside of the State’s control) as
they operate in the Mindanao setting constitute the whole. The Mindanao
Lumad Social Movement (MLSM) is the subwhole.

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

The author shall approach the MLSM from both the synchronic
and diachronic perspectives. Synchronically, this means analyzing the
movement in term of five elements, namely: 1) characteristic conditions,
2) typical processes, 3) effective mechanisms, 4) types of leaders, and 5)
dominant social forms. Diachronically, it means investigating the three
stages of development within the movement’s natural history, including (1)
the preliminary stage (2) the popular stage, and (3) the formal stage. The
last one has three parts, considering the ups and downs of this movement.
It is the author’s contention that the movement is only entering the
transition period towards the Institutional Stage.

This study covers only the period from the late 1960s and 1997 and
focuses on the non-Islamized lumads in Mindanao.

CHAP TER I

Historical Framework

The history of the social movement of Mindanao’s lumad began in the

late 1960s. To better understand why and how this movement arose, it is
important to go back to the Spanish colonial period in the 1500s.

Early on, there were attempts to establish mission territories in

Mindanao. These follwowed the early contacts of European missionaries
with the Mindanaoans. The first such missionaries were Portugese Jesuits
who got stranded on the east cost of Mindanao—what are now Surigao
and Butuan—in 1538. During their short stay, they were able to baptize
a number of people. This was the first recorded history of missionary
work in Mindanao

In 1543, Villalobos reached Mindanao and occupied Sarangani Island

for seven months. Twenty-three years after, it was the turn of Legaspi
to reach Mindanao. But the Spaniards soon moved on to other parts of
the archipelago, deciding to concentrate colonization and evangelization
efforts in Luzon and the Visayas. Consequently, missionary work was
limited to only a few areas in Mindanao.

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In 1596, a year after Manila became an archdiocese and Cebu a diocese,

the Jesuits returned to Butuan. Six years later, in 1622, the Augustinian
Recollects set up mission posts in the east coast. In the next decades, they
would cover the whole Mindanao’s eastern Pacific coast area which they
named Caraga—what are now Surigao del Sur and Davao Oriental. From
there, they made inroads to Lanao and Bukidnon.

The Jesuits, on the other hand, headed west of Mindanao and founded
Dapitan in 1625 and Zamboanga in 1635. From Dapitan they moved on to
Dipolog, Lubugan, Oroquieta, Iligan and Misamis. In 1767, King Charles
III ordered the expulsion of the Jesuits from all Spanish territories; the
order took effect in the Philippines the following year. The Recollects took
over the Jesuits’ parishes and mission areas, and opened up new missions
in Malaybalay and Davao.

Close to a hundred years would pass before the Jesuits were allowed to
come back in 1859. They first set up base in Davao and Cotabato and from
there to Cagayan de Oro, Basilan, Butuan, Surigao, and Zamboanga. They
subsequently penetrated Malaybalay and then Jolo.

Throughout this period, Spanish forces were at constant war with the
Muslims (Moros). No matter how hard they tried, the former could not
subjugate the latter. In the course of the Spanish military campaign against
the Muslims (Moros), two Jesuits lost their lives in their attempt to win
the Muslims (Moros) over through diplomacy—Fr. Francisco Paliola and
Fr. Alejandro Lopez.

Since it was difficult for them to convert the Muslims, the missionaries
concentrated their proselytization efforts among the non-Islamized (non-
Muslim) peoples, especially those whom they were able to get in touch
with in the coastal areas where the first Catholic communities were
established. These lumads included the Manobos and Mandayas of Caraga,
the Higaonons of Misamis, and Subanen of Zamboanga. Unlike the
Muslims, the lumads responded to Spanish hispanization in various ways.

Some communities responded positively and entered into the

acculturation process beginning with being baptized into the new

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

religion. Some—like in many other parts of the archipelago—left their

settlements by the seacoasts and river banks and moved to the interior.
Being out or reach, like the Isnegs up North, they managed to preserve
the culture of their ancestors and, in the process, looked less and less like
their acculturating, acculturated neighbors (Scott 1982:41). Still others,
especially those with the bagani (warrior) tradition, took on a defiant
posture. Waging pangayaws, these lumads attacked the missionaries, in a
few instances cutting off heads.

All these led to various derogatory names that the colonizers used to
refer to the lumads, especially to those who fought tooth and nail against
the Spanish yoke. The expletives included salvajes (evil), diablos (devils),
infiles (infidels), feroces (savages) (Barrameda 1994:998)

Other communities already lived in places which were either too deep
into the forbidding rainforests or feared, because these were believed to be
peopled by ogres and monsters (Scott 1995:166). On this account, they
were not priority areas for mission work. Hundreds of years would pass
before these communities would encounter lowlanders, and this only came
about because of the change in colonial masters.

The coming of the American colonial period would have tremendous

impact on the lives of the IPs. The Americans reached more areas than
did the Spaniards and at a much faster pace, forcing more IPs to either
accept colonial rule or to move to thicker rainforests or higher mountain
ranges. With the takeover by American interests of vast tracks of land
for logging and plantations, the process of disenfranchising the IPs from
their ancestral domain began. The subsequent entry into Mindanao, the
Land of Promise by migrant landless peasants from Luzon and Visayas
beginning in the early 1900s worsened such disenfranchisement (Ofreneo
1980, Salgado 1990, Miclat-Cacayan 1993, Rodil 1994).

Land-holdings (haciendas) expanded into full-scale plantations which

produced traditional export crops—especially sugar, hemp, tobacco and
copra—in big volumes. American agribusiness also introduced two new
export crops, namely pineapple and rubber. This led to the increase in land
values in Mindanao and the significant role of businesses that would later

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become transnational corporations involved in highly mechanized agri-

business plantations (Ofreneo 1980:20, Edgerton 1982:375).

Several cases are in order. For instance, the Philippine Packing

Corporations (Philpak) was set up in 1926 as a subsidiary of Del Monte
Corporation in order to engage in the large-scale production and
canning of pineapple. Philpak chose Bukidnon—with its rainfall and soil
condition—as the site of its plantation. Philpak was able to sublease almost
2,000 hectares from the US Navy. When these reverted to the Philippine
Commonwealth, Philpak managed to wangle from President Manuel
Quezon a lease on these lands under the National Development Company.
Apart from pineapple production, American business also introduced
cattle-raising in Bukidnon.

On the other hand, B.F. Goodrich and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.
were able to set up rubber plantations in Zamboanga and Basilan.

American corporations also went big into logging and sawmill

operations. Weyerhaeuser Corporation had 72,000 hectares in Basilan and
other parts of Mindanao. Boise-Casdade Corporation had a concession
of 42,800 hectares. Georgia Pacific Corporation, through its Philippine
subsidiary, the Lianga Bay Logging Corporation, had 92,800 hectares in
East Mindanao.

As earlier indicated, hundreds of landless migrants from Luzon and the

Visayas streamed into Mindanao. Government encouraged such migration
by enacting Commonwealth Acts 2254 and 2289 of 1913 and by setting up
agricultural colonies in Davao, Cotabato, Bukidnon and other provinces.

In the process, more and more of the IPs’ ancestral domain fell into the
hands of the outsiders. As before, the IPs responded to these developments
by accepting the assimilation thrust of the government, fleeing further into
the interior, or by resisting the powers-that-be.

One such resistance involved the Arumanon Manobo in Pikit, Cotabato

(Mansayagan 1997:5-6). This took place in the 1920s when government
set up boarding schools. A school in Pikit had a bad reputation among the
Manobos. Allegedly, the teachers were very strict; there were also reports

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

of physical and sexual abuse. Datu Busagaw Mampurok of Bintangan

campaigned among the people not to send their children to this boarding
school, much to the anger of Mr. William Manyon, the school supervisor.
Manyon asked the former to meet with him to discuss this matter, but
Datu Mampurok refused.

The resistance qualified as a subversive act under an anti-subversion law

that was in place at this time. On March 27, I923, government troops attacked
Bintangan and killed a number of people, including Datu Mampurok.

In I936, the government set up the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes

(BNCT) to facilitate and institutionalize the assimilation and integration
of the IPs into lowland communities. A number of communities in
Mindanao—especially those reached by the settlers, which led to mixed
marriages; and those who were accessible to government and church
institutions—succumbed to this drive. The rest, however, resisted
acculturation. But without the unifying elements of Islam as well as the
historical and cultural factors that enabled the Muslims in Mindanao
(especially the Maranaws, Maguindanaos and Tausogs) to consolidate
their armed resistance against the colonizers, the IPS remained vulnerable
to encroachment by outside elements.

Unlike the Muslims, they were fair game for proselytization.

This explains why many foreign missionaries—both Catholic and
Protestants—were very aggressive to reach the hinterlands of Mindanao.
Considering that the majority of lowlanders were baptized Catholics,
American missionaries focused their proselytization efforts among those
in the uplands. Protestant denominations and sects, including the most
evangelical and fundamentalist ones, penetrated the tribal communities
up in the mountains or deep into the forests. In time, the Summer
Institute of Linguistics would set up its headquarters in Bukidnon in
order to decode the IPs’ spoken languages and translate the Christian
bible into the IPs’ tongue.

European and American Catholic missionaries gave top priority to

the remaining frontier areas of Mindanao as new mission areas. In I912,
the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart (MSC), mainly Dutch, established

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themselves in Surigao; in I935, they expanded to the riverine villages of

the Agusan River. In I921, the Jesuits (SJ) established parishes in Iligan
and Ozamis. In I937,the French-Canadian PME Fathers established
more mission areas in Davao. The same year, the American Oblates of
Mary Immaculate (0M1) settled in Cotabato and Sulu. In1938, the Irish
Columban Fathers (SSC) set up headquarters in Ozamis. Later, they would
expand to the rest of Misamis, Lanao and Zamboanga del Sur. More IPs
got baptized into Catholicism.

Events in China at this time spurred the increased presence of

European and American missionaries in Mindanao. As the reality of China
becoming communist dawned on many religious congregations, and they
saw the Philippines as the alternate site for missionary work. It was quite
prescient of the missionaries, for the setting up of the People’s Republic of
China under Mao Tse Tung saw the expulsion of foreign religious orders.

Those who were already in Mindanao (e.g., SJ, MSC, PME, and SSC)
increased their staff. This coincided with the big increase in the number
of Catholics in Mindanao owing to the migrations from the north. Soon,
many more congregations would come to Mindanao. Among them were
the Spanish Claretians (1951), the American Maryknoll and Passionists
(both in 1958), the Marist Brothers, and women religious congregations
(SSC, OND, FMM, MSM, and the RGS). As they established parishes
and new mission outposts, missionaries came face to face not only with
the hardships and the hopes for a better life of the newly-settled migrants,
but also with the poverty and powerlessness of the IPs. The missionaries
found it relatively easy to define their roles with respect to the migrants;
i.e., to respond to the migrants‘ spiritual needs as Catholics in terms of
celebrating Mass and administering the sacraments. With IPs, however,
the missionaries were not as commonly-agreed on their role. Most of the
traditional missionaries were convinced that their work was to instruct
the IPs into the Catholic faith and to baptize. But others believed that
apart from these, they should also address the physical needs of the IPs.
They were those who slowly got involved in literacy, health and livelihood
projects for and with the IPs.

This shift in perspective would make a lot of difference in how the

Church would deal with the IPs in the coming decades.

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

The latest statistics on the IP population in Mindanao and where they

can be found (DLAC 1990: 82-86) are as follows:

NAME POPULATION PLACES LOCATED

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CHAP TER II

Natural History of the Mindanao Social Movement

The Preliminary Stage (early 1960 until 1973)

A. Characteristic Conditions

At the State Level. In the I960s, the US-promoted constitutional elite

democracy reined in place (Bello 1987, 1990). In the rest of the country, the
elite political factions in Mindanao alternated in power, with the masses
locked in patron-client relationships. Institutionalized looting marked
the bureaucracy. Electoral exercises were generally a sham. Reforms never
materialized. (Not even the popular President Ramon Magsaysay could
push for genuine reform up to his death in 1957).

Mindanao‘s population drastically increased. They came in droves: not

only landless peasants but also those looking for jobs in the plantations,
logging concessions and in the burgeoning industrial sites of Davao,
Iligan and Cagayan de Oro. The import substitution strategy of the
government had led to the setting up of industrial plants in these cities.
More barrios and municipalities were born. Government infrastructure
slowly connected boomtowns and provinces with highways linking
Davao and Butuan, Bukidnon and Cagayan de Oro, lligan and Pagadian.
Foreign and domestic corporations were either keeping a tighter hold on
their agricultural properties, opening up new agri-business plantations,
or else expanding hectarages: pineapple in South Cotabato., bananas in
Davao, rubber in Basilan and the like. Other corporations, mainly family
businesses, secured licenses for logging operations, ranches, and mining
explorations. Politicians arose among those connected to or supported by
these business corporations. There were also those who obtained political
power by buying off vast tracks of land early on, engaging in “carabao
logging” (small-scale logging operations using carabaos but which went
big-time as profits rose), or cornering contracts involving government
funds or huge private projects.

All these did not translate into a better life for everyone. The ones
who benefitted the most were those who were able to combine ownership

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of property (land) or control over resources (logging) with positions in

Government. A few hitherto landless tenants who were able to secure
parcels of land under the homestead program also gained. So did medium-
and small-scale businesses that were able to operate profitably within the
dynamics of a frontier economy.

But workers who were able to secure employment only at starvation

wage levels and peasants who came too late to apply for homesteads did not
find Mindanao the Promised Land. Neither did both Mindanao’s Muslims
and lumads. Not anymore at least. They who have lived in Mindanao first
and have lived there longest possessed least. They have become refugees in
their own land, disenfranchised prey to rapacious outsiders (Ofreneo 1980,
Salgado1990, Rodil I994).

In 1957, the government set up the Commission on National

Integration (CNI) through R.A. No. 1888. Based mainly on what the
BNCT did during the American colonial period, the CNI was supposed
to “… foster, accelerate, and accomplish all the adequate means and in
systematic manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
advancement of the Non-Christian Filipino hereinafter called National
Cultural Minorities, and to render real, complete, and permanent the
integration of the said National Cultural Minorities” (Abelardo 1993:30-
31). The CNI, however, was unable to assist the Lumads in protecting
their ancestral domain from outsiders who systemically sought to take over
ownership and control of Moro and IP homelands.

Their dislocation from their homeland and the disruption of their way
of life could only lead to restlessness among the Muslims and the lumads,
Tension arose in terms of their relationship with outsiders, especially
those who the Muslims and the lumads regarded as responsible for their
dislocation. Violent confrontations which included pangayaws erupted,
resulting to evacuations and military interventions. Some sections of the
Muslim communities consolidated their struggle with the setting up of the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which helped stop incursion
into Muslim territories.

But no such consolidation took place among the IPS, even among
those with bagani traditions. Tribes were left to their own devices in coping

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with the drastic social changes which were taking place around them and
directly affecting them. In many instances, they were helpless and left with
no choice but to co-exist peacefully with the more powerful outsiders.

Government also setup the Mindanao-based Southern Philippines

Development Authority (SPDA) to respond to the specific needs of all the
peoples in Mindanao. But it had very little impact on the lives of the IPs.

The situation would worsen after the 1969 elections, which many
considered the most expensive, the most corrupt, and the most violent up
to that time. The late Ferdinand Marcos won reelection in an exercise that
left the country on the brink of bankruptcy. To get the economy back on its
tracks, Marcos heeded the dictates of the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. He pursued an export-oriented industrialization strategy
and put in place a liberalization program that sought to attract foreign
investments and knock down barriers to US imports.

Agri-business plantations saw the opportunities which Marcos’

policies opened up, as export cash crops became one of the country’s major
sources of revenue. So did extractive industries like logging and mining.
In the meantime, inflation raged unchecked. Outside Malacanang and
the palatial abodes of Marcos’ cronies, poverty stalked the land. The poor
became poorer. This massive poverty fueled the social unrest that was
sweeping the country then. This was the context for the re-founding of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military arm, the New
People’s Army (NPA). Massive demonstrations and other forms of protest
action hit Metro Manila and other centers in the country. Marcos found
himself pushed to the wall, or so government had made it appear then. On
September 2l, 1972 Marcos declared martial law.

At the Church Level. Significant changes took place in the Catholic

Church worldwide, following the Second Vatican Council (or Vatican
II) which convened from I962 to I965. As later events would prove,
the documents of Vatican II had a major impact on the church people
of Mindanao. New theological concepts, and consequently new pastoral
approaches, evolved. No longer did church people believe that only
baptized Catholics could be saved. This would ultimately neutralize their
strong drive towards proselytization. They no longer focused their efforts

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on nurturing the people’s souls; they were as convinced that the people’s
bodies needed apostolic care in terms of food, good health, and livelihood.
Salvation was no longer a private endeavour; salvation now involved
liberation of the poor from oppressive structures and which would only be
accomplished through communal action.

Responding to the call of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the

Philippines (CBCP) and following the setting up of the National
Secretariat of Social Action, Justice and Peace (NASSA) in l966, many
of the dioceses in Mindanao established their respective social action
Centers (SACs). A good number of these were involved in organizing
local chapters connected to the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF). They
also set up cooperatives, provided health and nutrition services, and taught
farmers how to improve their productivity, among others. A member of
SACs would also begin to systematically put up programs to serve the
needs of the IPs.

This period saw the rise of the activist role of church people. They
became more immersed among the poor, championing their rights not
only in the pulpit but also in the streets. They attacked corruption in
government and conscienticized the people towards fighting for their
rights. It was no wonder that not a few of them landed behind bars when
martial law was declared. But despite the dictatorship, they continued with
their efforts to be at the service of the poor and marginalized sectors.

B. Typical Processes

The processes were the consequences of the main strategy that church
people adopted to respond to the needs of the IPS. This strategy involved
the setting up of their social apostolate, coordinated either through the
SACs and/or a religious congregation. At the regional level, the SACs
formed a network and was serviced by a secretariat based in Davao City,
the Mindanao-Sulu Secretariat of Social Action (MISSSA). The following
shows which dioceses and congregations established programs for the
different IP groups (MSPC Communications 1978):

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DIOCESES/CONREGATIONS
(Acronmys: Religious TRIBAL GROUPS TYPE OF PROGRAMS
congregations)

Of the dioceses and congregations, those of Tagum and Marbel there

the most advanced in terms of extent of outreach to IP community, the
number of programs and resources set aside for program implementation.
Tagum became a prelature in 1962, four years after the American
Maryknoll Fathers, Sisters and Brothers took over the parishes of what are
now the provinces of Davao Norte and Oriental. Twelve of the parishes
had a significant IP population, so it was inevitable that evangelization

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work took place among the IP communities. In l969, the Prelature

established a coordinative apostolate under the Christian Formation
Center. At this time, most efforts were in the areas of catechism, literacy
and health services.

In the next few years until the setting up of an Apostolate for Cultural
Communities (ACC) in early l974, church people got more and more
in touch with the IPs. In responsive communities, they initiated various
projects. They also held consultations, bringing together the leaders of the
various IP communities, and thereby providing them the chance to be in
touch with one another. In early 1974, ACC staff and 22 representatives
from different IP communities met to discuss the situation of the lumads,
define their problems and identify the priority programs of the ACC.
They agreed that the ACC’s main objective was “to enable the more or less
105,000 members of the cultural communities of the Prelature of Tagum
to integrate into the mainstream of the contemporary Philippine social
life” (Masinaring 1997:2). Priority programs identified included religious
education, community formation, family life, health and sanitation, agri-
economic education, and adult literacy.

On the other hand, the Diocese of Marbel’s showcase project for

the lPs was the Sta. Cruz Mission which the Passionist Fathers started
in l961. It operated primarily in the Lake Sebu area (South Cotabato)
and its surroundings, providing services for the development of 49 IP
communities of T‘bolis, Manobo and Maguindanaoan Muslims. The
Mission was founded for the following purposes: “to help the members
of the cultural communities to achieve self-reliance and self-sufficiency,
to help (them) to become respected members of their own and the larger
Philippine society (and) to implement the different developmental
programs necessary to effect the change in the attitudes and values of the
people” (Mansmann 1981:1). These programs included health, education,
economic development, religious program and community organizing.

Elsewhere in Mindanao were various efforts which involved priests,

religious and laypeople who were teachers, medical personnel, agriculturists,
and trained in community development techniques. Within a short period,
they were able to reach many IP communities and establish rapport with
their leaders. Some of these IP leaders began to establish contact with

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each other as they learned from each other’s experiences; they also held
meetings to discuss common problems and find appropriate solutions. In
some of these meetings, tribal leaders spoke about the situation of their
tribes. The most significant meeting was the First Mindanao-Sulu Pastoral
Conference held in Davao City in November 1971 where more than 200
bishops, priests, religious and lay people looked into the situation of the
Church in Mindanao and discussed what they could collectively do to
respond to the people‘s needs. The dawning of the MSPC would help give
birth to the IPS’ social movement in Mindanao.

C. Effective Mechanisms.

The following were some of the main mechanisms that proved effective
in advancing the cause of the IPs:
1. Greater immersion/integration of church workers with the IP
communities that led to the establishment of rapport with one another,
mutual respect for each other, and lines of effective communication.
2. Establishment of venues where they can regularly gather together,
e.g. a village gathering center cum chapel or school. In many
instances, these were built with the lumads providing the labor.
These venues were right in the middle of their village or quite
accessible from their abodes. There were informal activities,
including learning their songs and dances, to attract the lumad‘s
attention, encourage them to participate and their leaders to speak
up and share their ideas
3. The setting up of projects that could draw their interest and
participation e.g. provision of health services, putting up a school
for their children, and the like.
4. The conduct of various forms of conscientization sessions
(including adult literacy classes, informal education, and the like)
where the lumads were able to trace the roots of their poverty
and powerlessness and better informed as to the causes of their
disenfranchisement. Processes employed were always dialogical
and experiential in order to help break the culture of shyness and
silence when they found themselves in the company of outsiders.
There was sharing of the situations of the lumad communities;
through this process they knew were not the only lumads faced
with such problems.

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5. Gathering of church workers involved in this apostolate and their

respective tribal leaders towards establishing a providence-wide
or region-wide network. In such gatherings, they shared about
their situation, their responses to this and the problems they
encountered in their apostolate. Church workers got more and
more information about the plight of the IPs in Mindanao, and
they learned from each other in terms of effective conscientization
approaches. They were collectively agitated to reach out to more
lPs. Empowerment in their ranks was starting to evolve.

D. Types of Leaders.

On the part of church workers, these were those who were able to articulate
the plight and aspirations of the IPs, had the skill to mobilize resources for
this apostolate, had the ability to agitate everyone—from their superiors to
the lumads themselves—to be involved in this apostolate whether directly
or indirectly and could establish warm relationship with the lumads. On the
part of the lumads, these were the datus or traditional leaders who were not
afraid to take a strong position regarding social issues affecting them, had
the ability to articulate the demands of the lumads, and had the capacity
to deal with outsiders as well as agitate the people to support initiatives.

E. Dominant Social Forms.

At the grassroots level, the lumads all felt a sense of dislocation owing
to rapid changes taking place. The masses knew that they needed to do
something to arrest the disruptions. But, they were not in a position,
especially on their own, to evolve a collective action that would be to
their benefit. No one among them felt able to at least suggest a general
group action. Not even the church workers could facilitate a coordinated
program for all the lumads, given the nascent stage of this movement.
For the moment, they all sensed that the most important thing to do
was to consolidate the early gains of the apostolate. This was especially
because there were uncertainties and insecurities owing to the declaration
of martial law.

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The Popular Stage (1974 to 1982)

A. Characteristic Conditions.

At the State Level. Upon the declaration of martial law. Marcos abolished
Congress and ruled through presidential decrees (PBS). The nationalist-
oriented business sector found itself outside the ruling bloc. Power shifted
from the old ruling elite to a new coalition that had monopolistic control
over key financial and industrial institutions. The new ruling coalition
was made up of the key members of the Marcos family, Marcos’ cronies,
wealthy businessmen who used state power to build up their empires in
key sectors (sugar, coconut, telecommunications, infrastructure, and the
like), high-level technocrats (who were the key implementors of the WB-
IMF export-led industrialization strategy), regional and local kingpins
with private armies, and the military.

The latter, which served as the linchpin of this power structure, used
various forms of repression—arbitrary arrest, torture, summary executions
(“salvaging”), etc.—to silence the opposition. Resistance to the dictatorship
moved underground as the CPP/NPA expanded its guerrilla bases in a few
of the mountain ranges of Mindanao. In the next decade, the CPP/NPA
would make its presence felt among the IP communities in the uplands.

In the course of the martial law regime, Marcos issued a number

of Presidential Decrees that seriously affected the lives of the lumads,
marginalizing them even more. These decrees included the following:

1. Presidential Decree no. 410 (1974) or the Ancestral Lands Decree.

While this declared all agricultural land occupied and cultivated by
the lumads since 1964 as alienable and disposable (with exceptions
in some parts of the country), all other areas remained state property
including forest reserves, watersheds, public parks, wildlife sanctuaries,
national historical sites and other forest areas. This PD empowered the
government to establish agro-industrial projects in ancestral areas.
2. Presidential Decree no. 705 (1975) or the Revised Forestry Code.
This defined the private right of cultural minorities over places of
abode, burial grounds and land clearing. But there was no provision
for recognition of private ancestral land right. Lands over 18% slope

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were automatically owned by the State; therefore, no one can utilize,

occupy, exploit, possess or conduct any activity in public forests
or unclassified public land unless authorized. Swidden agriculture,
unless with a permit, was considered illegal.
3. Presidential Decree no. l073 (1977). This prevented the judiciary
from recognizing ownership to ancestral land which has not yet been
declared or certified as alien able and disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development (BFD).
4. Presidential Decree no. 1414 (1978) or the PANAMIN Enabling
Decree. This authorized the Presidential Assistance to the National
Minorities (PANAMIN) to design, implement, and maintain
settlements among national cultural minorities. It also tasked
the PANAMIN to provide advice regarding forest concessions.
(PANAMIN began as a private, non- profit foundation. Manuel
Elizalde, Jr. set it up after his appointment to the Marcos cabinet as
adviser on national minorities in 1967. When CNl was abolished
in 1975, owing to its ineffectiveness in quelling the increasing
opposition to government projects like the Chico River dam,
Marcos transformed PANAMIN into a government agency by virtue
of PD719 and appointed as head none other than Elizalde himself
(Duhaylungsod and Hyndman 1993: 83).
5. Presidential Decree no. 1559 (1979) or the Ejectment Amendment to
the Revised Forestry Code. This ordered the ejection and relocation
to the nearest government area of all kaingeros (swidden farmers),
squatters, and other occupants of public forests—who were mainly
lumads—whenever the best land use of these areas so demanded.

All these PDs made life for the IPs even more difficult. They led to an
expansion of logging companies, agri-business plantations, and corporate
farms; they also resulted in plans for setting up infrastructure development
projects in the uplands. A few of these got implemented, but the others had
to be given up because of the resistance of the IPS and their supporters.

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The following table shows some examples:

In most of these areas, the affected lumads opposed the encroachment

of these ventures into their homeland. But despite the courageous
attempts of some of the tribal leaders to wage their struggle, they were
powerless to resist these incursions, considering the power of: military and
the PANAMIN. Both controlled the local powers-that-be in the local
government and judiciary. The confluence of these powerful forces made
possible the subjugation of many IP communities. In time, even some of
their leaders collaborated with those in power and allowed themselves to
used as pawns.

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This situation proved to be fertile ground for attracting IP support

to NPA activities which began in the uplands in Mindanao during this
period. It was inevitable that the IPs would encounter the NPAs who
established and operated guerrilla fronts and bases in IP territories. In
time, it was easy for the NPAs to solicit the support of IPS given the
extent of the latter’s disenfranchisement.

At the Church Level. The repression and oppression during the early
years of martial law only pushed the Mindanao Church to become even
more committed to justice and human rights issues. Even if priests and lay
leaders were arrested and imprisoned when martial law was declared, this
only strengthened their desire to take on a prophetic stance and side with
the poor and the victims of human rights violations. This was true for those
whose apostolate was with the lumads.

Alarmed by the increasing reports about more incursions of business

corporations into the uplands and incidents where PANAMIN and the
military subjected the lPs to harassment and abuse, church people saw the
need to consolidate their ranks. MISSA facilitated this consolidation with
support of the Jesuit-run Mindanao Development Center (MDC). Both
MISSA and MDC shared one office at that time.

On February 5-7, 1974, the First Mindanao Regional Conference on

Cultural Communities convened in Lake Sebu, Surallah, South Cotabato. Its
objective was “to give voice to the more than one-and-half million minorities
of Mindanao ... a voice of anguish, frustration and fear; a voice crying out,
almost without hope, appealing to the Christian communities of Mindanao.”

Twenty tribes were represented in this conference. Most of the

participants—who were from the Dioceses of Malaybalay, Marbel, Tagum,
Surigao, Davao, Butuan, Cotabato and Basilan—were church people (a
number of them American missionaries); a few were Lumads.

Nine months later, the second MSPC Conference took place in Cagayan
de Oro City. After listening to the reports given by some delegates about the
oppression of the IPS, the conference decided to consider the apostolate with
cultural communities as one of its priorities. There was a call to encourage
dioceses to set up programs for these communities and for an increase

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in church personnel present in the lives of the IPs. The type of programs
changed. In the words of Bishop Francisco Claver: “The declaration of
martial law in 1972 pushed the apostolate in a direction that was somewhat
different to the one it had been following until then. Simple conversion to
Christianity had long been the main purpose of work among the tribals. But
when the military government of Marcos started to [run] roughshod over
the rights of the tribal peoples to their ancestral lands in pursuit of rapid and
forced development schemes the trust of [church] work among [IPs] moved
in the direction of helping them to preserve their dignity, rights, tradition
and culture as tribal peoples” (Claver 1995: 10).

In the next few years under the auspices of MSPC-MISSA, there

would be more assemblies among church people with increasing
participation by IP leaders.

Meanwhile, at the national level, the CBCP also became more

interested in responding to the needs of the IPS, once more because of
reports corning from Mindanao. ln I975, the CBC elevated the sub-
commission on Non-Christians to a full-fledged Episcopal Commission
on Cultural Communities (ECCC), The following year, there was a
consultation among those working with the IPS. At this meeting, they
agreed to set up a Desk on Cultural Communities at NASSA which was
tasked with initiating coordination. In November 1977, the newly elected
chair of the commission, Bishop Bienvenido Tudtud, convened the Second
consultation held in Davao. The delegates decided to refer to the IPS as
Tribal Filipinos, upon the recommendation of the delegates who were IP’s
themselves; consequently, the ECCC was renamed Episcopal Commission
on Tribal Filipinos (ECTF).

With the setting up of the ECTF and the consolidation of the network
in Mindanao, the Church was poised to take on an adversarial role vis-a-vis
the military and PANAMIN. It was also bound to get into a collision course
with business and government corporations that aimed to take over part
of the lPs homeland. Being the voice of the voiceless, the church defended
the lPs from state aggression, as well as championed their rights. The IPs
themselves stayed in the background, still struggling to find their own voice
in the face of threats from the State. Church people who denounced the
injustices were harassed; a few reported being under military surveillance.

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In the meantime, the National Council of Churches in the Philippines

(NCCP) had set up the Program Aimed at Christians’ Education about
Muslims (PACEM). lt reached out for ecumenical collaboration with
Catholics who responded positively. In December l976, the Mindanao-Sulu
Conference on Justice and Development (MSCJD) was born. This joint
effort would further bring dynamism into the emerging social movement.
One of its most significant contributions to this social movement was
its identification and training of tribal leaders and providing them the
opportunities to develop leadership skills. The MSCJD also pioneered in
bringing tribal groups together so that, through the leaders, they would be
able to establish linkages at the regional level.

B. Typical Processes

What happened during the First Mindanao Regional Conference on

Cultural Communities (and the subsequent meetings at the local, diocesan,
regional and national gatherings) provides the reader with an idea of some
of the processes employed to popularize the cause of the IPs which would
give rise to their social movement. These included the following:
1. Reporting of incidents in local areas detailing how the IPs suffered
in the hands of multinationals, land speculators from the lowlands,
government institutions such as PANAMIN and their local cohorts
and the military. Such reports were well documented. All these were
collated and served as basis for an analysis, the output of which
became an IP situationer. Through such a process, which involved
the IPS themselves, participatory research techniques were slowly
introduced. Considering the high illiteracy rates among the IPs,
these processes demanded the adoption of the principles of popular
education. This approach surfaced the conflict situation between the
IPs and their church supporters on the one hand, and all those linked
with the State apparatus on the other. In so far as the conscienticized
IPs were concerned, these business and governmental institutions
were their enemy coming from the outside. Church people also were
outsiders, but IPs accepted them as insiders because of their deep
sympathy for and solidarity action in the IPS’ struggle.
2. Biblical and theological reflections in order for church workers
to deepen their commitment “to serve the least of their brothers
and sisters.”
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3. Discussions on how they can improve their apostolate with the IPS.
For example, at the First Regional Conference, they agreed:
a. To call on the Church of Mindanao to condemn the immoral
system by which the minorities were dispossessed of their
lands whether by loggers, miners, plantation owners, settlers or
ranchers; and that because the Church recognized the prior rights
of these peoples to the lands of Mindanao, it should demand
that the IPS’ basic rights to their native land be recognized and
that effective legal machinery be created to protect them;
b. That instead of treating them as objects for economic exploitation
and political manipulation, the members of Christian
communities should accept IPs as members with equal rights
to the benefits of Philippine society; and that, consequently,
programs for social, economic, cultural and educational
development should be designed to correct the ineffectiveness of
former efforts through new and creative approaches in harmony
with their cultural heritage and aspirations;
c. That all educational institutions of learning take cognizance of
the IPs’ religio-cultural heritage and as far as possible, adjust
their curricula in accordance with the culture of the minorities
in the area; additionally, that colleges and universities put their
research and training facilities at the service of the minorities
especially those in their areas of operation.
d. That each of the 15 dioceses of Mindanao-Sulu assign qualified
priests together with religious and lay people for this apostolate,
in proportion to the numbers assigned to lowland Christian
population, and
e. That a desk under MISSSA be created for the purpose of
communication, coordination and promotion at the regional
level, and an advisory body of five be established to give direction
to the establishment and functioning of such a desk.

With the setting up of this advisory body and assigning of full-time

personnel, there was a body who could encourage more efforts and the
diocesan and local levels, monitor their activities and provide back-up
financial technical support.

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C. Effective Mechanisms

The operationalization of this Desk, its partnership with the NCCP-

PACEM (later to also include People‘s Action for Cultural Ties or PACT)
through the MSCID and the support it got from the ECCC in Manila,
led to the setting up of the following mechanisms which proved effective
in generating more concern about the plight of the IPS, as well as in
mobilizing more IP communities to express their resistance:

1. The conduct of better conscientization approaches, especially in

adopting the structural analysis that became popular among those
engaged in organizing peasants and workers.
2. The conduct of training in participatory research and documentation,
which later on became the major contribution of the different units
of the Task Force Detainees (TFD) to this social movement.
3. The holding of regular consultations at the local, diocesan and
regional levels in order to strengthen the ties among the different IP
communities and provide the tribal leaders with venues to articulate
their aspirations and consolidate their ranks.
4. The popularization of IP issues through various ways of informing
the public, especially the Christian communities, regarding events
and incidents where IP communities were victimized. The Alternate
Forum for Research in Mindanao (which the MSPC established
in the late ’70s in association with the UP Center for Third World
Studies and Maryknoll and MCC missionaries) provided support in
publishing documentations and reports. Considering that the State
controlled the media, there was an effort to look for alternative outlets
through the use of micro-media (komiks, posters, songs, theatre and
slide productions). The nascent mosquito press and the alternative
media provided avenues for popularizing the IP’s’ struggles.
5. The introduction of the yearly celebration in October of Tribal
Filipino Sunday. Posters with the theme of the yearly celebration
found their way into schools, churches and even chapels in the most
isolated villages. On this day, all churches across the country read a
statement on the situation of IPs and the responsibilities of Christians
to support their cause. These statements then found their way into
the circles of the academe, youth groups, and the rest of the popular
movement. More sectors expressed support for the IPS’ struggles.

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One such statement entitled “An Open Letter to the Mindanao-Sulu

Communities” and which came out in’ 1975 read thus:

“We call your attention to the plight of the ever-growing

number of landless poor and in particular, the original owners
of the islands—the cultural communities of Mindanao-Sulu.

“We believe that this worsening situation is a direct result of

the agro-industrial trend which through pressure, manipulation
and divide-and-rule tactics, is depriving an increasing number
of farmers-cultural communities and low land settlers alike of
their land. (The statement then cites examples).

“We call upon the members, leaders- lay and ecclesiastical, the
bishops, priests, pastors, and Sisters to make a serious moral
judgement in the light of the principles that you profess as to
whether this worsening situation is not seriously contrary to
our professed beliefs in the oneness of God and the dignity and
brotherhood of men.

“We appeal to the leaders in the fulfillment of their teaching

role to clearly inform and encourage their membership to make
a clear public moral stand on this issue.

“We appeal to the membership of these religious communities,

above all, the poor, who themselves are often the victims of this
oppression and manipulation in the light of their Christian or
Muslim commitment, to forgive past injuries and to join hands
with the members of the cultural communities in working
towards a just solution to the land and agro-industrial problems
of Mindanao-Sulu.”

Other mechanisms included exposure programs to bring lowlanders

and even foreign visitors to IP areas affected by incursions, dislocations and
human rights violations. In their interaction with the lumads, lowlanders
and foreign visitors learned first-hand of tribal handicraft (native bags,
headgear, cloth and jewelry) and other concrete cultural expressions.
There developed an appreciation for these indigenous creations, many of

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which became popular protest symbols. Throughout these interactions

documentation was systematic, the output published or packaged for
education and propaganda purposes. These materials found their way into
the protest movement and abroad.

A broader projection of the life and struggles of the IPs would later
materialize through songs, theatre productions and even liturgical celebrations
staged during Tribal Filipino Sunday. These presented the lumads as peace-
loving people with a unique cultural legacy who fell victims to greedy land
speculators, multinationals, and the minions of the dictatorship.

The point of such efforts was not lost on lowlanders; in time a growing
number of them would organize themselves and mobilize support for
the IPs. Such support found clear manifestation in regular regional and
national conferences in various places in the country. These conferences
had distinctive themes and popular slogans. The following is indicative of
how the themes evolved through the period under consideration:

DATE/PLACE HELD THEME

This might be the place to note that as they became more and more
involved with the IPs, many churchworkers had begun to feel their
inadequacy in understanding the IPs worldview. They had reached a stage
where they did not want to impose ideas from the outside on the IPs; they-
wanted to be more sensitive to the IPs’ perspective of life and struggle.
They also wanted to grapple with these seeming culture of silence of the
IPs by facilitating a process where they could speak to them in terms of
the IPs’ hopes and dreams, their fears and uncertainties, their struggles and
aspirations of solidarity with the outside.

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In this light did the MSCJD Organize a World View Seminar in Davao
City that ran from November 28 to December 2, 1997. The forty-four
participants included representatives from 12 IP communities (Subanon,
Mamanua, Manobo, Higaonon, Mandaya. Mansaka, Dibabawon, Bagobo,
B‘laan) who came to share their views on land, education, problems related
to government and the lowland settlers, equality, freedom, human dignity,
peoplehood, participation in development processes and the like. This
seminar proved significant in cementing solidarity links; the outsiders were
now better able to understand the IPs, who, in turn, felt more empowered
to speak up and assert their dignity.

But prior to this seminar, there was one major activity that made a
singular difference in involving the IPs themselves as well as mobilizing
leadership from among their ranks—who were both datus and emerging
leaders through their work as staff of IP programs. This was MSCJD’s
program in the late 1970s whose organizing strategy was called SILDAP,
the accronym for silingang dapit (neighboring places). The program first
identified linkpersons among the different tribes who regularly met with
MSCJD staff for sharing and mutual support purposes. Together they
planned ways to organize the IPS in clusters. The fact that many lPs lived
in contiguous places appeared to make organizing work more practical and
effective. The following clusters emerged:

1. KIDMACODA (composed of tribes in Kidapawan, Marbel ,

Cotabato and Davao);
2. ZAMBASUTA (Zamboanga, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-tawi);
3. MISZAM (Misamis Occidental and Zamboanga Sur);
4. ILBUCAG (Iligan, Bukidnon and Cagayan de Oro City); and
5. BUTTAS (Butuan,Tandag, Tagum, Agusan and Surigao).

With the assistance of the MSCID staff, members of each cluster

(the linkpersons) sought to set up viable indigenous people’s organizations
(IPOs) that would ultimately be autonomous and self-reliant. ILBUCAG
was the first to develop one such IP0 in 1978, the Pakigbisog sa Lumadnong
Kalingkawasan (Struggle for Tribal Liberation) or PLK. (The PLK became
the Kahugpungan sa Lumadnong Kalingkawasan or KLK in I982).

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The BUTTAS cluster, on the other hand, setup a support

institution which it called simply SILDAP. In l984, this branched Into
SILDAP-Sidlakan to cover Eastern Mindanao and SILDAP Davao
Norte and Oriental.

SILDAP-Sidlakan strove to help establish and strengthen solidarity

among the tribal communities of Agusan and Surigao for “total emancipation
from the shackles of oppression, and [for recognition] and support[to]the
lumad’s strugglefor elf-determination.” (PARUD Profiles 1984: 5).

The objectives of SILDAP sidlakan included (1) coming up with a

self-reliant organization of the Tribal communities in Eastern Mindanao;
(2) setting up mechanisms to strengthen the communities participation
in decision-making concerning policies that directly affected them;
(3) initiating and assisting in activities that helped protect human and
indigenous rights, and (4) reviving those values systems and mores of the
IPs that related with their present condition.

To achieve these objectives, SILDAP-Sidlakan sponsored and

facilitated leadership skills training, datu organizing, functional literacy,
and programs for tribal women. SILDAP-Sidlakan also facilitated
assemblies and meetings, campaigns and celebrations like Human Rights
Day and Tribal Filipino Sunday; published documentation work and
established solidarity linkages at the regional and international levels.
These mechanisms served as models for other lumad-centered groups.

For its part, the KIDMACODA cluster set up Secretariat called

Tribal Filipino Center for Development (TFCD) which serviced
the needs of the Tabunaway Descendants Association (TDA). This
would later on give way to the Alyansa sa mga Lumad sa Habagatang
Mindanao alang sa Demokrasya (Tribal Alliance in Southern Mindanao
for Democracy) or ALUHAMAD, composed of 11 tribes in the five
provinces of Southern Mindanao.

The other clusters were not as successful during this period either
in setting up a local secretariat to facilitate the operations of local lPOs,
or in directly organizing the lumads into an IPO. Both of these would
happen later on.

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In order to provide a venue for those directly involved in this

clustering work and to strengthen ties together with outside supporters,
the MSCJD also held general assemblies for tribal filipino workers. These
assemblies provided the direct workers—both tribal leaders and staff
of support groups—with the chance to do a critique of their work,
reflect on better approaches and methodologies, as well as to strengthen
their mutual support.

At this time, the underground movement (UG) was starting to

exert its influence over the various organized sectors—from peasants
to workers, to the urban poor, to IPs. In many cases, the UG’s cadres
became political officers (POs) in many non-governmental and people’s
organizations, the academe, and even within the church. The POs’ task:
to organize different sectors.

Being open to collaboration with the underground forces, a number

of church people were willing to establish linkages with them. This would
eventually lead to tensions within the Church. Certain’ bishops and other
key church leaders were not happy with such an arrangement. The tension
became so oppressive that all sectors of the Church began realizing that it
was to their advantage to maintain unity among their ranks.

D. Types of Leaders

The leadership in the lumad social movement during this period

involved two types. The first consisted of the church people, including
Americans missionaries and especially those connected to the leadership
of the MSCJD. They took on a very strong prophetic stance in the face of
the injustices committed against the IPs and demanded the martial law
government to initiate reforms that would benefit the IPs.

The second leadership type consisted of the few tribal leaders who stood
by the church people and organized and spoke up for their communities.
These were the identified potential leaders from among the IPs who were
assigned key tasks in the SILDAP clusters.

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E. Dominant Social Form

The times made it possible for ethnic groups and communities

and their lowlander supporters to mobilize themselves into protest
crowds. Evidently, they had transcended their fear of the military
dictatorship and were more than willing to join liturgical celebrations
inside churches and chapels, symposia and fora, and gatherings that
different churches sponsored.

Admittedly, there were those among their ranks who were not really
all that knowledge able on the issues involved. But there were also those
who believed their tasks were clear, namely: to help expose the injustices
committed against the IPs, to encourage others to know more about the
plight of IPs, and to support the IPs’ struggle. While they were out to
criticize the government for its injustices and repression, they also realized
that their efforts would not be effective unless they were organized. Thus,
apart from the conscientization work that needed to be consolidated,
they saw the need to organize the IPs themselves. This organizing would
begin at the local level and would later expand towards SILDAP and
the regional networks.

The Formal Stage, Part 1: The Consolidation Process (1983-1987)

A. Characteristic Conditions

At the State Level. The assassination of Marcos’ political adversary

Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in 1983 opened the gates for a nationwide
anti-establishment protest. The national democratic movement, the
only viable opposition to the dictatorship until then, joined forces
with the disenfranchised traditional politicians, social reformists, and
the agitated middle class to establish a united front against the US-
Marcos dictatorship. Demonstrations and other forms of protest actions
involving all sectors of society hit the major urban centers of the country.
The CPP-NPA ranks swelled; by 1985, the CPP-NPA had 30,000 full-
time members in 59 guerrilla fronts.

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Even then, and despite the alleged lifting of martial law (in
1985), state terrorism persisted. With the full backing of Washington,
government launched a counter-insurgency drive. Hundreds evacuated
areas that the military targeted for its offensives. Hundreds, too, were
caught in the crossfire between government troops and NPAs. Throughout
this, government enticed or else forced people at the grassroots to join the
Citizens’ Home Defense Force (CHDF) which became a party to human
rights violations. More people were arrested, put in military prisons,
tortured or summarily executed.

The heightened repression only pushed more Filipinos to take

active roles in the broad protest movement. There was a strong call to
establish and consolidate sectoral and people’s organizations, as well as
establish linkages and alliances. Legal institutions (LIs), the precursor of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were tasked with open, legal
organizing work. Cause-oriented groups (COGs), on the other hand, took
on the leadership in the parliament of the streets. This led to a major shift
in the social movement involving the lumads in Mindanao.

The left as embodied by the NDF-CPP-NPA clique, however, was

to commit a major error. It was not successful in keeping the unity of all
the progressive forces under the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
refusing to give in to some of the demands of the other forces in the broad
alliance. It was convinced that it had enough strength to stay on its own,
finding it unnecessary to consolidate its linkages with the other moderate
groups. It called for boycott of the presidential elections and did not
participate at EDSA’s People Power. This debacle would later create major
internal tensions within its armed and legal ranks, leading to splits.

With the ascendancy into power of Mrs. Cory Aquino following the
EDSA revolution and the exile of the Marcoses, radical changes took place
in the country. Although Mrs. Aquino had to deal with a military force
not totally loyal to her (David 1996), she nonetheless restored democratic
institutions. However, her government’s peace talks with the NDF-CPP-
NPA collapsed, and Aquino subsequently declared a total war policy
against the insurgents. This strategy incorporated the low-intensity conflict
doctrine of counter-insurgency and the gradual constriction strategy.

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

The stages of this doctrine, originally implemented during the

Marcos’ OPLAN Katatagan, included clearing (use of huge number of
full-battle geared military personnel, aerial bombings, and destruction of
properties that led to evacuations by internal refugees), hold-and-defend
(establishment of checkpoints and detachments as food and medicine
blockades), development (through livelihood projects and civic action
programs) and consolidation (TABAK 1992: 13).

With consolidation, the military set up paramilitary troops and used

vigilantes for counter-in-surgency purposes. In some cases, these included
lumads who were drawn to join cults like the Rock Christ, Sagrado Corazon,
Tadtad, Pulahan among others. Military operations once more took place
in the countryside. Settlers and IP communities fled to safer grounds. The
military subjected to abuse and atrocities those it suspected of supporting
the rebels.

At the Civil Society Level. In 1982, the conflict between the moderate
leadership and the progressive rank-and-file within the church could no
longer be resolved (Kin 1990). The bishops complained that communists
had infiltrated and were manipulating the MSPC Secretariat and other
church institutions working for justice and peace. They believed that it
was no longer possible for them to support the MSPC Secretariat and
consequently dissociated themselves from it.

The staff and some of the members of the MSPC Board decided to
set up their own conference, the Mindanao Interfaith People’s Conference
(MIPC) and its secretariat (MIPCS). This time both the conference
and Secretariat involved people of other Christian denominations and
other faiths (Islam, animism). With the scrapping of the MSPCS and
MSCJD, there was a setback in terms of the regional coordination of
church programs. There was a split among their ranks: the progressive ones
shifted their ties to MIPCS, while others adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
National linkages remained in place under the ECTF. But with no regional
secretariat, the national ECTF office found it much more difficult to do
its coordination work.

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Local tribal filipino programs went on their own with little

coordination. As a result, and as support from the outside fell, the
momentum weakened. It was the MIPCS that provided some level of
coordination, even as elements of the national democratic movement—
both the armed and the legal fronts—would still continue to provide the
direction of the IP’s social movement.

Despite the slackening in the momentum of the IP movement, though,

efforts to sustain support for it persisted.

At the national level, there was created the Ethnic Study and
Development Center (ESDEC). It became the secretariat of the
Consultative Assembly of Minority Peoples of the Philippines (CAMPP),
an attempt to establish a national sectoral organization of the IPs open to
an alignment with the emerging united front. At the regional level, there
was the Mindanao Tribal Resource Center (MINTREC) which emerged
after a consultative assembly attended by representatives of MIPCS, PACT
and a number of tribal leaders.

This led to the setting up of the multi-sectoral alliance called

Lumadnong Alyansa Alang sa Demokrasya–Mindanao (Tribal Alliance for
Democracy-Mindanao) or LUMAD-Mindanao (LM) in a consultative
assembly meeting held in Bansalan, Davao del Sur in July 1983. Church
people remained quite active despite the changes in the social movement.
Two priests and a nun, in fact, became officials of Lumad-Mindanao.
Fr. Rudulfo Galenzoga, executive secretary of MIPCS, held the post of
vice chair. Fr. Jose Guintadcan from the Diocese of Butuan was general
secretary, while Sr. Carme Arenas RGS was treasurer. MINTREC, based
in Butuan City, served as LUMAD-Mindanao’s Secretariat. By this time,
LUMAD had become the acceptable name for all IPs in Mindanao.

The following principles served for the work of LM, namely (1) to
expose the various forms of exploitation of the Lumad people by foreign
and local capitalists; (2) to expose and prevent further occurrence of
human rights violations and all forms of oppression; and (3) to oppose
further intrusion of foreign corporations in ancestral lands. Following the
1983 assembly, those within the alliance engaged in sponsoring symposia,
lectures, cultural presentations, parades, marches, prayer rallies and

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conferences. They reached out to the press, confident that they could now
articulate their identity and that they have been able to make a definite
formulation regarding their vision and plan of action.
LM and progressive church groups joined the left’s boycott of the
1986 elections. Moderate church groups, on the other hand, joined the
electoral exercise and fully supported Mrs. Aquino’s candidacy. They also
helped monitor the election results. When people power erupted, and
the dictatorship collapsed, they were as overjoyed as those massed at
EDSA. When Mrs. Aquino became President, they fully supported her
administration and censured those who refused to collaborate with her
government. When Mrs. Aquino declared total war on the insurgents, they
did not criticize her for this. Only the progressive church people joined the
rest of the militant groups who denounced the total war policy.

B. Typical Processes

As in the previous period, the IP social movement followed the same

basic process, namely the bringing together of those involved in programs
for the IPs. With the setting up of Silingang Dapit, there was a better
strategy for lumad organizing. The establishment of a few sub-regional
centers like SILDAP-Sidlakan also facilitated consolidation work since
they were more effective in holding fora, symposia, cultural presentations,
prayer rallies and mobilization at the local level. The MSCJD became
more able to reach out to the different sub-regions. The number of tribal
communities that became integrated into the growing network increased;
so did the number of tribal leaders—especially the linkpersons—who took
over the tasks of organizing and monitoring.

At the height of the mass movement, it was easy for these organizations
and networks to secure the support of all other groups, organizations and
alliances who were part of this popular movement. There were various
national and regional groups willing to take up the issues of the IPs. In
1983, for example, the ECTF’s statement on Tribal Filipino Sunday that
year drew the support of the following groups: Ecumenical Movement for
Justice and Peace (EMJP), Farmers’ Assistance Board (FAB), the College
Editors’ Guild of the Philippines (CEGP), the Coordinating Committee to
Minority Concerns (CCMC), Ugnayang Aghamtao (UGAT), Concerned

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Students for Tribal Filipinos (CSTF), Ecumenical Seminarians Fellowship

(ESF), Committee for Muslim-Christians Dialogue (CMCD), the
NCCP-PACT, the Philippine Federation of Environmental Concerns
(PFEC) and many others. This was true in Mindanao where a growing
number of organizations joined multi-sectoral alliances.

With the collapse of the MSPC and the closure of its Secretariat,
however, the ranks of organizations fighting for the lumads became divided.
There was no longer a regular regional assembly of church people engaged
in the IP apostolate. Only the national assembly that ECTF conducted
remained in place. But considering its distance from the base, the national
Secretariat was not in a position to sustain the high level of coordination
and collaboration of the MSPC and MSCJD days.

With limited contacts at the national and regional levels, local

groups concentrated their efforts in their respective areas. Other religious
congregations (including the PIME and Scarboro Fathers, the Guardian
Angel Sisters, the Benedictine Sisters and the Missionaries of the
Assumption Sisters) responded to the call for more personnel to engage
in work with the IPs.

On the other hand, a new network which included progressive church

groups and legal institutions slowly took shape among those working with
the IPs, thanks to MIPCS and Lumad-Mindanao. These groups were the
ones who had reached the stage of formalizing the institution (that is to
say, complete with a technical staff, among others). Once more, when they
came together for consultations at the local and regional level, they followed
the same processes: Sharing and analysing situations, determining trends
and prospects, and planning for future campaigns and activities.

For those who had been involved in these activities for some time,
there was greater interiorization of the commitment to strengthen the
organizations. These activities likewise encouraged more IPs and their
sympathetic supporters to take part in the IP social movement. But then
again, given their links with the national democratic movement, network
members did not concentrate solely on the IPs. Like other sectoral groups,
they sought to express and establish solidarity with other oppressed sectors,
as well as join multi-sectoral gatherings and mobilizations.

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C. Effective Mechanisms

The second Lumad-Mindanao assembly took place in Kidapawan,

North Cotabato in August 1985. At this gathering, delegates agreed to
split the assembly into two bodies: one an all-lumad organization and the
other consisting of their lowland supporters. An ad hoc Committee made
of Angelito Omos, Antonio Lumandong, Nestor Masinaring, Marshall
Daul and a few other tribal leaders took on the task of preparing the ground
for the organizing of a regional all-lumad organization. The lowland
supporters, for their part, formed themselves into the Kahugpungan sa mga
Dumadapig ug Nakig-unong sa Lumad (Organization of those who support
the cause of the Lumad) or KADUMA-Lumad. They elected church
people who were then officers of LUMAD-Mindanao.

KADUMA-Lumad coordinated its efforts with the existing SILDAP

network which at the time included KALUHA sa KIDMACODA
(KidapawanCotabato), ALUM sa Sugpat (Davao-Tagum), KADUMA-
BUGAC/KLK (Bukidnon-Cagayan de Oro), ALIMUKON (Misamis-
Zamboanga Sur), and SILDAP-Sidlakan (Agusan).

At the end of this assembly, the delegates agreed on the following

recommendations: (1) to unite the lumads by forming a Mindanao-wide
organization for the attainment of lumad self-determination; (2) to provide
assistance to tribal workers and leaders; and (3) to link up with other
struggling sectors. The delegates also agreed to hold another assembly
in November to formally launch the regional all-lumad organization, an
assembly that the LM Ad hoc Committee would facilitate.

The assembly failed to take place, however. Many activists from

various alliances and legal institutions decided to focus on plans for
boycott movement vis-a-vis the Marcos-initiated snap presidential
elections the following year.

But the recommendations found their way to a conference that the

International Forum for Solidarity-Mindanao, with MIPCS as secretariat,
sponsored in Davao City in December 1985. In attendance were 152
delegates from 26 countries. They came up with the following proposals
in relation to the IPs in Mindanao, namely: (1) to support the work of

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LM; (2) to oppose all types of imposition from external forces, e.g. big
local capitalists and foreign corporations; (3) to work towards a world-
wide forum of IPs to express common experiences and a common history
of colonial exploitation; and (4) to build solidarity among themselves.

And then, People Power erupted. Aquino’s total war policy against
the insurgents followed. The left denounced this as a US-sponsored
Low Intensity Conflict Strategy. Anti-communist paramilitary troops,
also referred to by human rights advocates as fanatical cults, sprouted.
Quite a number of lumads joined such cults as Tadtad, Alsa Masa,
and Kuratong Baleleng.

This sharpened the need to set up the all-lumad organization that

the Kidapawan assembly had planned back in August. In June 1986, the
assembly finally convened and created LUMAD MINDANAW, the new
all-lumad regional organization. (the reader will note the letter “W” which
the participants used to distinguish the new aggrupation from the multi-
sectoral alliance Lumad-Mindanao established in 1983). The discussions
which followed focused on structure. Assembly participants decided on a
Regional Council, one with sub-regional structure based on the Silingang
Dapit clusters. Two such structures already existed: the ALHUMAD
of KIDMACODA and KLK for ILBUCAG. The priority task was to
aggressively put up other sub-regional structures. Within the year, the
following sub-regional groupings were born:
1. Buhing Kahiusanan sa Lumadnong Grupo (Living unity of the IP
group) or BUKLOG for the Zamboanga Peninsula (The name would
later change to Subanen United Lumad Organization or SULO).
2. Kahugpungan sa Kalingkawasan sa Nagkahiusang Lumad
(Organization for the Liberation of the United IPs) or KAKANA for
Davao Norte and Oriental.
3. Lumadnong Bugkot sa Agusan-Surigao alang sa Kalingkawasan (IP
Unity in Agusan-Surigao for Liberation) or LUBASAN for Agusan
and Surigao.
Assembly participants also agreed on the slogan to be used for
the October campaign, which was Lumadnong Kaugalingnan Kabahin sa
Nasudnong Kalingkawasan (IP Self-Determination Part of National Liberation).

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In early 1987, the Council of LUMAD MINDANAW decided not to

rely anymore on MINTREC and to set up its own Secretariat. It opened an
office in New Corella, Davao Norte with Lito Omos as General Secretary.
The office later transferred to Davao City.

With Mrs. Aquino as President, there arose a strong commitment for

human rights and social justice in the political arena (Abelardo 1993: 84).
This was clear during the Constitutional Convention that followed the
historic February 1986 event. Discussions on how to better respond to the
aspirations of the IPs brought about amendments to the 1973 Constitution.
Thus, this new provision in what would become the Constitution of 1987:

“The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and

national development policies and programs, shall protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral
lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being.

“The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary

laws governing property rights or relation in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” (Art XII, Sec. 5).

Meanwhile, new developments were taking place in the corridors

of power in Manila. New appointees in the Cabinet began to hold
consultations towards institutionalizing people power. One was Secretary
Carlos Dominguez, recently appointed chief of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He convened a group of
technocrats, professional, academicians, business people and government
personnel to a policy consultation in January 1987. Among those invited
were members of the Ugnayang Pang-Aghamtao, Inc. or UGAT. During
this consultation, however, business interests (especially those of logging
and mining concessionaries) overshadowed those of the IPs.

UGAT felt compelled to convene another forum that would give

due recognition to the IPs’ aspirations within the new political reality. It
sponsored a Land Congress with the theme ‘Land is Life’ in Cebu City
on March 23-24, 1987. There were 250 participants representing 20 tribal
organizations and alliances, 10 support organizations, and the government.

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It was in this Congress that the IPs pushed for the ancestral domain agenda.
Based on the proposals agreed on during this Congress, participants sent
a proposed Executive Order to Malacañang for Mrs. Aquino’s signature.
She did not sign the document, preferring that a bill be filed in Congress.

When Congress convened several members sponsored bills

related to IP concerns. In the Upper House, Senator Santanina Rasul
introduced Senate Bill 152 entitled “An Act Providing for Safeguards to
the Fundamental Right of Ancestral Domain of the Different National
Cultural Communities and for the Different Modes of Enjoyment
Thereof, and for other Purposes”. At the Lower house, Representatives
Andolana, Claver, Puzon, Lumauig, Dominguez, Bernardez, Dangwa,
Garduce, Dupaya, Aquino H.Y., Rodriguez, and Bandon co-authored
or else co-sponsored House Bill 428 called “An Act Creating the
Commission in Ancestral Domain”.

The different lumad organizations and their support groups were

in quandary with this recent development. Those who had strong links
with the radical left—who who were more concerned with opposing
Mrs. Aquino’s total war policy and, consequently, reserved their limited
resources for the ensuring campaign—were not interested in engaging the
State despite new openings in the legal political arena.

But the rest were. They mobilized their ranks to attend congressional
hearings, studied intently the proposed bills, suggested changes, and
lobbied for the passage of a bill on ancestral domain (HORIZONS
1990: 2).

Most of those in church programs were drawn to such engagement

because the ECTF decided to push for such a bill. In its annual national
convention in 1987 and 1988, the issue of ancestral domain and
self-determination were the major pre-occupations. Members studied
the different bills in Congress, gave their critique and lobbied for
the bills’ enactment.

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D. Types of Leaders

In the early part of this period, church people—including staff of

MSCJD—dominated the leadership. However, toward the latter part, the
leadership in the IP social movement changed. Among those who did not
align with the progressive forces, leadership remained with the church
both at the local and national levels. But among those who broke away
from the church-based network under the ECTF, tribal leaders who had
assumed the functions in the sub-regional clusters and nascent IPOs took
over the reins.

As they underwent leadership training programs and got more exposed

to different groups and circumstances, tribal leaders were able to acquire
greater skills in dealing with new challenges. They became quite adept at
conflict resolution, learned various approaches to building consensus, and
became creative in finding more effective alternatives at doing the job.
While they were rooted in their own tribal communities, they learned how
to deal with other lumad groups. There were still church people who had
leadership roles, especially the officers of LUMAD Mindanao. But the
greater responsibilities were now in the hands of the tribal leaders, with the
help of other social actors.

As the progressive lumad organizations and networks became more

and more interlinked with the National Democrat-oriented movement,
they welcomed the guidance and supervision of political officers who
operated in the background. These POs had to be consulted regarding
programs, activities and campaigns. They were responsible for directing
and coordinating all of these within the framework of overall movement
(i.e., in relation to activities of other sectoral and multi-sectoral groups).
Tribal leaders accepted the fact that they could not make decisions on their
own, at least not without the approval of “those up there.”

Politicized tribal leaders had acknowledged that they and the NDs
were comrades sharing the same vision of the national struggle. And so,
they were amenable to putting the lumad social movement within this
over-all political framework. Within this context, all took very strong
positions in supporting the united front. But they did not share the

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orientation of the leaders of the moderate groups; they believed that

fighting for societal reforms within the context of the Aquino government
was counterproductive. By and large, they were convinced, like the rest of
the radical left elements, that to continue waging the armed revolution was
the correct strategy to transform society.

E. Dominant Social Forms

All those lumads who were involved in the social movement became
more isolated from the rest of society. They experienced the resistance of
those opposed to the policy of providing the IPs full control over their
ancestral domain. Their cultural differences with lowlanders became stark.

The two factions within the IP social movement also became more
isolated from one another. The moderate ones decided to engage the State
toward the IPs’ having control over their ancestral domain and toward
working within the legal system. Thus, they poured their efforts in studying
approaches. Disseminating information and lobbying for the passage of
IP bills in Congress. They continued to hold and attend local and national
meetings, fora and other venues where they discussed and shared ideas
on self-determination. Such sharing and discussion proceeded from
the perspective of the lumad’s struggle for their own identity and their
assertion of their rights as a people. The other social development projects
of the moderates continued and expanded as more resources from various
sources became available to them.

The progressive ones, on the other hand, concentrated on opposing the

government’s total war policy. They also engaged in human rights advocacy
work and in relief and rehabilitation projects for internal refugee IPs. They
conducted meetings and fora to discuss self-determination, but these were
always in the context of the national revolutionary movement.

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The Formal Stage, Part 2: Temporary Weakening of Organizational

Structure and Initial Steps to Recovery (1987-1993)

A. Characteristic Conditions

At the State Level. The total war policy of the Aquino administration
remained in place. The military vowed to attain strategic victory over the
insurgency by the end of Mrs. Aquino’s term in 1992. Military operations
against suspected rebel strongholds, which were mainly in territories of the
IP’s homeland, intensified (TABAK 1992: 14). In 1991 alone, the military
conducted the following major operations (Ibid 14-15):

CODE NAME AREAS AFFECTED IPs AFFECTED

From data gathered by the Citizen’s Disaster Response Center

(CDRD) and TABAK, the following shows the extent of the displacement
of the IPs owing to these military operations (Ibid 18):

YEAR NO. OF CASES NO. OF FAMILIES TOTAL NO. OF

DISPLACED DISPLACED IPs

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Despite the clear and strong signal from the 1987 Constitution and
the lobby of IPs and their supporters from various segments of society,
opposition to the enactment of bills on ancestral domain continued. The
lobby of landlords, loggers and miners whose influence pervaded the halls
of Congress held.

Government boldly proclaimed to put flesh in Article XII, Section

5 of the 1987 Constitution by “drawing up special provisions on
ancestral land in two statutes, namely, Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and Republic Act No.
7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS) Law
(Abelardo 1993: 98). The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources then issued Department Administrative Order No. 2 series
of 1993, obviously a stop-gap measure to respond to the IPs’ demand for
control over their ancestral domain.

In essence, DAO 2 recognizes that IPs have a right to their ancestral

domain and that they are in a better position to manage natural resources
in their domain in a sustainable way. But there exactly is DAO 2’s inherent
inadequacy: While it provides for the issuance of certificates of ancestral
domain claim (CADCs), these CADCs are not titles, merely a recognition of
the right of claim and therefore open to contesting by any party.

Bills on ancestral would remain in limbo even when the popular Mrs.
Aquino ended her term as President. Several members of the Congress
that convened after Fidel Ramos took over as President filed their own
versions. One was Senator Juan Flavier with his Senate Bill 1475 entitled
“An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Cultural Communities’/ Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of
1996, and to establish implementing mechanisms therefor, and for other
purposes.” Flavier’s bill would later undergo major changes.

But bills on IPs in the Lower House remained basically the same:
unchanged, unacted upon.

Ramos in the meantime was busy promoting his government’s

Medium-Term Philippine Development Program (MTPDP) for the

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years 1993-1998 which would become the Ramos government’s slogan:

Philippines 2000 (Kasarinlan 1933 and 1994).

Like Marcos and Aquino before him, but perhaps with greater
enthusiasm, Ramos focused on an export-led industrialization and
liberalization scheme to transform the country into a tiger economy. Such
a scheme meant, among others, the expansion of industrial forest programs,
commercial tree plantations, infrastructure projects, and mining operations.
The Ramos government successfully urged Congress to ratify the Uruguay
Round General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and subsequently pass
UR-GATT- consistent and friendly-measures.

A case in point.

From data it collected from the Forest Management Bureau of the

DENR, the Legal Resources Center-Kasama sa Kalikasan (LRC-KSK)
reported that in August 1994 alone, at least 180 companies were able
to secure Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA). Through
IFMA, these companies gained access to 396,004.87 hectares of logged-
over lands which they planted to fast-growing trees. Around 34 of these
companies controlled 73% of the total hectarage. (The firms included
Alcantara and Sons operating in Talaingod, Davao del Norte where the
Ata-Manobos waged a tribal war against it).

Many of IFMA-covered areas were in Regions IX to XI—in the

ancestral domains of Subanen, Higaonon, Banwaon, Talaandig, Manobo,
Ata-Manobo, Dibabawon, Mandaya, Mansaka, T’boli, and Ubo. By the
end of 1994, LRC-KSK reported that the list of firms which had IFMAs
increased to 228, their area of coverage totalling 516,412 hectares about 65
% of which were in Mindanao (Gatmaytan 1995: 7).

Philippines 2000 had its version in the Mindanao 2000 Development

Framework Plan which incorporates a social reform agenda. The authors
indicate that in order to respond to the poverty situation of the IPs, it was
necessary to provide “determination of tenurial rights in ancestral domain
and access to productive requirements that will help convince them of
their being an integral part of society” (Paunlagui and Adriano: 17)

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But despite this recommendation, the Mindanao Plan lays more

emphasis on development projects right in the IPs’ homeland. Given
the drive to develop the evolving Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the
Philippine East Asian ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) with
Mindanao playing the major role, there has arisen the need to accelerate
Mindanao’s development especially in terms of infrastructure.

Prior to the IFMAs and establishment of the BIMP-EAGA, one

project that has drawn intense opposition from the IPs and their support
groups is the Mt. Apo geothermal project of the Philippine National Oil
Company. (MIPC COMMUNICATIONS 1990, Philippine Witness
1990, Rodil 1994, Miclat-Cacayan 1994, Tribal Forum 1995). The protest
seems to have fizzled out, though, with the plant set to begin operations
in early 1997. Mining companies, in particular the Australian-controlled
Western Mining Corporation, have also begun explorations in various
parts of Mindanao, despite the wide opposition of the IPs and support
groups. But people action has been successfully elsewhere. For instance,
owing to people’s protest, government cancelled plans to build hydro-
electric dams in Imelda and Mahayag, Zamboanga Sur.

At the Civil Society Level. The moderate groups continued to engage the
State. With DAO-2 in place, they coordinated their efforts with NGOs
(like the LRC-KSK and PANLIPI) toward empowering their respective
IPOs to apply for CADCs.

In Mindanao, the LRC-KSK opened an office, while the Kaliwat

Theatre Collective, SILDAP-Sidlakan and AFRIM made themselves
available to IPOs needing assistance for their campaigns. At the ECTF
national and regional conferences and meetings, there continued to be a
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of adopting DAO-2 as a
framework for the IP campaign. They were, however, one in their desire
to oppose development aggression—referring to IFMAs, infrastructure
programs, mining, and other projects in IPs’ ancestral lands.

The progressive groups, on the other hand, maintained their

adversarial stance vis-a-vis State, even as their unity was slowly becoming
eroded (Rosales 1992). They refused to be drawn into the DAO-2
scheme which they believed was a mere palliative to the problems of

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the IPs. As military operations affecting the IPs decreased, progressive

groups shifted their campaign to the victims of development aggression,
attacking the State for being responsible for ethnocide. Refusing to
collaborate with moderate NGOs—whom they criticized as having sold
out to the State—and distancing themselves from LUMAD Mindanaw,
they set up their own network, namely the PASAKA Regional Lumad
Confederation and the Solidarity Action Group for Indigenous Peoples
(SAGIP) which coordinated with Ata-Manobos in Talaingod, Davao del
Norte (SAGIP 1994).

At the national capital, the progressives set up the National

Federation of Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines (Kalipunan ng mga
Katutubong Mamamayan ng Pilipinas or KAMP) which held its first
national meeting in 1987. LUMAD Mindanaw would have been part
of this federation but owing to the developments that took place in the
late 1980’s, such linkage was no longer possible. It was PASAKA that
established linkages with KAMP.

B. Processes that Backfired

There arose a problematique in the process of consolidating LUMAD

Mindanaw. The staff and the Council members were bent on proceeding
with what was agreed on earlier, namely, to discuss how to consolidate the
sub-regional IPOs and support offices based in the local areas. But “those up
there” had their own agenda. Political officers explained this to a few people
connected with the LM Secretariat. The call of the moment was for all those
connected to the movement to help towards the recovery of the strategic
areas badly affected by government’s counter insurgency campaign.

By early 1989, the underground movement arranged that all Mindanao-

wide POs and NGOs should focus their efforts in a specific area assigned
to them. LM was concentrated in Malabog, Davao Norte and was not to
conduct activities outside the Southern Mindanao Region. But the staff of
the LM Secretariat demanded that the LM Council be consulted before
this decision was to be carried out, fearing that if there was no consultation
they would have problems later on with their Council and with the heads
of the different IPOs. After meeting with those within their network, the

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LM Secretariat decided to turn down the order from “those up there.”

The progressive forces ostracized them. From the grapevine, the LM staff
heard that the call to all progressive forces was “to let LUMAD Mindanaw
die a natural death,” by withdrawing all support, linkages and working
relationships. They also claimed that the LM leaders and staff suffered
from character assassination (Mansayagan 1997:12).

Informal sources (e.g. interviewees) opined that there was some basis
for the criticisms raised against the LM leadership, including charges of
financial opportunism. The same sources indicated, however, that even if
valid, these criticisms could not justify the drastic steps that the POs took
in isolating LM. In the end, the bottom line was that the LM leaders
asserted their independence, which was anathema to the POs.

These events brought setbacks to LM; with the withdrawal of support,

its whole structure weakened. The staff tried to sustain their activities,
continuing communications with all those in the alliance and monitoring
developments in the local areas. But momentum was lost. Without the
LM, the popular movement also weakened since its links to the IPs became
more limited. The MIPCS’s concern for the IPs also dwindled down, as
the Secretariat—given its other political priorities for Mindanao and the
decreasing financial support from the outside—gave up any support for
lumad alliances, networks and organization. All these mirrored the crisis
that the radical left faced then, a crisis that in large part evolved with the
drastic changes that were taking place in the country’s political landscape.

To all these the Church responded through the ECTF. Its regional
coordination, however, suffered when the regional Secretariat based in
Davao City had to close down for financial and other reasons. Coordination
had to be done from Manila. With communication and financial difficulties
that the ECTF Secretariat in Manila faced, coordination became even
more problematic. But despite the limitations, the network continued
to lobby for the passage of IP bills (by, among others, joining with other
NGOs the Technical Working Group set up by the office of Senator
Flavier) and to pressure the government to stop development aggression
in the IPs’ homeland.

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C. Mechanisms that Weakened the Social Movement But Those that

Also Helped to Slowly Revitalize It

At various fronts the mechanisms of the lumad social movement

weakened. At the church front—whether in terms of the network of the
Catholic (ECTF/MSPC) or the inter-faith/ecumenical group (MIPCS)—
the dynamism of the 1980s drastically ebbed. Within the progressive
groups, there was a crisis as to how to regain control over most of the
groups working for lumad concerns, considering recent setbacks.

This held true for LM. Faced with unresolved conflicts with the
underground and depleting resources, LM could not pursue the goals it
set in 1985 and 1988. To arrest further deterioration, the leaders and staff
convened the third LM Assembly in June 1991. Three months before the
assembly, the remaining sub-regional groupings conducted a thorough
evaluation of what they had done and were doing until then. The results of
such evaluation found their way to the assembly. One major finding of the
evaluation was that the sub-regional groups were not clear in terms of what
direction to take vis-à-vis their struggles for ancestral domain and self-
determination. Assembly participants decided to re-orient and redirect the
LM towards these two issues. Form here onwards, they were convinced
they were on their own: No outsiders would impose on the directions the
LM should take in the coming years.

In a council meeting held in Lake Sebu, South Cotabato in December

that year, LM declared a moratorium to big campaigns and encouraged
all members to prioritize the strengthening of local organizations. LM
likewise renewed the call for an assessment of the work done so far by the
LM Secretariat. In February 1992, LM decided to set up the Committee
on Redirection (COORE) composed of the secretaries of the five sub-
regional organizations plus two members of the Council. COORE’s
task was to facilitate the evaluation of LM and to provide direction on
the basis of the assessment’s findings. In the process, COORE talked
with traditional and emerging leaders of the lumad communities and
organizations, gathered documents, and held consultations with its sub-
regional units and NGOs supportive of IP concerns. In March 1993,
COORE presented its findings before the LM Expanded Council. Some
of the findings were the following:

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1. LM had 5 sub-regional organizations, 8 units at the provincial level,

19 at the municipal/district level, and 15 at the barangay level. Their
organizational identities varied: Some were sectoral alliances, others
inter-tribal federations. Those who operated as organic structures
had nebulous set-ups, powers and functions.
2. While organizing IPOs was supposed to be the priority of the local
groups, these groups were subject to the priorities of the NGOs that
provide them support. These NGOs were feeling the pressure to zero
in on the priority concerns of their partner agencies (otherwise known
as funding agencies or FAs) such as ecological action and gender
sensitivity. Because of this, organizing efforts became secondary.
3. As staff members of NGOs, a good number of whom “outsiders”
controlled, the lumads were just workhorses. They hardly had access
to important data about the organization (e.g. finances).
4. Conflicts pertaining to leadership of lumad organizations had arisen.
Most of those who took on key roles were not traditional tribal
leaders, but anointees of political officers. Clearly enough, these
anointees represented their “benefactors” not their tribes. There were
also no efforts to give women and young people leadership roles.
5. While there were consultations, staff made decisions only upon the
approval of their POs. If there were Councils, all they did was to
legitimize what the powers-that-be had already decided on.
6. And finally, LUMAD Mindanaw did not really function as an
organization that championed the rights of the lumad, it served
more as a campaign machinery to advance the cause of the national
liberation movement.

Given these findings, COORE proposed that LUMAD Mindanaw

be transformed into a genuine federation of IPOs and that the local
organizations be consolidated to advance the cause of the IPs. The LM
expanded council accepted the findings and the recommendations;
accordingly, it decided to make COORE a Committee on Restructuring
(CORES) tasked with drafting a program to reorganize Lumad Mindanaw.

What followed was the convening of the LM Special Assembly in

Sarangani on September 25-29, 1994. In attendance were 15 members of
the LM Council, two delegates representing all tribal groups within the

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network, and three people from NGOs/POs. Among the most important
decisions at this assembly were:

1. The ratification of the proposed restructuring of LUMAD Mindanaw,

which also changed its name to Lumad Mindanaw Peoples Federation
(LMPF).
2. The election of a new set of Council members.
3. The setting up of an ad hoc decision-making body to govern from
1996 to year 2000 which the participants regarded as a transitory
period. This Interim Council of Lumad Peoples Representatives
in Mindanao (ICLPRM) included 3 representatives from the
14 tribes constituting the network. The ICLPRM had three
commissions, namely: Membership and External Relations,
Research, Documentation, Education and Information, and Project
Development. Each had a chairperson who made up the executive
Committee along with the chair and vice-chair of the ICLPRM as
well as the LMPF Secretary General.

Their functions during the transitory period included organizing the

lumads as a basic sector at the village level, as well as into clan and tribal
federations. The objective was to build strength at the base and promote
participatory decision-making and self-governance in tribal territories.

From 1995 to 1996, the slow process of recovery began. With funds
from the European Union, many hoped to speed up the process in 1997.

Meanwhile, the national democratic movement split into the

Reaffirmist (RA) and the Rejectionist (RJ) factions. Both do not have ties
with LMPF; the latter is not welcome in their activities. Allegedly, too,
both discredit the LMPF even during international gatherings.

D. Types of Leaders

As far as the LMPF was concerned, its leaders showed a deep

commitment to have full control over the running of the structure and were
mature enough to face the consequences of their action. Unfortunately,
conditions did not allow for conflict resolution where their skills consensus-
building could have been tested. Despite the setbacks, they did not give up.

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They were even willing to be subjected to an evaluation by their own peers.

They were willing to weather the storm, to start from scratch, and learn
from their mistakes.

E. Dominant Social Forms

The members of LMPF isolated themselves from other forces whom

they no longer trusted. They asserted their right to direct their own
struggle and to conduct what needs to be done within their own political
and cultural perspectives. They were now willing to do it their way, rather
than being dictated upon by outsiders.

The Formal Stage, Part 3: The Rise of a New Alliance and

Consolildation of LMPF (1994-1997)

A. Characteristic Conditions

At the State Level. With the Philippines hosting the APEC in

1996, the government continued its drive towards globalization, in the
process legitimizing the activities of government institutions and global
conglomerates in IP homelands. This was especially true for mining
corporations expanding explorations in Mindanao.

DAO-2 continued to face all kinds of difficulties. Among these were

the incompetence of local DENR officials some of whom were ignorant
about the order, limited funds that government allotted for surveys,
resistance from local government officials and businessmen, and the lack of
assistance for local IPOs from various sectors of civil society. The IPOs also
got exasperated over the ludicrous requirements of CADC applications. All
these criticism only served to justify the positions taken by the progressive
groups who refused to get involved in DAO-2.

Ironically, as it pursued its globalization objectives, the State also

pushed its Social Reform Agenda, even convening a gathering of
government agencies, NGOs and POs for a poverty summit in 1996.
Once more, the plight of IPs was part of the order of business. But then,

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once more, the government seemed helpless in pushing for the approval of
pending bills on ancestral domain, as well as in carrying out programs that
could temporarily advance the ancestral domain cause.

The Ramos government also aggressively pursued peace talks with the
Moro National Liberation Front. With its persistence and the openness
of the MNLF under the leadership of Nur Missuari towards some level
of conflict resolution, the talks reached a breakthrough in mid-1996. This
led to the setting up of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and
Development (SPCPD). Missuari also ran and won as governor of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The SPCPD’s
Consultative Assembly, made up of representatives from the Moro, lumad
and settler communities, convened on early 1997. Given its limited
resources, its impact is still to be felt in Mindanao. The lumads, however,
have reservations about being integrated into a set-up where they play
a secondary role. They are sceptical that their aspirations and demands
would be responded to adequately by this body.

At the Level of Civil Society. Interested in engaging the State, various

segments of civil society took significant initiatives in a meeting hosted by
the ECTF in October and November 1994, where a number of NGOs held
discussions on the IP Legislative Agenda. Among those who joined were
PANLAPI, Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, LRC-KSK, HARIBON,
Cordillera Peoples Forum, Lingkod-Tao Kalikasan, SENTRO and the
Philippine Foundation for Environmental Concerns (PFEC). They would
later urge Congress that: (1) the law must give full recognition to the right
of IPs to ownership and management of ancestral domain; (2) the law
must respect the indigenous culture, justice system, concepts of ownership,
land use and resources utilization; (3) the IPs themselves should identify
and delineate their ancestral domains; and (4) sufficient funds should be
provided for the law to take full effect.

A parallel development took place in Mindanao. After informal

consultations, a group of church groups and NGOs convened an NGO
Consultation held last March 14-16 [1997] in Davao City. Among those
who participated were the Community Assistance for Rural Development
(CARD) Foundation of Davao, Lumad Development Foundation of North

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Cotabato, Silingang Dapit of Davao Norte/Oriental, Media Mindanao

News Service, Managing Alternatives Group, Inc. (MAGI), Paglilingkod
-Batas Pangkapatiran Foundation (PBPF), Proponents’ Technical
Assistance and Management Services, Inc. (PROTEAM), AFRIM,
PANLIPI, KTC, LKC-KSK and a number of church-based groups. The
convenors also invited several government agencies among them the office
of the Presidential Assistant for the Peace Process (OPAPP) and the
DENR an Region XI and Region XII.

This consultation would give birth to another broad alliance of

NGOs/IPOs who were interested in pursuing the ancestral domain/self-
determination agenda of the IPs within the perspective of engaging the
State. The alliance is called PANAGTAGBO.

B. Typical Processes

On the part of PANAGTAGBO. The 1995 NGO consultation provided

a venue for the participants to (1) present specific cases of AD claims in
the context of the deepening discourse on the issue of cultural survival; (2)
draw particular strategies in advancing advocacy work for the IPs’ welfare;
(3) to explore models and approaches for a community-based resource
management program appropriate to the state of the environment and IP
social structures; and (4) set up mechanisms in pursuing concrete actions
or resolutions raised during the consultation.

At the end of the 1995 consultation, they agreed on the following:

1. The conduct of empirical studies for establishing AD claims;

2. Lobbying in courts, LGUs and other policy-making bodies;
3. Petitions to DENR for the awarding of lands to claimants;
4. Consolidation of IPOs-NGO partnership and solidarity with IPs in
other countries;
5. Development of support groups among professionals and students;
6. The conduct of community exposure-integration programs;
7. In-depth studies of existing tenurial and resource laws;
8. Intensive media campaigns and wider public advocacy coverage;

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9. Continuing consultations and discussions with tribal communities

towards developing an alternative development program; and
10. Linking the AD struggle to environmental protection and cultural
survival.

Within the next year, it was clear to most of those who joined the
consultation that there was a need for a forum and an ad hoc secretariat
to coordinate their continuing efforts, whether done individually or
collectively. For a variety of reasons, they realized that the existing
structures (LMPF, MIPCS) were not appropriate for the current situation.
They found the need to set up another forum which also a broad alliance
open to all factions, no matter their political orientation, for as long as they
were convinced of the urgency of the foregoing tasks. In a consultation-
workshop held in Agusan Norte last August 30-31 [1997], the participants
agreed to hold a forum to be attended by IPOs and NGOs.

The following were the objectives:

1. To provide a venue for sharing experience and reflections among

IPOs for them to be able to lay down plans of actions for a wider and
more effective responses to issues that confront them (e.g. mining,
IFMA, dams, NIPAS, etc.) and their ancestral domains; and
2. To form bases of unity among NGOs, in the context of their
experiences and reflections, in strengthening their programs and
other forms of advocacy work supportive of, and in behalf of, the IPs.

The forum, later called PANAGTAGBO (Encounter or Gathering)

took place in Kidapawan from December 6 to 10, 1995. More than 60
NGO/IPO representatives attended this. Among the general principles
agreed upon were:

1. For the IPOs: To engage in massive education activities among

tribe members, and discussion of issues/threats; and to formulate
appropriate courses of action within the framework of their inherent
rights over their ancestral domains and resources therein.
2. For the NGOs: To participate in activities originating from the local,
provincial and regional levels which would lead to the pursuit of a

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Mindanao-wide forum, to extend regular services relevant to the IPs’

need, and to have regular sharing of experiences.

They also agreed to form a convenors group to serve as channel of

communication and catalyst for activities that forward the IPs’ cause
and prepare for the following year’s PANAGTAGBO 2. In concrete
terms, the convenors group (1) facilitated deeper discussions on IP
issues, reproduced/disseminated information and research findings; (2)
expanded the network of IP advocates and tapped existing local resources
for setting up a data/information center; (3) engaged in concrete actions
for policy advocacy; and (4) monitored ongoing processes of community
education and organizational consolidation. The group’s full-time staff
was Datu Lito Omos. The Kaliwat Theatre Collective headed by Nestor
Horfilla housed the secretariat.

After the PANAGTAGBO First Forum, the convenors and staff were
able to do the following: (1) Provide para-legal trainings in Cagayan de
Oro, Misamis Oriental, Bukidnon and Davao Norte; (2) set up a data
bank; (3) organize task forces to facilitate the conduct of the mining forum
and the one on ancestral domain; (4) pursue media advocacy, e.g., a press
conference after the mining forum; (5) hold community consultations with
various IPs on various priority issues; (6) convene an NGO-IPO caucus in
preparation for the Mining Forum; and (7) expand its network to involve
more groups and organizations.

The PANAGTAGBO first forum met with a number of difficulties.

For one, there were tensions owing to differences in ideological orientation.
For another, many NGOs had limited resources for IP concerns and could
only do so much to support a concerted and more effective advocacy work.
Establishing working relationships with government agencies and LGUs
was also anything but easy. But despite these problems, PANAGTAGBO
was successfully in implementing planned activities.

In October 1996, PANAGTAGBO convened the IPO-NGO Forum

on Mining, Environment and Ancestral Domains in Davao City. More
than one hundred and twenty participants, representing 31 IPOs and
29 NGOs from all over Mindanao attended this Forum. There were also
participants and guests from government agencies, LGUs and the church.

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This forum’s objectives included (1) gathering the most recent and concrete
data on application for mining claims and mining activities in Mindanao
and disseminating the same to as wide an audience as possible; (2) drawing
out and processing the experiences of IPs in dealing with the ancestral
domain-mining-environment related issues as well as charting concrete
community actions to take; (3) facilitating discourse on sustainable mining
framework and formulating directions for IPO-NGO policy-advocacy
actions; and (4) popularizing the issues through various means, from
publications to symposia.

From out of this Forum emerged resolutions:

1. Urging the government to repeal the Mining Act of !995;
2. Urging the DENR to cancel all FTAAs granted to foreign
corporations;
3. Urging the DENR to cancel all large-scale and commercial tree
plantation or IFMA in ancestral domains;
4. Urging the DENR and other government agencies to recognize as
non-negotiables the following conditions in implementing programs
affecting the indigenous territories of the IPs: (1) genuine Filipino
equity in all corporations; (2) distribution to affected communities
of benefits derived from any project; (3) deputization of community
members in the monitoring and evaluation of projects in their
respective areas; and (4) a policy that any structure intended for use
in any community project implementation must be appropriate to
the culture and traditional practices of the local inhabitants.
5. Urging the DENR to demand that Congress expedite the passing of
the Ancestral Domain Bill specifically Senate Bill 1496;3
6. Demanding that DENR regional and provincial offices hasten the
process of recognizing and the issuance of CADCs; and
7. Demanding that DENR recognize the indigenous traditions and
cultural practices of the tribe living in ancestral territories covered
by NIPAS and that DENR should respect the decision of the local
communities to accept or not the implementation of the NIPAS in
their territories.

3
In October 1997, Pres. Ramos signed Republic Act no. 8173, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act.

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 aninawon | vol. 1 • no. 1 | january 2019

On November 21-24 took place an IPO Forum on Ancestral Domain

in Lantapan, Bukidnon. Participants included 80 IP representatives from
29 IPOs, 6 observers and 11 non-lumad NGO support staff. This forum
sought to (1) provide a venue for the participants to share and discuss
significant aspects of their culture, identity and collective experience as
a tribe and as a people from their very own point-of-views; (2) come up
with a common position on AD and self-determination as well as ways
to confront urgent socio-political and economic issue affecting the IPs;
(3) share and reflect on past organizing experiences in IP communities;
and (4) clarify the complementary roles and relations of support
NGOs and IPOs.

The following were the resolutions that the participants approved:

1. The compilation of written declaration on IP’s policy on their AD;

2. The setting up of an agreement among IPOs to strengthen and
consolidate their IPOs and build a larger organized body at the
municipal, provincial and regional levels; T
3. he establishment of an IP organization consultative body which shall
coordinate PANAGTAGBO-related action plans;
4. The evolving of a basis for relating with support organizations;
5. Lobbying for the legislation of the Code for IP Rights and Ancestral
Domain;
6. Supporting and pursuing the convening of PANAGTAGBO 2; and
7. A statement supporting the Higaonon’s claims in Impasugong,
Bukidnon.

With the result of the two forums, PANAGTAGBO officers and

staff began preparations for the second Conference to be convened in
mid-1997.

On the part of LMPF. Some of those in their network---both the

local and regional leaders—joined the PANAGTAGBO fora and
consultations under the name of the local IPOs. The LMPF Secretariat
staff attended in the name of LMPF, especially at the IPO Forum where
Edtami Mansayagan shared LMPF’s organizing experience. He informed

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 gaspar | the mindanao lumad social movement

the participants that after 1998, following the strengthening of base

organizing, they will hold a meeting of the council of LMPF and possibly,
by then, establish a genuine Mindanao-wide Federation and a Mindanao
Commission on Ancestral Domain. But at the moment, Mansayagan said
that they were still in the process of re-establishing their Secretariat and
following up the consolidation of the organizations within their network.

On the part of SAGIP-PASAKA. In October 1996, PASAKA and

SAGIP convened the Southern Mindanao Summit of Indigenous Peoples
and Advocates in Davao City. Its objectives were (1) to project the issues
affecting the IPs; (2) to contribute to the mass movement against APEC;
(3) to provide a venue for dialogue between lumads and urban-based
sectors to promote solidarity between them; and (4) to engage government
agencies and officials in a dialogue with lumad leaders and multi-sectoral
support groups in a venue for the ventilation of positions regarding laws,
executive orders, and policies affecting the lumads. After this summit, the
network continued to expose the impact of development aggression on a
number of lumad communities and to strengthen their existing programs.

From 1994 to 1996, PANAGTAGBO and LMPF tried to establish

some level of collaboration with one another. But the move mainly
came from PANAGTAGBO. Particularly with the success of the IPO
forum, PANAGTAGBO has been in a better position to coordinate the
efforts of the NGOs, IPOs, and church groups because it had taken on
an independent political position and could bring together groups from
various ideological persuasions, except the radical left.

On the other hand, the LMPF, with its very direct links with the mass
movement in the past, still had problems convincing the broad alliance
that it had the capacity to do efficient and effective coordination work.

Between 1994-1996, there were informal linkages between

PANAGTAGBO and LMPF. A number of LMPF key people attended
several consultations and fora that PANAGTAGBO organized. Since early
1997, however, those who held key positions within the remaining LMPF
have ceased to maintain such informal links with PANAGTAGBO. No
one from the LMPF joined the second PANAGTAGBO Assembly held

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 aninawon | vol. 1 • no. 1 | january 2019

in Davao City. Their absence was most noticeable, but no explanation for
their non-participation came the way of PANAGTAGBO.

At this writing, it has become clear that the social movement has
recovered from the major crisis of the 1988-1993 period. There are still
problems and difficulties in forging links with all NGOs/IPOs/church
groups and other support groups. But, at least for the moment, the broad
alliance has expanded and has been able—within a very short time—to
make its presence felt in Mindanao. Once a number of contradictions
are resolved (including that of PANAGTAGBO and LMPF, and that
of the moderates and some factions of the radical left, the Church
and the rest of civil society) this social movement would be on its way to
its institutional stage.

But then again, several other developments will need to take place to
effect the shift to the institutional stage. One is the process that could bring
about some level of tactical alliance among PANAGTAGBO, LMPF, and
PASAKA-SAGIP. This may be quite difficult to achieve, though. The
other more important development, which is possibly the more viable one,
is for the IPOs to be able to (1) strengthen their new configuration; (2)
take on greater leadership in the broad social movement as they seek to
enjoy a greater autonomy from various ideological forces, and (3) mobilize
the active participation of a growing number of lumad communities. A
more militant and broad civil society must continue to engage the State on
IP concerns. And finally, the State itself must find the political will to put
an end to the IPs’ continuing disenfranchisement.

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 Contributors

ULYSSES S. CABAYAO is a priest of the Society of Jesus, currently

assigned as a full-time faculty of the Ateneo de Davao University
Department of Anthropology. He received his Master of
Anthropology (Advanced) degree, with commendation, from the
Australian National University. He also completed a degree in
Bachelor of Sacred Theology (STB), magna cum laude, from the
Loyola School of Theology, and a Bachelor of Science in Management
Information Systems from the Ateneo de Manila University. He
has taught courses in Philosophy, Theology, and Computer Science
at Xavier University, Ateneo de Zamboanga University, Ateneo
de Manila University, and Saint Alphonsus Theological Mission
Institute. He has also served as vicar forane, parish priest, school
director, high school principal, and hospital chaplain.

KARL M. GASPAR , CS S R is a Redemptorist Brother from Davao

City. He has a Bachelor’s degree in Sociology (Ateneo de Davao
University), a Master’s degree in Economics (Asian Social Institute)
and a Doctorate in Philippine Studies (University of the Philippines-
Diliman). He has also received a Ph.D. in Humanities from Xavier
University. He currently teaches at Ateneo de Davao University’s
Anthropology Department and at the St. Alphonsus Theological
and Mission Institute, and gives various talks at universities
and seminaries. He has taken part in Mindanao’s Lumad social
movement through his work with the Manobos in Arakan Valley,
the Subanen of Zamboanga del Sur, the Dulangan Manobo of
Sultan Kudarat, and the Manobo/Blaan of Jose Abad Santos, Davao
Occidental. He is a prolific author, and his books include the award-
winning Manobo Dreams in Arakan and, more recently, Panagkutay:
Anthropology Interfacing Theology in the Mindanao Uplands.