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Glaser - The Normative Theory

The document discusses normative political theory. It summarizes that 1) it analyzes political institutions and the relationships between individuals and power to justify existing and potential political agreements, 2) it uses methods such as logic, social sciences, and moral intuition, and 3) the main currents are utilitarianism, deontological liberalism, and communitarianism.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
190 views19 pages

Glaser - The Normative Theory

The document discusses normative political theory. It summarizes that 1) it analyzes political institutions and the relationships between individuals and power to justify existing and potential political agreements, 2) it uses methods such as logic, social sciences, and moral intuition, and 3) the main currents are utilitarianism, deontological liberalism, and communitarianism.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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The normative theory

Daryl Glaser

Normative political theory assumes, in the words of Isaiah Berlin: 'the discovery or the
application of moral principles to the sphere of political relations." From this rigorous Page | 1
point of view is considered a branch of moral philosophy, dedicated to questions
foundational or basic morals that affect political life (Berlin, 1984, p. 120). Without
embargo, the term can be defined more broadly to encompass all theorization
policy of a prescriptive or recommendatory nature; that is, any theorization interested in
what "should be", as opposed to "what is" in political life. Thought
normative political is expressed through abstract moral reasoning but also in
through a more detailed analysis of the institutions and policies. If from the point
from a philosophical point of view, it seeks to create guiding moral precepts in its application more
concrete political theory investigates the repercussions of moral precepts on the
political practice.

Normative theories have a long tradition that in the West can be traced back to,
minimum, to ancient Greece and in the east, among other sources, to Confucius and to philosophy
Hindu. Given that politics "deals with the general agreements of human groups
linked by chance or choice" (Oakeshott, 1984, p. 219), the normative theorization
it may seem, at first glance, completely natural: like a way to attract the
attention of the intellectual towards the process of 'taking care of' our 'agreements'. Without
embargo, the existence of a specific area of exclusively theoretical activity
dedicated to 'what must be' is not entirely accepted in academic circles. Some
critics deny that the agent makes coherent moral choices, others question that
moral budgets make sense or are logically derived from what happens in the
world and a few have disqualified moral thinking itself.

Despite such criticisms, normative theory remains a vibrant and healthy branch of
political studies. In fact, it has sparked renewed interest since the early 70s,
partly thanks to the influence of authors like Rawls and Nozick. Its resurrection is
produced after a long period in which the criticisms of logical positivism in the
The thirties and later those of behaviorism produced a loss of its influence.
Those schools have been on the defensive for a long time, while political theorists
normative show a growing self-confidence. Despite everything, as
We will show later, the normative theory faces new challenges.
By analyzing the discipline of normative political theory, we delve into its evolution.
since the 1970s, although we mention, when necessary, thinkers and schools of
previous thoughts.

Key issues and methods


Normative political theory is a way of analyzing both social institutions,
especially those linked to the exercise of power, such as the relationships of the
individuals with them, and thoroughly examines how political agreements are justified
existing ones and how other possible ones would be justified.
The followers of this theory use several methods, of which three are the most
habitual. First of all, what normative theorists care about above all else
it is the internal coherence of moral arguments and to weigh it they use, among others
sources, of formal logic and analytic philosophy. Secondly, they use disciplines
of the social sciences such as social anthropology and history to verify if they are
correct the empirical premises of the arguments or discover the problems of them Page | 2
moral arguments that abstract reasoning does not reveal immediately.
Finally, the normative theorists contrast the conclusions of their arguments with their
own moral intuitions. Their arguments can show the weakness of the
institutions based on common sense but, in the same way, a conclusion
markedly counterintuitive may indicate a weak point in the reasoning that the
produced. Normative theorists differ from each other by the relative importance that
they grant to these three elements: abstract logic, scientific-social and historical data
and intuition.

The key substantive issues of political theory since the early 1970s can be
classify, very roughly, into two groups. The first focuses on existence and
purpose of the public institutions that we call the State: Is there any foundation
What moral justifies the existence of the State? When should we feel obligated to
to obey their laws? And, on the contrary, when is civil disobedience justified?

A second group of substantive issues deals with matters concerning justice.


redistributive and its consequences for freedom or freedoms: What importance
What relative morality do freedoms and equality have? Is there any moral foundation that...
justify the existence of public policies aimed at materializing a certain
conception of socially substantive equality?, Do such policies respect both the
autonomy as the freedoms of individuals and are compatible with pluralism?

In this same chapter, it will be analyzed how normative theorists have debated the role of
State in the distribution of goods, a topic that addresses substantive issues of the
two mentioned groups.

Political theorists, when analyzing these issues, tend to focus on matters


elementary, or foundational, of political philosophy, such as does morality have a basis?
objective, rationally perceptible? And if it exists, what does it consist of? Or, on the contrary, is it
Is it perhaps a human invention, the result of a community convention or tradition, and why?
Do the answers to these questions affect political theory?

First of all, we must address these foundational issues of moral philosophy.


The following section will analyze the various viewpoints that the authors have.
adopted in relation to these issues. Subsequently, the ideas of those will be addressed.
that call into question the very existence of moral philosophy.
Main currents of normative political theory

Since its revitalization in the 70s, it has developed in various directions. Some
of their followers have reformulated the foundations of traditional positions, others
(especially from feminism) have sought new territories. There have been three
Page | 3
general trends in normative political theory and, without exhausting all possibilities, have
dominated the debate since the 1970s, based on texts from decades and centuries earlier.
These three currents are utilitarianism, deontological liberalism, and communitarianism.
We will first address utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a moral and political philosophy linked, as is known, to Jeremy
Bentham, radical social reformer of the 19th century. Like many later utilitarians,
Bentham received the principles of political action that were based on assertions
abstract or speculative about natural rights and duties. For his part, this author
I would resort to what were considered the elemental characteristics of human nature.
revealed by empirical observation and asserted that human beings were motivated
for the desire to achieve happiness and to not suffer. Therefore, I believed that the
morally correct political decisions were those that sought greater happiness for a
greater number of people in society. This happiness could be measured as a utility -
that property of any object by virtue of which it contributes to produce
benefits, advantages, pleasure, goodness or happiness" - and the goal of those who design the
policies should aim to maximize aggregated social utility (Plant, 1993).

Bentham did not try to prescribe the actions that produced the greatest happiness. The
members of society would ultimately be responsible for defining what they considered
utility. Each individual had to define their 'good' and, in a process of social decision-making, the
interests of each one (subjectively defined) should count equally in the
calculation of the profit.

This classic form of utilitarianism has suffered constant criticism. It is often considered
It is implausible that both pleasures and sufferings can be quantified and that the
wishes, always immeasurable, of the different individuals can be compared from
impersonal form. Many critics are concerned about the possible consequences that may
to have a doctrine for individual and minority rights that conceives of utility
socially in an aggregated form and does not allow for the constraints that a theory of rights might impose.
put social action. Even more unsettling to them is the trust of utilitarianism in the
preferences expressed by the same individuals, given that some (such as racism,
for example) are markedly antisocial. The obligation to seek the greatest happiness
for the largest number of people, social engineering or a technocracy can be sanctioned
of well-being consented by the majority. On the other hand, this model of the individual that
maximizing utility could lead to an apology for a more extreme free market, whose
The natural successor would be the public choice theory of the new right. The elitists.
cultural and religious thinkers fear that equating all desires means a
degradation of what is elevated in life, whether it be art with a capital A or truths.
established theological doctrines that reveal the scriptures.
John Stuart Mill was one of the first to openly criticize utilitarianism.
Bentham. Mill set aside a strictly quantitative utilitarianism to make room for
qualitative assessments, admitting, for example, that certain types of experiences
intellectual or aesthetic could be superior to others also desired. Mill also
he defended a utilitarianism that considered the protection of certain interests a right Page | 4
elementary or vital to all individuals. Rights, in themselves, contribute to utility.
general to "strengthen the foundations of our existence." Mill's idea that the
rights are inviolable against the various utilitarian imperatives is not entirely
Clara. Mill pointed out that sometimes, some rights conflict with others and that, when
this happens, only a calculation of relative utility can indicate which ones should prevail. The
Mill's arguments distance themselves from act utilitarianism, according to which every actor
should be judged in isolation and based on its consequences for maximization
of happiness, and they approach a utilitarianism of rules, which would preserve entire systems
of coercive norms by virtue of the benefits they produce for the whole of the
society (Mill, 1978).

Since Mill, several authors have attempted to present utilitarianism in a way


more acceptable or convincing, some with the intention of giving greater subtlety to their precepts or
nuance, others modifying them substantially. Utilitarianism, although to a certain
the point contrasts with recent debates, has continued to develop on its own with
different denominations - consequentialism, teleological ethics, proportionalism - and today
is a less easy target than its 19th-century predecessor. To readers
who want to stay informed about the latest evolution of utilitarian thought or of the
debates surrounding the discipline, it would be useful for them to start with the collection of A. Sen
y B. Williams Utilitarianism and Beyond.

Deontological liberalism
Political theorizing reemerged in the 1970s primarily as an opposition to this legacy.
utilitarian. Rather, he did it to oppose all kinds of teleological ethics. By ethics
teleological we understand all morality that judges the value of human conduct based on
if it achieves a certain purpose or reaches a specific end or goal. In this sense, the
utilitarianism, although it does not clarify the content of human happiness, is clearly
teleological but, for example, the Aristotelian idea that the human being (male
and not a slave) fulfills its rational nature by participating as a citizen in life
from a community. Several important thinkers from the 1970s - such as John Rawls,
Robert Nozik has emphasized that transferring teleological ethics to political life proves to be
insufficient and even adventurous for human freedom, for two reasons that we have
mentioned earlier.

Firstly, these authors point out that utilitarianism does not take into account the plurality of
the individual ends, either because it indicates that there is a single end of greater entity than the
others (the maximization of happiness or utility), either because it judges what is good
for the human being, or well-being, from the strategic position that the whole of the
society (or 'most of its members'), without considering each individual.
Secondly, teleological ethics places greater importance on the ends than on the means.
means that can be used to achieve them. Specifically, it refuses to admit that the
The fight to achieve general social objectives must be subject to rights.
inalienable rights that every individual enjoys.

Although, as mentioned earlier, utilitarians have sought


facing these criticisms, they continue to argue that the utilitarian defense of rights Page | 5
it is always contingent and insecure. Utilitarianism has been the basis of much of the
liberal thought but some of its critics have stated that liberalism needs
philosophical fundamentals and more convincing.

The authors who put forward these arguments are known as deontological liberals or
Kantians. They contrast deontology (the ethics of rights and obligations) with the
theology (ethics of ends), with a favorable result to the former, Kant being the first
reference point of deontological ethics. Kant was opposed to any conception of the
a policy that would sacrifice individuals for a higher purpose. For him, individuals do not
they were means rather than ends and, therefore, inviolable. Kantian liberals believe that the
individuals should be free to decide and pursue their own goals, without being
impose those of others.

Although deontologists have a plural idea of human ends, they are not relativists:
human behavior must have certain conditioning factors that must become
rights and duties, which are tied to individuals and cannot be annulled. The
individuals are free and autonomous beings but not to undermine the freedom and autonomy of
others. They can pursue different 'goods' but must always do so within a framework.
of 'rights' commonly accepted and respected everywhere, and where the law and
the good that enters into conflict must prevail first.

Liberals insist that collective social action must also respect rights.
individuals, among which, according to all deontological liberals, is a right
especially important to political freedoms. At the same time, liberals
they distinguish themselves from anarchists by accepting the need for some kind of
public organism that guarantees rights and puts them into practice. Even the liberals
who are more decisively in favor of the free market and recognize that such an organization
public -the State-, to perform its most essential functions, must submit to the
individuals to the laws that regulate their behavior and to claim them, through the
taxes, part of its resources. The role of the State is more controversial for the
deontological liberals, who indicate that they aim to satisfy both the right to
well-being as the right to free will. At this point, a multitude of problems arise:
What is it that the State really needs to do or has the right to do?
Should I only maintain law and order or intervene to distribute wealth?
Is there something that can be called the right to a minimum of well-being? If rights
The individual's rights against the State are inviolable, what exactly are those rights?

Those who defend universal human rights awaken something more than a
academic debate. They are addressing a world marked by the decline of projects
universalists like socialism or liberalism, national, religious, and
territorial, and the development among women and ethnic minorities of a political attitude
based on identity. In a world like this, there seem to be few foundations for a
agreement among various cultures. Evidently, the defenders of universal rights
They will insist that the current proliferation of conflicts between communities simply puts
the need for agreed criteria that serve to mediate between
ethnic or cultural claims in conflict. In fact, this is my own point of
view. However, there are important currents of normative theory whose proponents Page | 6
doubt that this universal strategic position is possible or desirable. Some feminists
they point out that, in reality, this universal strategic position is masculine, that is,
impersonal, abstract, rational, and public, in contrast with the empathetic, practical forms and
located where women prefer to confront human disputes. A
Next, we will focus on another approach that criticizes deontology and to which we
imprecisely termed communitarianism (Sandel, 1984).

Communitarianism
Communitarians start from a critique of the liberal concept of the individual 'I'. The I
Liberal, according to Sandel, "has no obstacles," is able to position itself in a privileged position.
outside the community of which it is a part and to define and redefine its purposes and
commitments without relying on inherited traditions or shared objectives. This has
endowed with rights and duties defined in a purely abstract and universal manner, which do not
they take into account the purposes and obligations that arise from our own ties
personal and social. Communitarians believe that the individualized 'I' of liberalism
is only dominant where community ties have corroded and individuals are
they are found alienated and adrift, although, even in this situation, communal life or the
tradition is a necessary benchmark for individual dissent. They consider that,
from a normative point of view, this individualism is not desirable and is a symptom of
that something is wrong. They prefer to talk about a "situated" self that is rooted in a
community and is defined in terms of two factors that shape it: the bonds themselves and the
shared interpretation one has of oneself. The specific rights and duties
that make up our 'moral particularity' come from our community, whether it is
a village, a subculture, a movement or an ethnic group. At the same time we
we necessarily find "involved in the purposes and aims" of our community
(Taylor, 1975).

A conception of rights and duties that depends on each community and another of the
purposes, understood as something shared by these communities, clashes head-on
with the defense that deontological liberalism makes of universal rights along with
specific ends determined by the individual. Communitarians are wary of the
the insistence of deontologists that law (universal principles of justice)
must constrain or limit the search for the common good. Liberals
deontologists claim that, since we cannot fully understand the purposes of others
individuals, any search by society for a superior social good will prevail over
the interpretation that individuals have of themselves that shapes them. On the other hand, Sandel
emphasizes that the shared life of a community can reduce this mutual
impenetrability, allowing certain interpretations of the self to arise among people
common and, with them, genuinely shared and not imposed objectives. From the point
from Sandel's perspective, liberals evaluate the good by allowing calculations to define it.
individuals who are guided by their own interest. In contrast, in a community
Is there a possibility for everyone to work together for the common good?
morally acceptable (Sandel, 1984).

Although communitarians are wary of liberalism that is based on rights, they have not
united in a common political alternative. Authors coming from a wide variety of Page | 7
ideological traditions have turned to communitarian viewpoints. Among them are
conservative Michael Oakeshott, who has been drawn to the communitarian defense of the
particularities and tradition against universalist rationalism, and of republicans
civic thinkers like Hannah Arendt and Michael Sandel, who sympathize with the perspective of a
participatory public life. Nowadays, communitarianism attracts a new group of
political thinkers who want to revive in the individual the sense of obligations for the
community, on the ashes of what they interpret as the failure of individualism
both of the new right and the new left.

Although communitarianism stems from a critique of liberalism, it is not invulnerable to


objection that it does not sufficiently safeguard individual freedom and that it serves no
protection against traditionalist or majority tyranny. Some currents of the
communitarian thought is close to the conservative idea of an organic community
in which there is an insistence on deadly submission sacrificing individual dissent. Others
currents envision the possibility of a participatory or democratic community but,
as defenders of liberties could point out, they leave the individual at the mercy of the
impositions of a will of the majority that is foreign to them. The idea of a democracy
consensual, which some radical communitarians propose as an alternative to the government of
most is completely unfeasible in a world where people are culturally
divided or in which scarcity and conflicts of interest cannot be eradicated.
Furthermore, wanting to define rules of 'unitary democracy' in a diverse community
threatens to marginalize the interests (often special) of those whose participation is
less effective (Mansbridge, 1980).

The communitarians who are more sympathetic to freedoms or who are more oriented towards the
democracy could respond that the participation or identification they envision
only occurs in some types of community and that a generalized dissociation of the
individuals regarding communal living, which is a symptom that a community has stopped
to exist. The problem for these communitarians does not lie in whether to suppress the
individual dissent - something that should not be done - but in how it can be created
community that everyone can feel a part of (without any dissent). Since
There are increasingly fewer cohesive societies, and it is difficult for them to...
establishing oneself in an unstable and interdependent world like the current one, this response from the
communicators undoubtedly leads them to pessimism or to a desolate utopianism. What is
most importantly, from the point of view of protecting freedoms, this argument
does not give any good reason to limit individual rights. Guaranteeing these rights
it can be considered necessary not only in the long period that must precede the satisfactory
restoration of community life, but in any type of community that, in
realistic terms, let's think about the future; especially if, judging by previous experiences
In communal living, authoritarianism falls within the realm of possibility.
In any case, communitarianism offers some judicious arguments that make us
aware of to what extent inherited traditions shape our way of
to reason in moral terms, so that, even to oppose such traditions,
we may have to use their terminology (for example, referring to the provisions
customary or constitutional measures that safeguard dissent). It reminds us that
we are born with moral obligations towards a community from which we can only renounce Page | 8
It costs to seem insensitive towards those with whom our ancestors contracted.
a moral debt (in this sense, Germans born after can be mentioned
1945 and the special responsibility they may have when it comes to opposing fascism or
racism). In addition, communitarianism teaches us that some of the moral obligations
that we contract also affect those closest to us, whether they are our family,
friends or the community, and that abstract moral language works better in public life
that in the informal realm and mutual affection of, for example, a group of friends, with
which is generally more appropriate to be guided by love or personal loyalty, with
paternalistic and protective spirit responding to a final knowledge, that following the
impersonal and neutral principles posited by deontologists. Finally, the ideal
community members of social solidarity face a true lack of our
atomized modern life and, probably, this ideal is shared by many
defenders of individual rights.

Main objections to normative theory


It is evident that the range of positions that have been revitalized or generated since the
The 1970s in political theory is very broad. The divisions within the discipline between
utilitarians, deontologists, communitarians and other currents (as well as those that occur
In each of these areas) they are sometimes profound. However, it would also be helpful
to address the ideas of those who question the very viability of the normative theory.
Next, we will focus on three general critical approaches to this theory: The
logical positivism, relativism, and determinism.

Logical positivism
Logical positivism is a school of analytical philosophy that is partly inspired by the
first writings of Wittgenstein, especially the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). The
Tractatus studies the logic of language, that is, what gives it meaning or makes it possible that
communicate the truth. Wittgenstein concludes that the elementary units that grant him
that power is the names because only they refer directly to the world that is
outside of language. The meaning of names is not mediated by others
language propositions but rather they constitute the objects of the outside. Conversely, only
the propositions that refer to external objects can be true. The only ones
exceptions are tautological propositions, which are true by definition, and the
contradictory statements that, by definition, are always false.

Wittgenstein himself did not specify the nature of the objects to which they refer.
true propositions but other logical positivists have insisted that these must
to be material objects or direct sensory experiences. If this is the case, the normative theory
has, as R. Plant points out, 'serious problems', because the parts that make it up -
words like freedoms and justice do not refer to material or perceptible objects
through the senses. Wittgenstein himself believed that the propositions of ethics, the
aesthetics like religion and metaphysics were 'nonsense' and argued that philosophy should
limit itself to factual and descriptive language of the natural sciences (from Wittgenstein, 1961).

To a large extent, this attitude laid the groundwork for the two schools to later
political studies that logical positivism sanctioned as capable of stating truths Page | 9
objectives about the world -behavioral political science and linguistic analysis of the
political concepts - will condemn 'metaphysics'. Both behaviorists and analysts
linguists strived to separate, based on facts or logically, the
true propositions of the values that, according to them, were the result of emotions,
the feelings and attitudes. His writings suggested that normative theory dealt with
of subjective values and that could never aspire to the intellectual or scientific position of the
experimental sciences.

How have normative theorists responded to these accusations? On one hand, they have
it is recognized that moral propositions are not facts or that they do not arise from
logically of these, but insisting that this does not seriously harm the
possibilities of a rigorous normative theory. First of all, the normative theory can
make use of the (facts) or, in any case, of the data and arguments that come from
the descriptive disciplines of social sciences. The nature of reality 'as it is
it
normative and has been cited, for example, in arguments related to universality or
specificity of human characteristics and needs.

Although normative theory cannot infer values from facts, it can reveal the
implicit logical relationships of a certain moral discourse. Considering that
a moral community rarely subjects its everyday language to rigorous scrutiny, the
normative theorists offer, in this sense, a special service, almost always according to
demanding criteria.

On the other hand, there has been a more ambitious response from normative theory, which
insists on the fact that the objective bases of moral truths can be demonstrated.
Alan Gewirth indicates that the right to freedom and well-being can, in strict logic,
to be deduced from certain generic requirements of human action (Gewirth, 1978). John Rawls
find a moral argument that, while not factual, is also not the product of values
particulars. He believes that he can find it by resorting to a procedural trick called
"original position", through which it tries to imagine the principles that, regarding the
justice, the founders would have chosen a new order that lacked a set
prior to their own natural gifts, social resources, position, etc.; people who
were forced to articulate principles neutral enough to be
acceptable by any possible member of the future society, and that they themselves could
be such members (Rawls, 1972).

In my opinion, it is doubtful that values can be derived, in strict logic, from the
facts, or that may be considered as such. Even if Gewirth could demonstrate that
there is a strictly logical link between the human right to freedom and well-being and
certain facts related to the requirements of human action, it would not be clear what it is
What this really demonstrates, since someone who does not accept Gewirth's methods
one could reject that rational coherence contains moral height or that it is also a
made the existence of such coherence between a moral proposition and a fact. From
same way, Rawls' original brilliant position that understands better, just as the
I would focus on Ronald Dworkin as a mechanism whose choice over others
possibilities reveal a prior moral concern for egalitarianism and respect for the Page | 10
humans. Factual argumentation is very important in normative theory but
this is not a variant of that.

Relativism
Moral relativists, who are the second group I would like to address, could
to argue that moral principles, if they cannot be derived from facts, are ultimately
instance, completely relative. And if so, if no viewpoint regarding the
values can be considered better than another, normative theory, as such, makes no sense.
If moral budgets are so questioned and, at the same time, are the subject
more opinionated than facts, how can they be judged?

Communitarians respond that particular moralities can still have a role.


there where the transcendent ones have been renounced; that is, certain things still
they can be morally correct within a community and its own games of
language, although they are not considered, in general terms, correct or incorrect. In order that
If pure relativism were to exist, it would require that individuals be islands, but in itself
the nature of language is that we are not and that moral and other types of content are
they constitute according to the relationship established between the subjects. Morality still has, for
its own weight, a place in the world and, of course, it has it for normative theorists
that are used to explain in a coherent and deep way what it involves in terms
morals that a community has its own cultural language.

This answer is not entirely valid because the moral arguments of the current world do not
take place in hermetically sealed language games. Language games
they find out when countries go to war, when they exchange military aid or
economic, when they trade or pay debts, when they are part of them
organizations or sign the same treaties. Even if there is no moral community that
It can be classified as global is clear, however, moral languages overlap, they
they cross, mix, commit to each other, and move when they suffer injuries
externals.

A communitarian could point out that by increasing, with this fluid interaction, the possibility
the collision between games of moral language is even more urgent to respect in it
measure to each of them to avoid conflicts or impositions. However, this
reasoning is only plausible up to a certain point since, in some situations, it can
legitimize oppression within a certain moral community or abolish all
criteria for conflict resolution and among them, thus thwarting the objectives of the
community pluralism. The mere act of praising moral or cultural differences does not
It will be very useful if the language game of another community justifies the conquest of
our territory, for a foreign power to sentence one of our
citizens or that their pollution falls as acid rain on our forests and
crops. At least one could say that there is a reason for moral communities
that share spaces or resources clarify what the reasonable common criteria are that
they can be used when mediating between opposing positions.

In any case, what is a moral community? It is difficult to consider that it is, because Page | 11
example, a nation-state, if most of the entities that have this category host
probably different moral perceptions. There may be groups or individuals
dissidents of a nation-state who feel oppressed by their own rulers and who
they turn to other nation-states for help. Individuals can group themselves according to
collective loyalties that cross national borders. In this sense, it also becomes
difficult to consider that an ethnic group and a gender are moral communities in the sense
strict. Perhaps it can only be done by a truly voluntary association, composed.
by adults who choose freely, but even this moral community would participate in a
broader moral universe when interacting with other people outside the association.

The most forceful rebuttal of normative theory to relativism is that there are certain
basic precepts recognized as morally correct, at least by some people,
in practically all areas of the moral community. That torture is wrong
it is not a 'fact' but for it to be recognized as such represents a great progress wherever
someone is being tortured unless those people unequivocally agree to such
practical. In other words, there are moral language games that are above the
communities that, therefore, are also universal. What is stated here is not that it
I can say that a certain precept has always been present in all the
societies, nor that all generally accepted precepts are just.
Simply put, what is intended to be expressed is that the cultural relativity of a moral language
it does not serve, by itself, to convincingly defend a suit in a world where
we talk to each other about morality, and even less if we say that we subscribe
certain common moral values. If moral discourse crosses borders
cultural arguments, as it doesn’t make much sense to oppose a universal moral theory based on
the multiplicity of language games.

Determinism
The last argument against normative theory comes from determinism. There are theories that
they seem to deny, at least from a certain reading, that human beings exercise the
the power of action that is a prerequisite for moral choice. It makes no sense to judge
a censurable action if the person who carried it out had no alternative. In general, it is considered
that one who is forced at gunpoint to kill another is not as guilty as the one who
plan a murder with premeditation and treachery. Are there circumstances in which everyone
we are deprived of the ability to decide in a morally relevant way or in which
our choices are in any case more limited than what normative theorists
do they suppose?

Various kinds of determinism can be distinguished. Some consider that the individual
the agent is conditioned or, at least, very constrained and pressured by external forces
that cannot be controlled. Individuals may be subjected to hidden structures or be
object of historical processes that develop with their own and impersonal logic. In
In general, the forces or relationships related to economic life are attributed to
a more or less decisive role, both in Marxist and liberal currents; others
determinists can emphasize national traditions or conditioning of a certain type
ecological; even others point to supernatural forces. There is a second type of
determinism that argues we are conditioned by forces that are within Page | 12
us and that escape our control, such as the subconscious or genetic inheritance.
One could even say that there is no more consciousness than that of brain processes and that,
therefore, there is also no center of moral dominance that is not the same susceptible to
to explain oneself based on a specific conjunction of pre-programmed neurons.
Therefore, in what sense are we free to make moral decisions? Is there a
which 'we' should really choose?

Determinism has several elements that we cannot address here.


We will address only two of the questions it raises. The first is whether the determinist
it is amoral. A determinism-inclined Marxist may still consider that capitalism
it is unfair and socialism is just, a convinced Freudian of the power of the subconscious
it can still be seen as desirable for a patient to be shown the way towards a greater
mental health. In these two senses, both may make normative judgments; in fact,
they may have started their investigation to solve a moral 'problem' or
normative, such as the existence of capitalism or neurosis. In addition, the judgments of
Value often hides behind it, or seeks to justify itself in assertions.
ostensibly neutral that deal with the inevitable causal relationships between
phenomena such as, for example, human nature and greed. Of course, the
the presence of budgets related to the values in an academic work does not demonstrate that
the conclusions of this may be wrong but, despite everything, we should be attentive to those
values, as they provide us with greater knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of a
intellectual project and what it implies in general terms.

The second question is whether moral reasoning, as an activity


Intellectuals determine personal or historical outcomes. This is really the question.
crucial for the future of normative theory. There may be forces that constrain us.
But, despite them, do we have the capacity to choose in important matters? When
We choose on these matters, do the considerations about whether the actions influence us?
Are they correct or incorrect? On the contrary, can one influence, reasoning this way?
way, in those that define the regulations governing the sanctions and incentives that
Do they affect our behavior? If the answer to these questions is 'yes', then the theory
regulation has a "function".

Two tentative assertions can be made in favor of the normative theory.


First, it would be very difficult to prove that we never have to decide on issues.
important or morally relevant; even the one they are pointing a gun at, before
mentioned, has a certain choice (between killing or letting them kill him) and many
circumstances in life where the range of possible choices is much greater than
in this scenario. Some of those belonging to supposedly deterministic currents
(like Marxism) they would readily accept the existence of a space for action.
human in contexts of structural conditioning that could be understood in various ways
ways.

If we really choose in significant matters, it at least seems plausible that the


moral language can influence elections. Moral discourse is a part of our
cultural media, a part of the way cultures communicate and Page | 13
to reproduce. Of course, we find various manifestations of moral language and the
what is presented to us in an explicit form in theoretical terms is only one of them. In
In any case, the strict moral expression is important, especially among some.
of the elites that create opinion, such as educators, legal theorists or the
political thinkers, and it has a lot of influence in legalist cultures or in those that value the
erudition. Where participants in a conversation doubt themselves, they are not
insurance of something or they are not interested in a certain issue, moral theory can help them clarify their.
ideas, expressing the feelings that it is difficult for them to expose or convincing them not to
modify what is not in accordance with the rest of your beliefs.

In this section, the normative theory of the attacks of positivism has been defended.
relativism and determinism, but now we can give it a more positive character.
summary of the implicit arguments in that defense. The normative theory offers a method
to address human moral options from logical rigor and objectivity, in those
areas where human beings face such choices or, better said, where it exerts in
something we can call freedom of moral action. The areas of moral choice
they can sometimes be considerable and within their limits moral theory can be
determinant. Of course, there is no guarantee that this influence will be positive or
that the approaches produced by normative theory are "good" (in any case,
there will be many). However, subscribing to normative theory is based on the hope that the
moral actors who discuss their options openly and with self-awareness
generally do fewer things that most of us consider negative
that those who behave thoughtfully or suppress moral debate.

The applied normative theory: justice and freedoms


Justice or the distribution of goods is one of the important areas in which it is applied.
normative theory. Normativists have fully engaged and undoubtedly have influenced this
controversy, which has been one of the most persistent and fierce in political life
Western after the 1930s and the debate on the extent to which the State should intervene.
when structuring or establishing a model for the distribution of goods in society.
It is a heated debate about a background in which, at the beginning, the 'State of
"well-being" is developed and, since the mid-70s, has been entering into a crisis of legitimacy.
how economically.

One of the contenders in this controversy can be called, rather roughly,


A social democrat is one who indicates or presupposes that there are moral reasons for
The state participated in some way in the provision of social services or in the
redistribution of goods. What such actions imply is a forced transfer of
resources from some citizens to others, how can they be justified in societies that
Do they proclaim both respect for the autonomy of individuals and for freedoms? There is
several possible answers to this question.

The welfare state can be defended based on the utilitarian idea that it guarantees more.
happiness for a greater number of people; for example, because those who have
Few goods achieve greater utility when they attain at least some or because of this. Page | 14
type of economy increases general well-being through the rise in demand
added (Plant, 1993). The deontological objection to such arguments is based on that
they subordinate individual rights to a single concept of well-being, leaving this, to the
same time, in an unstable equilibrium. So, what strategies do they have at their disposal?
liberal social democrats deontologists?

The strategy that made John Rawls famous is that of 'the original position'. As it has been
As previously mentioned, Rawls asks us to imagine the founders of a state who
they have no prior understanding of their own abilities or their possibilities or
social position in the new order. Based on this "veil of ignorance" they must choose the
principles of justice that will govern the initial distribution of social goods such as the
well-being or liberties. Rawls believes they would choose two principles: a first principle of
equality regarding freedoms, which enjoys a special priority, and a second principle
so that only those inequalities in the distribution of goods are allowed that
benefit the most disadvantaged. Although the chosen principles are inviolable.
they allow for a plurality of purposes in the distribution of all goods, except
of the primary ones. In addition, they are theoretically compatible with a wide range of systems
socioeconomic, from capitalism to democratic socialism (Rawls, 1972).

There is a second deontological strategy that authorizes intervention in the market in


virtue of a foundational principle that is categorical and does not need justification. This is
the approach of Ronald Dworking, for whom the basic principle in question is the
existence of a concern and equal respect for human beings (Dworking, 1977).
Dworking asks what it means for a government to treat all its citizens in a manner
equitable. It points (using American terminology) conservatives and liberals
they will propose different answers and, later, try to explain the liberal one. He thinks that a
government of this sign would take all the ends and preferences of its citizens
likewise seriously but I couldn't do it by distributing the goods in a way
centralized according to a uniform criterion, which should allow the operation of
market. However, preferences are not the only thing that is different, so are the
the abilities of individuals, the level of inherited wealth, and specific needs.
In a free market, all these differences would translate into inequalities that the liberals do not
they can defend. Therefore, the liberal will pursue a market reform and,
probably, it will resort to a mixed economic system, "either capitalism
redistributive or limited socialism" (Dworking, 1984).

The services of the State can also be justified by a third reason that would proceed.
from a theory of basic and universal human needs. Evidently, the
The problem in this case is that there is hardly any agreement (let's say between the different cultures).
about what could be called the 'primary goods' of the human being. It has already been mentioned
previously Gewirth's response. Whatever the variety of ends that beings
Humans can choose, but they will always have to meet certain requirements - the generic ones of the
voluntary and deliberate action - before they can even begin to act like
moral agents. Among these requirements are both the right to freedom and the right to ...
well-being, which has a universal character. However, the right to well-being cannot
satisfying oneself endlessly without infringing on the right to freedom. Like Dworking,
Gewirth is more in favor of a state that helps improve than of the free market or Page | 15
of complete egalitarianism.

The third approach is communitarian. Michael Walzer points out that the proper criteria
distributive vary not only according to cultures and communities but also according to different
"spheres of justice," such as security or welfare, money and goods, the
work, working a lot, free time, education, love, and divine grace. Defend
a complex equality aimed at ensuring that the most prominent distributive criteria
of a certain sphere do not collide with others where appropriate criteria apply
different. In a market society, this may mean that everything is done possible to ensure that
those who legitimately possess a certain amount of money do not use it for,
example, buying from people, positions, honors, or exemptions from military service; in a way
that money from goods should not be allowed to be used
to buy. In the spheres of security and well-being there should be a better system
less broad community service that responds to the needs and of its
members but, since there are various definitions of need and of essential goods, not
there can be no universal individual right to the ownership of any set of goods
that exceeds the right to life and mere subsistence. Beyond these rights the
pertinent redistribution policies will proceed from a common agreement in the community and
of the changing political decisions (Walzer, 1985).

All these positions admit that redistribution can be morally illegitimate. It is


precisely this conclusion is what liberals consider a curtailment of freedoms
fundamentals and, ultimately, a license to exercise totalitarianism. The
Libertarians can be left or right, but they are the ones who support the market.
free, those who have had the most influence when it comes to questioning social democratic ideas or
of well-being. The range of free market libertarians extends from the
completely anarchists, opposed to all forms of state authority, even those who
they justify the existence of a minimal State. Next, we will address the
libertarian objections to a specific aspect of the role of the State: its intervention to
offer social services and redistribute wealth.

Why do libertarians consider such intervention a threat to rights and


the essential freedoms? In this sense, it would be useful to make a minimal distinction, known
by Berlin's argumentation, between "negative" liberty, defined by the absence of
coercive conditions on action, and 'positive' freedom, defined as the power of
to achieve the desired ends or control over oneself. Berlin believes that only the former is
true freedom. The policies that make it possible for individuals to achieve their
fines can be justifiable even if they involve coercion over others - that would be the
case of helping the poor through taxes-, but it should not be considered that
these policies increase freedom (Berlin, 1984).
Free market libertarians agree on a definition of freedoms.
completely negative. They are extremely reluctant to accept that one can renounce
part of these freedoms in exchange for another social good. By definition, the intervention
The state's coercive action for social purposes decreases the negative freedoms of the individual and
this is morally unjustifiable and harmful to social well-being.
Page | 16
F.A. von Hayek, for example, presents this argument. He believes that social freedom and the
Economic progress can only be based on the individual who decides for themselves.
Individuals should have equal access to negative liberties, which should be
guaranteed by impersonal laws and regulations that allowed them to pursue
its own legally designated purposes. The distribution by the State of the income or of the
Wealth not only undermines freedoms but also equality and implies that the State should set
distribution norms (based, for example, on need or merit) that discriminate
to favor some individuals over others. These rules cannot be conceived with criteria
indisputable and their effects are inevitably arbitrary.

The distribution of goods by the State cannot be justified by necessity either.


to correct social injustice. To point out that a certain distribution of goods is
unjust implies that this constitutes a deliberately sought outcome that must be
Correction. Injustice can only be the result of the bad intentions of certain individuals.
individuals and in a free market society, distribution is the result not
intended from countless voluntary transactions. Therefore, it is not legitimate
to demand that no group corrects them.

Hayek also asserts that the economic and social intervention of the State produces failures.
Rejects the assumption that complex human societies can be planned.
rationally and indicates that this argument fails to account for the limits of the
human knowledge. Institutions that arose spontaneously as a result of the
unintended effects of voluntary transactions and among a considerable number of
people have, she claims, more chances of success than those who have been conceived to
purpose by a supposedly omniscient entity. For Hayek, market policies
liberal not only are more just but also harm social welfare less, including that of
the poor (Hayek, 1960).

Robert Nozick develops his own libertarian discourse. He does not share the arguments.
anarchists against the State but favors having one of minuscule size
that is limited to maintaining law and order. Rejects any other type of intervention,
arguing that these are to the detriment of individual autonomy as conceived.
Kant then, instead of treating individuals as an end in themselves, uses some.
from them without their consent to achieve a supposedly noble purpose, such as
a certain distribution of goods. Nozick develops a special theory of the
possession of property that qualifies as historical. It states that if a person's assets
they have reached their hands fairly through acquisition or transfer, no
the government can, in justice, transfer part of these assets to another person without the
consent of the first. To seek, at a certain moment, for there to be a
The 'designed' distribution of assets infringes on inherited property titles.
historically.
Of course, all of this leads us to question how the titles are originally obtained.
of property. Nozick, in this sense, uses an argument taken from Locke: we obtain
property titles by combining in our own work -that belongs to us- with others
resources that do not belong to us. This initial acquisition is fair, as long as it does not worsen
the situation of others at that moment. Every inequality that arises from the later Page | 17
the use of the exchange of goods will be fair to the extent that appropriation is fair
initial of the resources.

There is no room here to discuss the merits of these libertarian and social arguments.
Democrats. However, in conclusion, we can say that none of them has
has stopped being disputed and that everyone raises many problems, which, in my opinion,
the sharpest are the ones that raise libertarian arguments. Hayek exaggerates when considering
that certain distributions of goods have unforeseen results; it could very well be
that unequal results are a foreseeable consequence of a certain kind of system of
exchange and that the participants in such exchanges are aware of the
external consequences of its private transactions. Undoubtedly, Nozick cannot
demonstrate why the 'conjunction of works' has a moral weight, nor why
all voluntary exchanges of properly acquired properties are fair, although
are structurally unequal. The argument that free markets benefit more
the poor have moral weight but it is of a utilitarian nature and still precise of a
historical verification.

The arguments about the right to property can be problematic in themselves.


but I believe that social democrats (and the left) show that there are reasons
morally consistent for redistribution. Those who accept the Dworkin premise
that all human beings deserve to be treated with equal concern and respect, don't they?
The unequal outcomes of the structures can be considered morally neutral.
economic (like the market), which come from history and convention more than from
a natural or completely spontaneous human activity. Authors like Gewirth
they demonstrate something undeniable: that in order to be an agent that chooses freely, one must enjoy
of freedoms and well-being. It can be said even more that, to actively participate in
Politics, in this way, deciding about oneself collectively, may be necessary.
to have equal access, albeit roughly defined, to politically resources
significant. A substantive equality (although Tosca) can be a requirement for a
egalitarian political activity.

Evaluation of normative theory


The major dilemmas faced by normative theory can be summarized in various ways.
forms. I will limit myself to pointing out what I consider to be its two main issues. The first
if the normative theory is really possible. Some arguments have been presented
against -positivists, relativists, determinists- and it has been pointed out that none of them present their
conclusive reasons. In response to the critical statements that I have pointed out that the
normative theory can provide a rigorous and qualified method to address the
options that the human being has in those spheres of life in which they can exercise a
free moral action.
The second important issue relates to the discipline itself. What decisions regarding
human goods should be left in the private hands of individuals or in the
collectives of political communities, so that some or others decide based on their
Preferences? And which should be conditional or guided by principles?
fundamentals? Page | 18

It is pointless to divide participants in normative political debates into


relativists, on one hand, and those who claim to have found moral principles
objectives for another. Both utilitarians and deontologists and communitarians
they look for fixed reference points and all would allow certain important issues to
they would decide individually, democratically, or communally.

Classical utilitarians find their reference points in the assumption that there exists
a rational individual who maximizes utility, in the scientistic hope that it can be
It is possible to measure and compare preferences empirically, and on the same principle of utility.
However, regarding the actual content of utility, they are somewhat relativists.
Benthamites, at least, are also relativists in that they do not subject free
individual's choice of imprecise natural rights. Deontologists start
from various points of reference -God, human nature, and social contracts- and of
the existence of fundamental principles relating to good and justice applicable to
any historical period. On the other hand, they are in favor of the same individual
decide on the purposes, considering that the principles of good and justice are, in part, the
basis for this election to take place freely. Finally, the communitarians
they link the moral obligation to the community, avoiding individualistic relativism of the
two other sides; at the same time, they accept relativism concerning communities,
denying the existence of a universally and morally privileged position occupied
for a "me without barriers".

In my opinion, the three strands offer relevant arguments. The same utilitarianism
Benthamism seems, in general, false; however, it results in perverse ideas about value.
moral of human behavior can be established without referring to the benefits or
the damages it causes and it is questionable that even a seasoned deontologist could wish for this
be like this. The morally relevant damages and benefits in question may be those that
they stem from respect for certain laws and not from individual actions; in the long term,
they can accumulate in individuals in a way that is difficult to specify in terms
strictly practical. The deontologists who advocate for the recognition of the
rights, or something prior to them, such as a mutual concern and respect for all
Human beings must take into account that violating such rights and precepts will be harmful.
If respect for such rights has brought nothing but historical misfortunes.
Constatables, even deontologists would think twice before defending them.

However, the same deontological tradition produces arguments that no utilitarian,


consequentialist or proportionalist can quietly be set aside. It's fine to talk
of damages and benefits but can these be measured in such a way that when the sum of
Can the benefits outweigh the drawbacks for a particular action to be considered correct?
Once again, intuition tells us that it seems sensible to take the consequences into account but
What kind of consequences are acceptable? If a policy benefits many but
Does it have to be morally acceptable if it intolerably harms a few?
In this case, only a hardened utilitarian would say that it is.

For deontology, every just result must comply with certain criteria. It appeals to the
conviction that individuals cannot be treated unjustly, as means to Page | 19
to achieve an end, or to be deprived of freedoms and well-being. The measurement of harm or of
the benefit of public policies will not automatically conform to this belief, nor
at least where the preference of each agent is taken into account. Curiously, the
deontology can reveal in which cases the approximate calculations of cost and benefit
acceptable results: perhaps there where fundamental rights are not at stake or
where they come into conflict. Deontology, often based on assumptions
"foundational" about human nature and need, also accepts the best
the existence of some rights that our immediate subjective preferences do not reveal and
that protecting them is a requirement to pursue our ends, whether these are imposed or chosen
democratically.

The main problem with communitarianism is that it is reluctant to admit that it can be
appeal to individual rights to combat the morality of the community, or to
recognize that the moralities of the various communities converge in a moral village
global. Although it accepts a plurality of moral communities, it lacks a principle for
the individual rights on which to base a normative commitment to the
plurality within (all) moral communities. However, of the three traditions,
communitarianism is the only one that reminds us that important areas of decision-making
decisions do not have a public character to which abstract rules can be easily applied and
that, in the same public life, both the collective and democratic decision as well
participation actually determines many of the things we have the right to do or to
those that we are required to.

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