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Action Knowledge and Will 1st Edition John Hyman
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Author(s): John Hyman
ISBN(s): 9780198735779, 0198735774
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Year: 2015
Language: english
 Action, Knowledge, and Will
John Hyman
ABSTRACT
Human agency has four irreducibly different dimensions—psychological, ethical, intellectual, and
physical—which the traditional idea of a will tended to conflate. Examining them separately yields several
significant results. First, the mark of human agency in general, like that of every kind of agent with
functionally differentiated parts, is functional integration, not intention. Second, voluntariness is an
ethical concept, unlike either intention or agency as such, and it is defined in negative not positive causal
terms: an act is voluntary if it is not due to ignorance or compulsion, the connection between these factors
being that both are normally exculpations. Third, acting intentionally cannot be defined as acting for a
reason because intentional action is a manifestation of desire whereas action done for reasons is a
manifestation of knowledge or belief. Furthermore, explanations that simply give agents’ reasons, e.g. ‘He
took the left fork because it was the road to Larissa’, differ significantly from ones that refer to belief, e.g.
‘He took the left fork because he believed it was the road to Larissa’. For the first explanation mentions a
fact about the traveller’s situation he knew and took into consideration, whereas the second merely
mentions his state of mind. Drawing this distinction between these different kinds of explanations leads
to a new theory of knowledge as an ability that is exercised in rational thought and behaviour, and thereby
a new solution to the puzzle in the Meno about whether knowledge is a better guide to action than true
belief.
Keywords: action, will, intention, voluntariness, desire, reason, knowledge, belief
BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
Print publication date: 2015 Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

Contents
Dedication
Preface
Epigraph
1 Agency and the Will
2 Action and Integration
3 Acts and Events
4 Voluntariness and Choice
5 Desire and Intention
6 Reason and Knowledge
7 Knowledge as an Ability
8 The Road to Larissa
Appendix: The Modern Theory of the Will
End Matter
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
Title Pages

University Press Scholarship Online

Oxford Scholarship Online

Action, Knowledge, and Will

John Hyman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

Title Pages
Action, Knowledge, and Will Action, Knowledge, and Will

(p.iv)

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Dedication

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Action, Knowledge, and Will

John Hyman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
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DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

Dedication
(p.v) For George

Page 1 of 1
(p.viii)

(p.ix)
Preface

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Action, Knowledge, and Will

John Hyman

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Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

(p.viii) (p.ix) Preface

The main ideas I shall defend in this book can be summarized quite briefly.

First, human agency has several distinct dimensions, some of which it has in common with the
agency of other animals, or other agents more generally, others of which it does not. For we can
think about human agency in physical, psychological, intellectual, and ethical terms. And we
cannot hope to understand it philosophically unless we understand how these different
dimensions of agency are defined, and how they are related.

If we survey the philosophy of action in the modern period, bearing this in mind, it is bound to
seem painfully inadequate. Modern philosophy developed a remarkably simplistic theory of
action, which eventually enabled philosophers to equate action in general, human action,
voluntary action, intentional action, and action done for reasons. It was less an intellectual
revolution than an earthquake, and it levelled a complex conceptual structure that enables us to
think and reason effectively about the different dimensions of human agency. One aim of the
book is to criticize this relentlessly simplifying philosophy and reconstruct the edifice,
separating the storeys that were sandwiched together in the collapse.

Second, understanding the intellectual dimension of human agency involves thinking about the
relationship between knowledge and rational behaviour in a substantially new way, and this
offers the prospect of a new conception of knowledge itself. Many philosophers still think of
knowledge as what Ryle sardonically called an élite suburb of belief, true belief with a special
accreditation or guarantee. But unlike belief, knowledge is an ability, so if we want to
understand what knowledge is, and why we value it, we need to ask what it is an ability to do,
instead of asking how it can be certified or acquired. We need to think prospectively not
retrospectively, about how knowledge is applied, employed, expressed, in the infinitely varied
circumstances of human life. In the last three chapters, I shall make a case for reorienting the
theory of knowledge in this way.

Page 1 of 3
(p.viii)

(p.ix)
Preface

(p.x) Combining these two tasks means in effect realigning the philosophy of action and the
theory of knowledge, and reforming received ideas about some of the main structural features of
our thought about human action—in particular, about the relationships between voluntary
agency, intentional agency, rational agency, and agency as such; about the explanation of
intentional action; and about the distinction between activity and passivity in human life. But I
do not want to exaggerate how radically I am departing from tradition. Philosophy does
sometimes seem incapable of making gradual progress, so that only the most violent attack, with
its own kind of excess, can overcome the vested interests of the ancien régime, and achieve deep
and lasting change. But this is a pity, because philosophical theories are more often
exaggerations or simplifications than intellectually worthless ‘houses of cards’.

So it is, I believe, with the theories of human action that emerged in the third quarter of the
twentieth century, when first Wittgenstein and Anscombe and then Davidson held sway. Their
ideas are still dominant, but we have gained sufficient distance from them in recent years to
reassess the whole subject, freed by their efforts from the errors they criticized, but also free
from the intellectual trap of discipleship.

The philosophy of action takes up most of the book because the range of concepts it involves is
large and complex, and the dominant ideas about them are deeply rooted in early modern
philosophy. My aim in this part of the book is analytical rather than historical, as it is
throughout, but I have included a certain amount of historical material because even the ideas
that philosophers imagine they spin out of themselves like spiders have long and complicated
histories, and we cannot hope to understand them, or assess them properly, or improve on them,
unless we know about their past. Philosophy is not a formal discipline: logical acumen is not
enough.

My approach is therefore partly historical, but my aim is to contribute to the development of the
philosophy of action, in two main ways: first, by encouraging an approach to the study of human
agency that emphasizes the distinctions between its physical, ethical, psychological, and
intellectual dimensions; and second by bringing the most general questions in the theory of
knowledge within its compass—what knowledge is and why it is of value; why, as Julian ‘the
Apostate’ put it, the serpent was a benefactor rather than a destroyer of the human race.

My plan for this book was always to combine epistemology and the philosophy of action, and I
always intended to keep the text close to 100,000 words, (p.xi) in the hope that it might be read
as a continuous argument, and not just cited or searched. I therefore knew that I would be
unable to discuss some important topics in the philosophy of action, and so it has turned out.
There is nothing here, or next to nothing, about the social dimension of human action; about
deliberating, deciding, and intending; about trying and attempting; about strength, weakness,
and freedom of the will; or about processes and events. And there is nothing about so-called
mental acts in general, as opposed to acts of will in particular. Consequently, several interesting
and influential studies in the philosophy of action do not receive the attention they would
require in a more comprehensive work. But like every author, I hope my work will be judged
mainly by what I have written, rather than what I have left out.

I should like to record my thanks to the many friends and colleagues who kindly read and
commented on drafts of chapters, especially Maria Alvarez, Alexander Bird, Lesley Brown,

Page 2 of 3
(p.viii)

(p.ix)
Preface

Jonathan Dancy, Antony Duff, Víctor Durà-Vilà, James Grant, David Hillel-Ruben, Jennifer
Hornsby, Erasmus Mayr, Yuuki Ohta, Christopher Pulman, Joseph Raz, Natalia Waights-
Hickman, and the anonymous authors of some very astute reports commissioned by OUP. I am
doubly indebted to Sir Anthony Kenny, who read several chapters of the book in draft, and
whose own writings on these topics have had a profound influence on my work. (The title of this
book is a tribute to his Action, Emotion and Will.) Peter Momtchiloff, Emily Brand, and Sarah
Dancy have guided and advised me and edited my work with great skill and patience. I am very
glad to be able to thank them here as well.

Much of the work on the book was done during my tenure of a Leverhulme Major Research
Fellowship, in 2010–12. I am very grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for the award, and to the
Governing Body of The Queen’s College and the Faculty of Philosophy in the University of
Oxford for permitting me to take leave of absence during these two years.

John Hyman

London, June 2014

Page 3 of 3
Epigraph

University Press Scholarship Online

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Action, Knowledge, and Will

John Hyman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

Epigraph
(p.xii) (p.xiii)

And the Lord went before them by day in a pillar of a cloud, to lead

them the way; and by night in a pillar of fire, to give them light …

Exodus, 13.21

Page 1 of 1
Agency and the Will

University Press Scholarship Online

Oxford Scholarship Online

Action, Knowledge, and Will

John Hyman

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780198735779
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2015
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.001.0001

Agency and the Will

John Hyman

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735779.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords

Human action has four irreducibly different dimensions, which we think about by means of four
tightly knit families of concepts: a physical dimension, in which the principal concepts are those
of agent, power, and causation; an ethical dimension, in which they are voluntariness and
choice; a psychological dimension, with the concepts of desire, aim, and intention; and an
intellectual dimension, with the concepts of reason, knowledge, and belief. Together with the
Appendix, this introductory chapter reviews the history of the modern theory of the will from
Descartes to Mill, the early dissent from it in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s attack on it, and its incomplete demise. The distinction between
agency and voluntariness is explained, and the consequences of ignoring or denying the
distinction are explored.

Keywords: will, agency, voluntariness, volition, Wittgenstein, Ryle

1.1 Introduction
This chapter, which is in effect a prolegomenon to the main business, is about the modern
theory of the will and its incomplete demise. By the modern theory of the will I mean a theory of
human action that held sway in philosophy, in several variants, from Descartes in the
seventeenth century to Mill in the nineteenth century. It could also be called the empiricist
theory of the will, except that Descartes is one of its main sources. The Appendix contains a brief
historical digest of the theory and the early dissent from it by Bain, James, and Russell.

The philosophers who defended one variant or another of the modern theory uniformly regarded
the will as the source of all voluntary or intentional action, and generally also as the source of

Page 1 of 20
Agency and the Will

human action in general, so that an act cannot be attributed to the agency of an individual at all
unless it originates in her will. And since it was widely regarded as axiomatic that only voluntary
action can merit praise or blame, or be justly punished, these were also thought to be dependent
on the will.* Considered in itself, independently of its causes or effects, an act was held to
consist in either motion or thought, for example, the motion of your legs when you walk, or your
lips when you speak, or the thoughts that occur in your mind when you do mental arithmetic or
recite a sonnet in your head. As for the cause of the act, it was thought to be a kind of conscious
choosing or willing, usually called a (p.2) ‘volition’ or ‘intention’, not merely a wish or desire or
appetite or aversion, but a sui generis act or operation of the will.

Why did philosophers postulate a sui generis act of the will? The reason is simple. The mere fact
that I feel hungry clearly isn’t sufficient to make me eat, because when I feel hungry, I can still
choose not to eat. And feeling hungry isn’t necessary to make me eat either, because I can
decide to eat despite not feeling hungry at all, perhaps because I am ill and have lost appetite.
So, it was thought, for me to eat, or at least for my eating to be my own act, and not forced on
me, there needs to be a mental act, a choice or decision, which causes my eating. And this is the
‘volition’ or ‘act of will’.1

When I say that the modern theory held sway from the time of Descartes to that of Mill, I do not
mean to imply that it is now defunct. But in the second half of the nineteenth century,
philosophers influenced by the emerging science of experimental psychology began to explain
voluntary action without postulating sui generis acts of will, as in fact Hobbes had done, writing
at the same time as Descartes: first Bain, later James in The Principles of Psychology, and then
Russell, who followed James closely. Then, in the middle of the twentieth century, the modern
theory came under fierce attack, not merely on the grounds that postulating volitions is
unnecessary, as James and Russell claimed, but on the more radical grounds that the very idea
that a voluntary act is a bodily movement with a mental cause is misconceived. Wittgenstein
argued in these terms in his Brown Book and Philosophical Investigations, drawing on broadly
Kantian ideas which he had learned from Schopenhauer, and Ryle did so in The Concept of
Mind, drawing on ideas that would have been familiar to philosophers in the empiricist tradition,
but deploying them with unprecedented destructive energy and panache.

Ryle describes a volition as the means by which a mind gets its ideas translated into facts:

I think of some state of affairs which I wish to come into existence in the physical world,
but, as my thinking and wishing are unexecutive, they require the mediation of a further
executive mental process. So I perform a volition which somehow puts my muscles into
action. Only when a bodily movement has issued from such a volition can I merit praise or
blame for what my hand or tongue has done.2

In one of the most brilliant passages in The Concept of Mind, Ryle argues that the ‘doctrine of
volitions’ is a myth, ‘a causal hypothesis, adopted because it (p.3) was wrongly supposed that
the question, “What makes a bodily movement voluntary?” was a causal question.’3 Wittgenstein
agrees: ‘There is a difference’, he writes, ‘between the voluntary act of getting out of bed and
the involuntary rising of my arm. But there is not one common difference between so-called
voluntary acts and involuntary ones, viz, the presence or absence of one element, the “act of

Page 2 of 20
Agency and the Will

volition”.’4 A voluntary movement, Wittgenstein suggests with enviable insouciance, may simply
be one by which the agent is not surprised.

In the decades that followed, some philosophers criticized the idea that the will is the source of
individual human agency in general (e.g. Frankfurt), and others criticized the idea that any act
consists in the observable motion we associate with it, such as the motion of a limb (e.g.
Hornsby), or in any kind of motion or event at all (e.g. von Wright). For some, the attack by
Wittgenstein and Ryle proved that teleological explanations of voluntary or intentional human
acts cannot be reduced to explanations in terms of mental causes (e.g. Anscombe). Some argued
on the contrary that the idea of a volition or act of will should be discarded, but not the idea that
intentional action consists in motion of the agent’s body with a particular kind of mental cause
(e.g. Davidson). And others defended a purified conception of the will as the capacity or ability to
act intentionally or for reasons (e.g. Kenny and Raz), without postulating any specific kind of
mental event as the cause of action of these kinds. Davidson’s position is the dominant one
today, but it is widely and increasingly contested.

My overall view about the attack on the modern theory of the will in the twentieth century is
that it did not go far enough. The elements of the theory singled out for criticism were indeed
erroneous or confused. But the critics did not pay sufficient attention to the fact that it was a
theory of several quite different things at once: voluntary action, intentional action, action as
such—to which we must now add action done for reasons. Whatever details of the modern
theory we criticize or reject, the very idea of a will is a standing invitation to participate in this
confusion, and we do not gain much by dismissing ‘mysterious acts of the will’ if, at the same
time, we equate voluntary action and intentional action, claim that being intentional (in some
respect or ‘under some description’) is the ‘mark of agency’, and define intentional action as
action that is done for reasons.5

As I see it, we think of human action in four different dimensions, by means of four tightly knit
families of concepts, although of course the relationships between these concepts are not
confined to the family to (p.4) which they principally belong. In the order in which I shall
discuss them in this book, human action has a physical dimension, in which the principal
concepts are those of agent, power, and causation; an ethical dimension, with the concepts of
voluntariness and choice; a psychological dimension, with the concepts of desire, aim, and
intention; and an intellectual dimension, with the concepts of reason, knowledge, and belief. The
whole point of the philosophy of action is to understand these dimensions of human action, to
distinguish between them, and to explain how they are related to each other—not to amalgamate
them or equate them, or reduce them in number. Such at least is the main premise of this book.

1.2 Agency and voluntariness

Ryle’s readers can form the impression that the modern theory of the will prevailed for three
hundred years, unchallenged and unaltered, from Descartes’s The Passions of the Soul (1649) to
The Concept of Mind (1949). Of course, this is very far from being the case. Most importantly,
Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid, Bentham, and Mill postulated volitions or intentions—
sui generis acts of will, distinct from desires and memory-images—whereas Hobbes, Bain,
James, and Russell did not. But despite this difference, and the other differences described in

Page 3 of 20
Agency and the Will

the Appendix, philosophical thought about the will was marked by three constant features,
which Ryle refers to in the remarks quoted above:

(A) The will was generally seen as both the source of voluntary action, which was considered to
be apt for praise or blame and punishment or reward, and the source of individual human
agency as such, so that the bodily movements we ourselves cause personally originate in our
wills, whereas the bodily movements we do not cause personally have another cause, whether
exogenous, as when one person moves another person’s limb, or endogenous, as when our
pupils dilate or our hearts contract.

(B) A specific kind of conscious thought was held to cause every voluntary act. Even James and
Russell, who anticipated Ryle’s claim that the traditional doctrine of volitions is a myth, never
doubted that the question, ‘What makes a bodily movement voluntary?’ is a causal question.
They simply held that an idea of a movement or a kinaesthetic image is generally sufficient to
cause motion in our bodies, without what James called a ‘super-added “will-force”’.6

(p.5) (C) Considered in itself, independently of its causes and effects, an act was held to be a
bodily movement, such as the movement of a limb, or, as the influence of physiology on the
theory of the will grew in the nineteenth century, a muscular contraction.

Ryle and Wittgenstein were mainly interested in (B), and I shall discuss their views about it in
1.4 and 1.5. I shall comment on (C) in 1.4.3 and 3.1. But my immediate concern is with (A), the
idea that the will is the source of both voluntary action and individual human agency in general.

Agency is a highly abstract physical concept, of the same order as the concepts of substance,
causation, and event, whereas voluntariness is an ethical concept. An act is done voluntarily if it
is not due to ignorance or compulsion, and the point of saying that an act is not due to ignorance
or compulsion is that these are both normally exculpations, factors which excuse someone from
blame (see 4.1). But the operation of the will was widely held to explain both agency and
voluntariness, both the difference between active and passive movements of the body or
operations of the mind and the difference between the kinds of conduct that can and cannot
merit punishment or reward, gratitude or resentment, praise or blame.

I shall criticize the doctrine that will or intention is the mark of agency in the next chapter, and
examine the idea of voluntariness per se in Chapter 4. For the moment, I am interested in the
relationship between agency and voluntariness, and the principal point I want to make is simply
that it is one thing to explain the difference between activity and passivity—e.g. eating and
being eaten or kissing and being kissed—and another quite different thing to explain the
difference between choice and compulsion—e.g. being kissed consensually and being kissed
against one’s will. One task belongs to the theory of agency, while the other belongs to the
theory of voluntariness. The ideas of agency and voluntariness refer to different aspects of
human action and they cannot be equated.

Has this ever been in doubt? Stated in these terms, perhaps not. But both the proponents and
the opponents of the modern theory of the will have tended to confuse the ideas of agency and

Page 4 of 20
Agency and the Will

voluntariness. For example, consider the following passage from Reid’s Essays on the Active
Powers of Man:

In morals, it is self-evident that no man can be object either of approbation or of blame for
what he did not. But how shall we know whether it is his doing or not? If the action
depended upon his will, and if he intended and willed it, it is his action in the judgment of
all mankind. But if it was done without his (p.6) knowledge, or without his will and
intention, it is as certain that he did it not, and that it ought not to be imputed to him as
the agent.7

Every sentence in this passage, bar the question, is untrue. First, a man can be praised or
blamed for what he did not do, as well as for what he did; or for what others did or did not do,
for instance if he coerced them, or if they were in his charge or under his command. Our moral
responsibility extends beyond our deeds in both these ways. Second, in the latter case, an action
may depend on one man’s ‘will’, and be intended by that man, but still be the action of another.
Third, many acts, including ones with serious consequences, are done without the agent’s
knowledge or intention.

How could Reid have gone so badly wrong? The answer seems to be that he thought of ‘will and
intention’ as the single cause that both makes action qualify as voluntary and makes it imputable
to an individual as the agent, and he confused or equated the ideas of voluntariness and agency
as a result. He thought of agency as being negated by ignorance, and as a condition on which
moral responsibility depends, because these things are true, or approximately true, of
voluntariness.

In the nineteenth century, the confusion between voluntariness and agency was imported into
jurisprudence, and in the twentieth century it was perpetuated even by philosophers who
opposed the modern theory of the will. As a result, each concept was made out to be more like
the other than it really is: the concept of agency was invested with an ethical character it does
not have, and the concept of voluntariness was divested of the ethical character it does have.
Hart makes the first mistake:

The difference between ‘His body moved in violent contact with another’s’ and ‘He did
it’ (e.g., ‘He hit her’) [cannot] be explained without reference to [ … ] sentences by which
liabilities or responsibility are ascribed.8

And Ryle makes the second mistake. For example, the following passage is from his chapter on
the will in The Concept of Mind:

Very often we oppose things done voluntarily to things suffered under compulsion. Some
soldiers are volunteers, other are conscripts; some yachtsmen go out to sea voluntarily,
others are carried out to sea by the wind and tide. [ … ] So sometimes the question
‘Voluntary or involuntary?’ means ‘Did the person do it or was it done to him?’9

This is no more plausible than saying that we sometimes oppose things done happily to things
suffered unhappily, so sometimes the question ‘Happy or (p.7) unhappy?’ means ‘Did the
person do it or was it done to him?’ Ryle is confusing the distinction between active and passive

Page 5 of 20
Agency and the Will

and the distinction between voluntary and involuntary, or rather, he is stating the confusion as a
positive claim.

Similarly, in Elbow Room, which is dedicated to his teacher Ryle, Dennett asks ‘Are decisions
voluntary? Or are they things that happen to us?’10 But these are quite different questions. Are
decisions voluntary? Some are, some are not. ‘Did he decide to hide the gun, make the
broadcast, perjure himself … voluntarily?’ These are practical questions, and the answers can be
yes or no. Are decisions things that happen to us? In other words, are they passive or active
operations of the mind? This is a theoretical question, and the answer cannot vary from case to
case, although of course some decisions are spontaneous, perhaps automatic, perhaps
unconscious, whereas others are carefully thought through in advance. ‘Did he decide
voluntarily or did the decision happen to him?’ makes as much sense as ‘Did he pay up
voluntarily or was he paid?’

1.3 Voluntary passivity and involuntary activity

1.3.1 Terminology
Agency and voluntariness are different phenomena, and the distinctions between active and
passive and between voluntary and involuntary cut across each other, since activity can be
either voluntary or involuntary and so can passivity. But the confusion between agency and
voluntariness encouraged philosophers to ignore two of these possibilities. They thought about
voluntary activity, but they ignored voluntary passivity, or in some cases denied that it exists.
And they equated activity and voluntary activity, as if activity were always voluntary. I shall
comment on voluntary passivity and involuntary activity in turn. But I shall begin with some
brief comments about terminology.

The use by philosophers and jurists of terms such as ‘voluntary act’, ‘voluntary movement’, and
‘willed movement’ has tended to conflate the ideas of voluntariness and intention. Very roughly,
an act is voluntary if it is due to choice as opposed to ignorance or compulsion (see 4.1), and an
act is intentional if the agent does it because she wants to do it or values doing it for its own
sake, or because it seems conducive to something else she wants (p.8) or values (see 5.2).* But
if we want to understand what writers who accept or are influenced by the modern theory mean,
including writers who oppose it, we need to bear in mind that when they describe an act as
‘voluntary’, they commonly do not mean one of these things rather than the other, or even both
things at once, because they do not distinguish clearly between them. And the reason why they
do not distinguish between them, at least part of the reason, is that their thought about human
action, and therefore their use of terms as well, is influenced by a picture: desire—or the
‘uneasiness’ of desire, as Locke described the feeling of wanting something—causing the mental
act of willing or choosing, and the mental act causing the motion of a limb. It is this process that
is supposed to make the act (i.e. the motion) qualify as ‘voluntary’, ‘intentional’, or ‘willed’.

Naturally, the use of the term ‘involuntary’ is also affected, and it is commonly reserved for
thoughts or changes in the body which the agent is unable to control, e.g. ‘an involuntary
concurrence of ideas’, ‘the involuntary running of urine’, or ‘the involuntary closing of the
eyelids when the surface of the eye is touched’ (all three examples are taken from the OED). If
we define ‘involuntary’ in this way, it is clearly not equivalent to ‘not voluntary’. For example, a
man who hands over his wallet because he is threatened with physical violence does not hand it

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Agency and the Will

over voluntarily, but he does not hand it over involuntarily either, in this sense, because he does
not lose physical control.

But although the use of the terms ‘involuntary’ and ‘not voluntary’ match this convention to
some extent, it also deviates from it in many cases, especially but not exclusively in the law. For
example, ‘involuntary manslaughter’ means unintentional manslaughter, where death results
from recklessness, criminal negligence, or an unlawful act, without a specific intent to kill;
‘involuntary euthanasia’ means euthanasia without consent; and the term ‘involuntary servitude’
in American law refers to labour that is coerced. ‘Involuntary’ is evidently not used in these
cases in the narrow sense explained in the last paragraph. We therefore have a choice. I shall
use ‘involuntary’ as the negation of ‘voluntary’, which is how it is generally defined in
dictionaries. The difference between an act the agent is unable to control and an act (p.9)
elicited by coercion is obviously important, and I shall discuss it in detail in Chapter 4, but we do
not need to mark it lexically in this way.

The terms ‘active’ and ‘passive’ also require comment. Basically, the term ‘active’ refers to the
exercise of an active power, that is, an ability to cause change, while ‘passive’ refers to the
exercise of a passive power, a liability to undergo change. But, confusingly, ‘passive’ is also
commonly used to mean inactive, quiescent, or unresponsive. I shall avoid using ‘passive’ in this
way. As I shall use them, ‘inactive’ is the negation of ‘active’—it simply means not active—
whereas ‘passive’ is the converse of ‘active’, as ‘child’ is the converse of ‘parent’ and ‘buy’ is the
converse of ‘sell’.

So much for terminology. I said that the distinctions between active and passive and between
voluntary and involuntary cut across each other. So it is a mistake to imagine that activity is
always voluntary, that there is no involuntary activity; equally, it is a mistake to think that
voluntariness can only be attributed to acts—or only to acts and failures to act, positive and
negative acts, as Bentham called them, or only to the things a person does, as opposed to the
things that are done to him—because it can be attributed to passivity as well, in other words, to
the reception, and not only the performance, of an act. I shall comment on voluntary passivity
first and involuntary activity after that.

1.3.2 Voluntary passivity

Aquinas certainly understood that both activity and passivity can be voluntary. In the Summa
Theologiae, he states:

An action is termed voluntary in two ways. First with respect to action, or acting upon, as
when one wills to do something. Second, with respect to passion, or being acted upon, as
when one wills to receive another’s action.11

By contrast, the proponents of the modern theory of the will, and even its opponents, almost
without exception, ignore voluntary passivity, or else deny explicitly that it exists.* In the whole
corpus of his writings, (p.10) Wittgenstein mentions voluntary inactivity in a solitary remark
from 1947 about Wundt’s theory that voluntary acts are caused by feelings of innervation,12 and
as far as I know he does not mention voluntary passivity even once. Ryle maintains that the
terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ apply exclusively to acts.13 And White, who developed

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Agency and the Will

Wittgenstein’s and Ryle’s ideas about the will, and applied them in jurisprudence, claims that
‘something may not be voluntary because it is not an act at all, as when a man is carried bodily
on to another’s land’.14

White’s example refers to the seventeenth-century legal case Smith v. Stone, in which the report
states:

A. brought an action of trespass against B. pedibus ambulando; the defendant pleads this
special plea in justification, viz. that he was carried upon the land of the plaintiff by force
and violence of others, and was not there voluntarily, which is the same trespass for which
the plaintiff brings his action.15

But White misinterprets the case. It is true that the man was not carried onto the plaintiff’s land
voluntarily, but the reason for this is not that being carried cannot be voluntary, since it is not
an act, but rather that he was carried ‘by force and violence of others’, against his will. A man
can be carried voluntarily, for example, a wounded man on a stretcher or Anchises escaping
from Troy on his son Aeneas’s back. If not being an act prevented something from being
voluntary, there would be no sins of omission or voluntary deaths.

As it happens, the OED’s entry for ‘voluntary’ begins with voluntary thoughts and feelings, and
then proceeds to voluntary acts; and if we turn to the entry for ‘voluntarily’, we find several
quotations in which the word qualifies something passive. For example, the first and the eighth
are as follows:

c1374 CHAUCER Boeth. III. pr. xii. (1868) 103 Ther may no man douten, that thei ne ben
gouerned uoluntariely. [ … ] 1663 BP. PATRICK Parab. Pilgr. xiii. (1687) 87 At last he
voluntarily, and without any compulsion but that of his Love, died upon a Cross.

The fact is that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary applies to passivity and
inactivity in exactly the same way as it applies to activity. Children can be kissed and put to bed
voluntarily, and they sometimes sit still voluntarily in front of the TV. For their part, adults
undergo surgical procedures voluntarily, they are sometimes voluntarily unemployed, and they
may die voluntarily, as Bishop Patrick says Christ did, and as people (p.11) suffering from
painful illnesses do every day. There is no reason to deny that voluntariness can be attributed
equally to all of these things; or to think that it is a different attribute, depending on which of
them we have in mind.

Roughly, voluntariness is about choice as opposed to ignorance or compulsion, and both children
and adults sometimes choose whether or not to be kissed or carried, just as they sometimes
choose whether to kiss or carry someone or something else. So the question whether it was
voluntary or involuntary can arise in the passive case just as it can in the active case. Again, a
man can allow himself to fall in love with a woman in the knowledge that he could avoid falling
in love with her if he chose to, or allow himself to fall asleep in the knowledge that he could
avoid falling asleep if chose to; or alternatively he can fall in love willy-nilly, or fall asleep
despite trying to remain awake. In the first case, he falls in love or falls asleep voluntarily, in the
second case not. But falling in love and falling asleep are not acts, any more than falling in battle
or falling downstairs.

Page 8 of 20
Agency and the Will

1.3.3 Involuntary activity

It is a mistake to imagine that activity is always voluntary. But proponents of the modern theory
of the will commonly assumed that it is, and by the nineteenth century, the assumption
sometimes took the form of a definition. John Austin (not J.L. Austin, but Bentham’s disciple and
the first Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of London) introduced the definition into
jurisprudence, and it has been repeated by British and American jurists ever since.

Austin defines an act as follows: ‘A voluntary movement of my body, or a movement which

follows a volition, is an act.’ The American jurist and Supreme Court justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes writes: ‘An act is always a voluntary muscular contraction and nothing else [ … ] An act
implies a choice.’ The English jurist D.A. Stroud defines a ‘simple’ act as ‘a voluntary movement
of the body’, and a complex act as ‘a series [ … ] of simple acts and their consequences.’
Glanville Williams defines an act as ‘a willed bodily movement’, adding, ‘Since every act is by
definition willed, there is no need to call it voluntary.’ R.W.M. Dias defines an act as a ‘voluntary
bodily movement’, adding that voluntariness is ‘a criterion of responsibility and connotes
controllability of the action in question.’ Michael S. Moore defines an act in the same way as
Glanville Williams, as a ‘willed bodily movement’, and states (now following Mill) that ‘human
acts are themselves a compound of other events, consisting of a volition causing a bodily
movement.’16

(p.12) When we read these definitions, we need to bear in mind that the use of the terms
‘voluntary movement’ and ‘willed movement’ often conflated the ideas of voluntariness and
intention. Nevertheless, none of these definitions can be right. Some acts are voluntary; others
are not. Equally, some are intentional; others are not. Putting out one’s hands to break a fall is
often neither voluntary nor intentional, and the same is true of licking one’s lips absent-
mindedly, smiling with pleasure, frowning with concentration, laughing when one is tickled, or
crying out involuntarily with pain; speaking or changing one’s posture in one’s sleep; acts
caused by hypnotic suggestion or by abnormal or pathological conditions, such as panic or
psychosis; and acts done without knowledge or foresight, such as involuntary manslaughter,
which was mentioned above.

These are preliminary remarks, to be substantiated in later chapters of this book. And I have so
far ignored the assumption, which is made explicitly by all the jurists quoted above, that
physical acts are bodily movements or muscular contractions (see 1.4.3 and 3.1). But it should
already be clear that the confusion between agency and voluntariness has permeated modern
philosophy, at least from the eighteenth century on. And the reason should be clear as well. The
modern theory represented voluntary action, intentional action, and action as such—i.e. action
that can be imputed to an individual as the agent—by means of a single picture: desire (or the
‘uneasiness’ of desire) causes the mental act of volition, which in turn causes motion in our
limbs.

Some philosophers and psychologists in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first
half of the twentieth century modified this picture, substituting ideas of movements or
kinaesthetic images for acts of will, and explicitly adding muscular contractions to the sequence
of events. Then, in the 1930s and 1940s, Wittgenstein and Ryle both argued (in Ryle’s words)
that ‘the doctrine of volitions is a causal hypothesis, adopted because it was wrongly supposed

Page 9 of 20
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Learning Objective 1: Key terms and definitions
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[Figure 5: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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- Note: Important consideration
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Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 8: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Definition: Best practices and recommendations
• Case studies and real-world applications
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Lesson 2: Case studies and real-world applications
Example 10: Literature review and discussion
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Note: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Best practices and recommendations
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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• Literature review and discussion
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[Figure 13: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
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- Example: Practical application scenario
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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[Figure 18: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
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• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
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Remember: Research findings and conclusions
• Historical development and evolution
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• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Definition: Practical applications and examples
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[Figure 30: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Fundamental concepts and principles
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[Figure 39: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Chapter 5: Literature review and discussion
Example 40: Key terms and definitions
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Remember: Case studies and real-world applications
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Practice Problem 50: Practical applications and examples
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Case studies and real-world applications
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Definition: Comparative analysis and synthesis
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
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- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Practice Problem 55: Practical applications and examples
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
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• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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[Figure 58: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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[Figure 59: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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Section 7: Comparative analysis and synthesis
Important: Literature review and discussion
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 61: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
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- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Assessment criteria and rubrics
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 63: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
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• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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Note: Learning outcomes and objectives
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 66: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Definition: Experimental procedures and results
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
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- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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[Figure 69: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
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Practice Problem 70: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Remember: Study tips and learning strategies
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Comparative analysis and synthesis
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Current trends and future directions
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 76: Experimental procedures and results
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Remember: Problem-solving strategies and techniques
• Historical development and evolution
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 78: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Best practices and recommendations
• Study tips and learning strategies
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- Note: Important consideration
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- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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- Note: Important consideration
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Remember: Key terms and definitions
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Example 81: Literature review and discussion
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Fundamental concepts and principles
• Ethical considerations and implications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Key Concept: Research findings and conclusions
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Key Concept: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Problem-solving strategies and techniques
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
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- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 86: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Practical applications and examples
• Study tips and learning strategies
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Note: Best practices and recommendations
• Interdisciplinary approaches
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 89: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Case studies and real-world applications
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Section 10: Learning outcomes and objectives
Remember: Practical applications and examples
• Comparative analysis and synthesis
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
[Figure 91: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Key Concept: Theoretical framework and methodology
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
[Figure 92: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Practice Problem 92: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Current trends and future directions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 93: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Study tips and learning strategies
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 94: Best practices and recommendations
• Fundamental concepts and principles
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Remember: Statistical analysis and interpretation
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 96: Key terms and definitions
• Theoretical framework and methodology
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
Important: Critical analysis and evaluation
• Critical analysis and evaluation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Example 98: Current trends and future directions
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
Note: Interdisciplinary approaches
• Statistical analysis and interpretation
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Discussion 11: Best practices and recommendations
Note: Practical applications and examples
• Key terms and definitions
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Historical development and evolution
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Remember: Fundamental concepts and principles
• Literature review and discussion
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 103: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Remember: Case studies and real-world applications
• Learning outcomes and objectives
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Definition: Key terms and definitions
• Assessment criteria and rubrics
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 105: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Current trends and future directions
• Practical applications and examples
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
[Figure 106: Diagram/Chart/Graph]
Definition: Best practices and recommendations
• Experimental procedures and results
- Sub-point: Additional details and explanations
- Example: Practical application scenario
- Note: Important consideration
Formula: [Mathematical expression or equation]
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