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Solved Exercises of Operations Research II

The document presents proposed exercises in operations research focusing on queueing theory and game theories. It includes various scenarios involving customer arrivals and service times at different establishments, requiring calculations of performance measures such as idle probabilities, average wait times, and expected runtimes. Additionally, it discusses game theory concepts, including payoff matrices and strategies for competitive scenarios between companies and individuals.

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37 views3 pages

Solved Exercises of Operations Research II

The document presents proposed exercises in operations research focusing on queueing theory and game theories. It includes various scenarios involving customer arrivals and service times at different establishments, requiring calculations of performance measures such as idle probabilities, average wait times, and expected runtimes. Additionally, it discusses game theory concepts, including payoff matrices and strategies for competitive scenarios between companies and individuals.

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PROPOSED EXERCISES IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH

II
Salazar Toledo Yehudi Omar
CODE: 082.2013.130.
QUEUEING THEORY
1. Assume a fast food restaurant where an average of
100 clients per hour. There is capacity to serve an average of 150.
customers per hour It is known that customers wait on average 2 minutes
in the queue Calculate the performance measures of the system
a) What is the probability that the system is idle?
What is the probability that a customer arrives and has to wait,
Why is the system busy?
c) What is the average number of customers in line?
d) What is the probability of having 10 customers in line?

2. Suppose that in a station with a single server, an average of 45 arrives


clients per hour, an average capacity to serve 60
clients per hour. It is known that customers wait on average 3 minutes
in line.
It is requested:

a) Average time a customer spends in the system.


b) Average number of customers in the queue.
c) Average number of clients in the System at any given time.
On average, 10 cars per hour arrive at a single cashier.
server that provides service without having to get out of the car.
Assume that the average service time per customer is 4 minutes,
and that both the arrival times and the service times are
exponential. Answer the following questions:
a) What is the probability that the cashier is idle?
b) b. What is the average number of cars that are in line?
from the cashier? (it is considered that a car that is being attended to
is not in line waiting)
c) c. What is the average amount of time a customer spends in the
bank parking, (including service time)?
d) d. How many customers will the cashier serve on average per hour?

4. Computer programs are sent to a university server.


to be executed. Programs arrive at the server at a rate of 10
per minute. The average execution time of each program is 5
seconds and both the arrival times and the execution times
they are distributed exponentially.
a) What proportion of time is the server idle?
b) What is the expected total runtime of a program?
c) What is the average number of programs waiting in the queue for the
system?

5. The bank counter conducts transactions in an average time.


of 2 minutes. Customers arrive at an average rate of 20 customers per
hour. If it is supposed that arrivals follow a Poisson process and the
service time is exponential, determine:
a) The percentage of time the cashier is unoccupied.
b) The average waiting time of customers in line.
c) The fraction of customers that must wait in line.

GAME THEORIES
1. Build the payoff matrix for the following game. Consider a game
to 'equalize' coins in which each of the 2 players A and B chooses heads (H)
the Eagle (A). If the 2 results are equal (S and S) or (A and A) the player A
Player A wins 1 and weighs against player B, otherwise A loses a weight that B pays.

2. The Company, after following advice and achieving results


optimal, decides to consult the strategy to follow to compete with the
DII company has developed a sales forecasting model for each
one of the products of your company, based on your decisions and those of
the company DII. This data has been collected in the payment matrix that
sample. What is the report you need to present to the company? Describe
its strategy, that of DII and the value of the game.
DII
B1 B2 B3 B4
COMPANY A1 50 20 120 -50
A2 60 20 70 60
A3 -20 0 -40 60

3. Solve the following games using dominated strategy


a. Determine the optimal strategy for each player, through the
DOMINATED strategy technique.
J2
B1 B2 B3
J1 2 -2 -2 -1
A2 1 5 -2
A3 5 3 0

Suppose the situation where two are questioned in different rooms.


people who have jointly committed a crime. Each of them
he/she has the option to plead guilty and thus implicate the other or deny
having participated. If only one of the prisoners confesses, he remains in
freedom and the authorities blame each other, condemning him to 6 months of
prison. If both prisoners deny their participation in the events, both
they are sentenced to 1 month for some strictly technical argument; and, if
both confess, both are sentenced to 3 months.
a) Determine the payoff matrix of this game.
b) For prisoner 1 and prisoner 2, analyze the received payments against
to the different strategies used by prisoner 2 and prisoner 1
respectively
c) What is the best strategy for both players?

In the game of showing 1, 2, and 3 dice, a strategy can be built.


mixed.
X= (1/6, 1/3, ½), which means that player one plans to show finger 1.
1/6 of the times, 2 fingers 1/3 of the times, 3 fingers 1/2 of the times.

Let the following payoff matrix be for a 2-player zero-sum game.


This game has no saddle point, nor can the value of the game be calculated. It
he says it is an unstable game.
PLAYER
B
1 2 3 4
1 5 -10 9 0
2 6 7 8 1
PLAYER A 3 8 7 15 2
4 3 4 -1 4

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