This confidential briefing responds to the Governing Council’s request for legal guidance on
a proposed National Human Rights Charter. It is written against a backdrop of prolonged
unrest, lethal protests, and allegations of misconduct by the Valorian Security Forces. The
Council’s central challenge is to entrench meaningful protection while preserving the
operational capacity of the state in future crises. To that end, I analyse five concepts that
shape emergency action and treaty engagement: derogations, non-derogable rights,
reservations, declarations, and denunciations.1 The analysis draws primarily on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its interpretive guidance, 2 together
with comparative practice from regional systems and leading academic commentary. 3 4 These
sources are used in two ways. First, where Valoria ratifies a treaty, they identify binding
standards that any Charter should reflect or exceed. Second, even absent ratification, they
supply persuasive benchmarks for constitution-level design and for assessing proportionality,
necessity, and accountability. Throughout, I indicate how each device can preserve, or
unnecessarily erode, state sovereignty, and I recommend drafting choices calibrated to
Valoria’s security environment. The objective is pragmatic: a Charter that enables lawful
crisis response while safeguarding the inviolable core of human dignity and reinforcing
Valoria’s international credibility and regional stability.
A derogation is a temporary suspension of some human rights obligations during a publicly
proclaimed emergency that “threatens the life of the nation”. It is lawful only to the extent
strictly required by the situation, must not discriminate, and must be notified to the relevant
international body. In practice, this device permits short-term limits on rights such as
movement or assembly to restore order, while certain core rights remain untouched.5
For Valoria, a carefully drafted derogation clause can strengthen sovereignty by creating a
clear legal space to act fast in genuine crises curfews, restricted gatherings, emergency health
measures without immediately breaching treaty duties. Yet it also disciplines power: it
requires a formal proclamation, a clear legal basis, strict tests of necessity and
proportionality, and external scrutiny by courts and treaty bodies.6 7 Those conditions matter
1
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT)
2
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR).
3
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered
into force 3 September 1953) ETS No 5
4
Rhona K M Smith, International Human Rights Law (9th edn, OUP 2022).
5
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 4
6
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) art 15.
7
A and Others v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29.
in the present unrest. If officials rely on ordinary policing powers to take emergency-level
steps, courts may find measures unlawful; a lawful derogation supplies firmer authority,
narrower scope and independent review.
Comparative practice is instructive. After the 2016 coup attempt, Turkey notified derogations
under the ICCPR and the ECHR and adopted sweeping emergency decrees. European bodies
accepted that an emergency existed but criticised the breadth, duration and weak safeguards
of several measures. The lesson for Valoria is direct: notification does not immunise the state;
non-derogable rights and the tests of necessity and proportionality remain justiciable.8 By
contrast, the African Charter contains no derogation clause, so states must rely on general
limitation clauses instead preserving formal authority but reducing flexibility in true
emergencies.9
Recommendation. Include a narrow, procedurally rich derogation power requiring: (i) public
proclamation; (ii) strict necessity and proportionality; (iii) non-discrimination; (iv) an express
list of non-derogable rights; (v) short sunsets with legislative renewal and judicial review;
and (vi) prompt international notification and public reporting. Valoria should also require ex
post human-rights impact assessments of emergency measures.
Non-derogable rights are the small set of rights that cannot be suspended, even in a genuine
national emergency. Under the ICCPR, these include the right to life, the absolute prohibition
of torture and slavery, no punishment without law, recognition as a person before the law,
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the ban on imprisonment for breach of
contract. Even if Valoria lawfully proclaims an emergency, these guarantees still bind every
official.10 In practice, this matters now: crowd-control and counter-riot tactics may
temporarily limit movement or assembly, but they cannot justify torture, disappearances, or
lethal force that is not strictly necessary to protect life.
For sovereignty, non-derogable rights constrain the state in the short term, but they strengthen
it in the long term. They give clear, bright-line rules that protect legitimacy at home and
credibility abroad. Courts also treat these guarantees as truly non-negotiable. In Chahal v
United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 3’s torture ban is
absolute, with no balancing against national security; the state could not deport a suspected
extremist to a real risk of ill-treatment.11 Likewise, the UK’s post-9/11 detention scheme was
struck down because emergency measures must still meet strict legality, necessity and non-
discrimination standards; a derogation is not a blank cheque.12
8
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), ‘Opinion on
Emergency Decree Laws of Turkey’ CDL-AD(2016)037.
9
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force
21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217.
10
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered
into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art 4(2); Human Rights Committee, ‘General
Comment No 29: States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (31 August 2001) UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11.
11
Chahal v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR 413.
Advice. The Charter should list non-derogable rights expressly, track ICCPR Article 4(2),
and state that emergency powers cannot limit them. This anchors operational discretion to
clear red lines and will help Valoria defend necessary measures while rejecting abusive ones.
A reservation is a statement a state makes when it joins a treaty to say that a particular clause
will not apply (or will apply only in a limited way) to that state. It lets a country sign up to
most of a treaty while keeping space for domestic rules that would otherwise conflict. Under
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, reservations are allowed only if they are not
banned by the treaty and are not “incompatible with the object and purpose” of that treaty. 13
For Valoria, reservations can protect sovereignty by avoiding obligations that clash with core
constitutional choices. But they also come with legal and political checks. If a reservation
goes too far, other states can object, and treaty bodies may treat it as invalid. The UN Human
Rights Committee has said that incompatible reservations do not shield a state from review
and that the underlying obligation may still bind the state.14 So reservations are not a free
pass; they must be narrow and defensible.
Practice shows the trade-offs. When the United States joined the ICCPR, it entered several
reservations and declared the Covenant non-self-executing. This helped align the treaty with
US constitutional structures but drew criticism that the protections were weakened
domestically.15 By contrast, some states have lodged broad religion-based reservations to
CEDAW especially to core equality articles prompting objections that such reservations
defeat the treaty’s purpose and harm credibility.16
Advice. The Charter need not set treaty text, but it should require: (i) a public statement of
compatibility with a treaty’s object and purpose; (ii) prior parliamentary approval for any
reservation; and (iii) periodic review with a presumption of withdrawal when no longer
necessary.
A declaration is a statement a state makes when signing or ratifying a treaty to explain how it
understands a clause. Unlike a reservation, a declaration does not claim to change the state’s
legal obligations; it clarifies their meaning for that state’s officials and courts. 17 Declarations
can therefore reduce uncertainty without reopening negotiations. If a declaration tries to make
12
A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.
13
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts 2(1)(d), 19–23.
14
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 24: Issues Relating to Reservations’ (4
November 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.
15
University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, ‘ICCPR—United States: Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations’ [Link]
16
UN Treaty Collection, ‘CEDAW: Declarations and Reservations’ [Link]
the treaty operate only on the state’s terms (a “conditional” declaration), it will be treated as a
reservation and must satisfy the usual legality tests.18
Effect on sovereignty. Declarations give Valoria limited control over interpretation. They
guide domestic authorities and may be taken into account by international bodies when the
text is genuinely ambiguous. But they do not shield Valoria from duties the treaty clearly
imposes. In other words, declarations can shape the margins of interpretation, not the core
obligations.²
Practice and lessons. When the United States ratified the ICCPR it made a declaration that the
Covenant was “not self-executing”, meaning domestic effect required legislation. This did
not reduce US international duties, but it channelled implementation through Congress. For
Valoria, a similar approach could protect legislative primacy while accepting international
scrutiny: the Charter can be implemented by statute without implying that treaty standards are
optional.19
Recommendation. The Charter need not contain a dedicated “declarations” clause, but
Valoria should authorise negotiators to issue narrow interpretative declarations where
necessary to align treaty language with domestic law while recognising that declarations
cannot contradict clear treaty text or undermine non-derogable guarantees. Use them
sparingly, alongside strong implementing legislation and open engagement with treaty
bodies.¹ ²
A denunciation is the formal step a state takes to withdraw from a treaty. If the treaty permits
withdrawal or if the Vienna Convention rules allow it notice is given and, after the notice
period, the state is no longer bound for the future .20
Effect on sovereignty. Withdrawal appears to expand room for manoeuvre no external
scrutiny and full legislative freedom. But the legal and political costs can be heavy. When
Russia ceased to be a party to the European Convention on Human Rights in 2022, it
regained formal autonomy yet faced sharp criticism and a backlog of unimplemented human-
rights judgments; reputational damage and loss of judicial oversight followed.21 Conversely,
some core treaties cannot be left: the ICCPR contains no denunciation clause, and the UN
17
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331; International Law Commission, ‘Guide to Practice on
Reservations to Treaties’ (2011) UN Doc A/66/10, guideline 1.2.
18
ILC, ‘Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties’, guidelines 1.2–1.3; Human Rights
Committee, ‘General Comment No 24’ (4 November 1994) UN Doc
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6.
19
University of Minnesota Human Rights Library, ‘ICCPR—United States: Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations’ [Link]
20
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, arts 54–56.
21
Council of Europe, ‘Russia is no longer a party to the European Convention on Human
Rights’ (16 September 2022).
Human Rights Committee has stated that withdrawal is not available under the Vienna
Convention’s default rules.22 For Valoria, that means planning for long-term compliance, not
exit, where no withdrawal right exists.
Recommendation. The Charter should not make treaty exit easy. Require (i) prior
parliamentary super-majority approval, (ii) published human-rights impact and foreign-policy
assessments, and (iii) a cooling-off period with judicial review. Where withdrawal is legally
possible (e.g. some regional instruments), treat it as a last resort and prefer narrower tools
interpretative dialogue or, if necessary, tightly drawn reservations so that Valoria retains both
legitimacy and crisis capacity.
Valoria can design a Charter that protects people without disabling the state. The real choice
is not “rights versus security” but clear rules versus unfettered discretion. Derogations should
exist only for a publicly proclaimed emergency and be tightly bounded by strict necessity,
proportionality, non-discrimination, short sunsets, legislative renewal, judicial review, and
international notification; throughout, non-derogable rights remain absolute.¹ ² Listing those
rights life, the bans on torture and slavery, legality (no punishment without law), recognition
as a person before the law, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and the ban on
imprisonment for debt gives bright-line guidance to commanders and courts.²
Externally, reservations and interpretative declarations can preserve limited policy space, but
only within the Vienna Convention’s compatibility test and subject to parliamentary control;
they cannot be used to hollow out the Charter’s core guarantees.³ ⁴ Finally, treaty exit should
be a last resort and, where legally possible, require a super-majority and a published human-
rights impact assessment; where exit is unavailable (as with the ICCPR), long-term
compliance planning is essential.⁵
Adopting these measures will enhance sovereignty in practice by providing lawful powers in
crisis and strengthen legitimacy at home and abroad. This is the safest way to restore order
while affirming the inviolable dignity of every Valorian.
22
Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 26: Continuity of Obligations’ (8
December 1997) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1; International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999
UNTS 171.
