Global Center on Cooperative Security

Report Part Title: Strategic Communication in Practice

Report Title: Mastering the Narrative

Report Subtitle: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations
Report Author(s): NAUREEN CHOWDHURY FINK and JACK BARCLAY
Published by: Global Center on Cooperative Security (2013)
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Strategic Communication in Practice

Strategic communication differs from merely

communicating information in that it aims to
change not only belief but also behavior.

What Is Strategic Communication? project a transnational presence and even spur indi-
viduals or groups, so-called lone wolf terrorists or self-
The term “strategic communication” describes a rela- starter cells, to independent action. Their messages are
tively new and often poorly understood field, particu- designed to resonate locally but also to apply globally,
larly by those approaching it from the counterterror- not only radicalizing but ultimately mobilizing an
ism profession. Broadly speaking, strategic audience in support of the movement’s ideology and
communication refers to the use of messaging to affect objectives, wherever that audience may be located.
behavior change. A more detailed working definition
increasingly in use among practitioners is a “systematic Fundamentally, the movement will not prevail unless
series of sustained and coherent activities, conducted it is able to move a certain number of passive support-
across strategic, operational, and tactical levels, that ers to become active participants. Al-Qaida and its af-
enables understanding of target audiences, identifies filiates have excelled in this kind of strategic commu-
effective conduits, and develops and promotes ideas nication. They have combined traditional approaches,
and opinions through those conduits to promote and including developing tightly knit familial and social
sustain particular types of behavior.”21 networks, and exploited innovative technologies to
reach the broadest possible audiences. To date, it has
This section first explores the practice of strategic com- been difficult for international actors, including gov-
munication and how it differs from communication, ernments and the United Nations, to compete.
public diplomacy, and public affairs. Subsequent sec-
tions examine how both governments and extremist Consequently, strategic communication differs from
groups have adopted strategic communication and offer merely communicating information in that it aims to
a selection of case studies to illustrate the arguments. change not only belief but also behavior. It incorpo-
rates elements of psychology, social science, market-
The long-term survival and success of terrorist organi- ing, and other disciplines to develop a more nuanced
zations depend on their ability to project a legitimiz- understanding of an audience—their values, attitudes,
ing narrative. International terrorist groups such as and beliefs; motivations; normative affiliations; pro-
al-Qaida seek to create and spread such a narrative to pensity for change; and a host of other factors. This

21
Steve A. Tatham, “Strategic Communication: A Primer,” Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2008, http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/
document-listings/special/08%2828%29ST.pdf.

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Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations

Box 1. Case Study: Facebook Rebels

A rebel group in the Democratic Republic The website contains photos of fighting “now even developing world guerrilla
of Congo (DRC) involved in fighting that between the rebels and the Congolese groups have social media campaigns.”d
has reportedly displaced more than military, but much of the content appears M23’s online presence may also have
500,000 people from the country’s Kivu aimed at softening the image of a group been an acknowledgment by the group
province has extended its campaign to in an effort to counter accusations by of communication opportunities created
cyberspace. the United Nations that it is a Rwandan- by the rapidly rising rates of Internet
backed proxy force whose main aim is penetration in sub-Saharan Africa, as well
The M23 group, named after a failed to establish control over mineral-rich as a need to communicate effectively with
29 March 2009 peace agreement, has territories of the DRC.c external audiences in order to project the
established a Facebook pagea and a image of a legitimate rebel movement.
websiteb containing statements, interviews A report in the Washington Post in
with its leaders, and political commentary. October 2012 expressed surprise that

a
M23 Congo RDC page, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/M23CongoRdc (accessed 9 November 2012).
b
Congo DRC News, http://congodrcnews.com/ (accessed 9 November 2012).
c
“UN Accuses Rwanda of Aiding DRC Congo Rebels,” Al-Jazeera, 17 October 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news//africa/2012/10/
2012101755814154.html.
d
Max Fisher, “Of Course This Congolese Rebel Group Has a Fan Page,” Washington Post, 19 October 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
worldviews/wp/2012/10/19/of-course-this-congolese-rebel-group-has-a-facebook-fan-page/.

can inform campaign design by helping strategic com- Brooks, a former Pentagon official, explains, “‘Strate-
munication practitioners develop narratives and messages gic communication’ refers to the thoughtful integra-
that aim to compel a target audience to adopt a desired tion of issues of stakeholder perception and response
behavior or to divert them from undesirable behavior. into policymaking, planning, and operations at every
level.” She notes that although the practice bears simi-
An analogy used to illustrate this has been that of an larities to the concepts of “public affairs,” “informa-
orchestra, where the conductor is the main policy- tion operations,” or “public diplomacy,” strategic
forming body that sets a strategic objective, such as a communication “is less about what we have to say
government; the score is the strategic communication than it is about considering how others may interpret
plan; and the orchestra itself represents the diversity of our words and actions.”23
practitioners involved. Depending on the outcome
sought, different sections of the orchestra will be used As such, although correlation exists between disci-
at different times; the tempo of the music will vary, plines such as marketing and strategic communica-
under the leadership of the conductor.22 tion, the latter has to be far more sophisticated, first,
in identifying its audience and, second, in crafting its
A recent article highlights the still evolving nature of message. A report of the Defense Science Board, with-
the practice and the lingering confusion about how it in the U.S Department of Defense, called strategic
differs from the traditional practice of public diplo- communication an “interactive” process that includes
macy or, simply, communication. As author Rosa (1) understanding the identities, attitudes, and cultures

22
Ibid.
23
Rosa Brooks, “Confessions of a Strategic Communicator,” Foreign Policy, 6 December 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/06/
confessions_of_a_strategic_communicator?page=0,0.

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 Strategic communication practitioners have to
presume that audiences view and interpret messages
in many different ways and through many different
frames, whereas advertisers usually assume the
audience is passive and understands the message
to be conveyed exactly as it was intended.

of the audience; (2) advising policymakers on the Strategic communication practitioners have to pre-
communication implications of policies and actions; sume that audiences view and interpret messages in
(3) engaging in a dialogue of ideas between people and many different ways and through many different
institutions with common interests; (4) influencing at- frames, whereas advertisers usually assume the audi-
titudes and behavior; and (5) measuring the impact of ence is passive and understands the message to be con-
activities over time.24 veyed exactly as it was intended. This is a critical point

Box 2. Case Study: “Peace Bombing”

In December 2004, authorities battling an generated some excitement among local quickly fielded their own counternarrative,
escalating insurgency by Islamist separat- children who were encouraged to set up distributing leaflets in the same communi-
ists in southern Thailand air-dropped an catch nets to see how many birds they ties and claiming authorities were trying
estimated 100 million paper origami birds could collect. Beyond local youth, however, to murder Muslims by impregnating the
in what the BBC described as “an unusual the reports suggested the “peace bomb- paper cranes with avian influenza.
peace bid.”a ing” was poorly received in some cases.
Some local citizens were bemused by the The debatable success of the peace-
Citizens from across the country were campaign and said the government could bombing campaign underscores the
invited by the government to write peace have communicated a far more powerful importance of strategic communication
messages on the paper cranes, con- message of peace had it demonstrated a practitioners appreciating the cultural,
sidered by many Thais to be a sign of willingness to fully pursue meaningful po- political, and religious landscape in which
peace and reconciliation, which were litical negotiations to end the conflict. Oth- they are trying to operate, not to mention
then dropped across communities in the ers reportedly objected to having paper the current attitudes and perceptions of
Muslim-majority provinces that had been birds dropped on their heads on the basis the target audience. It also serves as a
worst hit by insurgent violence. that their Islamic beliefs dictated that reminder that a strategic communica-
the representation of anything created by tion campaign may have to compete for
According to reports by the BBC, CBS God was haram. Worse still, in an effort to influence with other potentially persuasive
News, and other media organizations, this undermine the campaign, the insurgents narratives deployed by an adversary.

a
Kylie Morris, “Thais Drop Origami ‘Peace Bombs,’” BBC, 5 December 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4069471.stm.

Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Strategic Communication, U.S. Department of Defense, “Final Report,” January 2008, http://
24

www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA476331.pdf (hereinafter DSB task force final report) (emphasis added).

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Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations

for the United Nations, given the global audience with • identify the thresholds that must be overcome in
which it is communicating. The Internet’s centrality as order to prompt a change in behavior;
a means of communication now also means that mes- • analyze the available channels for communica-
sages crafted for one particular audience often end up tion and make recommendations based on the
being viewed by many other audiences as well, which reach and credibility of the channel;
adds an additional layer of complexity to the develop- • ask questions such as how the message can reach
ment of strategic communication campaigns. In other the audience in a form and via a route that gives it
words, in an increasingly interconnected world, a se- the greatest “stickiness” and ability to influence; and
ries of messages intended for a specific audience can • develop and analyze options, not limited to media
have a positive impact on that audience but inadver- or other traditional means such as leafleting, for
tently have a negative impact on another, unintended achieving the campaign objectives, i.e., whatever
audience. behavior change is desired in the target audience.

As the case studies in this section demonstrate, the The desired outcome of methodologically rigorous au-
most effective strategic communication is based on in- dience analysis is an understanding of the human and
depth knowledge of the target audience. Audience behavioral dynamics of the target audience and the
analysis leverages decades-old proven social science best manner in which to influence that audience
and psychology methods to profile the range of dif- toward desired behavioral change. Many states that
ferent factors that can influence the behavior of an engage in countering violent extremism issues recog-
individual or group. This approach helps distinguish nize that strategic communication has a role to play
strategic communication from other forms of com- both in challenging the message of the extremists and
munication, such as public relations or public affairs. promoting alternative, more compelling narratives to
Audience analysis can equip strategic communica- compete with the extremists for influence in the
tion campaign planners with options that offer the marketplace of ideas. Consequently, as part of their
greatest possible chance of success; when conducted countering violent extremism initiatives, many states
thoroughly, it examines a range of factors affecting have reviewed the suitability of their strategic commu-
the design and delivery of a messaging campaign. nication capabilities to challenging the narrative of
Ideally, audience analysis can al-Qaida and violent extremists more generally.

• establish behavioral characteristics of the target In some cases, this has resulted in the creation of spe-
audience; cialist agencies such as the Research, Information, and
• identify how attitudes are shaped and at what Communications Unit within the UK Office for Secu-
point they are shaped as information flows rity and Counter-Terrorism or the U.S. Department
through a community; of State Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Com-
• identify characteristics of messages that success- munication (CSCC). These agencies work directly
fully shape attitudes; and indirectly to counter extremist messaging and un-
• identify the formal and informal power structures dertake a range of activities, including
that can influence attitudes, opinions, and actions;
• identify beliefs, attitudes, and motives and incen- • monitoring strategic communication activities of
tives that drive the behavior of the target audience; the adversary, analyzing their narratives and
• identify issues, influences, and messages that are methods, and identifying potentially exploitable
competing for the target audience’s attention, for vulnerabilities;
example, extremist messaging;

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 Box 3. Case Study: Perception Sometimes Equals Reality

In July 2012, some Egyptian newspapers of the giant Buddhist statues at Bamiyan, The story demonstrates that messages
printed a story alleging that the coun- Afghanistan, in 2001 or more recently can resonate strongly if, whether inten-
try’s new president, Mohammed Morsi, the reported demolition of Sufi religious tionally or otherwise, they are capable
was secretly plotting with fellow Muslim sites in Mali by the Islamist militant group of integration into a preexisting “master
Brotherhood members to demolish the Ansar Dine. The level of interest in the narrative” that an audience finds cred-
ancient Egyptian pyramids in Giza and story was surprising given that it was ible. The story draws attention to the
other artifacts of the Pharaonic period. quickly exposed as complete fabrica- importance of strategic communication
The article suggested that the nature of tion by the New York Times and other practitioners understanding preexisting
the Brotherhood’s Islamist ideology would publications. According to an analysis perceptions of an audience and the vari-
compel them to destroy landmarks they by the Center for Strategic Communica- ous frames through which that audience
considered to be taghout (false idols). tion at Arizona State University, the fake may interpret a message. If messages are
story played directly into an existing and designed to interlock with these master
The story was widely disseminated on popular frame, at least for a minority in frames, they will resonate more strongly.
the Internet and found notable trac- the West, that Islamism is a monolithic
tion among some online constituencies movement that represents an existential
in the West, where it received coverage threat to other civilizations.a
reminiscent of the Taliban’s destruction

a
Jeffry R. Halverson, “Narratives Behind the False Pyramid Destruction Story,” ASU Center for Strategic Communication, 25 July 2012,
http://csc.asu.edu/2012/07/25/narratives-behind-the-false-pyramid-destruction-story/.

• equipping public figures in government with an nities targeted by extremist propagators and others focus-
understanding of how to communicate on issues ing on challenging extremist messaging in cyberspace.
relating to extremism by developing narratives
and talking points for use by public officials; In the United Kingdom, the government’s national
• s upporting work by other government agencies counterterrorism strategy CONTEST includes a com-
in communities where efforts are underway to ponent known as Prevent, designed specifically to ad-
counter extremist radicalization and challenge dress the challenge of violent radicalization. Under
extremist recruitment and messaging; and Prevent, authorities have sponsored public events to
• e ngaging in online strategic communication raise awareness of radicalization that can lead to terror-
campaigning directly and in some cases indirectly. ism and of efforts to counter it. Workshops to Raise
Awareness of Prevent (WRAPs) involve showing com-
munity members videos explaining radicalization pro-
cesses. The showings are normally followed by group
Government Use of Strategic Communication discussion of the issues raised in the films. The latest
iteration of WRAP training videos highlights a spec-
Below are specific examples of various UN member trum of violent extremism and avoids focusing on a
states attempting to use strategic communication for single group or ideology.
terrorism prevention. Their efforts have embraced a
wide range of programs, some involving partnerships For example, an important case study used during
with local authorities or volunteers from at-risk commu- the workshops is based on an excerpt from the British

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Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations

feature film This Is England, in which a far-right ex- satire, or religious discourse in order to “annoy, frus-
tremist activist attempts to recruit a number of friends trate, and humiliate denizens of online extremist fo-
to participate in campaigns of intimidation against lo- rums.”27 Shahed Amanullah, a senior technology ad-
cal ethnic minorities. The footage presents the audi- viser to the State Department and Viral Peace’s
ence with a case study on how extremists influence creator, says he wants to use “‘logic, humor, satire,
vulnerable youth. In the context of Prevent, for which [and] religious arguments, not just to confront [ex-
the UK Home Office has been criticized for stigmatiz- tremists], but to undermine and demoralize them.’”28
ing Muslim communities, this is significant precisely The project also showcases the value of public-private
because it focuses on the risks of violent extremist partnerships, where governments can work together
radicalization by the far right. The video conveys an with individuals and groups in the private sector.
implicit message that the Home Office is concerned
about violent extremism in all its forms and that vio- Another example is a series of videos that the CSCC
lent radicalization is a concern for society in general, has produced that draw attention to the widely per-
not just specific communities. ceived irrelevance of al-Qaida to the 2011 democrati-
zation movement in the Middle East. Other initiatives
The United States is one of the few countries to have support local efforts on the ground in priority coun-
an articulated national policy strategy to address vio- tries to exploit the messaging weaknesses of militant
lent extremism, “Empowering Local Partners to Pre- groups, for example, by highlighting that the majority
vent Violent Extremism in the United States,” as well of their victims reside in their own communities.29
as an interagency strategy for public diplomacy and
strategic communication. The State and Defense de- In Saudi Arabia, counterradicalization and deradical-
partments lead on much of the counterterrorism stra- ization programs are premised on the idea that extrem-
tegic communication, but the broader effort engages ists, particularly those with no blood on their hands,
nearly 64 government agencies.25 To address the are mistaken in their interpretation of Islam and that
emerging challenge online, the State Department’s the response needed is one that corrects these ideas. In
Digital Outreach Team conducts overt cyberengage- that country, the Sakina program, which is run by a
ment among online communities in multiple coun- nongovernmental organization (NGO) supported by
tries, to correct rumor and misconception about U.S. the interior, education, and Islamic affairs ministries,
foreign policy or provide factual information to coun- includes an online intervention initiative designed to
ter what extremist groups publish. Indirect programs persuade radically inclined youth to adopt more mod-
take many forms.26 One example is a training program erate views. Trained experts with Sakina not only re-
for citizen bloggers to compete with extremists for in- spond to religious or social queries, but they are also
fluence among contested online constituencies. proactive in challenging online extremist sympathizers
Known as Viral Peace, it primes volunteers to use logic, about their views.30

25
The White House, “Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States,” August 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf; The White House, “National Framework for Strategic Communication,” 2009, http://www.fas.
org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf.
26
DSB task force final report.
27
Spencer Ackerman, “Newest U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Trolling,” Wired, 18 July 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/07/
counterterrorism-trolls/all/.
28
Ibid.
29
CSCC officials, interviews with authors, Washington, D.C., June 2012; CSCC officials, interviews with authors, Brussels, November 2012.
30
See Naef bin Ahmed al-Saud, “The Evolution of Saudi Security and Enforcement Policies on Communication,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 65 (April
2012), http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/jfq-65/JFQ-65_38-43_Al-Saud.pdf; Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Ellie B. Hearne, “Beyond Terrorism:
Deradicalization and Disengagement From Violent Extremism,” International Peace Institute, October 2008, http://www.ipinst.org/media/pdf/
publications/beter.pdf.

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The above strategic communication campaigns occur many participants in violent extremist groups fear for
in communities in the physical and virtual space and their own security or that of their families, should the
have encompassed the written word and audio-visual groups become aware of their desire to leave. A close
media, and in each of these instances, the master nar- understanding of the target demographic helps in the
rative has been set by a national strategy that shapes development of creative communication approaches.
the messaging campaign.
In Germany, for example, Exit Deutschland, an orga-
nization established to assist individuals who wish to
leave right-wing extremist groups, undertook what has
Civil Society Use of Strategic Communication been dubbed the “Trojan T-shirt” project.31 Some 250
T-shirts bearing National Socialist logos and messages
Nongovernmental actors also have made innovative use were distributed at a right-wing extremist rock festival
of strategic communication opportunities to counter and eagerly received. Once the shirts were washed at
violent extremism. For such groups, reaching key target home, the right-wing message disappeared and was
audiences through novel messaging is key, especially as replaced with “If your T-shirt can do it, so can you.

Box 4. Case Study: Inspired? Crafting a Message From the Audience Perspective

The focus of much of al-Qaida’s strategic of violence. These include concerns over preciated the barriers to action because
communication is on turning radicaliza- lack of technical skills, the possibility that he had considered them himself. He knew
tion of an audience into mobilization. the attack will go unrecognized by the wider his audience and their “lived reality,” their
A noteworthy recent example of this al-Qaida movement, or the contentious values, attitudes, and beliefs, concerns,
can be seen in its first official English theological justification for such an attack. and propensity to change behavior if
language publication, Inspire. This presented with an interlocking combina-
full-color online magazine produced by Inspire has attempted to address these tion of the right messages.
al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula first barriers to direct participation compre-
appeared in June 2010. Since then, a hensively through cleverly constructed Although Khan was assassinated along
total of nine issues have been published. packages of content, including interviews with Anwar al-Awlaki in April 2012, Inspire
with al-Qaida leaders, essays, theologi- has offered Islamist extremist supporters
The aim of the magazine is to move its cal tracts, accessible tradecraft tutorials, a potentially effective template for stimu-
readership from the position of passive and poetry. This combination of content lating grassroots jihadist mobilization.a
sympathizers to active participants in al- constitutes a potent cocktail of incitement
Qaida–inspired acts of terrorism on West- to violence greater than the sum of its Inspire is a potentially effective tool for
ern soil. To achieve this, Inspire’s content parts and gives Inspire its motivational mobilization of individuals to extremist
takes aim at a number of key psychologi- potential. The magazine was launched by violence in part because it is designed
cal barriers that might otherwise prevent an al-Qaida sympathizer, Samir Khan, who from the perspective of the audience
readers attempting even the simplest acts grew up in the United States and who ap- rather than the messenger.

a
See Jack Barclay, “Mobilize and Inspire: Assessing AQAP’s English-Language Strategic Communications Capabilities,” IHS Security and Risk
Consulting, March 2012 (copy on file with authors).

31
“Right-Wing Extremists Tricked by Trojan Shirts,” Spiegel Online International, 10 August 2011, http://www.spiegel.de/international/
germany/tee-d-off-right-wing-extremists-tricked-by-trojan-shirts-a-779446.html.

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Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations

We’ll help to free you from right-wing extremism” and and communicates a lasting message. Yet, terrorists in-
included the contact information for Exit Deutsch- trinsically understand that they must master the use of
land. These shirts may not have swayed hard-core be- strategic communication to mobilize their target audi-
lievers, but Exit Deutschland reported nearly triple the ence as well as potential supporters. This is especially
requests for assistance made to their program, and the important as terrorist groups have become increasingly
discussion and publicity generated by the act prompted decentralized and dependent either on national or re-
greater public awareness of their group and mission.32 gional “franchises,” such as AQAP or al-Qaida in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), or self-starters who can act
without the necessity of contact with larger networks
or groups.
Extremist and Terrorist Use of
Strategic Communication Some stark examples of the mobilizing power of al-
Terrorism is itself a form of strategic communication, Qaida messaging can be seen in the cases of individual
a theater of violence in which the primary target audi- sympathizers who, despite lacking substantive connec-
ence lies far beyond the stage or the seats but in a posi- tions to wider extremist networks, nonetheless become
tion to affect sociopolitical changes. The dramatic act sufficiently affected by the movement’s message to at-
of violence pressures an adversary to change behavior tempt terrorist attacks on their own initiative. In the

Box 5. Case Study: Commander’s Intenta

The last decade has seen the develop- travelers, for example, activists on the series of simple master narratives that
ment of al-Qaida from a terrorist vanguard outer edges of the movement. Strategic communicate messages about terrorism
into a global movement, parts of which communication by al-Qaida now occurs and the United Nations that the organiza-
are in some cases connected only by a according to what the military refers as tion would like to disseminate globally, for
shared ideology and a legitimizing narra- commander’s intent; master narratives are example, that terrorism, however defined,
tive. In spite of this, the movement dem- set by the leadership and communicated is a violent crime or that terrorism in all
onstrates a surprising degree of coher- by key media outlets such as As-Sahab its forms is a violation of human rights.
ence in its messaging. This achievement Foundation. Franchises and supporters If these master narratives can be clearly
offers lessons for strategic communication use their local knowledge and the skills at communicated to field missions and
practitioners and national or institutional their immediate disposal to independently other agencies of the UN family, it can be
actors engaged in countering terrorism produce communication campaigns that left to individual entities to develop and
and extremist narratives. appeal specifically to a local audience but deploy their own messaging initiatives that
integrate the master narratives. support these narratives but be more ef-
Within al-Qaida, innovation in strategic fectively nuanced to suit local conditions
communication is increasingly driven How could the United Nations use such and priorities. This approach is decentral-
not by the senior leadership but by its an approach? Strategic communication ized, flexible, and inexpensive and lends
regional franchises and ideological fellow specialists might start by developing a itself to sustainable campaigning.

a
For a definition of “commander’s intent,” see U.S. Department of the Army, “Operations,” FM 3-0 (February 2008), para. 5-30, http://www.fas.org/irp/
doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf (“Commanders summarize their visualization in their initial intent statement. The initial commander’s intent aims to facilitate
planning while focusing the overall operations process. Commanders develop this statement. It succinctly describes the commander’s visualization of
the entire operation listing what the commander wants to accomplish. The initial commander’s intent links the operation’s purpose with the
conditions that define the desired end state. Usually the intent statement evolves as planning progresses and more information becomes available.”)

32
Exit Deutschland officials, discussions with authors, October 2012.

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United Kingdom, for instance, in 2010 a young Mus- tion by local audiences, what is referred to as the “glo-
lim student angered by the British government’s deci- calization” of al-Qaida messaging. To that end,
sion to join the U.S. invasion of Iraq attempted to stab al-Qaida and like-minded groups have been able to
to death Steven Timms, a member of Parliament who leverage opportunities presented by outrage against,
had voted in favor of the war. Timms survived the at- for example, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq; the
tack, and his assailant, Roshonara Choudary, was ar- Danish cartoons perceived as mocking the Prophet
rested and later convicted of attempted murder. Dur- Muhammad; and in the summer of 2012, the Internet
ing questioning by detectives shortly after her arrest, film “Innocence of Muslims,” and to create a narrative
Choudary claimed to have been motivated primarily of a West that is in conflict not with extremists but
by lectures she had found on YouTube featuring the Muslims around the world.
extremist ideologue Anwar al-Awlaki.

Notably, Choudary’s situation appears to have been a

genuine case of so-called autoradicalization, in which What Do Extremists Think of the
there was little if any substantive contact with like-mind- United Nations?
ed extremists and where the primary radicalizing influ-
ence was extremist strategic messaging and discourse. Extremists reportedly view the United Nations as syn-
onymous with the permanent members of the Security
The transnational nature of terrorism makes it crucial Council, particularly the United States. As one inter-
that leaders communicate a master narrative to which viewee noted, extremists view the United Nations, the
all subsequent activities can be linked. Al-Qaida has United States, and the United Kingdom as “basically all
taken strategic communication so seriously that its se- being part of one force—even NATO, it’s seen as all the
nior leadership has increasingly been likened to a me- same to them. Ironically, there’s often confusion among
dia organization that does terrorism, rather than a ter- extremists between the [United Nations] and NATO.”
rorist organization that does media. They have shown
expertise in audience analysis and segmentation, pro- The perception that the United Nations is a puppet of
ducing audience-specific messages and an understand- Western powers, particularly the United States, is prom-
ing of how to create cognitive openings that make an inent in the narratives of al-Qaida and its supporters. For
audience more receptive to their narrative. example, one Islamist extremist activist in the United
Kingdom, discussing the perceived failures of the United
New media and innovative technologies or platforms Nations in the conflict in Syria in 2012, stated that the
permit terrorist groups to project their messages more United Nations “says it supports international human
widely and farther than ever. Groups such as al-Qaida rights—and what is the [United Nations]? It came out of
have ensured that their messages appear in an unadul- the League of Nations, which came from the [United
terated form that maximizes their impact. Along with States]. And we wonder why it’s doing nothing while
the use of sophisticated media postproduction tools Muslims are being massacred in Sham [Levant].”33
and the official branding of content, they aim to proj-
ect an image of source credibility. The effectiveness of This narrative of a world body controlled by the Unit-
al-Qaida’s global strategic communication efforts has ed States and allied Western powers has been cited by
been magnified by the presence of ideologically aligned al-Qaida and its affiliates as justification for attacks on
groups and supporters who have become adept at re- UN field offices since 2001, for example, the 2007 sui-
packaging the group’s master narratives for consump- cide vehicle bomb attack in Algiers by AQIM that

33
“Lessons From Syria Abu Waleed,” YouTube.com, 28 June 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66y8o2t8VwQ.

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Mastering the Narrative: Counterterrorism Strategic Communication and the United Nations

killed 17 UN staff members. In a statement claiming like it to give them some sort of recognition
responsibility, AQIM said the UN offices were “an in- and would lobby in support of any policies they
ternational infidels’ den” and were attacked on behalf think might benefit them. So it’s where you
of the “wounded nation of Islam.”34 start to look at the discourse of the more na-
tionalistic groups that you start to see a differ-
Additionally, some extremists decry the United Na- ence in terms of how they look at the [United
tions’ ability to pass legislation that is binding on all Nations] and its legitimacy.37
states under Chapter VII of its charter and thereby
theoretically impose man-made law on those subscrib-
ing to a theocratic state in which only divine law is
recognized. These views are fueled by resentment re-
garding the composition and opaque working meth-
ods of the Security Council and perceptions that the
permanent members determine the agenda of the
world body.35

These views were underscored by the recent statement

made by al-Zawahiri, the current al-Qaida leader, urg-
ing supporters to use only Sharia (Islamic law) to re-
solve disputes and explicitly directing them to “refuse
judgment by any other principles, beliefs, and laws,”
including the United Nations. The world body, he
said, was controlled by the five permanent members of
its Security Council. Al-Zawahiri called on Muslims
to work to set up a caliphate that “does not recognize
nation-state, national links, or the borders imposed by
the occupiers, but establishes a rightly guided caliph-
ate following in the footsteps” of the Prophet Muham-
mad.36

One expert on terrorist communication pointed out

that some groups, particularly those with nationalist
political agendas,

don’t always harbor positive views about the

[United Nations], but there’s something there
in terms of almost a grudging acceptance of the
role the [United Nations] plays. They don’t rec-
ognize it as an objective force, but they’d still

34
“Al Qaeda Takes Credit for Algerian Attacks,” CBS News and Associated Press, 11 February 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-
3605123.html.
35
Former combatant, interview with authors, New York, September 2012.
36
Sami Aboudi, “Qaeda Chief Rejects Nation States, U.N. as Conflict Mediator,” Reuters, 14 November 2012, http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/11/14/us-qaeda-zawahri-idUSBRE8AD0L920121114.
37
Terrorist communication expert, interview with authors, New York, August 2012.

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