Occasional Paper

ISSUE NO. 406 AUGUST 2023

© 2023 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this
publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.
Decoding India’s Priorities at the SCO:
Connectivity, Counterterrorism,
and Afghanistan

Ayjaz Wani

Abstract
As an emerging power in the current multipolar global order, India can use the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to protect, promote, and project its
geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. The SCO is also a platform for India
to reaffirm its commitment to revive and deepen its centuries-old civilisational,
spiritual, and cultural ties with other member countries. This paper explores
India’s priorities at the SCO, chiefly connectivity, counterterrorism, and
Afghanistan. It also highlights the challenges the SCO faces from the China-
Pakistan axis, and recommends ways in which New Delhi can leverage the
regional multilateral organisation to further its goals.

Attribution: Ayjaz Wani, “Decoding India’s Priorities at the SCO: Connectivity, Counterterrorism,
and Afghanistan,” ORF Occasional Paper No. 406, August 2023, Observer Research Foundation.
 T
he post-Cold War era saw the emergence of several
multilateral forums, including the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO). Initially formed in 1996 as the
‘Shanghai Five’ (by China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz
Republic, Russia, and Tajikistan) for measured collaboration
in Eurasia on regional geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geostrategic
challenges, the grouping was renamed as the SCO in 2001 following the
inclusion of Uzbekistan. In 2005, India, Pakistan, and Iran were granted
observer status, with New India and Islamabad becoming full members
in 2017. Since 2008, the SCO has inducted several countries—Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
Maldives, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Myanmar—
as dialogue partners under Article 14 of its charter.1 Iran became a full
member in 2023, making the SCO the world’s largest regional organisation
with nine member states, spanning 60 percent of Eurasia, home to over
three billion people, and accounting for a quarter of the global economy.
Belarus, Mongolia, and Afghanistan currently have observer status and are
also keen to accept full membership.2

Despite its scope and promise, the SCO is marred by divergences among
Introduction

the member countries on many pressing issues, including narcoterrorism,

connectivity, border disputes, and regional stability. Bilateral friction
between several SCO members has posed challenges for the grouping in
fostering peace, prosperity, and stability in the wider Eurasia region. These
constraints and pressure points have also restrained the SCO from pursuing
its stated mandate of cooperation on regional security, development, and
connectivity.

As an emerging power in the current multipolar global order, India needs

access to various multilateral forums—including the SCO—to pursue its
geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in different geographies. The SCO
provides New Delhi with an opportunity to protect, promote, and project
its geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. It also provides India with a
platform to reaffirm its commitment to revive and deepen its centuries-
old civilisational, spiritual, and cultural ties with the other members of

3
 the grouping.3 India’s engagement with the SCO and other multilateral
platforms must be viewed under the current government’s proactive
foreign policy to preserve India’s strategic space in the rapidly changing
geopolitical and geoeconomic contexts and considerations.4 In September
2022, India assumed the SCO’s rotating presidency and hosted 134 events,
including 14 ministerial-level meetings and the SCO Summit in July 2023.5

This paper analyses India’s engagements with the SCO. It also highlights
the SCO’s challenges and recommends ways New Delhi can work to infuse
cohesion and convergence in the regional multilateral organisation to
achieve its priorities.

Despite its scope and

promise, the SCO is marred
Introduction

by divergences among the

member countries on many
pressing issues, including
narcoterrorism, connectivity,
border disputes, and regional
stability.

4
 T
rade on the ancient Silk Road connected the Eastern
and Western civilisations and was a significant factor in
the development of the Eurasia region.6 In addition to
trade, this 6,400-km transcontinental route7 also enabled
intellectual and cultural exchanges, dating back to the first
century AD when Buddhism spread from India to Central Asia, China, and
Assessing the Priorities

other parts of Eurasia.8 Given its geographical location, Central Asia was
the meeting ground of different civilisations and the hub of socioeconomic
and political activities from ancient times. However, during the twentieth
century, the Anglo-Russian rivalry, and the consequent emergence of
nation-states with differing ideologies, stagnated the region’s relations
with India.9
India and the SCO:

India redesigned its ties with the region after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the formation of the five independent Central Asian
Republics (CARs).10 India adopted a constructivist approach,11 providing
much-needed financial aid of US$10-15 million to the region and
initiating programmes like Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation
through capacity building and training programmes, study tours,
and technology transfers. India inked many bilateral and multilateral
agreements in defence and military technology, security cooperation,
connectivity, and counterterrorism with these countries.12 Indeed, New
Delhi became an SCO member to strengthen cooperation in the areas
of security, economy, and culture within the region and promote its
constructivist strategic interests in the region.13

At the 2017 Astana Summit, where India became a full member, Prime
Minister Narendra Modi defined the country’s priorities based on a shared
culture and the common future of the region. He stressed the need for
better connectivity without violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of the member states.14 He also emphasised cooperation in combating
terrorism, radicalisation, and the fight against illicit narcotics trade,15 as
codified in Article 1 of the SCO Charter since 1998,16 while highlighting
the importance of peace, prosperity, and stability in Afghanistan for the
region.17 At the 2018 Summit, Modi proposed the ‘SECURE’ concept to
make the SCO more connected and safer.18 The acronym SECURE stands
for ‘security of the citizens’, ‘economic development for all’, ‘connecting

5
 the region’, ‘uniting the people’, ‘respect for sovereignty and integrity’,
and ‘environmental protection’. These pillars are central to India’s SCO
membership and have been repeatedly stressed at subsequent meetings
(see Table 1).

Table 1: India’s Priorities at the SCO

Assessing the Priorities

Year Place of meeting India sought cooperation for

• Connectivity without violation of the
sovereignty of member countries
India and the SCO:

Asthana,
2017 • Cooperation and coordination to fight against
Kazakhstan
terrorism, radicalism, and illicit drugs

• Peace and stability in Afghanistan

• Connectivity with respect for sovereignty and
integrity

2018 Qingdao, China • Situation in Afghanistan

• Consequences of terrorism and extremism on

the SCO region
• Respect for sovereignty, regional integrity, and
transparency in connectivity projects
Bishkek, Kyrgyz • Terrorism-free society
2019
Republic
• Road map for Afghan-led, Afghan-owned,
and Afghan-controlled peace process in
Afghanistan
• Connectivity

• Opposition to terrorism, Illegal arms

smuggling, drugs, and money laundering in
2020 Virtual format
compliance with the SCO charter

• Special Working Group on innovation and

startups
• Terrorism, radicalisation, and extremism

Dushanbe, • Trust deficit and Afghanistan

2021 Tajikistan (Hybrid • Emphasis on consultative, transparent
format) connectivity to respect territorial integrity

• Connecting young entrepreneurs and startups

6
 Year Place of meeting India sought cooperation for
• Reliable, resilient, and diversified supply
chains that need better connectivity
Samarkand,
2022 • Full rights to transit
Uzbekistan
• Special Working Group on innovation and
Assessing the Priorities

startups
• Cross border Terrorism.

• Inclusive government in Afghanistan.

2023 New Delhi, India
• Connectivity but respect to sovereignty and
territorial integrity of member countries.
India and the SCO:

Source: India’s Chairmanship of SCO the SCO 2022-2319

Connectivity
Poor connectivity between India and the SCO region is the biggest
hindrance to trade and development. Several connectivity projects initiated
by India and a few other SCO member countries have been marred by
Eurasia’s fractured geopolitical and volatile security situation. Divergent
interests and trust deficit among the SCO members have added to the
region’s volatility, with some countries using the organisation for their
parochial and hegemonic interests. For example, under China’s influence,
Pakistan has stonewalled India’s attempts to pursue its cultural, strategic,
and economic interests20 by not allowing any regional connectivity via its
territory. The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline, which
promises to meet the increased energy demands of a fast-growing Indian
economy, has been stalled since 2006.21 Conversely, China has used the
hostility between Pakistan and India for its hegemonic pursuits in the
SCO region through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, the
construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), BRI’s
flagship programme that aims to build infrastructure projects within
Pakistan with Chinese investments of more than US$62 billion, violates
India’s sovereignty and integrity in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.22

7
 After the Soviet Union’s collapse, China and Russia pursued ‘cooperative
hegemony’ in the newly formed Eurasian countries. Over the past three
decades, China and Russia have spread their sphere of influence in
Eurasia, with Moscow becoming the region’s security provider and Beijing
emerging as its primary investor and economic power.23 However, the BRI
is neither consultative nor transparent, and is being pursued by China
Assessing the Priorities

to achieve its hegemonic interests in Eurasia. All BRI agreements in the

region mandate that recipient countries transfer greater control over the
assets to Beijing if they default on the repayment of loans.24 Such stringent
loan conditions have led many countries, including Tajikistan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Iran, Russia, and Pakistan, into China’s BRI’ debt trap’.
India and the SCO:

On the other hand, New Delhi has pursued a constructivist outreach to

establish direct connectivity to revive its historical cultural and trade ties
with the hydrocarbon-rich and strategic Eurasian region. In September
2002, India, Russia, and Iran agreed to construct the 7,200-km long
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC),25 which includes
sea routes, and road and railway links connecting Saint Petersburg
(Russia) with Mumbai (India). Ratified by 13 countries,a the INSTC
will decrease transit time by 40 percent and freight cost by 30 percent
compared to the Suez Canal route.26 However, work on INSTC stalled due
to harsher sanctions on Iran following the US withdrawal from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2018. The INSTC has made slow and
steady progress amid numerous challenges and setbacks. In July 2022, the
first shipment via this corridor reached Mumbai’s Jawaharlal Nehru Port
from Russia’s Astrakhan Port.27

New Delhi has also invested heavily in Chabahar Port in Iran’s Sistan
Baluchistan province to gain direct connectivity with Eurasia. The
memorandum of understanding for the port was signed in 2015.28 The port
started operations in 2018, and handled 1.8 tonnes of bulk and general
cargo between 2019 and 2021.29 By 2022, the Chabahar terminal handled
4.8 tonnes of bulk cargo, including transshipments from Bangladesh,

a Russia, India, Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic,
Oman, Tajikistan, and Ukraine.

8
 Australia, UAE, Germany, Russia, and Brazil.30 New Delhi also invested
heavily to connect the strategic Chabahar Port with the conflict-marred
Afghanistan, investing an estimated US$3 billion in civic infrastructure,
including the 218-km long Zalrang-Delaram highway. The highway
connects Afghanistan with the Chabahar Port via Malik in Iran.31 Similarly,
Uzbekistan, a double landlocked country,b invested US$500 million in
Assessing the Priorities

constructing a 650-km railway line from the Uzbek-Afghan border to

Chabahar-Zahedan in Iran, and has also repeatedly sought collaboration
with India on this project.32 Furthermore, Uzbekistan established a
trilateral working group with Iran and India in 2020 to examine the
convergence between the Chabahar Port, INSTC, and other connectivity
projects for greater intra-Eurasian connectivity.33
India and the SCO:

India also joined the Ashgabat Agreement in 2018 to facilitate connectivity

within Eurasia and synchronise it with other transport corridors, including
the INSTC, to facilitate regional trade and commerce. Signed in 2011,
the Ashgabat Agreement is currently endorsed by Turkmenistan, Iran,
Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Oman, and India.34 It has paved the way
for the 928-km Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) railway line running
east of the Caspian Sea. The KTI became operational in 2014,35 giving
landlocked Central Asian countries access to Iranian seaports. Kazakhstan
is willing to construct a railway line between Chabahar and the Iranian
railway network that will connect with the KTI line upon completion.36

INSTC and Chabahar are consultive, transparent, economical, reliable,

and based on a strong civilisational connection. As a result, while New
Delhi has promoted the Chahbahar and the INSTC, the SCO countries
have explored bilateral options to be part of these India-led strategic
connectivity projects. For example, in May 2023, Russia and Iran signed
a deal to construct the 162-km long Rasht-Astara railway line37 at an
estimated cost of US$2 billion, which will be a key link to the INSTC.38
Upon completion, it will provide more convenient connectivity between
Gulf and Europe.

b A country that is surrounded by landlocked countries.

9
 Given the immense potential of trade between South Asia and Eurasia,
some SCO member countries, especially the CARs, have also sought to
enhance connectivity with India bilaterally and multilaterally. In 2020,
New Delhi provided a US$1 billion line of credit to Central Asian countries
to develop infrastructure projects39 and even started many infrastructure
projects within the region (for example, Tajikistan’s Dushanbe-Chortut
Assessing the Priorities

highway).40

All SCO countries barring China and Pakistan have generally responded
positively to India’s convergence-based institutionalisation of the
constructive approach based on shared historical and cultural connections.
At the 2021 meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the member states stressed
India and the SCO:

expanding regional transport connectivity,41 concurring with India’s view

that interconnectedness between Central Asia (Eurasia) and South Asia will
contribute to the common goal of prosperity and security and strengthen
the dialogue between civilisations.42

During the first India-Central Asia summit in 2022, it was proposed that
the Chabahar Port and Turkmenistan’s Turkmenbashi Port be included in
the INSTC to facilitate direct trade with India.43 The participating countries
also stressed transparency, focusing on local priorities, and upholding their
sovereignty and territorial integrity.44 In April 2023, India and Central Asia
also formed a joint working group (JWG) on the Chabahar Port, and the
group’s next meeting will be held in Iran with private-sector participation.45
During the meeting, the Managing Director of Indian Ports Global Limited
demonstrated operations and facilities at the Chabahar Port. The JWG
also expressed its commitment to implement international standards for
facilitating large-scale private investments, and noted the port’s role in
delivering humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.46

Counterterrorism and Afghanistan

Peace and security are prerequisites for connectivity, trade, and
socioeconomic development. Since 1991, terror organisations based in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan (AfPak) region—such as the Islamic Movement of

10
 Uzbekistan (IMU), Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and Jamaat Ansarullah—
have repeatedly posed security threats to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
the Kyrgyz Republic,47 given their 2,387-km long porous border with
Afghanistan. Thousands of IMU and IJU fighters in the AfPak region48
have organised more than 19 attacks in Central Asia between 2008 and
2018, killing 138 people. Since the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan
Assessing the Priorities

in August 2021, ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks were sidelined from the group’s
leadership and forced to join the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISKP).49 In
2022, the ISKP and other groups carried out rocket attacks on Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan from their bases in northern Afghanistan.50 In April 2023,
Tajikistan forces killed two terrorists at the volatile Tajik-Afghan border
and seized a huge cache of automatic weapons.51 As such, the presence of
India and the SCO:

terrorists in the AfPak region is a key worry for Central Asian leaders.

China, too, faces separatism and centrifugal tendencies in restive

Xinjiang owing to the socio-cultural mistreatment of Uyghur Muslims
and exploitation of the region’s resources. The ill-treatment of Uyghur
Muslims has made China a target of terror groups such as Tahreek-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), ISKP, and al Qaeda. Since 2021, there has been
an uptick in attacks against Chinese workers in Pakistan and Afghanistan.52

The AfPak region has been a hotbed for terrorism and extremism since
the 1980s, exporting this menace to Eurasia. Terrorism emanating from
AfPak is a concern for all neighbouring countries, given its impact on
regional connectivity, security, and economic development.

The AfPak region has become a cradle of terrorism because of Pakistan’s

state policy that uses terrorism and terror for geostrategic and geopolitical
interests. Indeed, Islamabad has used state-sponsored terrorism against
New Delhi in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 and has supported radical
elements in Eurasia.

Pakistan has also helped the Taliban with recruitment53 and donations for
geostrategic reasons,54 and reportedly sent over 10,000 trained terrorists
to help the group capture power in Afghanistan.55 Islamabad also adopted
a selective policy to support terrorists who helped pursue its anti-India and
anti-Afghan policy to operate freely while cracking down on others like

11
 TTP.56 But the use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool and distortion of
hadith (sayings and traditions attributed to Prophet Mohammad) to propel
terrorism in Eurasia and against India has also had disastrous domestic
consequences in Pakistan. For instance, the TTP has increased its offensive
within Pakistan, killing 433 civilians and security personnel in 250 attacks
between August 2021 to August 2022 alone.57
Assessing the Priorities

This, coupled with the SCO countries’ changing geostrategic and

geopolitical interests, has complicated the grouping’s counterterrorism
potential. For instance, although once opposed to the Taliban government,
Iran and Russia have helped the Taliban since 2019 on the pretext of
countering ISIS affiliates in Afghanistan and allegedly ‘settle scores’ with
India and the SCO:

the US.58

Given Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorism and the presence of other

terror outfits in the AfPak region, the erstwhile Shanghai Five prioritised
the fight against terrorism, extremism, and separatism in 1998,59 codifying
it in Article 1 of the SCO Charter. At the 2001 SCO Summit, the AfPak
region was referred to as the “cradle of terrorism, extremism and
separatism”,60 and strengthening and rebuilding the counterterrorism
grid of SCO member countries based on a non-intervention agenda has
remained the core principle of the organisation. Indeed, since 2001,
the SCO countries have signed several agreements and released joint
communiques against terrorism (see Table 3).

12
 Table 3: SCO counterterrorism
documents
Month-Year Place Declaration/ Joint Communique
Assessing the Priorities

• Shanghai Convention of
June 2001 Shanghai Counterterrorism, Counter-Extremism
and Counter-Secessionism.
June 2002 St. Peterburg • Agreement over Counterterrorism
• Agreement over Counterterrorism
June 2004 Tashkent
India and the SCO:

Database
• Cooperation Guideline of
June 2006 Shanghai Counterterrorism, Counter-Extremism
and Counter-Secessionism, 2007–2009
June 2007 Bishkek • Agreement over military exercise
• Agreement on counter terrorism exercise,
August 2008 Dushanbe cracking down smuggling of weapons,
explosives and ammunition
• Cooperation Guideline of
Counterterrorism, Counter-Extremism
and Counter-Secessionism, 2010–2012;
agreement with Afghanistan over
March 2009 Tashkent Cracking Down Drugs Smuggling,
Terrorism and Organized Crimes.

• Agreement over Counterterrorism

Training
June 2011 Asthana • Asthana Declaration
• Cooperation Guideline of
June 2012 Beijing
Counterterrorism 2013-2015
• Joint Counteraction to International
June 2017 Asthana
Terrorism
June 2019 Bishkek • Bishkek Declaration
November 2020 Moscow • Moscow declaration

13
 Month-Year Place Declaration/ Joint Communique
• Establishment of the SCO
Counterterrorism Centre in Dushanbe as
a separate permanent body.

• Establishment of the SCO Information

Assessing the Priorities

Security Centre.

• Establishment of SCO Centre

against International Organised Crime
in Bishkek.
September 2021 Dushanbe
• Programme of Cooperation of the SCO
Member States in Countering Terrorism,
India and the SCO:

Separatism and Extremism for 2022-

2024.

• Prioritise the Programme of Cooperation

of the SCO Member States in countering
Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism
for 2022-2024.
• Consistent implementation of the
Program of Cooperation of The SCO
2022 Samarkand Member States in Combating Terrorism,
Separatism and Extremism for 2022-
2024.
• Develop common approaches to form
a unified list of terrorist, separatist and
extremist organisations.

2023 New Delhi • Cooperation between competent

authorities in countering terrorism,
separatism and extremism, including
the implementation of the relevant
programme for 2022-2024.

Source: SCO, Ministry of External Affairs, India61

The SCO’s counterterrorism policy was consolidated and institutionalised

through the executive committee of the Regional Anti-Terror Structure
(RATS). RATS works per the SCO charter, and maintains an information-
gathering relationship with member countries and other global

14
 organisations. RATS also train the security forces of SCO member
countries in counterterrorism operations, drills, and search operations.62
Between 2011 to 2015, RATS prevented 20 terror attacks, averted 650
terror-related crimes, destructed 440 terror training camps, arrested
2,700 members of extremist groups and neutralised 1,700 others across
the member countries. The SCO member countries also recovered huge
Assessing the Priorities

hauls of weapons, including 3,250 improvised explosive devices, 450,000

ammunition pieces and 52 tons of explosives.63 Similarly, in 2021, the
organisation successfully thwarted 40 terror attacks and more than 480
terror-related crimes, and blocking 26 global international funding
channels.64
India and the SCO:

India is a strong advocate of convergence on counterterrorism in the SCO

region, and has successfully raised state-sponsored terrorism issues at the
SCO, albeit with limited outcomes against Pakistan-based terror groups.
In 2018, New Delhi successfully garnered SCO support for the draft of
the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).
The CCIT is currently being discussed by the UN’s sixth ad hoc committee
on international terrorism to restrain such organisations from receiving
“support, sustenance and safe haven in another country”.65

The SCO’s working languages are Russian and Mandarin, and the
RATS database on suspected terrorists and terror organisations exposes
the centrality of Russian and Chinese interests. China has successfully
used RATS to stabilise its Western frontier province of Xinjiang. India
considers the RATS an effective mechanism but has expressed concerns
over its opacity because of language barriers. India has pushed for using
English as one of the main SCO languages for better communication on
counterterrorism,66 as terror organisations and terrorists now also use
digital and internet-based strategies for crime and anti-state activities. In
October 2021, New Delhi assumed the SCO-RATS’s directorship for one
year and tried to diversify the group’s counterterrorism agenda by calling
for synergy in RATS’ operations on cyberterrorism, digital forensics, and
ransomware.67

15
 Afghanistan
Afghanistan is central to the Eurasian region’s peace, prosperity, and
socioeconomic development. The SCO created the Afghanistan Contact
Group (ACG) in 2005,c but it became defunct with the escalation of violence
in West Asia and the emergence of more violent terror outfits like ISIS.68
Assessing the Priorities

Afghanistan joined the SCO as an observer in 2012 and signed the protocol
on counterterrorism with RATS in 2015.69 After Moscow changed in policy
towards the Taliban, the ACG was revived in 2017 and started playing a
role in reconciliation and peace through diplomatic channels between the
Taliban and the civilian government in Kabul. However, the trust deficit
India and the SCO:

and mistrust among SCO members helped the Taliban to adopt a more
ruthless approach towards ethnic minorities and women in Afghanistan.
The evolving situation in Afghanistan drove many SCO member countries
to use the country and the Taliban to further their own geostrategic and
geoeconomic interests against the West and each other. This worked in the
Taliban’s favour. For example, before 2021, Russia and Iran helped the
Taliban on the pretext of defeating ISIS affiliates in Afghanistan, but this
was a way to settle scores with the US.70 Without any inclusive government
in place, in February 2023, the Chinese state-owned China National
Petroleum Company (CNPC) struck a multimillion-dollar investment deal
with the Taliban to extract oil from the Amu Darya basin. Under this deal,
the CNPC will invest US$150 million in the first year and US$540 million
in the next three years.71

At the 2021 SCO Heads of State Council, held virtually, Chinese

President Xi Jinping said that the group must “step up coordination,
make full use of platforms such as the SCO-ACG, and facilitate a smooth
transition in Afghanistan”.72 The 2021 Dushanbe Declaration also stressed
the need for an inclusive government in Afghanistan that represents all
religious, ethnic, and political groups.73 However, despite the rhetoric,
the Dushanbe meeting did not have a separate ACG meeting, as internal
disagreements and divergences created by the China-Pakistan axis blunted
efforts to counter the growing security and humanitarian risks of a fragile

c The Afghanistan Contact Group was created to cooperate with the country on issues of mutual
interest, including the circulation of narcotics, organised crime, and counterterrorism.

16
 Afghanistan. Divergent and antagonistic views within the SCO have only
strengthened the presence of the ISKP, al Qaeda, TTP, IMU, and IJU
terrorists in Afghanistan. Additionally, a belligerent Taliban has rescinded
their assurance of forming an inclusive government, ensuring girls’
education, and upholding women’s rights.
Assessing the Priorities

India’s official position even after the Taliban’s return to power has been
for “an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled process for
enduring peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan”.74 Sticking to its neutral
position, New Delhi provided US$650–750 million as humanitarian and
economic aid to Afghanistan before the Taliban took over. New Delhi also
invested US$3 billion for the welfare of the Afghan people and undertaken
India and the SCO:

500 projects in critical areas of power, water supply, road connectivity,

healthcare, education, agriculture and capacity building.75 In the 2023-
24 budget, India also pledged to provide US$25 million in development
aid to Afghanistan, a move welcomed by the Taliban.76 Steady investments
and aid have won India many friends within the Afghan government, and
even the Taliban has recognised India’s constructive and people-friendly
approach, welcoming India’s proposed (in the 2023-24 Budget) US$25
million developmental aid package for Afghanistan.77

In November 2021, India hosted the third regional security summit on

Afghanistan and invited all SCO members, including Iran.78 However,
Pakistan and China did not attend. Islamabad even deplored these
consultations as a “futile attempt” and called New Delhi “a spoiler” that
“cannot be a peacemaker”.79 Instead, Pakistan and China held the ‘Troika
Plus’ talks with the US and Russia on Afghanistan in November 2021.80

17
 T
he SCO is a China-created, China-dominated, and China-
led multilateral forum used by Beijing for its parochial
geostrategic, geoeconomic, and security interests in
Eurasia. Russia wanted India in the SCO to balance China’s
hegemonic dominance and belligerent pursuits. The
Russian media considers India’s presence in the Eurasian region as a
counterbalance to “growing Chinese influence and prevent the southern
part of the [Commonwealth of Independent States] CIS from turning
into a region of undivided domination of Beijing”.81 India’s membership
has lent the SCO a democratic character, since it is otherwise packed with
authoritarian leaders. The SCO has provided India with a platform to
pursue its interests in Eurasia. India has used the SCO to strengthen its
diplomatic ties and intellectual capital, and bring a progressive agenda
Achievements and

on connectivity, counterterrorism, and Afghanistan. On the other hand,

the China-Pakistan axis has always used the SCO against India’s regional
the Way Forward

interests. Consequently, certain SCO priorities related to security and

connectivity are witnessing more collaboration from some member
countries through bilateral arrangements.

Still, India has had many achievements as part of the SCO:

• India became the leader of the INSTC, and stressed the importance
of reliable, consultative, and transparent connectivity projects with
total rights of transit within the SCO region. India used the SCO to
persuade member countries, including the CARs and Russia, to create
multilateral and bilateral working groups on INSTC and Chabahar.
India also got a special waiver from the US’s unilateral sanctions
against Iran and avoided ‘secondary sanctions’, which could have
adversely impacted these projects. The CARs are trying to diversify
their foreign policies to minimise China’s economic and Russia’s
political influence. Given the trade potential with India, Central Asian
leaders have used the SCO platform to deepen their engagement
with New Delhi more openly. The 2022 virtual summit between
Central Asian leaders and India paved the way for the inclusion of
the Chabahar and Turkmenbashi ports into the INSTC. India and
Central Asia also formed a joint working group on the Chabahar Port
to boost regional connectivity and trade.

18
 • India joined the SCO to ensure peace and security in its extended
neighbourhood, and pitched strong mechanisms of counterterrorism
under the SCO-RATS mechanism but has faced opposition from the
China-Pakistan axis. In November 2021, all SCO member countries,
barring China and Pakistan, participated in a regional summit to
discuss Afghanistan. However, despite such limitations, India has
successfully strengthened its ties with the CARs. The Central Asian
leaders skipped the Organisation of Islamic Countries conference on
Afghanistan in December 2021 hosted by Pakistan and instead came
to New Delhi for the Third India-Central Asia Dialogue to discuss
terrorism and the evolving security situation in Afghanistan.

• Divergent and antagonistic views within the SCO have increased

Achievements and

the presence of ISKP, al Qaeda, TTP, IMU, and IJU terrorists in

Afghanistan. These groups have launched repeated attacks in Central
the Way Forward

Asia, Pakistan, and on Chinese projects in the AfPak region. Against

this backdrop, India’s anti-terrorism agenda within the SCO is hailed
by CARs.82 Through the SCO, the CARs have endorsed and supported
India’s position for “an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-
controlled” peace process in Afghanistan. Additionally, agreements on
counterterrorism, security cooperation, and defence between India
and the CARs showcase the deep inroads made by New Delhi through
the SCO.

• India is a fast-growing economy and an emerging pole in the current

multipolar global order. In the changed geopolitical context, India’s
regional security and economic interests have remained forefront of
New Delhi’s SCO membership. India has used the SCO forum to raise
the issue of Chinese ingress and the belligerent approach towards its
neighbours. New Delhi has stressed a “respect for territorial integrity”
under the SCO’s “Shanghai Spirit”.83

Despite these achievements, India needs to use the SCO to push its
priorities, such as connectivity and combating the issues of extremism and
narcoterrorism for peace and prosperity in the northern borders. India
and other member countries need to remind China that the ‘Shanghai
Spirit’ should be the guiding principle for SCO. After independence,

19
 the Central Asian countries also faced border ingress from a belligerent
China and were forced to cede some territories to Beijing.84 Beijing used
the economic and political instability of Central Asian countries to rectify
border treaties with Kazakhstan (1994), the Kyrgyz Republic (1996) and
Tajikistan (2002). However, in 2020, Chinese news websites republished an
article by Chinese journalist-historian Cho Yao Lu stating that the “entire
Pamir region in Tajikistan belonged to China and should be returned”.85
The report further highlighted that after the demise of the Soviet Union,
some territories were handed back to China. Similarly, another article,
titled “Why is Kazakhstan eager to return to China?,” also displayed
China’s assertive hegemonic and imperialistic efforts. The Kazakh foreign
ministry summoned the Chinese ambassador to protest against the article,
and the offending pieces were deleted.86 Indian External Affairs Minister S
Achievements and

Jaishankar also reminded his Chinese counterpart during the SCO foreign
ministers’ meeting in Goa, India, that bilateral ties were “not normal and
the Way Forward

cannot be normal if peace and tranquillity along the border areas are
disturbed”.87

India needs to use the SCO

to push its priorities, such as
connectivity and combating
the issues of extremism and
narcoterrorism for peace and
prosperity in the northern
borders.

20
 C
oncerned by the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the CARs are trying
to reduce their traditional security dependence on Moscow,
which is now increasingly seen as threatening regional
stability, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.88 Given
India’s increased economic and political standing globally,
the CARs are looking towards New Delhi as a reliable partner in the
coming decades. The SCO has provided New Delhi with a platform that
needs to be leveraged to meet its geopolitical and geostrategic goals. In
this regard, India must expedite the INSTC and Chabahar Port projects,
and policymakers must view these investments as a strategic counter to
China’s growing regional influence. India must use the India-Central Asia
Dialogue to jointly develop and strengthen its cooperation with the CARs
and Iran, making it more development and security oriented. India has
already expressed its displeasure against the China-Pakistan axis at the
SCO. Additionally, China has used the RATS mechanism for its vested
security interests in Xinjiang and has driven the platform for its hegemonic
agenda. India needs to work closely with other likeminded members to
make real progress on the SCO’s focus on counterterrorism and a peaceful
Afghanistan.
Conclusion

Ayjaz Wani is a Fellow in ORF’s Strategic Studies programme.

21
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22
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23
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24
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25
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26
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27
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28
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Endnotes

Images used in this paper are from Getty Images/Busà Photography (cover and page 2) and
Getty Images/Otto Stadler (back page).

29
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