VERBAL CITATIONS:

Barbados Cricket Association v Pierce (BB1999 CA 8), 57 WIR 29

Barbados Cricket Association against Pierce, which is reported in Volume 57 of the West
Indian Reports for 1999 at page 29...

Bradley v The Jockey Club [2004] EWHC 2164 (QB)

Bradley against The Jockey Club, reported in 2004 at the England and Wales High Court,
Queen’s Bench Division...

D’Arcy v Australia Olympic Committee 2008 3(1) ANZSLJR 119

D’Arcy against Australia Olympic Committee, which is reported in Volume 3(1) of the
Australia and New Zealand Sports Law Journal Reports for 2008 at page 119...

Hartlepool United FC, Green, Chandler & Buncall v The FA (21 September 2018, FA
Appeal Board)

Hartlepool United Football Club, Green, Chandler and Buncall against The Football
Association, which was a matter of appeals from decisions of a Regulatory Commission of
the Football Association in the Appeal Board, 2018...

Modahl v British Athletics Federation [2002] 1 WLR 1192

Modahl against British Athletics Federation, which is reported in Volume 1 of the Weekly
Law Report for 2002 at page 1192...

Novica Toncev v Football Association of Serbia CAS 2022/A/8694

Novica Toncev against Football Association of Serbia, an Arbitral award heard in the Court of
Arbitration for Sports in 2022, case number 8694...

R (Mullins) v Appeal Board of the Jockey Club [2005] EWHC 2197 (Admin)

Mullins against the Appeal Board of the Jockey Club, reported in 2005 and heard at the
England and Wales High Court in the administrative court, case number 2197...

R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 1 WLR 909

The Crown against the Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, an ex parte hearing
reported in Volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports of 1993 at page 909...

The AG of Trinidad and Tobago v Wayne Kublalsingh and Others Civil Appeal No. P018 of
2014

The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago against Wayne Kublalsingh and Others, a Civil
Appeal of 2014, number P018...

The Fédération Internationale De Football Association v Trinidad and Tobago Football

Association Civil Appeal No. P225 of 2020

The Federation Internationale De Football Association against Trinidad and Tobago Football
Association, a Civil Appeal of 2020, number P225.
CASE FACTS
Barbados Cricket Association v Pierce:
Facts:

A dispute arose over two cricket matches involving the Wanderers Cricket Club, the
Barbados Cricket League (BCL), and Carlton Club, due to the inclusion of an ineligible
player, Dennis Osbourne, in violation of regulation 17 of the 1998 special conditions and
regulations.

 First Match (Oct 4, 1998, vs. BCL): Wanderers won, but BCL protested on Oct 8. The
BCA’s disputes committee dismissed the protest as untimely. However, on appeal, the
BCA later ruled that both teams had breached regulations, awarding no points to
either.

 Second Match (Aug 30, 1998, vs. Carlton): Wanderers won, but Carlton protested on
Nov 10. The disputes committee again ruled the protest was late but still decided that
Wanderers breached regulations, stripping them of points.

Due to these rulings, Wanderers lost all points from both matches and failed to qualify for the
Fire Cup quarter-finals.

Court Proceedings:

On 11 December 1998, Wanderers obtained an injunction preventing Carlton and BCL from
playing in the Fire Cup quarter-finals. They promised to file a formal case by 16 December
1998.

On 16 December, Wanderers sought judicial review and filed a motion on 17 December

requesting:

1. A declaration that the decisions against them were incorrect.

2. Annulling those decisions.

3. Reinstating their lost points.

4. Allowing them to compete in the quarter-finals.

5. Confirmation that they had not breached the rules.

 6. Alternatively, directing the disputes committee or an extraordinary BCA meeting to
review the matter.

7. Extending the injunction.

The court granted permission for judicial review. However, BCA, Carlton, and BCL
challenged the injunction in December 1998 and January 1999, leading to its discharge on 15
March 1999. On the same day, a new order was issued, similar to Wanderers' original request,
which is now the subject of an appeal by BCA, Carlton, and BCL.
Bradley v The Jockey Club:
Facts:

Former steeplechase jockey Graham Bradley sued the Jockey Club for an injunction and
damages over its disciplinary process.

 Background: Bradley was licensed from 1982 to 1999. During a Licensing Committee
meeting, he denied wrongdoing regarding his ties to BBW.

 Breach: Under cross-examination, he admitted to receiving money and gifts in the

1990s for sharing sensitive horse-related information without the knowledge of
owners and yards.

 Outcome: The Jockey Club found him guilty of breaching the Rules of Racing and
disqualified him for eight years.

Court Proceedings:

Graham Bradley appealed his 8-year disqualification, citing bias, unfairness, misapplication
of rules, new evidence, and disproportionate punishment.

 Appeal Outcome: The Appeal Board reduced his disqualification from 8 years to 5
years.

 Legal Action: Bradley then sought to challenge a 1st October 2004 ruling that
dismissed his claim for an injunction and damages.

Key Issues:

1. Was the 5-year disqualification proportionate?

2. Did the Jockey Club’s disqualification order amount to an unjustifiable restraint of

trade?

Decision:

 The Appeal Board acknowledged that the disqualification prevented Bradley from
working as a bloodstock agent.

 The court upheld the 5-year disqualification as a proportionate penalty.

 However, the court ruled that the disqualification order was an unjustifiable restraint
of trade, as it was not reasonable or proportionate in the interests of both parties and
the public.

 Bradley’s appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent (Jockey
Club).
D’Arcy v Australian Olympic Committee
Facts:

 The Appellant signed an agreement with the Australian Olympic Committee (AOC)
for the 2008 Olympics, requiring adherence to ethical behavior rules.

 On 30 March 2008, he elbowed another swimmer, causing serious injury.

 The AOC terminated his team membership on 18 April 2008.

 The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) First Panel found he breached the agreement
but ruled proper termination procedures were not followed, leading to the decision
being set aside.

 The AOC re-terminated his membership on 11 June 2008.

 The Appellant appealed again, arguing the penalty was unfair.

 Court Decision: The appeal was dismissed—his actions brought him into disrepute,
justifying termination.

Court Proceedings and Held:

 The Appeal Panel ruled that its powers were not limited to overturning decisions only
if they were irrational (as per Wednesday unreasonableness).

 The CAS Code allowed for a full rehearing rather than just a limited review.

 The Appellant argued that his termination was unfair, excessive, and did not consider
its impact on him.

 The Panel upheld the termination, agreeing with the AOC’s decision, even after
considering all arguments in the Appellant’s favor.

 His serious misconduct (intoxication and a physical altercation) justified termination,

especially given the potential impact on the Olympic team.

 Extensive media coverage reinforced the disrepute caused.

 Even under the stricter Wednesday test, the AOC’s decision was not irrational.

 Final Decision: Appeal dismissed, termination upheld.

Hartlepool
Facts:

Note: In professional football, a transfer is the action taken whenever a player under contract
moves between clubs. It refers to the transferring of a player's registration from
one association football club to another. In general, the players can only be transferred during
a transfer window and according to the rules set by a governing body.

 The Appeal Board held a hearing on 6 September 2018 at Wembley Stadium.

 The Regulatory Commission (RC) had previously sanctioned the Appellants for
violations related to player transfers in 2016, all of which involved Hartlepool United
FC.

 Players involved in the transfers:

o Padraig Amond from Grimsby Town FC (20 June 2016)

o Nicholas Deverdics from Dover Athletic FC (1 July 2016)

o Lewis Alessandra from Rochdale AFC (1 July 2016)

 Russ Green was the CEO of Hartlepool United FC during these events, and by the
time the RC reviewed the charges, the club had undergone two ownership changes.

 Mr. Chandler was the registered intermediary for the Deverdics transfer, and Mr.
Buncall was for the Alessandra transfer.

 Amond's transfer did not involve a registered intermediary.

 Charges:

o Russ Green, Hartlepool United FC, and the involved intermediaries were
charged with violating Regulations A3 and A6 of the Intermediaries
Regulations.

o Some charges were admitted, while others were denied.

 Regulation A3: Prohibits misrepresentation or concealment of transaction details.

 Regulation A6: Requires that all contracts contain the intermediary’s name, signature,
and registration number, or a statement if no intermediary was involved.
Procedural History:

 The Regulatory Commission (RC) imposed sanctions on Hartlepool United FC and

individuals for breaches in player transfers, including fines and suspensions.

 Hartlepool United FC and the individuals appealed the sanctions, claiming they were
excessive.

 Hartlepool also challenged the finding related to Amond’s transfer.

 Regulatory Legal conceded part of the appeal, agreeing a charge was improperly laid.

 The appeal focused only on whether the sanctions were too excessive.

Held:

Six months suspension was reasonable, looking at the facts of the case and previous cases of
a similar nature.
Modahl:
Facts:

A well-known British athlete was accused of taking a banned drug during an athletics event
in Lisbon. After testing positive, she was suspended by the UK governing body for athletics.
A disciplinary committee found her guilty and banned her for four years. The athlete
appealed, presenting new evidence suggesting bacterial contamination in the samples that
could have affected the results. The appeal panel lifted the ban based on this new information.

The athlete then sued the governing body for breach of contract, claiming damages for
expenses and lost income during her suspension. She argued that the defendant had failed to
ensure an unbiased and fair hearing.

Procedural History:

The court ruled that there was no contract between the athlete and the governing body. It
concluded that the disciplinary committee acted fairly and conscientiously, and even though
there may have been bias from two members, it did not affect the outcome, as the other
members agreed. The court upheld the original decision.

On appeal, Held:

 No express contract existed between the athlete and the governing body, but the court
acknowledged that a contract could be implied based on circumstances.

 The athlete had accepted the rules of the defendant and IAAF over time, suggesting
an implicit contract.

 The court (with Jonathan Parker LJ dissenting) concluded the athlete entered into a
contract by participating in competitions and submitting to doping tests.

 Despite the dissent, the court dismissed the appeal.

 The court found the appeal process fair, with no actual bias in the disciplinary
committee's decision.

 While one committee member showed apparent bias, the overall process was deemed
fair, and the appeal outcome was upheld. Apparent bias did not breach the fair hearing
obligation.
Novica Toncev:
Facts:

 The case involves the Appellant being accused of "unsporting behaviour" under the
FAS Disciplinary Code for entering the referees' dressing room during halftime of a
match between FC Radnik and FC TSC on 24 November 2021. He and his son
questioned the referees' decisions and engaged in a discussion.

 The FAS Disciplinary Committee imposed a nine-month ban on the Appellant, which
was upheld by the FAS Appeals Committee.

 The Appellant is now appealing to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), arguing
that no sanction should have been imposed, or that the sanction should be reduced.
The FAS argues that the original sanction should stand.

Held:

Based on the findings, the Panel concludes:

1. Any procedural issues raised by the Appellant have been addressed through the de
novo proceedings or are dismissed.

2. The nine-month ban on the Appellant's performance of duties is proportionate and

should be upheld.
Mullins v The Jockey Club
Facts:

 The Claimant was informed he needed to attend an enquiry before the Jockey Club's
Disciplinary Committee regarding a morphine finding in the horse Be My Royal.

 The Committee found a breach of Rule 53 and disqualified Be My Royal, awarding

the race win and prize money to Gingembre.

 The Claimant sought a declaration that the disqualification was unlawful, arguing that
a prior case (Aga Khan) was wrongly decided or distinguishable.

Issue:

 Whether the Jockey Club qualifies as a public authority for the purposes of judicial
review under CPR Part 54.

Held:

 The Court of Appeal ruled that the Jockey Club is not a public authority for judicial
review under CPR Part 54.

 The decision to disqualify Be My Royal is not subject to judicial review; the review
of Jockey Club disciplinary decisions falls under private law, not public law.

 The Jockey Club's function in this case was not governmental in nature. Despite its
powers being described as "public" in some respects, they are not governmental.

 The Court clarified that even if the Jockey Club’s functions could be carried out by a
statutory body elsewhere, this does not make them governmental functions in
England.
Aga Khan
Facts:

 The Jockey Club, incorporated by Royal Charter, regulates and organizes national
racing, but its powers and duties are not derived from statute.

 The Jockey Club maintains its authority through licenses and permits, requiring
stakeholders such as racecourse managers, owners, trainers, and jockeys to submit to
its Rules of Racing.

 The applicant, a registered racehorse owner with the Jockey Club, had agreed to
follow the Rules of Racing.

 A filly owned by the applicant failed a urine test and was disqualified by the club's
disciplinary committee under the Rules of Racing.

 The applicant sought to have the committee's decision quashed through an order of
certiorari.

 The Divisional Court dismissed the application, and the applicant appealed.

Issue:

Whether a decision of the disciplinary committee of the Jockey Club was amenable to
judicial review.

Held:

 The Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that the Jockey Club's powers and duties,
despite its dominant role in national racing, were not governmental in nature.

 The Jockey Club's authority arose from private contractual agreements with those
who chose to be bound by the Rules of Racing.

 As the applicant could seek effective relief through private law rights, the disciplinary
committee’s decision was not subject to judicial review.
FIFA
Facts:

This case concerns an appeal by the Fédération Internationale De Football Association (FIFA)
against a decision by the Trinidad and Tobago Football Association (TTFA). The court found
that service of the claim form by way of email was in breach of the Swiss Federal Act on
Private International Law and a breach of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), rendering the
service unlawful and a nullity. As a result, the court set aside the decision of Gobin J in the
substantive claim and granted FIFA's appeal.