UGANDA PENTECOSTAL UNIVERSITY

THE GROTIUS LAW SCHOOL

GROUP 4 MEMBERS

NAME REG.NO. MARKS

MAMBE WYCLIFF

TWINAMATSIKO ROBERT

KYAZZE BASHIR

NAKIMULI SOPHIA
 STATUTORY INTEPRETATION

What is statutory interpretation?

According to1, Statutory interpretation refers to the act or process of interpreting a

statute.

Collectively, they are principles developed by courts for interpreting statutes.

Interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a statute or subsidiary legislation.

Statutory interpretation assumes importance when an act of parliament may be difficult to

understand.

In many cases, there is some ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must be
resolved by the judge.

Alternatively, where specific words in a statute have a particular meaning but they are not
clear, ambiguous or are vague.

Or each word could give different meanings.

Hence, without the statutory interpretation, judges would have trouble in deciding their
judgments in deciding a case.

Principles of statutory interpretation are not any different from ordinary principles of
linguistic communication.

Interpretation may vary and difficulty and the following factors are responsible:

 The draftsman may refrain from using certain words that he or she regards as necessarily
implied. The problem here is that the users may not realize that this is the case.

 The draftsman may use a broad term ("a word or phrase of wide meaning") and leave it to
the user to judge what situations fall within it.

 Ambiguous words may be used.

 There may be unforeseeable developments.

1
Black’s Law Dictionary 9th edition
There are many ways in which the wording may be inadequate. There may be a printing
error, a drafting error or another error.
It is notable that the general methods of statutory interpretation are not themselves regulated
by Parliament, but have been developed by the judges.
The Interpretation Act 1978, which from its title might seem to fulfil such a function, has the
comparatively unambitious aim of providing certain standard definitions of common
provisions, and thereby enables statutes to be drafted more briefly than otherwise would be
the case.
Modern statutes commonly include "definition sections" in which the meaning of words and
phrases found in the statute are explained, either comprehensively (X "means" ABC) or
partially (X "includes" ABC).

Principles governing interpretation and construction:

The meaning of a word is a question of fact while its legal implications is a matter of law.
In other words, a proper construction of a statute is a question of law. Usually a question of
fact is for the trial court while the CA only addresses a question of law.
No court has powers to vary the meaning of words whether in a statute or subsidiary
legislation. Even if a rule or piece of legislation is unjust, courts have no powers to interprete
it otherwise.
Since a particular interpretation would also become binding, it became necessary to introduce
a consistent framework for statutory interpretation.

In the interpretation of statutes, the principle aim of the court must be to carry out the
"Intention of Parliament".

Changing an unjust piece of legislation is for parliament not courts. Words of parliament are
authoritative. It is the meaning attached to these words which is to be determined.

Parliament normally has a broad purpose, which has to be used in guiding interpretation. It is
this purpose, which constitutes the context rule.

Context

Meaning of a word may be in its context. Therefore when reading a statute, it is always
important to read the section with interpretation of its meaning given may be in context

Tools of statutory interpretation

To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory
interpretation, including
traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose.

Courts may apply rules of statutory interpretation both to legislation enacted by the
parliament or subsidiary legislation and regulations.

Common law developed three main rules (plus some minor ones) to assist them in the task.
These are the Mischief Rule, Literal Rule, and the Golden rule.

Presumptions

Statutes may have presumptions which help in interpretation and construction of

statutes; for example

Statutes may be presumed to incorporate certain components, as Parliament is "presumed" to

have intended their inclusion. For example:

Offences defined in criminal statutes are presumed to require mens rea (a guilty intention by
the accused), Sweet v Parsley.

A statute is presumed to make no changes in the common law.

A statute is presumed not to remove an individual's liberty, vested rights, or property.

A statute is presumed not to apply to the state.

A statute is presumed not to apply retrospectively (whereas the common law is

"declaratory", Shaw v DPP).

A statute is to be interpreted so as to uphold international treaties; and any statutory provision

which contravene EC treaties are effectively void, Factortame.

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted ejiusdem generis, so that words are to be
construed in sympathy with their immediate context.

Where legislation and case law are in conflict, there is a presumption that legislation takes
precedence insofar as there is any inconsistency. In the United Kingdom this principle is
known as parliamentary sovereignty; but while Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to
legislate, the courts (mindful of their historic role of having developed the entire system of
common law) retain sole jurisdiction to interpret statutes.

THE RULES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The Literal Rule

The literal rule is the first rule which is the least problematic method in interpretation.
It was popular in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The literal rule followed an increasingly strict view of the words of a statute: if the case
before them was not precisely covered they were not prepared to countenance any alteration
of the statutory language.
One of the leading statements of the literal rule was made by Tindal CJ in the Sussex
Peerage Case (1844) 11 Cl&Fin 85:
"... the only rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed
according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are
in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case,
best declare the intention of the lawgiver."

Under this rule a judge just considers what the legislation actually says by looking at the
plain, ordinary, everyday meaning.
In Brutus v Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297
This was a case of whistle blowing on a sports ground, which whistling was so
irritating to the spectators and the whistler was arrested and charged with insulting
behavior in breach of the peace. The trial court dismissed the charges of appellant’s
behavior being insulting, hence this appeal to the Divisional Court which convicted
the respondent. The case proceeded to the HL and one of the issues was the meaning
of the word “insulting”.

Court used the ordinary meaning of the word as the issue of fact, was whether the
words, behaviors of the appellant were insulting.

The literal rule is further discussed in two other cases:

Whiteley v Chappell (1868) LR 4 QB 147.
What did Lord Esher MR state in R v Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 QB 273?
The literal rule was favoured by the Law Commission for a variety of grounds
It encouraged precision in drafting;
Should any alternative approach be adopted, an alteration of the statutory language could be
seen as a usurpation by non-elected judges of the legislative function of Parliament, and other
statute users would have the difficult task of predicting how doubtful provisions might be
rewritten" by the judges.
The main advantage of the literal rule is that it fits easily in the constitutional principle
without causing any problems.
The judge gives effect to the grammar or the technical meaning of the words; he must also
determine the extent of the general words mean.

Short comings

It may be hard to get the ordinary meaning anymore as illustrated in Whiteley v Chappell
[1868] LR 4 QB 147.

In this case a statute made it an offence “to impersonate any person entitled to vote”. The
defendant used a voting card of a deceased person.

The defendant had pretended to be a person whose name was in the list but was already dead.

The statute only required a person with voting rights to be a living person to be entitled to
vote.

Court used the literal rule and the defendant was acquitted, since a dead person is not, in the
literal meaning of words, ‘entitled to vote'.

The decision discredited the literal rule actually for absurdity in such cases.

Therefore, the literal rule was not a good rule to follow as it provides only one
interpretation.
Besides that, the intention of the legislature would not be shown if the judges would follow
this rule. On the other hand the literal rule was criticized by the Law Commission (1969) on
the ground that:
Judges have tended to excessively emphasize the literal meaning of statutory provisions
without giving due weight to their meaning in wider contexts.

To place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words is to assume an unattainable
perfection in draftsmanship.

It ignores the limitations of language.

Lastly, it leaves little room for the judicial law making.

THE GOLDEN RULE(http://www.iep.utm.edu/goldrule/)

(law of reciprocity (do Ut des= I give so that you will give in return)
A court may depart from the ordinary meaning where that would lead to absurdity. In Grey v
Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61, Lord Wensleydale said:
"... the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some
repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in
which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words
may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and
inconsistency, but no farther."
This became known as "Lord Wensleydale's golden rule".
It only applies where the words are ambiguous. An interpretation that is not absurd is to be
preferred to one that is. An example is R v Allen (1872) LR 1 CCR 367.

Its background

It has a moral value and is based on ethical considerations. It may any of the following:

One should treat others, as one would like others to treat oneself.

One should not treat others in ways that one would not like to be treated.

What you wish upon others, you wish upon yourself

The moral value has religious background is derived from the saying that Do unto others as
you would have them do unto you.

In this rule, absurdity is avoided to give abhorrent result. The golden rule probes the intention
of parliament and helps to closes the lacuna or loopholes in the law.

The rule call for critical and creative thinking and this enable judges to add or change the
meaning of the statutes anytime.

This of course may be in breach of the doctrine ofd SoP. However, it is well known principle
that judges make law under the doctrine of precedent.

They are able to do that in the interest of justice and fairness

This rule would indirectly make the judge to have the role to make the law.

Thus, the separation of power would be avoided in this kind of circumstances.

Lastly, the judges would also able to bring in the subjective case such as the morality and
prejudice.
Before resorting to the golden rule court must be satisfied about the difficulties arising out of
the literal rule.

This rule is only used where the literal rule leads to absurdity, as was the case of Whitely v
Chappell (supra).

The golden rule is used to probe what the statute should have said or meant rather than what
it is actually already stated there.

There are two versions of golden rule.

One which is narrow in meaning; which is only used where there are two apparently
contradictory meaning.

The other versions, is the wider meaning, where it is resorted when there is only one possible
meaning to a provision.
The Law Commission (1969) noted that:
The rule provided no clear means to test the existence of the characteristics of absurdity,
inconsistency or inconvenience, or to measure their quality or extent.

As it seemed that "absurdity" was in practice judged by reference to whether a particular

interpretation was irreconcilable with the general policy of the legislature "the golden rule
turns out to be a less explicit form of the mischief rule".
THE MISCHIEF RULE
The mischief rule is contained in Heydon's Case (1584) 3 Co Rep 7, a land mark decision, in
which the rule was first used for interpretation of statutes.
According to this rule, while interpreting statutes, the problem or mischief that the statute
was designed to remedy should be identified and then a construction that suppresses the
problem and advances the remedy should be adopted.

It was stated in Heyden’s case that judges should:

Consider what the law was before the Act was passed;
Identify what was wrong with the law;
Decide how Parliament intended to improve the law through the statute in question;
Apply that finding to the case before the court. This was a sincere 16th century attempt to
discover the intention of Parliament and to apply it to cases before the courts.

In using the mischief rule court inquires in;

What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?
What remedy Parliament resolved and wanted to cure the disease?
The true reason of the remedy
and then the function of the judge is to make such interpretation as shall suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy.

The importance of the mischief rule

The mischief rule as laid down Heydon's case is known as the most flexible rule and it is
established in the as a "rather more satisfactory approach" than the other two established
rules.

It is used where there is still ambiguity even though the literal rule and golden rule may be
used.

However, this rule goes much further than the golden rule in the sense of the rule goes further
in investigating the position of the statute holistically and allows courts the freedom in the
construction of statutes.

When using the mischief rule court looks into the court's objective and purpose of the statute,
the intention of the legislature rather than depending on the words before them.

The rule allows judges to choose between the different meanings of the statutory language or
infer into the statute a small number of words.

It is therefore a flexible rule, which can be applied in many cases.

The mischief rule was the product of a time when statutes were a minor source of law by
comparison with the common law, when drafting was by no means as exact a process as it is
today and before the supremacy of Parliament was established.
The mischief could often be discerned from the lengthy preamble normally included.

The difference between the rules:

The plain meaning (or literal) rule and the mischief rule, the golden rule is not, in a strict
sense, a compromise between them.

Like the plain meaning rule, the golden rule gives the words of a statute their plain, ordinary
meaning.
However, when this may lead to an irrational result that is unlikely to be the legislatures
intention, the golden rule dictates that a judge can depart from this meaning.
Where a word has more than one meaning, the judge can choose the preferred meaning; but
if the word has only one meaning, but applying such meaning would lead to a bad decision,
the judge can apply a completely different meaning.

The mischief rule aims to interpret statute to what it meant regardless of the wording, by
referring to any previous statutes for the same purpose and by looking at the intention of
parliament for improvements in the law.
In Major and St Mellons RDC v Newport Corporation [1950] AC 189, Lord Denning
had this to say about the mischief rule:
‘We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of
ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the
gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up
to destructive analysis.’ What do you think he meant by this? It
was better to interpret statutes in a way, which carries out
Parliament’s intention than to be so restricted by the exact
wording that this is not achieved. In contrast to Fisher v Bell,
where the purpose of the legislation was to prevent the sale of
offensive weapons was defeated, the courts have been seen on
occasions to go out of their way to enable a statute to work.
However, this rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain
meaning rule, as it can only be used to interpret a statute and, strictly speaking, only when the
statute was passed to remedy a defect in the common law.

The mischief rule was regarded by the Law Commission, which reported on statutory
interpretation in 1969, as a "rather more satisfactory approach" than the other two established
rules.

Purposive Approach
In statutory interpretation, there is purposive approach, which is widely used in interpreting
statutes rather than the literal approach.

The purposive approach rejects strongly on judges’ limitations on searching the meaning of
the literal meaning of the word in the legislation itself.

The approach enables the judges to look beyond the words of statute in search of the reason
of enactment and from there the meaning of the word would be construed on the purpose of
such enactment and as to give it effect.

Legislation may set out the general principle and the fine details would leave to future to fill
in the gap by the judges later on in later cases.
Hence, the purposive approach makes sure that it does not only cover the future but also the
present.

In order for the judges to interpret the statutes accurately, they must understand why the
Parliament passed the statute then from there the judges would be able to determine the
purpose of the enactment of the statute. Hence, the statute would be correctly applied to
achieve what Parliament hoped for.

RULES OF LANGUAGE
There are a number of so-called "rules of language" which "simply refer to the way in which
people speak in certain contexts" (Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation).

EJUSDEM GENERIS
General words following particular ones normally apply only to such persons or things as
are ejusdem generis (of the same genus or class) as the particular ones. For example:
Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse [1899] AC 143.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
This tag refers to the fact that words "derive color from those which surround them" (per
Stamp J. in Bourne v Norwich Crematorium [1967]). For example:
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Frere [1965]AC 402.

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

"Mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all
other members of the class" (Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes). For example:
Tempest v Kilner (1846) 3 CB 249.

INTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

There is a wide range of material that may be considered by a judge both (1) in determining
the primary meaning of the statutory words and (2) where there is ambiguity, in pointing the
way to the interpretation that is to be preferred. Some of these aids may be found within the
statute in question, others are external to the statute. We deal first with "internal aids".

OTHER ENACTING WORDS

An examination of the whole of a statute, or at least those Parts which deal with the subject
matter of the provision to be interpreted, should give some indication of the overall purpose
of the legislation. It may show that a particular interpretation of that provision will lead to
absurdity when taken with another section.

LONG TITLE
It became established in the nineteenth century that the long title could be considered as an
aid to interpretation. The long title should be read as part of the context, "as the plainest of all
the guides to the general objectives of a statute" (per Lord Simon in The Black-Clawson
Case [1975]).

PREAMBLE
When there is a preamble it is generally in its recitals that the mischief to be remedied and
the scope of the Act are described. It is therefore clearly permissible to have recourse to it as
an aid to construing the enacting provisions.

SHORT TITLE
There is some question whether the short title should be used to resolve doubt.

HEADINGS, SIDE-NOTES AND PUNCTUATION

Headings, side-notes and punctuation may be considered as part of the context.

EXTERNAL AIDS TO INTERPRETATION

HISTORICAL SETTING
A judge may consider the historical setting of the provision that is being interpreted.

DICTIONARIES AND OTHER LITERARY SOURCES

Dictionaries are commonly consulted as a guide to the meaning of statutory words.
Textbooks may also be consulted.

PRACTICE
The practice followed in the past may be a guide to interpretation. For example, the practice
of eminent conveyancers where the technical meaning of a word or phrase used in
conveyancing is in issue.

OTHER STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA

Related statutes dealing with the same subject matter as the provision in question may be
considered both as part of the context and to resolve ambiguities. A statute may indeed
provide expressly that it should be read as one with an earlier statute or series of statutes.
 OFFICIAL REPORTS
Legislation may be preceded by a report of a Royal Commission, the Law Commissions or
some other official advisory committee. This kind of material may be considered as evidence
of the pre-existing state of the law and the "mischief" with which the legislation was intended
to deal. However, it has been held that the recommendations contained therein may not be
regarded as evidence of Parliamentary intention as Parliament may not have accepted the
recommendations and acted upon them (The Black-Clawson Case [1975] AC 591).

TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

There is a presumption that Parliament does not legislate in such a way that the UK would be
in breach of its international obligations.

PARLIAMENTARY MATERIALS
It was held by the House of Lords in Davis v Johnson (1979) that a court may not refer to
Parliamentary materials for any purpose whatsoever connected with the interpretation of
statutes. The prohibition covered such materials as reports of debates in the House and in
committee, and the explanatory memoranda attached to Bills. Then in Pepper (Inspector of
Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593, the House of Lords significantly relaxed the general
prohibition.
See Martin, The English Legal System, chapter 3, for the criteria for the rule and criticism.

PRESUMPTIONS
There are various presumptions that may be applied:
(i)Presumption against changes in the common law
(ii) Presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts
(iii) Presumption against interference with vested rights
(iv) Strict construction of penal laws in favor of the citizen
(v) Presumption against retrospective operation
(vi) Presumption that statutes do not affect the Crown
(vii) Others
See Martin, The English Legal System, chapter 3, for examples of the most important
presumptions.

GENERAL APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The rules of statutory interpretation were analyzed by Professor John Willis in his influential
article "Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938). He suggested that:
'a court invokes whichever of the rules produces a result that satisfies its sense of justice in
the case before it. Although the literal rule is the one most frequently referred to in express
terms, the courts treat all three as valid and refer to them as occasion demands, but, naturally
enough, do not assign any reason for choosing one rather than another.'
Thus, on some occasions the literal rule would be preferred to the mischief rule: on others the
reverse would be the case. It was impossible to predict with certainty which approach would
be adopted in a particular case.
Sir Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation (3rd ed, 1995), suggested that the English
approach involves not so much a choice between alternative rules as a progressive analysis in
which the judge first considers the ordinary meaning of the words in the general context of
the statute, a broad view being taken of what constitutes the "context", and then moves to
consider other possibilities where the ordinary meaning leads to an absurd result. This unified
"contextual" approach is supported by dicta in decisions of the House of Lords where general
principles of statutory interpretation have been discussed.
Reference is now frequently made by judges to the concept of "purposive" statutory
construction, i.e. one that will "promote the general legislative purpose underlying the
provisions" (per Lord Denning MR in Notham v London Borough of Barnet [1978] 1 WLR
220). There will be a comparison of readings of the provision in question based on the literal
or grammatical meaning of words with readings based on a purposive approach. In Pepper
(Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593, Lord Browne-Wilkinson referred to "the
purposive approach to construction now adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the
true intentions of the legislature". Lord Griffiths stated:
"The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of
interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts
now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation
and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against
which the legislation was enacted."
However, a purposive interpretation may only be adopted if judges "can find in the statute
read as a whole or in material to which they are permitted by law to refer as aids to
interpretation an expression of Parliament's purpose or policy" (per Lord Scarman in R v
Barnet LBC [1983] 2 AC 309).
The Law Commission (1969) emphasized the importance in interpretation of a provision of
the general legislative purpose underlying it. The Renton Committee on the Preparation of
Legislation (1975) approved this.

CONSTRUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
Refers to the process of interpreting legal documents such as contracts, wills, and deed to
determine their meaning and effect
It is similar to Statutory interpretation but applies to private legal instruments rather than
legislation

Principles of construction

Plain meaning rule; Words should be understood in their natural and ordinary sense
Contra Preferentem rule; If there is ambiguity, the document is interpreted against the party
that drafted it
Harmonious construction; All parts of the document should be read together to avoid
contradiction
Commercial or Business Efficacy; In contracts, terms may be implied to give the agreement
practical meaning and effectiveness

Rules of Construction have been formulated to help courts determine how to interprete both
Statutory law and the terms of contacts between private individuals
For example;
In Raffles vs Wilchelhouse, An English merchant contracted to sell a shipment of cotton
arriving on a ship called ‘’The Peerless Bombay’’ but unknown to the parties that there were
two parties with same names where one ship was going to leave in October in the defendant’s
thought and the other in December in the applicant’s thought.
It was held that the contracts between the parties was not enforceable because there was
ambiguity in Peerless ant therefore the court will examine and interprete the contract
according to certain rules of construction. So the court can facilitate the wishes