INTRODUCTION

The word ‘proprietary’ is an adjectival term relating to Property and ownership of Property.
PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
Proprietary Estoppel is a legal claim and doctrine, which may arise in relation to rights to use the
Property of the Owner, and may even be effective in connection with disputed transfer of
ownership.
It is one of the four (4) principal mechanisms to acquire rights over Property, seen particularly in
the case of land, the others being; a contract, an implied trust and adverse possession.
Unlike a contract or gift which depend on consent, or resulting and constructive trusts that
depend primarily on the fact of contribution: a proprietary estoppel arises when a person has
been given a clear assurance, and it was reasonable of them to rely on the assurance, and they
have acted to their detriment.
Essentially, proprietary estoppel transfers rights if:
1. Someone is given a clear assurance that they will acquire right over Property,
2. They reasonably rely on the assurance,
3. They act substantially to their detriment on the strength of the assurance, and
4. It would be unconscionable to go back on the assurance.
If these elements of assurance, reliance, detriment and unconscionability are present, the remedy
will surface; that the Property be transferred to the claimant if the court views the reliance to
warrant a claim in all circumstances.
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
Proprietary Estoppel prevents someone from relying on certain facts or rights which are different
to earlier ones asserted – to the detriment of someone else.
It arises where A incurs expenditure (e.g. by building on land), or otherwise prejudices himself,
in the belief, actively or passively encouraged by the true owner, that he (A) had (or would
obtain) a sufficient interest in the property to justify such expenditure.
The law says; such is unconscionable behavior – lacking principles of natural justice, equity and
good conscience.
The classic exposition of proprietary estoppel, which has been cited in whole or in part in several
Nigerian judgements1, is that of Lord Cranworth in RAMSDEN v. DYSON. It is stated thus:
“If a stranger begins to build on my land supposing it to be his own, and I, perceiving his
mistake, abstain from setting him right, and leave him to persevere in his error, a court of Equity

1
E.g. Owodunmi v. George (1967) 1 All N.L.4 177; Morayo v. Okiade (1942) 8 W.A.C.A. 46.
will not allow me afterwards to assert my title to the land in which he had expended money on
the supposition that the land was his own. It considers that, when I saw the mistake into which
he had fallen, it was my duty to be active and to state my adverse title; and that it would be
dishonest in me to remain willfully passive on such an occasion, in order afterwards to profit by
the mistake which I might have prevented.
But it will be observed that to raise such an equity, two things are required: first, that the person
expending the money supposed himself to be building on his own land; and secondly, that the
real owner at the time of the expenditure knows that the land belongs to him and not to the
person expending the money in the belief that he is the owner.
For if a stranger builds on my land knowing it to be mine, there is no principle of Equity which
would prevent my claiming the land with the benefit of all the expenditure made on it.
There would be nothing in my conduct making it inequitable in me to assert my legal rights”.
In summary, the following conditions must be present before a proprietary estoppel can be
raised:
(I) A must have expended money or otherwise prejudiced himself;
(II) He must have believed either that he already owned an interest in the property
sufficient to justify the expenditure, or that he would obtain such interest in the future;
(III) The owner must have been aware that A was incurring the expenditure in this
mistaken belief but nevertheless stood by without enlightening A.

APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN RECENT NIGERIAN CASES

In ANAGHARA v. ANAGHARA & ORS. (202) EWHC 3091; the late Chief Ferdinand
Anyaoha Anaghara, had three wives: Grace (referred to as the “statutory wife in Nigeria) and
Alice and Benedith (referred to as “customary wives”).
The claimant is the son of the late Chief Ferdinand Anaghara and Benedith, who sought
possession of a property in Golders Green, London, known as the “property” – purchased in
1976 as an investment for the chief and his family’s use in London – and his family’s use in
London.
The Chief made representations to Alice, that the property was “her house”, but these were not
clear and unambiguous to establish a common intention for a beneficial interest.
Alice paid for a replacement boiler in 2016 and contributed towards renovations, claiming
reliance on the late Chief’s representations to her.
The trial Judge found no countervailing benefit in Alice’s rent-free occupation of the property.
Issues:
 (1) Whether Alice suffered detriment on reliance of the Chief’s representation.
(2) Whether the trial Judge erred in finding no countervailing benefit in Alice’s occupation.
(3) Whether the Judge properly exercised discretion in awarding a life interest in the property
to Alice.
Reasoning:
(1) The representations made by the late Chief to Alice were not sufficiently precise to
establish a common intention for a beneficial interest in the property.
(2) Alice’s occupation of the property was in consequence of her status as the deceased wife
and not in consequence of any representation made to her( unlike the claimant in this
case).
(3) It followed from the foregoing that such a wife’s expectation that she might continue to
occupy the property was not unclear, extravagant or out of proportion to her detriment.
(4) The trial Judge correctly found that Alice did not suffer sufficient detriment in the
renovations paid for by third parties.
(5) The Judge’s decision to award a life interest to Alice was based on satisfying Equity, not
her expectations.
(6) The Judge’s refusal to consider Alice’s occupation as a counter ailing benefit was not an
error of law.
Holding:
The Court upheld the decision of the trial Judge finding no errors in law or discretion. Alice’s
appeal is dismissed.
In AFOLABI v. ADEKUNLE (2003) 10 NWLR (Pt. 828) 225:
The Court of Appeal held that proprietary estoppel can be used to enforce a promise or
representation in relation to an interest in land, even if the promise or representation was not
made in writing.
Also, in OGUNDIPE v. OLADELE (2007) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1057) 66: The Court of Appeal
confirmed that proprietary estoppel requires a clear and unambiguous representation, and that the
representee must have relied on the representation to their detriment.
Again, in AKINTOLA v. OLUWO (2010) 18 NWLR (Pt. 1224) 289:The Supreme Court
established that proprietary estoppel can be used to enforce a promise or representation in
relation to an interest in land, even if the promise or representation was made orally.

In addition, UDEZE v. CHUKWU (2012) 17 NWLR (Pt. 1328) 167: The Court of Appeal
applied the principles of proprietary estoppel to a dispute over a family property, where a son had
relied on his father’s promise to leave him the property.
Furthermore, in EZE v. EZE (2015) 15 NWLR (Pt. 1481) 124;
The Supreme Court confirmed that proprietary estoppel requires a clear and unambiguous
representation, and that the representee must have relied on the representation to their detriment.
Lastly, OGUNSANYA v. OGUNSANYA (2017) 16 NWLR (Pt. 1591) 247; The Court of
Appeal applied the principles of proprietary estoppel to a dispute over a family property, where a
daughter had relied on her father’s promise to leave her the property.
These cases demonstrate the application of proprietary estoppel in Nigerian law and highlight the
importance of clear and unambiguous representations, reliance, and detriment in establishing a
claim of proprietary estoppel.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPRIETARY AND PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Proprietary estoppel is different from promissory estoppel in that:
(a) proprietary estoppel is normally brought about by the conduct (especially acquiescence)
of the person estopped, and not usually by an express promise on his part;
(b) whereas a promissory estoppel is merely temporary, proprietary estoppel may be
permanent in effect;
(c) unlike promissory estoppel, proprietary estoppel can be raised not only as a defense but
also to confer a right of action;
(d) promissory estoppel is concerned with contracts, whilst proprietary estoppel is generally
concerned with rights over land.
ENFORCEMENT OF PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
Proprietary estoppel, as stated above, differs from promissory estoppel and estoppel at
Common Law in that it’s effect is to confer substantive rights on the person in whose favor
the equity is raised.
The nature of the right so acquired varies according to the circumstances of the particular
case, for “it is for the court in each case to decide in what way the Equity can be satisfied”. 2
In a recent supreme court decision,
THE RELIEFS AVAILABLE
The following examples show the wide variety of relief which the court may grant in cases
where a person has expended money on the property of another:
1.

2
Per Lord Denning, M.R. in E.R. Ives (Investment) LTD. V. High (1967) 2 Q.B. 379, at p. 395.